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If we shadows have offended,
Think but this, and all is mended,
That you have but slumb'red here
While these visions did appear.
And this weak and idle theme,
No more yielding but a dream,
Gentles, do not reprehend.
Puck, Act V, Scene I, 11. 423-29,
A Midsummer Night's Dream
I. PREFACE
The United States derives its basic authority to regulate the
field of immigration from sources found within the Constitu-
tion,' statutes passed by Congress,' in some instances from the
1. The general power to regulate immigration has been granted Congress by article I,
§ 8, cl. 4 of the Constitution, which empowers the legislature "[t]o establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization." There are other clauses which authorize powers permitting the
regulation of immigration in either direct or peripheral fashion. For example, article II, §
2, cl. 1 provides that "[tihe President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and the
Navy." To the extent this authorization allows the President to play a decisive role in
the conduct of foreign affairs, significant repercussions on the ability to regulate immi-
gration naturally follow. Article II, § 2, cl. 2 provides that the President "shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided
two-thirds of the Senators present concur." Additionally, in the same clause, the Presi-
dent is empowered to appoint ambassadors with the consent of the Senate.
The Constitution confers powers upon the Congress that allow that body to regulate
immigration directly or indirectly. Several clauses in the enumeration of congressional
powers in article I, § 8 authorize Congress to raise and support the armed forces. This
authorization affects the conduct of foreign affairs, and indirectly, the development of
immigration law. See, e.g., art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 11, 12, 13, 14, & 15. Congress is also author-
ized "[tlo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations" in article I, § 8, cl. 10.
The prohibition against suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, except in times of
rebellion or invasion, in article I, § 9, cl. 2, allows individuals to contest government
abuses of the immigration powers. Debate has never died over which guarantees of the
Bill of Rights, as well as the other amendments, apply to aliens, nor at what point the
guarantees take hold during the development of the relationship between the alien and
the United States.
Other provisions in the Constitution make citizenship a requirement for election to
high public office. See art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (seven years of citizenship to be a member of the
House of Representatives); art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (nine years of citizenship to be a Senator); art.
II, § 1, cl. 5 (natural born citizen in order to be President). Section 1 of the fourteenth
amendment defines as citizens "[aill persons born or naturalized in the United States
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof." Various clauses elsewhere in the Constitution
refer either to citizens or to persons. The Constitution's treatment of slavery also defined
who was eligible and who was ineligible to partake in the blessings of liberty in the
United States. See, e.g., Scott v. Sanford (The Dred Scott Decision), 60 U.S. (19 How.)
common law, 3 from executive orders and proclamations," from
treaties with foreign nations," and from international law." Occa-
sionally, laws created by the individual states indirectly affect
immigration issues.7The United States Supreme Court has frequently decided
controversies arising between the interplay of these various
sources of authority. Many of the Court's opinions rest strictly
on a determination of constitutional issues. In a field so heavily
regulated by Congress, however, an overwhelming number of
Supreme Court opinions rest primarily upon statutory
interpretation.
The statutory formats regulating immigration have changed
tremendously over time. The older Supreme Court opinions in-
terpreting these statutes possess a continued vitality in the life
of modern immigration law because they loosely define expan-
sive parameters within which the executive and congressional
branches must operate. The boundaries the Court has drawn are
admittedly broad, allowing Congress and the executive to func-
tion with relative freedom. By defining these boundaries, how-
ever, the Court has also suggested that lines exist, even within
the context of immigration law, beyond which the powers of the
other two branches cannot tread.
The Supreme Court opinions analyzing vintage congres-
sional enactments also provide a means of understanding
393 (1856). This brief listing of constitutional clauses affecting the broad field of immi-
gration is by no means exhaustive.
2. The two most widely known statutes in the field are the recently passed Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, and the
general framework for the entire subject, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(INA), 66 Stat. 163, which has been amended a number of times. Additional primary
sources of authority include, but are not limited to, the rules and regulations issued by
the applicable federal agencies, such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), as well as other lesser rules of everyday operation, such as the Operations Instruc-
tion of the INS. These instructions are reproduced in 4 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE (1987).
3. See, e.g., notes 965, 1157-1175 infra and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 239-72 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., infra notes 21-40, passim (treaties with China), note 838 (Jay Treaty of
1794 with Great Britain), 843 (agreement with Mexico of 1942), note 962 (Treaty with
Japan of 1911), note 966 (various treaty arrangements), and note 1069 (NATO).
6. See, e.g., infra notes 345-71 (Helsinki Final Act), and note 393 (Geneva Conven-
tion, and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees), and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 852-878, 961-1104 and accompanying text.
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majoritarian reaction to immigration problems of the past. The
Court's decisions help illuminate the history of government so-
cial policy as it has responded to influxes of foreigners into the
United States. By studying these opinions, one may evaluate
firsthand the efficacy, as well as the humanity, of responses to
problems that still exist today. Additionally, one may directly
examine statutory remedies which may have been worse than
the problems they sought to cure. The history of the relationship
between the Supreme Court and Congress on this subject is one
of variations on a theme, where, one hopes, less than perfect
statutory solutions have been discarded to make room for more
promising ideas.
In studying any modern legal problem it is helpful to con-
sider solutions that have been tried in the past. By studying the
line of Supreme Court opinions one is struck by the many statu-
tory schemes that have been implemented. The ingenuity of
Congress has not always been generous, and it is well to keep in
mind the extremes of the past to avoid unnecessary hardship in
the future.
During the tenure of Chief Justice Burger,8 the Supreme
Court delivered a number of opinions concerning immigration is-
sues which covered a large amount of legal terrain. These opin-
ions considered a panoply of topics broad enough to affect every
individual in the United States. The Burger Court rendered de-
cisions involving the rights of foreigners to asylum and refuge
within the United States.9 The Court considered procedural pro-
tections for individuals in a host of legal categories created by
the general immigration statutes.10 The Court entertained en-
treaties by individuals seeking to avoid forced removal from the
United States and scrutinized government power to effect such
removal." The Court defined the nexus between the fourth
amendment and general immigration law with repercussions af-
fecting every person in the United States. 2 The permissible ex-
8. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger was appointed to the Court in 1969. See 395 U.S.
xv-xvii, and 396 U.S. iii. His successor, Chief Justice Rehnquist, was appointed in 1986.
See 107 S.Ct. xl.
9. See infra notes 399-421 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 422-581 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 582-658 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 659-826 and accompanying text.
574 [Vol. IV
NOTE
tent of federal and state regulation of the right to earn a living
was treated by the Court in a line of decisions.13 The Court fur-
ther defined the effect immigration law has on the individual
right to enjoy all of the benefits which life in the United States
customarily affords.14 The Court allowed for limitations on the
applicability of doctrine that would otherwise make immigration
litigation in court more cumbersome for the government." Fi-
nally, the Court further developed its jurisprudence on the right
to be a citizen and the power of the government to diminish that
right."6 A summation of these opinions follows, accompanied
with a treatment of as much of the historical precedents as time
and space have permitted.
II. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION ON THE POWER TO EXCLUDE
ALIENS
During the nineteenth century, special legislation was en-
acted, known as the Chinese Exclusion Laws,17 which discrimi-
nated specifically against one racial group-the Chinese. The
following sections show that to a large extent, the basis for such
discrimination rested upon reciprocal provisions in treaties be-
tween China and the United States. The westward expansion of
the United States in the nineteenth century and the influx of
immigrants from Europe illustrate that absent comparable
agreements with foreign nations, the United States did not claim
authority to apply similar entry restrictions against individuals
from other countries. The Supreme Court did not always accept
efforts by Congress and the executive to exceed the scope of
these treaties unless there were compelling reasons such as legit-
13. See infra notes 827-1063 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 1064-1128 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 1129-56 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 1157-1353 and accompanying text.
17. The Chinese Exclusion Laws include the Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58
(prohibiting Chinese laborers), as amended by Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115
(affecting Chinese laborers); Act of Sept. 13, 1888, ch. 1015, § 3 (addressing members of
the Chinese race); Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064 (laborers), 25 Stat. 476, 504; Act of May
5, 1892, ch. 60 (persons of Chinese descent), 27 Stat. 25; Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301
(Chinese persons unlawfully in the United States), 28 Stat. 390; Act of Apr. 29, 1902, ch.
641, 32 Stat. 176, amended and reenacted by Act of Apr. 27, 1904, ch. 1630, 33 Stat. 394;
Act of Nov. 3, 1893, ch. 14, 28 Stat. 7, amending Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25.
The Chinese Exclusion Laws were finally repealed by the Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch.
344, § 1, 57 Stat. 600.
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imate invocation of government war powers.
A. Treatment of the Chinese in the Nineteenth Century
The Chinese Exclusion Laws afforded some procedural pro-
tections to certain Chinese which were not granted other aliens.
These instances are few, but examples do exist, particularly in
the cases that are described below. There were at least some
Chinese who were statutorily entitled to a district court trial
before deportation to which other aliens were not entitled.18 Dif-
ferent types of Chinese aliens were granted some minimal sub-
stantive rights, although there apparently were, for the least
protected Chinese, few guaranteed rights indeed. 19
A revision of the Chinese Exclusion Laws shows that there
were limits and restrictions on the powers which Congress and
the executive exercised over the Chinese. The tendency of mod-
ern courts to cite the Chinese Exclusion Laws as an example of
Congress and the President exercising a completely plenary sov-
ereign power is not completely supported by the line of cases
and the statutes from that time. This is an important point be-
cause starting with cases such as United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy,2" and following through to the present day, the
most sweeping and indiscriminate exercise of power against
aliens has been frequently justified by the presumed precedent
of the Chinese Exclusion Laws. A closer look at these laws will
reveal that they are not completely the precedent for which they
are cited.
1. Development of the Chinese Exclusion Laws
The Treaty of Peace, Amity, and Commerce, between the
United States and China of 18581 placed United States citizens
in China in a comparable legal position as Chinese subjects
18. See notes 109-10 and accompanying text, text at notes 73-76, and notes 172-202
with accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., notes 119-222 infra and accompanying text.
20. 338 U.S. 537 (1950). See infra notes 226-323 and accompanying text.
21. Concluded at Tientsin, June 18, 1858; ratified by the United States, Dec. 21,
1858, and proclaimed by President James Buchanan, Jan. 26, 1860, 12 Stat. 1023. Treaty
relations between the United States and China were first concluded on July 3, 1844, 8
Stat. 592. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case) 130 U.S.
581, 590, discussed at text accompanying note 58 infra.
[Vol. IV
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themselves enjoyed.2" United States citizens in China were not,
however, on an equal footing with subjects of China since the
Treaty also provided that United States citizens remained sub-
ject to the laws of the United States.23 Additionally, the Treaty
did not allow for unrestricted movement inside China;2 4 it al-
lowed United States citizens to visit only a handful of Chinese
ports and cities.25
Additional articles to the Treaty of 1858 were signed in
Washington, in the summer of 1868 and became known as the
Burlingame Treaty.26 These articles described the presence of
United States citizens in China as a privilege that would be tol-
erated only at certain locations.27 To the extent that the rights
of United States citizens were not specifically provided for by
treaty, the articles subjected them to the authority of the Chi-
22. Art. XI, 12 Stat. 1024. The provision stated:
All citizens of the United States of America in China, peaceably attending
to their affairs, being placed on a common footing of amity and good will with
subjects of China, shall receive and enjoy for themselves and everything apper-
taining to them the protection of the local authorities of government, who shall
defend them from all insult or injury of any sort.
Id. at 1025.
23. Art. XI, 12 Stat. 1024, provided:
citizens of the United States, either on shore or in any merchant vessel, who may
insult, trouble, or wound the persons or injure the property of Chinese, or com-
mit any other improper act in China, shall be punished only by the consul or
other public functionary thereto authorized, according to the laws of the United
States.
Id. at 1025.
24. Art. XII, 12 Stat. 1024, 26 provided:
At the places where the ships of the United States anchor, or their citizens re-
side, the merchants, seaman, or others can freely pass and repass in the immedi-
ate neighborhood; but, in order to the preservation of the public peace, they
shall not go into the country to the villages and marts to sell their goods unlaw-
fully, in fraud of the revenue.
Similarly, the Act of Sept. 13, 1888, ch. 1015, 25 Stat. 476 permitted entry of certain
categories of Chinese into the United States only at the ports of San Francisco, Portland,
Oregon, Boston, New York, New Orleans, Port Townsend, or such other ports as the
Secretary of the Treasury designated. 25 Stat. at 478, § 7. This Act was to take effect
pending ratification of a treaty with China in 1888 which never occurred. See Li Sing v.
United States, 180 U.S. 486 (1901), and discussion of this case in text accompanying note
106 infra.
25. Art. XIV of the Treaty, 12 Stat. at 1026.
26. Treaty with China, July 28, 1868, 16 Stat. 739, proclaimed by President Grant.
See also T.A. ALIENIKOFF AND D.A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 3 n.3
(1985).
27. Art. 1, 16 Stat. 739.
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nese government.28 This placed United States citizens within the
boundaries of domestic Chinese law. The rights United States
citizens enjoyed in China at the time of these agreements, how-
ever, were subject to discretionary action by the Chinese author-
ities.29 China was under no obligation to treat United States citi-
zens in the same manner as it treated its own subjects.
Under the Burlingame Treaty, United States citizens in
China and Chinese subjects in the United States were granted
reciprocal rights of freedom from religious persecution, "liberty
of conscience," and other basic rights.30 The 1868 agreement rec-
ognized an "inherent and inalienable right" of subjects of both
nations to move freely between the two countries. 3 1 Chinese sub-
jects were extended a reciprocal right to travel and to maintain a
residence in the United States as was similarly enjoyed by
United States citizens in China. 2 China and the United States
agreed to accord each other's subjects the same status as they
accorded subjects of the "most favored nation."3 3 A reciprocal
restriction was placed on the right of Chinese subjects to be nat-
uralized into the United States. 4 Visitors from each country
were also granted a reciprocal right of access to public
education.3 5
By November 17, 1880, the United States concluded an
agreement with China, later ratified in 1881, that allowed the
United States to prohibit new Chinese laborers from entering
the country. 6 This signalled a fundamental change in the way
Chinese were treated under United States law. The Treaty did
not affect Chinese subjects in the United States who were either
28. Art. II, 16 Stat. 739-40.
29. Id.
30. Art. IV, 16 Stat. 740.
31. Art. V, 16 Stat. 740, provided:
The United States of America and the Emperor of China cordially recognize
the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and
also the mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration of their citizens
and subjects, respectively, from the one country to the other, for purposes of
curiosity, or trade, or as permanent residents.
32. Id. at art. VI.
33. See art. IV, 16 Stat. 740. Under the terms of the Treaty, the "most favored"
nations were Great Britain and Russia. Art. III, 16 Stat. at 740.
34. Id. at art. VI.
35. Id. at art. VII.
36. 22 Stat. 826 (proclaimed by President Chester A. Arthur).
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"teachers, students, merchants," or merely "curious[]";" nor did
it affect Chinese laborers who were in the United States on the
date of the conclusion of the Treaty."' Chinese laborers in the
United States before 1880 were to be protected as citizens of the
most favored nation. 9 The terms of this Treaty awaited statu-
tory enactment.40
In the case of Chew Heong v. United States,41 a Chinese
subject and laborer had been residing in the United States on
November 17, 1880 when the Treaty restrictions on Chinese im-
migration were concluded. In 1881, he left the United States
and remained in the Hawaiian Kingdom until 1884 when his at-
tempted reentry into the United States was denied.4 3 During his
absence, two statutes were passed implementing the restrictions
of the 1881 Treaty." The Chinese Restriction Act of 1882 barred
the entry of Chinese laborers into the United States for 10 years
and provided that any Chinese laborer who entered the United
States would be present unlawfully. 5 The Act made a special
allowance for Chinese laborers who were in the United States
before November 17, 1880 by creating an identification certifi-
cate that was to be issued to Chinese laborers when leaving the
country in order to permit their return. 6 It was impossible for
Chew Heong, departing from the United States before the pas-
sage of the Chinese Restriction Act, to leave in possession of one
37. Art. II, 22 Stat. at 827. This language constituted a typical exception to the gen-
eral ban against the Chinese presence in the United States. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 13,
1888, ch. 1015, § 2, 25 Stat. 476.
38. Art. II, 22 Stat. at 827.
39. Arts. II & III, 22 Stat. at 827.
40. Id. at Art. IV.
41. 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
42. Id. at 538.
43. Id.
44. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, amended by Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220,
23 Stat. 115 [hereinafter Chinese Restriction Act] (continuing the ban against Chinese
laborers for a ten-year period). The restrictions were directed against all Chinese, regard-
less of which country they were subjects. Act of July 5, 1884, § 15, 23 Stat. at 118. The
amendment also introduced a maximum one year of imprisonment for violating its provi-
sions. Id. at § 16, 23 Stat. at 118. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896),
discussed infra at text accompanying note 101. The Acts of 1882 and 1884 are collec-
tively referred to as the Chinese Restriction Act in the note contained in Chew Heong v.
United States, 112 U.S. at 543.
45. Act of May 6, 1882, 22 Stat. 58 (first section).




In Chew Heong, the Supreme Court limited Congress' abil-
ity to abrogate the 1881 Treaty with China. The Court rejected
the argument that the Chinese Restriction Act had repealed the
Treaty by implication. In allowing Chew Heong to return to the
United States without a certificate, the Court restricted the
power of Congress to decide who may enter the United States.
The effect of this ruling was complemented, at the level of
state power over aliens, by the result in Yick Wo v. Hopkins 7 in
which the Court restricted the power of local governments to
regulate the conduct of foreigners within their borders. The
Court ruled that under the fourteenth amendment all persons
within the jurisdiction of any state are guaranteed equal protec-
tion and equal application of the laws. Selective enforcement of
state laws in a manner designed to promote hostility toward
aliens on the basis of their race or nationality was expressly
disallowed.48
In Edye v. Robinson (The Head Money Cases),'9 the Su-
preme Court recognized that Congress has an additional power
to regulate immigration through its power to regulate "com-
merce with foreign nations." 5 In this decision, the Court upheld
the power of Congress to place a tax on aliens entering the
United States. The Court observed that the power to tax under
such conditions rests solely in the federal government to the ex-
clusion of the states.51
In United States v. Jung Ah Lung,52 the Supreme Court
extended the limitation on the power of Congress to control im-
migration. The Court decided that the writ of habeas corpus
would issue to a detained Chinese laborer who claimed the cer-
tificate he needed to reenter the United States, as required by
the Chinese Restriction Act,5" had been stolen by pirates while
47. 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). The second and third clauses of the second sentence of §
1 of the fourteenth amendment state: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws."
48. 118 U.S. at 374.
49. 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
50. Id. at 591.
51. Id.
52. 124 U.S. 621 (1888).
53. Chinese Restriction Act, supra note 44.
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he was sailing to a Chinese port.' Despite phrases in the Act
allowing immigration inspectors to make a determination as to
who could enter the United States, the Supreme Court decided
that actions taken by administrative officers under the statute
were subject to judicial review through habeas corpus. The use
of this writ remains the most stalwart counter to the claim of
broad sovereign power to regulate immigration. 5
Without formally modifying the treaty arrangements with
China, Congress passed a bill in 1888 that barred all resident
Chinese laborers who left the country from returning.8 6 This ban
was contrary to the terms of the treaties with China that
granted certain Chinese laborers a right of reentry who were in
the United States on or before November 17, 1880. 5 In Chae
Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case)58 the
Supreme Court conceded the Act of 1888 contravened express
provisions in the Treaties of 1868 and 1881.11 Nonetheless, the
Court ruled that since statutes and treaties are both the su-
preme law of the land and neither has paramount authority over
the other, the sovereign's most recent expression controls. ° The
Court held that Congress had the power to prohibit all Chinese
laborers who were not citizens of the United States from reen-
tering the country following their departure.
The Court found that this power to exclude returning Chi-
54. 124 U.S. at 624-25.
55. Limitations on the use of habeas corpus were recognized in Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892), where the Court stated that if sufficient grounds for
the detention of the alien seeking entry into the United States are shown, the alien will
not be discharged. Id. at 662. Under this decision, an administrative or executive official
acting within the scope of his statutory authority can detain and exclude an alien and, as
long as he has acted within the bounds of his authority and the alien has not pursued the
right of appeal to the official's superiors, the Great Writ can be denied and juducial
intervention will be barred. Nishimura Ekiu is briefly discussed in the text accompany-
ing note 66, infra.
56. Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504; see also Act of Sept. 13, 1888, ch. 1015,
25 Stat. 476. See the discussion of these statutes at text accompanying note 106 infra.
57. The Treaty of 1881, 22 Stat. 826, set the November 17, 1880 date. See the discus-
sion supra accompanying note 36. The Burlingame Treaty of 1868, 16 Stat. 739, dis-
cussed supra at text accompanying note 26, and the Treaty of 1858, 12 Stat. 1023, dis-
cussed supra at text accompanying note 21, provided for generally unrestricted
movement between the two nations.
58 130 U.S. 581 (1889).




nese residents derived from the government's obligation to pro-
tect the country under the general rubric of national defense."
The broad power to exclude foreigners from the United States
was an exercise of sovereign powers delegated by the Constitu-
tion.2 The Court did not specify to whom nor to which branch
this broad sovereign power had been assigned. Within the con-
text of a government of enumerated powers, this conclusion by
the Court is surprising. By contrast, the Court, in Chew Heong,
granted greater recognition to the enumeration of each of the
fundamental sources of authority over the regulation of immi-
gration. 3 Once the Act of 1888 was upheld, the doorway into the
United States through which returning Chinese laborers had
passed was resoundingly shut.64 Although the prohibition was
directed against Chinese laborers, it did not apply, at that time,
to Chinese merchants who were returning to the United States.6
By the Act of March 3, 1891,66 the class of aliens who could
be excluded from admission into the United States included a
wide range of socially undesirable people. The restriction ap-
plied against more than just the Chinese. In Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States,68 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the 1891 Act. In that case, a Japanese woman was denied en-
try into the United States on the basis that she would likely be-
come a public charge.
By 1892, statutory discrimination against Chinese persons
attained new heights. The Act of May 5, 18929 extended the
61. Id. at 606.
62. Id. at 609.
63. Chew Heong is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 41-46. A modern ex-
ample of judicial restrictions of the power of Congress to regulate very fundamental at-
tributes of immigration appears in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), which found the
one-House veto to be unconstitutional (discussed infra at text accompanying note 603).
Despite the Court's acknowledgment that Congress has "plenary authority," id. at 940,
to regulate aliens, the Court decided in no uncertain terms that the means Congress had
chosen to implement that power were constitutionally infirm.
64. Cf. Wan Shing v. United States, 140 U.S. 424 (1891).
65. See, Lau Ow Bew, 141 U.S. 583 (1891); but cf. Lem Moon Sing v. United States,
158 U.S. 538 (1894), discussed infra at text accompanying note 98.
66. Ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.
67. The list included "idiots, insane persons, paupers or persons likely to become a
public charge," the diseased, felons, and polygamists, and contained other grounds for
exclusion. 26 Stat. 1084.
68. 142 U.S. 651 (1892). See discussion at note 55 supra.
69. Ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25.
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restrictions against the entry of Chinese persons to persons of
Chinese descent. Any such person who was found unlawfully in
the United States could be punished by up to one year of hard
labor.7 0 Eventually, this penalty was declared unconstitutional.
Under operation of the statute, however, a Chinese laborer with-
out a certificate of residence was unlawfully in the United States
and subject to the hard labor provision. 2
In Fong Yue Ting v. United States,73 the Supreme Court
ruled that an unjustifiable refusal to issue an identification cer-
tificate would entitle a Chinese person to a judicial hearing to
afford an opportunity to "prove by competent and sufficient evi-
dence the facts" needed to obtain a certificate.7 4 The Court,
however, was unpersuaded that the aliens in question should not
be deported since "the testimony of a credible white witness"
had not been produced.75 Nowadays, such a requirement would
presumably collapse before the Court's more enlightened con-
cept of due process and equal protection of the laws. It is there-
fore appropriate not to give undue weight to the precedential
value of decisions like Fong Yue Ting. The contemporary impor-
tance of this opinion rests in its recognition that under proper
circumstances a resident alien is entitled to a judicial hearing
before his forced removal from the country.7 e Fong Yue Ting
also provided a definition of deportation which drew a distinc-
tion between the process of exclusion of aliens who are entering
the United States and the expulsion of people with firmly estab-
lished roots to the nation.77 This distinction remains operative
to this day.
70. Id. at § 4, 27 Stat. 25.
71. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896), discussed in text accompanying
note 101 infra.
72. Ch. 60, § § 4, 6, 27 Stat. 25.
73. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
74. Id. at 732.
75. Id.
76. See the discussion on this point in the text at notes 109-10 infra.
77. In interpreting this statute, the Court defined deportation as
the removal of an alien out of the country, simply because his presence is
deemed inconsistent with the public welfare, and without any punishment being
imposed or contemplated, either under the laws of the country out of which he is
sent, or under those of the country to which he is taken.
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709 (1893).
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Justice Brewer's dissenting opinion in Fong Yue Ting"s at-
tacked the assertion that Congress possessed broad and inherent
sovereign powers to expel resident Chinese from the United
States. He argued that "[tihis doctrine of powers inherent in
sovereignty is one both indefinite and dangerous." 9 He warned
of the difficulties in finding limits on such powers, especially
when the same governmental body exercising those powers, such
as the legislature or the executive, claims to be the judge of the
extent of those powers.8 0 Under this system "the mere assertion
of an inherent power creates it, and despotism exists."8' The
statute threatened the expulsion of over 100,000 resident Chi-
nese who had lawfully come into the United States under the
treaties with China. 2 According to Justice Brewer, government
by "inherent powers" is no more than despotism. 3
In light of future statements by the Court, it is interesting
to note the seriousness with which Justice Brewer regarded
forced removal from the United States. He stated that deporta-
tion is a punishment "most severe and cruel." 8  President
78. 149 U.S. 732.
79. Id. at 737.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 734.
83. Id. at 737.
84. Id. at 740. Expanding upon the issue, Justice Brewer stated:
But it needs no citation of authorities to support the proposition that de-
portation is punishment. Everyone knows that to be forcibly taken away from
home, and family, and friends, and business, and property, and sent across the
ocean to a distant land, is punishment; and that often times most severe and
cruel. Apt and just are the words of one of the framers of this Constitution,
President Madison, when he says (4 Elliot's Debates, 555): "If the banishment of
an alien from a country into which he has been invited as the asylum most aus-
picious to his happiness-a country where he may have formed the most tender
connections; where he may have invested his entire property, and acquired prop-
erty of the real and permanent, as well as the movable and temporary kind,
where he enjoys, under the laws, a greater share of the blessings of personal
security and personal liberty than he can elsewhere hope for; . . . - if a banish-
ment of this sort be not a punishment, and among the severest of punishments,
it will be difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can be applied."
Id. at 740-41. But see Bugajewitz v. Adams (also cited as Bagajewitz v. Adams), 228 U.S.
585 (1913)(Holmes, J.), in which the Court stated that deportation is not punishment.
Id. at 591. However, Justice Holmes' statement should not be taken out of context. In
Bugajewitz, the alien was deportable because she was a prostitute. Her deportation was
not punishment in the sense that she was not convicted of the crime of prostitution, and
her order of deportation did not follow any criminal proceeding. There can be little
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Madison had taken a similar view." Common sense commends
this perspective. As a punishment, according to Justice Brewer,
deportation must follow a judicial trial"0 with a right to secure
witnesses87 as well as other constitutional protections.8 Justice
Brewer's ultimate concern was to prevent the exercise of these
powers against other classes of people such as citizens
themselves.8 9
Justice Field's dissenting opinion in Fong Yue Ting,90 con-
sidered the effect of one of the statutes passed as part of the
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.91 Under the Act of June 25,
1798, the President was authorized to order the deportation of
any alien whom he deemed dangerous to the peace and security
of the United States or whom he suspected to be involved in
treasonable conduct.92 Justice Field's dissent would have permit-
ted the use of these broad powers against aliens from hostile
countries but not against aliens from friendly nations during
peacetime.9 In response to the frequent claim by the govern-
ment to sovereign or inherent powers, Justice Field's dissent em-
phasized that "[s]overeignty or supreme power is in this country
vested in the people, and only in the people."9 ' He cited the
tenth amendment in support of this contention. 5 Under this
doubt, however, that the hardship which deportation can inflict upon an individual with
strong familial ties in the United States can be a very painful experience. The denial of
individual liberty and property interests should not follow except with due regard for all
of the constitutional safeguards that accompany any proceeding designed to mete out
punishment.
85. See supra note 84, as quoted by Justice Brewer.
86. 149 U.S. at 741.
87. Id. at 742.
88. Id. at 742-44.
89. Id. at 743-44.
90. 149 U.S. at 744.
91. Ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570. See also, Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577; and The
Sedition Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 73, 1 Stat. 596.
92. 1 Stat. 570.
93. 149 U.S. at 750. Similar expulsions of racial groups have occurred throughout
history. Justice Field's dissent pointed out that "Spain expelled the Moors; England, in
the reign of Edward I, banished fifteen thousand Jews; and Louis XIV, in 1685, by re-
voking the Edict of Nantes, which gave religious liberty to Protestants in France, drove
out the Huguenots." (footnote omitted). In the latter half of the nineteenth century,
Russia attempted to expel all its Jews. Id. at 757.
94. Id. at 758.
95. Id. See also, Justice Brewer's concurring statement in Turner v. Williams, 194
U.S. 279, 295-96 (1904).
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doctrinal view, the only powers the government possesses are
those specifically enumerated and delegated to it by the people.
Therefore, since Congress received no specific delegation in the
Constitution authorizing it to evict a class of people from the
nation, Congress' efforts to expel the Chinese were
unconstitutional.
Justice Field did not rest with this argument, but pointed
out that even if such a delegation of power had been attempted,
other constitutional provisions would render the effort null and
ineffective. Deportation under the terms of the 1892 Act
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment and violated the
eighth amendment.9 6 According to Justice Field, every step in
the procedure to deport resident Chinese violated some constitu-
tional provision designed to protect the rights of individuals."'
By 1895, however, the Supreme Court's decision in Lem Moon
Sing v. United States98 permitted the ban against the entry of
Chinese to extend so far as to prevent domiciled Chinese
merchants from returning to the United States following a tem-
porary trip abroad to their homeland. In continued deference to
the other branches of government, the Court accepted a statu-
tory removal of judicial authority to review decisions by execu-
tive officers barring reentry of Chinese merchants.9 9 Congress
had passed a statute in 1894 enforcing the exclusion of Chinese
by vesting immigration or customs officers with decision-making
capacity over individual Chinese entrants and by providing for
appeal of adverse decisions to the Secretary of the Treasury. 00
The statute did not grant a right of judicial review.
In contrast, where the rights of the individual are at stake
and the issue is less concerned with apportionment of power be-
tween the branches of government, the Court has taken active
steps to circumscribe the power of Congress. In Wong Wing v.
United States,101 the Court refused to uphold a section of the
Act of 1892 that punished those Chinese who were found to be
unlawfully in the United States with up to one year of hard la-
96. 149 U.S. at 759.
97. Id. at 760.
98. 158 U.S. 538 (1895).
.99. Id. at 549.
100. Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, 28 Stat. 372, 390.
101. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
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bor.02 The Court was willing to tolerate detention or temporary
confinement while the alien awaited removal from the United
States 0 3 and to allow an alien unlawfully in the United States to
be subject to imprisonment for the offense following a judicial
trial."' The Court, however, rejected operation of the statute
where punishment at hard labor was the result of summary pro-
ceedings conducted by a nonjudicial officer such as an agent of
the legislature. 10 5
In Li Sing v., United States,10 6 the Supreme Court enforced
provisions of the Act of October 1888 that barred the return of
Chinese laborers to the United States regardless of the length of
time they had resided in the United States.10 7 The provisions of
the October Act "annulled every certificate of the kind which
had been previously issued.' 0 8 The Court tolerated the opera-
tion of a statutory scheme designed to bar the return of aliens
into the United States who had resided there for long periods of
time; who had developed strong ties to their adopted country;
and who left the United States with the understanding that
their certificates of identity would enable them to return. A sav-
ing grace of this opinion was its explicit recognition that Chinese
laborers had a statutorily granted right to a trial "before a
United States judge"'0 9 where they could defend themselves
against deportation. The Li Sing opinion is one example, at
least, where the Chinese Exclusion Laws accorded the Chinese
an important right which is not directly available to aliens even
under today's immigration framework."0 The inclusion of this
102. Ch. 60, § 4, 27 Stat. 25 stated:
SEC. 4 That any such Chinese person or person of Chinese descent convicted and
adjudged to be not lawfully entitled to be or remain in the United States shall
be imprisoned at hard labor for a period of not exceeding one year and thereaf-
ter removed from the United States, as hereinbefore provided.
103. 163 U.S. at 235. In this regard, emphasis is placed on the requirement that de-
tention is temporary. See Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980) and
related case discussion infra at note 404.
104. 163 U.S. at 235. This conflicts with Justice O'Connor's opinion in INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038, discussed infra at text accompanying note 791.
105. 163 U.S. at 237.
106. 180 U.S. 486 (1901).
107. Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504.
108. Li Sing, 180 U.S. at 489. See § 2 of the October 1888 Act, 25 Stat. 504.
109. Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25, 25-26. See Li Sing, 180 U.S. at
494-95, and Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. 698, 730.
110. See § 106 of the INA (codified at 8 U.S.C. § l105a (1982)). Nowadays, aliens
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valuable right within the Chinese Exclusion Laws belies depic-
tions of these laws as an instance where Congress successfully
exercised an entirely free rein and absolute "plenary" power
over aliens. Such a characterization is imprecise.
Li Sing is of interest for other reasons. One is the Court's
recognition that a decision allowing an alien to enter the United
States is not final and could be reviewed by administrative of-
ficers other than by those who were solely entitled by statute to
review final decisions.111 In Li Sing, a United States commis-
sioner reviewed a decision by the collector of customs although
applicable statutes granted the reviewing power to the Secretary
of the Treasury."' The Court reasoned that only decisions ex-
cluding an alien are final. Thus, since a determination permit-
ting an alien to enter the country was non-final, the alien could
be required to demonstrate the legality of his presence in the
United States to other authorities. This distinction between final
and non-final determinations continues in present-day immigra-
tion law." 3
Second, the Supreme Court attacked the vitality of various
provisions of the Act of September 13, 1888. Section 15" re-
pealed earlier statutes which had authorized the commissioner
to regulate immigration."15 In Li Sing, the Court held that the
commissioner continued to have the authority necessary to re-
view questions on which the collector of customs had already
passed." 6 Since the September 1888 statute relied for its effec-
tiveness upon a treaty ratification that never occurred, the Court
generally must first proceed in an administrative exclusion or deportation hearing before
obtaining the right to appear before a judge on appeal. See, e.g. § § 242, 236, & 106 of
the INA (codified at 8 U.S.C. § § 1252, 1226, & l105a (1982)). The instances where there
is an immediate right to a trial in the district court are limited, but do exist. See § 106
and discussion in text at note 494 infra.
111. Li Sing, 180 U.S. at 490.
112. Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, 28 Stat. 372, 390. Section 12 of the Act of Sept. 13,
1888, ch. 1015, 25 Stat. 476, 478-79, provided for review by the Secretary of the Treasury
as well. This latter provision suffered from the additional infirmity of being a part of a
statute enacted to take effect upon a treaty ratification that never occurred.
113. See the discussion in text accompanying note 428 infra.
114. 25 Stat. 476, 479.
115. The statutes authorizing the commissioner were § 12 of the Act of May 6, 1882,
22 Stat. 58, 61, as amended by Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115, 117-18. These
two statutes were conditionally repealed by § 15 of the Act of Sept. 13, 1888, 25 Stat.
476, 479.
116. 180 U.S. at 490.
[Vol. IV
NOTE
dissected its provisions and determined that section 15, at least,
was of no force and effect. Another section that mandated re-
view by the Secretary of the Treasury was similarly suspect
since the treaty with China was not ratified. Although the Court
refused to rule flatly that no provision in the September 13, 1888
Act was binding upon the courts," 7 the authority of the entire
statute was undermined. The rule that can be derived from the
decision is that courts will respect language in a statute ex-
pressly conditioning its effectiveness upon a future treaty ratifi-
cation. 118 The statutory void that was left by the failure to ratify
the treaty with China was filled by the Act of October 1, 1888,
which dealt more harshly with Chinese laborers by banning their
return to the United States altogether."'
In a Treaty of 1894, China officially accepted the United
States rule that "absolutely prohibited" the migration of Chi-
nese laborers to the United States. 20 This was a significant de-
parture from the 1881 Treaty which expressly acknowledged
that the United States could not "absolutely prohibit" such mi-
gration.' 2' In United States v. Lee Yen Tai,22 the Supreme
Court held that the 1894 Treaty was consistent with prior statu-
tory provisions that detailed the procedures for expelling Chi-
nese persons unlawfully present in the United States.123
The 1894 Treaty additionally granted Chinese laborers the
privilege of transit across the United States "in the course of
their journey to or from other countries" subject to such regula-
tions as the United States prescribed. 2 4 In Fok Yung Yo v.
117. Id.
118. But see, Chin Bak Kan v. United States, 186 U.S. 193, 201 (1902) (Section 13 of
the Act of Sept. 13, 1888 was "in and of itself independent legislation and in force as
such.").
119. 25 Stat. 504. The September 13, 1888 statute allowed for a few exceptions to
lessen hardship to some Chinese laborers. For example, a Chinese laborer was permitted
to return to the United States if he had a lawful wife, child or parent in the United
States, or property worth over $1,000. Section 6, 25 Stat. 476. The October statute lacked
these allowances.
120. 28 Stat. 1210 (quoted phrase appears in article I of the Treaty).
121. Art. I, 22 Stat. 826.
122. 185 U.S. 213 (1902).
123. E.g., Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, § 12, 22 Stat. at 61, as amended by Act of July
5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115, 117, 118, and continued by Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § 1,
27 Stat. 25.
124. Art. III, V 2, 28 Stat. 1210, 1211. This was reportedly the first time Chinese were
granted the privilege in a treaty. See Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296, 299. A
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United States,126 a decision by the collector of customs disallow-
ing such transit was deemed sufficient without further investiga-
tion to deny the privilege to a Chinese subject en route from
Hong Kong to Mexico via San Francisco. The Supreme Court
recognized that the privilege of transit across the United States
should not be denied "without good cause" but that a necessary
part of this standard included consideration of the threat posed
to the well-being of the general population if transit were al-
lowed. '26 The Court showed great deference to the decisions by
"quasi judicial"' 21 7 officers against claims of lawful presence
made by the Chinese. 128
Judicial disinclination to review decisions by immigration
officers also extended to claims brought by aliens of other na-
tionalities. In Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant
Case),1'2 9 a Japanese subject who was determined by an immigra-
tion inspector to be in the United States in violation of law since
she was a pauper and likely to become a public charge,3 0 was
denied her request for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.13'
The Supreme Court found no basis for judicial intervention de-
spite the alien's claim that her right to due process had been
modern counterpart of this privilege may be found in § 101(a)(15)(C) of the INA, 66
Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(C) (1982)) ("alien in immediate and continu-
ous transit through the United States").
125. 185 U.S. 296 (1902). See also, Lee Gon Yung v. United States, 185 U.S. 306
(1902).
126. Fok Yung Yo, 185 U.S. at 302.
127. Chin Bak Kan v. United State, 186 U.S. 193, 200 (1902).
128. Chin Bak Kan v. United States, 186 U.S. 193 (1902)(claim of United States citi-
zenship); Chin Ying v. United States, 186 U.S. 202 (1902)(similar); but see, United States
v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (claim of United States citizenship upheld), discussed
infra at text accompanying note 1213.
129. 189 U.S. 86 (1903). In light of Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985), discussed
infra in text accompanying note 567, it is interesting to note the Court's language in
Yamataya:
That Congress may exclude aliens of a particular race from the United States;
prescribe the terms and conditions upon which certain classes of aliens may
come to this country; establish regulations for sending out of the country such
aliens as come here in violation of law; and commit the enforcement of such
provisions, conditions and regulations exclusively to executive officers, without
judicial intervention, are principles firmly established by the decisions of this
court.
189 U.S. at 97 (emphasis added).
130. 189 U.S. at 87. The Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551 (first section), 26 Stat. 1084,
excluded from lawful admission aliens who were "likely to become a public charge."
131. 189 U.S. at 102.
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violated in earlier administrative proceedings.
In Yamataya, the Court also indicated that there are mini-
mum fundamental rights to which an alien is entitled when
seeking to enter or remain within the United States. The Su-
preme Court agreed that in a proceeding to expel aliens there is
a right to due process of law as understood at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution.13 The right includes an opportu-
nity to be heard before those officers upon whom the alien's lib-
erty in the United States depends, although full judicial involve-
ment is not mandatory. 13 3 The contours of these fundamental
rights were outlined in a constricted fashion. The limited guar-
antee of due process in Yamataya did not protect against the
fact that the alien received only informal notice of an investiga-
tion to determine whether she was illegally in the United States;
that she was unfamiliar with the English language and did not
understand the questions put to her; 4 and that she claimed the
investigation conducted concerning her right to be in the United
States was "pretended" with no review of the decision to expel
her. 8 5
132. The Court stated:
But this court has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding, that
administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the
liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in "due
process of law" as understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
One of these principles is that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without
opportunity, at some time, to be heard, before such officers, in respect of the
matters upon which that liberty depends-not necessarily an opportunity upon
a regular, set occasion, and according to the forms of judicial procedure, but one
that will secure the prompt, vigorous action contemplated by Congress, and at
the same time be appropriate to the nature of the case upon which such officers
are required to act. Therefore, it is not competent for the Secretary of the Trea-
sury or any executive officer, at any time within the year limited by the statute,
arbitrarily to cause an alien, who has entered the country, and has become sub-
ject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population, although al-
leged to be illegally here, to be taken into custody and deported without giving
him all opportunity to be heard upon the questions involving his right to be and
remain in the United States. No such arbitrary power can exist where the princi-
ples involved in due process of law are recognized.
189 U.S. at 100-01.
133. Id. at 101.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 102.
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2. Treatment of Claims by Chinese to United States
Citizenship
The entry restrictions in the Chinese Exclusion Laws cre-
ated problems for returning United States citizens who appeared
to be Chinese. In United States v. Sing Tuck,' 0 the Court'ruled
that Chinese persons claiming to be United States citizens had
to advance their claims according to procedures established by
Congress. At the time, these provisions included initial review by
an immigration inspector at the border, followed by an appeal to
the appropriate executive officer,' 7 before review of the claim of
United States citizenship could be had, if at all, by habeas
corpus.' 8 A dissenting opinion in Sing Tuck' 9 questioned "a
system and provisions which place within the arbitrary power of
an individual the denial of the right of an American citizen to
free entrance into the country, and put such denial outside the
scope of judicial inquiry."''4
136. 194 U.S. 161 (1904)(Holmes, J.).
137. In this case, review was originally contemplated as laying with the Secretary of
the Treasury, under the Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, 28 Stat. 372, 390. This jurisdiction
was transferred to the Department of Commerce and Labor by the Act of Feb. 14, 1903,
ch. 552, 32 Stat. 825.
138. But see Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904), where the Court exempted a
citizen of Puerto Rico (Gonzales) from the obligation of appealing a decision rendered by
the superintendent of immigration and the Secretary of the Treasury (pursuant to Act of
Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 8, 26 Stat. 1084) to exclude her from admission into the United
States. Gonzales was born in Puerto Rico and resided there on April 11, 1899, the date of
the Proclamation of the Treaty of Paris, 30 Stat. 1754 (proclaimed by President William
McKinley) that ceded the island to the United States (art. II). Although the Court did
not decide whether Gonzales had become a United States citizen by virtue of the cession
of Puerto Rico to the United States, 192 U.S. at 12, the Court decided the term "alien,"
as used in the Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084, did not embrace citizens of
Puerto Rico. 192 U.S. at 12. Therefore, Gonzales did not fall within the exclusion re-
quirements of the 1891 Act and the Commissioner of Immigration at the Port of New
York, whose duty it was to examine incoming aliens, lacked jurisdiction to detain and
deport her. 192 U.S. at 15.
139. 194 U.S. 161 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 179. Justice Brewer's dissent, in characterizing the history of Chinese im-
migration in the United States, aptly described the history of United States immigration
law:
Finally, let me say that the time has been when many young men from
China came to our educational institutions to pursue their studies, when her
commerce sought our shores, and her people came to build our railroads, and
when China looked upon this country as her best friend. If all this be reversed
and the most populous nation on earth becomes the great antagonist of this re-
public, the careful student of history will recall the words of Scripture, "they
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The constitutionality of these statutory provisions 1" was
considered in United States v. Ju Toy. 142 The Court upheld the
congressional delegation to the executive of final decision-mak-
ing authority concerning entry under a claim of United States
citizenship. Judicial review of such a decision was effectively
barred. 148 The Court deferred to the executive by utilizing a pre-
sumption that no abuse of the statutory authorization oc-
curred. 44 Restrictions barring the entry of all nationalities, de-
spite a close relationship to a United States citizen, were upheld
in Zartarian v. Billings.145 In this case, a child of a naturalized
citizen was denied entry because she did not dwell in the United
States at the time of her father's naturalization.' 6 She was ex-
have sown the wind, and they shall reap the whirlwind," and for cause of such
antagonism need look no further than the treatment accorded during the last
twenty years by this country to the people of that nation.
Id. at 182.
141. Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, § 1, 28 Stat. 372, 390.
142. 198 U.S. 253 (1905)(Holmes, J.).
143. The petitioner, although physically within our boundaries, is to be" regarded
as if he had been stopped at the limit of our jurisdiction and kept there while his
right to enter was under debate. If, for the purpose of argument, we assume that
the Fifth Amendment applies to him and that to deny entrance to a citizen is to
deprive him of liberty, we nevertheless are of opinion that with regard to him
due process of law does not require a judicial trial. That is the result of the cases
which we have cited and the almost necessary result of the power of Congress to
pass exclusion laws. That the decision may be entrusted to an executive officer
and that his decision is due process of law [has been established].
Ju Toy, 198 U.S. at 263. See also Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U.S. 673 (1912); but cf. Chin
Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908) (Holmes, J.)
144. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. at 260-61. Commenting on this opinion, the dissent stated:
It will be borne in mind that the petitioner has been judicially determined
to be a free-born American citizen, and the contention of the Government, sus-
tained by the judgment of this court, is that a citizen, guilty of no crime-for it
is no crime for a citizen to come back to his native land-must by the action of a
ministerial officer be punished by deportation and banishment, without trial by
jury and without judicial examination.
Id. at 269. Contrary to modern thinking, Justice Brewer stated "banishment is a punish-
ment and of the severest sort." Id. at 273. He also stated, "I cannot believe that Congress
intended to provide that a citizen, simply because he belongs to an obnoxious race, can
be deprived of all the liberty and protection which the Constitution guarantees, and if it
did so intend, I do not believe it has the power to do so." Id. at 279-80.
145. 204 U.S. 170 (1907). REV. STAT. § 2172 (2d ed. 1878) provided: "The children of
persons who have been duly naturalized under any law of the United States ...being
under the age of twenty-one years at the time of the naturalization of their parents,
shall, if dwelling in the United States, be considered as citizens thereof." See also Act of
Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 4, 2 Stat. 155.
146. See also, Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135 (1892); Campbell v.
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cluded since she had a dangerous, contagious disease, 47 even
though her native country had allowed her family to leave only
by promising never to return.'4"
In Chin Yow v. United States,49 the Court lessened this
trend toward harshness. It held that a Chinese person who
claimed to be a United States citizen by birth had a right to
judicial review when a judge was satisfied that a proper hearing
before the executive officers had been denied.' 50 The Court indi-
cated that although denial of a proper exclusion hearing could
not be established in a habeas corpus proceeding merely by es-
tablishing that the decision of the executive officers was
wrong,"' the petitioner's allegations could attack the validity of
the procedures used. In Chin Yow, the petitioner claimed he was
prevented from obtaining testimony of named witnesses and
other evidence to establish citizenship." 2 The Court required
the hearing by the immigration officers to be conducted in good
faith, although it could remain summary in form. 53 The proper
forum, however, in which to reconsider the claim of citizenship
was a trial on the merits before a judge.' This expedited route
to determine claims of United States citizenship has been imple-
mented under the current immigration laws. 55
B. Twilight of the Chinese Exclusion Laws
By the turn of the nineteenth century, a general legislative
movement was afoot to bring the Chinese within the framework
of the general immigration laws. This movement developed
slowly while new discriminatory legislation directed against the
Gordon, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 99 (1810).
147. 204 U.S. 175. Under the Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 37, 32 Stat. 1221 (1903),
she was therefore excludable.
148. 204 U.S. at 172. This result placed the girl in a category of excluded aliens whom
no country would accept. Unfortunately, many other aliens, especially in recent times,
have found themselves similarly situated. See notes 404 and 568, and text accompanying
note 295 infra.
149. 208 U.S. 8 (1908)(Holmes, J.).
150. Id. at 13.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 11.
153. Id. at 12.
154. Id. at 13.
155. Section 106(a)(5) of the INA, 66 Stat. 163, as added by Act of Sept. 26, 1961,
Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 651 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(5) (1982)).
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Chinese was contemporaneously enacted. It was not until the
midpoint of the twentieth century that the Chinese Exclusion
Laws finally were repealed. 5 ' During the first decades of the
nineteenth century, a welter of conflicting statutes delivered the
Chinese from the restrictions of the Exclusion Laws and brought
them within the mainstream of the general immigration laws.
Confusion developed over which body of laws applied to particu-
lar Chinese individuals and did not completely disappear until
the Exclusion Laws were repealed.
Occasionally, the Supreme Court bridged some of the gaps
in the existing laws and, along the way, effected humane results.
For example, early statutes required Chinese to present certifi-
cates to establish their right to enter the United States. An ex-
ception to this rule existed for Chinese merchants. In United
States v. Gue Lim,"5 7 the Treaty of 1880 with China and an Act
of 1884 were construed to exempt the wife and minor children of
a Chinese merchant from this requirement. 5 " A later Treaty of
1894111 did not alter this result.16 0 The Court later limited the
exception to prohibit the entry of a wife and child of a polyga-
mist Chinese merchant.""
An Act of April 29, 1902 continued all Chinese restriction
laws which were not inconsistent with treaty obligations."' The
Treaty of 1894 granted to "Chinese laborers or Chinese of any
other class ... all rights that are given by the laws of the
United States to the citizens of the most favored nation."'163 In
Ah How v. United States164 the Court held that despite the lan-
guage of this Treaty, residential certificate requirements were
still in effect since the Treaty specifically saved the earlier statu-
156. Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600.
157. 176 U.S. 459 (1900). See also Tom Hong v. United States, 193 U.S. 517
(1904)(Chinese merchants without required certificates allowed to remain in the United
States where uncontradicted testimony by disinterested witnesses other than Chinese
established they were merchants rather than laborers).
158. 22 Stat. 826 (art. II, affecting the rights of Chinese merchants); and Act of 1884,
ch. 220, § 6, 23 Stat. 115, 116.
159. 28 Stat. 1210 (art. III).
160. Gue Lim, 176 U.S. at 463.
161. Lee Lung v. Patterson, 186 U.S. 168 (1902).
162. Ch. 641, § 1, 32 Stat. 176.
163. Art. IV, 28 Stat. 1210, 1211.
164. 193 U.S. 65 (1904).
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tory 65 registration provisions. 166
In Liu Hop Fong v. United States,1 67 the Court indicated
that a Chinese resident found by the commissioner'68 to be un-
lawfully in the United States as a Chinese laborer had a right to
a judicial hearing before deportation. 169 In so deciding, the Court
admitted the gravity of such proceedings 70 and recognized that
competent evidence must overcome the presumption that the
Chinese alien's entry certificate was legally effective rather than
fraudulent.17 1
Chinese aliens were brought within the mainstream of gen-
eral immigration law 7 1 when the Court decided that section 36
of the Immigration Act of February 20, 1907 with its less "cum-
brous" procedures leading to deportation,'17 applied to Chinese
laborers in United States v. Wong You. 7 A number of provi-
sions in the 1907 Act continued the effectiveness of earlier stat-
utes directed against Chinese persons or persons of Chinese de-
scent in spite of this decision.'7 5
165. Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § § 3, 6, 27 Stat. 25.
166. Art. V, 28 Stat. 1211.
167. 209 U.S. 453 (1908).
168. A commissioner was provided for in various statutes. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 13,
1888, ch. 1015, § 13, 25 Stat. 476. This latter statute was enacted pending a treaty ratifi-
cation which never occurred. See discussion at text accompanying note 106 supra. This
particular provision remained in force as independent legislation despite the failure to
ratify the Treaty of March 12, 1888. The United States, Petitioner, 194 U.S. 194 (1904);
Chin Bak Kan v. United States, 186 U.S. 193, 201 (1902). A United States commissioner
was a "quasi-judicial" officer. The United States, Petitioner, 194 U.S. 194, 199.
169. 209 U.S. at 461-62.
170. Id. at 461.
171. Id. at 463. Cf. Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619 (1975), discussed below at text accom-
panying note 646 infra.
172. An opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury also applied a general immigration
statute to exclude a Chinese merchant with a dangerous disease although the Chinese
restriction laws did not have a similar provision. 24 Op. Att'y Gen. 706 (1903). See also
Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 473 (1912) (Immigration Act of Mar. 26, 1910,
ch. 128, 36 Stat. 263, amending Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898, applies, in
general, to all aliens).
173. Ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898, 908. Section 36 prohibited the surreptitious entry of
aliens into the United States. The Act provided more expedited deportation procedures
than the Chinese Restriction Acts. United States v. Wong You, 223 U.S. 67, 69 (1912).
174. 223 U.S. 67 (1912)(Holmes, J.).
175. Cf. § 43, 34 Stat. 911 (prior statutes relating to the immigration and exclusion of
Chinese persons or persons of Chinese descent not repealed, altered, nor amended); § 35,
34 Stat. 908 (trans-Pacific deportation contemplated).
NOTE
The Chinese Exclusion Laws were reenacted in 1904. '
Under these provisions, Chinese persons were accorded a formal
procedure of deportation containing various safeguards of their
rights.177 These rights were not accorded all aliens under the
general immigration laws. For example, the general immigration
laws provided for summary and direct proceedings leading to de-
portation.1 7 8 Unlike the result obtained in Wong You,' 79 the
Court in United States v. Woo Jan'80 ruled that the added pro-
tections in the Chinese Exclusion Acts applied to a Chinese per-
son alleging to be permissibly in the United States as a
merchant. The Court distinguished Wong You,' 8' which had ap-
plied the General Immigration Act' 82 to deport Chinese laborers
who entered the United States in a surreptitious fashion. In
light of Woo Jan, the Court's earlier rule in Wong You appeared
to require that the General Immigration Act be applied to Chi-
nese people only where there was a direct violation of one of its
express provisions.' 83 The distinction was unclear because a vio-
lation of one statute could be a violation of the other.
The Court clarified the distinction between these two cases
in White v. Chin Fong.'8 4 Later decisions did not fully consider
all of the statements made in Chin Fong.'85 The Court in Chin
Fong characterized Woo Jan as a case in which a Chinese person
facing imminent deportation is entitled to a judicial hearing
176. Act of Apr. 27, 1904, ch. 1630, § 5, 33 Stat. 394, 428, amending & reenacting Act
of Apr. 29, 1902, ch. 641, 32 Stat. 176.
177. The safeguards of impartiality included "the security of procedure and ultimate
judgment of a judicial tribunal, where all action which precedes judgment is upon oath
and has its assurance and sanctions." United States v. Woo Jan, 245 U.S. 552, 556
(1918). See also Act of Sept. 13, 1888, ch. 1015, § 13, 25 Stat. 476, 479, providing for
judicial review of a decision to deport a Chinese person.
178. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 21, 34 Stat. 898, 905, amended by Act of Mar.
26, 1910, ch. 128, 36 Stat. 263.
179. 223 U.S. 67 (1912)(Holmes, J.).
180. 245 U.S. 552, 554 (1918). But see Chin Fong v. Backus, 241 U.S. 1 (1916).
181. 233 U.S. 67 (1912).
182. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § § 21, 36, 34 Stat. 898, 905, 908.
183. In explaining the difference, the Court in Woo Jan, 245 U.S. 552, stated the rule
from Wong You, 223 U.S. 67, was that a Chinese persons "might offend against the Im-
migration Act and be subject to deportation by the Department of Labor if they should
so offend." Woo Jan, 245 U.S. at 557.
184. 253 U.S. 90 (1920).
185. Cf. Landon v. Plasencia, 449 U.S. 21 (1982) discussed infra at text accompany-
ing note 549.
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when he is in 8  the United States. 187 Wong You, on the other
hand, involved a Chinese person seeking to enter the United
States who was thereby subject to executive action and decision-
making.' By this reasoning, the Court focused upon the dis-
tinction currently in effect today between exclusion hearings'88
and deportation hearings. 90 This difference determines which
type of hearing an alien will be accorded: An exclusion hearing is
for an alien seeking entry into the United States; a deportation
proceeding is for one already present.
White v. Chin Fong'9' presented the more novel issue con-
cerning which proceeding was appropriate for a resident Chinese
merchant who was returning after a temporary trip to China.
The Court decided a judicial hearing was appropriate and indi-
cated the right was statutorily granted. 19 The statutory provi-
sion relied upon, however, did not expressly state a judicial in-
quiry was required.19 3 Nonetheless, the Court decided that under
186. The relevant facts in Woo Jan appear at 245 U.S. 554. For a modern definition
of what it takes to be "in" the United States, see In re Phelisna, 551 F. Supp. 960
(E.D.N.Y. 1982).
187. 253 U.S. at 92.
188. Id. For exposition of the facts in Wong You, see Ex parte Wong You, 176 F. 933,
934 (N.D.N.Y. 1910) (entry was made a few days prior to apprehension and "these Chi-
nese aliens had not settled down and become a part of the resident population of the
United States."), rev'd, Wong You v. United States, 181 F. 313 (2d Cir. 1910), rev'd, 223
U.S. 67 (1912). The argument that the extent of the alien's ties to the United States
should play a role in expulsion decisions, where such ties are defined in terms of family,
property, and community participation, is developed in Martin, Due Process and Mem-
bership in the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. Pirr. L. REV.
165 (1983).
189. Exclusion hearings are provided for in § 236 of the INA, 66 Stat. 200 (current
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1982)).
190. Deportation hearings are provided for in § 242 of the INA, 66 Stat. 208 (current
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982), as amended, Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, §
701, 100 Stat. 3445).
191. 253 U.S. 90 (1920).
192. 253 U.S. at 92.
193. Act of Nov. 3, 1893, ch. 14, § 2. 28 Stat. 7, 8. But see Chin Fong v. Backus, 241
U.S. 1 (1916), an earlier decision which also considered § 2 of the Act of Nov. 3, 1893, 28
Stat. 7, 8. In dismissing the Chinese person's claim of being a returning Chinese
merchant to the United States, Backus indirectly upheld the lower court's determination
that the surreptitious and illegal nature of the alien's original entry into the United
States would bar a Chinese merchant from returning to the United States. Later, in
White v. Chin Fong, 253 U.S. 90, however, the Court repeated and upheld the statement
submitted to it by the lower court that "The question was not whether the applicant was
legally admitted . . . The question was whether he had been a merchant in the United
States at least one year before his departure from the United States in 1912." White v.
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these facts a Chinese merchant was entitled to a judicial hearing
for a determination of his claim." 4 A contrary result was
reached in the relatively recent case of Landon v. Plasencia'95 in
which a returning legal permanent resident was relegated to a
summary, executive, exclusion hearing.
White v. Chin Fong held that the right to a judicial pro-
ceeding existed even though it was not expressly conferred by
statute. The decision accorded a significant right to a class of
people whose presence in the United States was considered the
least desirable of practically all people.196 White v. Chin Fong
illustrates that the Chinese Exclusion Laws did not constitute
congressional carte blanche over the regulation of aliens, regard-
less of how future courts reflected upon this body of legislation.
Although the statutory scheme has changed greatly since this
case, a returning resident's right to a judicial proceeding would
not have diminished if it were constitutionally based. White v.
Chin Fong suggests this was in fact the basis for the Court's
decision.
Certain procedural safeguards were guaranteed in an exclu-
sion proceeding against a person of Chinese descent in Kwock
Jan Fat v. White.197 This case involved various executive immi-
Chin Fong, 253 U.S. at 92 (quoting 258 F. 849, 853 (citation omitted)). In White v. Chin
Fong the same allegation against the alleged Chinese merchant was made as in Chin
Fong v. Backus, 241 U.S. 1, that their entries into the United States were illegal. In the
space of three years, Justice McKenna reversed himself on the question, although it can
be argued Chin Fong v. Backus never reached this legal issue, although indirectly decid-
ing it, because Backus dismissed review of the lower court decision for the reason that no
construction of the a treaty between the United States and China was involved and the
Court would not upset a prior interpretation of the applicable statute. In White, the
Court did precisely this.
194. The Court stated:
one who has been in the United States and has departed from it with the inten-
tion of returning, is entitled under existing legislation to have his right to do so
judicially investigated with "its assurances and sanctions," as contrasted with
the discretion which may prompt or the latitude of judgment which may be ex-
ercised in executive action.
253 U.S. at 92-93.
195. Landon v. Plasencia, 449 U.S. 21 (1982), discussed at text accompanying note
549 infra.
196. Additionally, the Act of Nov. 3, 1893, ch. 14, § 1, 28 Stat. 7, amending Act of
May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25, contemplated a judicial inquiry for Chinese laborers,
but unlike the case concerning merchants, the proceeding was for individuals already
resident in the United States.
197. 253 U.S. 454 (1920).
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL [Vol. IV
gration officers who had failed to preserve testimony in which
three white men identified the Chinese person as a native born
United States citizen.' As a result of this failure, the Court re-
versed the exclusion decisions. The Court indicated that despite
the broad legislative and executive powers to regulate immigra-
tion, it would not abdicate its responsibility to review actions of
the other two government branches.'99
On February 5, 1917, a General Immigration Act was passed
to take effect on May 1, 1917.200 Section 19 of the Act provided
for the deportation of aliens upon executive orders.2 ' Under the
Chinese Exclusion Acts, however, eligible Chinese could only be
deported following judicial proceedings.20 In Ng Fung Ho v.
White,20 3 several Chinese persons entered the United States
shortly before the General Immigration Act became effective.
The issue arose as to which body of law was applicable. Rather
198. Id. at 464.
199. Id. The Court stated:
The acts of Congress give great power to the Secretary of Labor over Chi-
nese immigrants and persons of Chinese descent. It is a power to be adminis-
tered, not arbitrarily and secretly, but fairly and openly, under the restraints of
the tradition and principles of free government applicable where the fundamen-
tal rights of men are involved, regardless of their origin or race. It is the province
of the courts, in proceedings for review, within the limits amply defined in the
cases cited, to prevent abuse of this extraordinary power, and this is possible
only when a full record is preserved of the essentials on which the executive
officers proceed to judgment. For failure to preserve such a record for the infor-
mation, no less of the Commissioner of Immigration and of the Secretary of La-
bor than of the courts, the judgment in this case must be reversed. It is better
that many Chinese immigrants should be improperly admitted than that one
natural born citizen of the United States should be permanently excluded from
his country.
Kwock Jan Fat, 253 U.S. at 464. Additionally, the Court required that hearsay used
against the Chinese not be "unfair and inconsistent with the fundamental principles of
justice embraced within the conception of due process of law." Id. at 459. The Court,
however, did express tolerance of tactics in which adverse testimony was used against the
individual seeking to return to the United States when the testimony was collected from
an unnamed witness from another unnamed witness, id. at 459, even where the Commis-
sioner of Immigration refused to disclose such testimony to the petitioner, asserted the
testimony did not affect his decision, and where the Court, upon viewing such secret
testimony, concluded that if believed, the "evidence [would be] of first importance . . .
against the claim of the petitioner." Id. at 458.
200: Ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874.
201. 39 Stat. 889-90. See also Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 279 (1922)(Bran-
deis, J.).
202. Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 279.
203. 259 U.S. 276 (1922)(Brandeis, J.).
NOTE
than rule whether the new statute could apply retroactively to
the time of the entry of the aliens, the Court decided the aliens
maintained a continuous unlawful presence by remaining in the
country and were deportable under the more recent statute.20
On a separate issue, the Court in Ng Fung Ho decided that
where Chinese individuals make a nonfrivolous claim of United
States citizenship, the fifth amendment guarantee of due process
requires a judicial proceeding to evaluate that claim rather than
a fact finding by the executive department.2 5 Under the facts of
Ng Fung Ho, one of the individuals claiming United States citi-
zenship resided in the United States over a year and the other
for more than six months after their most recent entry.2 6 It may
be possible to confine the rule in Ng Fung Ho granting the judi-
cial proceeding to those claiming United States citizenship
where the claim is made by one already within the United States
in the context of a deportation proceeding. Following Ng Fung
Ho, it is less clear that claims of United States citizenship in an
exclusion hearing automatically entitle the claimant to a judicial
proceeding. One could speculate that a judicial proceeding would
be appropriate where the claim is not frivolous, but a definition
of this latter term was not provided in Ng Fung Ho.101
Other bars to entry into the United States under the gen-
eral immigration laws were vigorously enforced in the early
twentieth century. In Kaplan v. Tod,20 8 a feeble-minded girl was
barred from entering the United States by operation of a statute
that restricted entry of aliens who were mentally impaired.2 9
204. 259 U.S. at 281. The Court also stated: "Congress has power to order at any time
the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful; and may do so
by appropriate executive proceedings." 259 U.S. at 280.
205. The Court stated its famous dictum: "To deport one who so claims to be a citi-
zen, obviously deprives him of liberty. . . It may result also in loss of both property and
life; or of all that makes life worth living." 259 U.S. at 284. Cf. Agosto v. INS, 436 U.S.
748 (1978) (review of a claim to United States citizenship), discussed infra at text accom-
panying note 494.
206. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 266 F. 765, 769 (9th Cir. 1920), aff'd in part, & rev'd in
part, 259 U.S. 276.
207. The Court stated: "If at the time of the arrest they had been in legal contempla-
tion without the borders of the United States, seeking entry, the mere fact that they
claimed to be citizens would not have entitled them under the Constitution to a judicial
hearing." 259 U.S: at 282.
208. 267 U.S. 228 (1925)(Holmes, J.).
209. Act of Mar. 26, 1910, ch. 128, 36 Stat. 263.
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Modern statutes provide similarly.210 She was excluded as if she
had never entered the United States although she was detained
nine years awaiting her physical removal while the First World
War made her departure impossible. She was confined on Ellis
Island for eleven months and for the remainder of the time, she
lived with her father under the supervision of an aid society.
During her stay, her father became a naturalized citizen of the
United States.2 1 Although a statute provided that minor chil-
dren became citizens if they were living in the United States
when a parent was naturalized, Kaplan held the girl did not re-
ceive any immigration benefits because she had not been offi-
cially admitted into the United States.212
In Kaplan v. Tod, the Court also held that although two
statutes placed a limitation upon the time period following entry
into the United States during which an immigration officer could
deport an alien,21 3 the time limitations did not bar the govern-
ment from deporting an excludable alien physically in the
United States when she technically had never made an entry
into the United States. According to the Court, "[t]heoretically
she is in custody at the limit of the jurisdiction awaiting the or-
der of the authorities. 2 1 4
This categorization of some individuals as physically but
not legally present in the United States has received widespread
approval by the courts and Congress. Kaplan v. Tod is an early
instance of this approval and is the result of an expansive read-
ing of the applicable statutes.21 5 The two statutes under inter-
pretation in Kaplan v. Tod addressed aliens who were excluda-
ble, providing that their removal from the United States should
follow "within five years after entry''2l or "within three years
210. Section 212(a)(1) (mentally retarded), (a)(2) & (3) (insane), (a)(4)(mental de-
fect), (a)(7)(disability), 66 Stat. 182 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1), (2) & (3), (4), (7)
(1982)).
211. 267 U.S. 228, 228.
212. REV. STAT. § 2172 (2d ed. 1878); Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 5, 34 Stat. 1228,
1229. See the discussion of the modern practice of granting parole to some aliens at text
accompanying note 563 infra.
213. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 19 (five years), 39 Stat. 874, 889; Act of Feb. 20,
1907, ch. 1134, § 20 (three years), 34 Stat. 898, 904.
214. 267 U.S. at 231.
215. See statutes listed at note 213 supra.
216. Section 19, 39 Stat. 889.
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after the date of. . . entry into the United States."21 The stat-
utes plainly recognized that excludable aliens make entries into
the United States. A legal fiction has developed to the contrary.
On December 17, 1943, the Chinese Exclusion Acts were re-
pealed.218 Section 2 of that Act brought all Chinese persons en-
tering the United States within the general numerical limita-
tions used in the Immigration Act of 1924.219 This Act created a
quota, beginning in 1927, limiting the number of immigrants eli-
gible to enter the United States to a figure based upon a ratio
between the number, in 1920, of inhabitants in the United
States having the entrant's national origin and the number of all
inhabitants in the United States. This ratio was multiplied
against 150,000, which was a ceiling amount of receivable immi-
grants.220 Additionally, some of the exceptions to the quota pro-
visions applied to Chinese 221' and they received an expanded eli-
gibility for naturalization.222
C. Dawn of the Modern Era
Decisions of the Supreme Court immediately following the
repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Laws2 23 indicated that the Court
derived from them a broad deference to Congress and the execu-
tive in matters relating to immigration. For reasons described
earlier, this deference was not entirely appropriate. 2 4 The deci-
sions of the Court during the 1940s and early 1950s extended
this deference to unprecedented lengths and are described in
this section. Following the post-World War II era, the lower
courts, in particular, chipped away at broad assertions of execu-
tive and congressional authority. Recently, the modern Supreme
Court has also extended a greater array of rights to aliens in
various legal statuses; these developments are discussed else-
217. Section 20, 34 Stat. 905-6.
218. Ch. 344, § 1, 57 Stat. 600.
219. Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, § 11, 43 Stat. 153, 159.
220. Id. § 11(b).
221. See, e.g., ch. 344, § 2, 57 Stat. 601; Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, § 4 (nonquota
immigrants), 43 Stat. 155, as amended by Act of July 3, 1926, ch. 738, 44 Stat. 812 (part
two), as amended by Act of May 29, 1928, ch. 914, 45 Stat. 1009.
222. Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, § 3, 57 Stat. 601, amending Act of Oct. 14, 1940,
ch. 876, § 303, 54 Stat. 1137, 1140.
223. Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600.
224. See supra notes 21-222 and accompanying text.
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225where in this paper.
1. Exclusion from the United States in the Immediate
Post-World War II Context
In United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,226 the
Court held that an alien could be prevented from entering the
United States without a formal hearing and without being in-
formed of the charges against her. The Court refused to review
the basis of the exclusion decision and decided that until the
alien left the country, she could be confined indefinitely.227
The facts in Knauff are even more compelling than the re-
sult indicates. 22 Ellen Raphael Knauff was Jewish. She left Ger-
many and moved to Czechoslovakia in the early 1930s. 229 From
1943 to 1946 she worked for the Royal Air Force. Her service
was described as "efficient[] and honorabl[e]. ' '230  Then she
worked for the United States War Department in Germany and
received similar praise for her work. She married a United
225. See, e.g., notes 422-658 and accompanying text.
226. 338 U.S. 537 (1950); see also, E. KNAUFF, THE ELLEN KNAUFF STORY (1952). See
generally Scanlan, Asylum Adjudication: Some Due Process Implications of Proposed
Legislation, 44 U. Pirr. L. REV. 261 (1983); Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and "Commu-
nity Ties": a Response to Martin, 44 U. PiT'. L. REv. 237 (1983).
227. See also Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
228. See E. Knauff, supra note 226.
229. That she was Jewish is mentioned in her autobiographical account of her battle
to enter the United States. E. Knauff, supra note 226, at 12. In her account of arriving in
the United States, Ellen Knauff recounted a dialogue she had with an inspector of
immigration:
"Your name?" he started his interrogation.
Gradually, I told him my whole life-history, beginning with my birth in Jan-
uary 1, 1915, in a small German town, the daughter of prosperous Jewish par-
ents. I told him of my marriage in 1934, after I finished high school, to my first
husband, a Czech national. I had automatically acquired Czech citizenship by
that marriage and had gone to live with my husband in Prague. This marriage
ended in divorce in 1936. I had stayed in Prague, however, working as a clerk in
an import-export business until it closed down in 1939 after the German inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia.
"Why didn't you return to Germany after your divorce?" he wanted to
know.
"How could I have returned as a Jew? Besides, I wasn't a German citizen
any longer," I answered.
"But you were born in Germany and that makes you a German," he
insisted.
Id. supra note 226, at 11-12.
230. 338 U.S. at 539.
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States Army veteran who was a naturalized United States citi-
zen.2 31 Her claim to enter the United States was based upon
rights created by the War Brides Act of December 28, 1945.23'
When she arrived in the United States on August 14, 1948, she
was detained on Ellis Island, with a few interludes away, until
her final release on November 2, 1951.233 Ultimately she tri-
umphed in her efforts to enter the United States, but her claims
before the judiciary met with failure.2 3 4
The War Brides Act238 provided that a foreign wife of a
United States soldier could enter the United States when the
soldier was a citizen of the United States and honorably dis-
charged from the armed forces .23  The Act provided, however,
that a war bride could be admitted to the United States "if oth-
erwise admissible under the immigration laws." ' Unfortunately
for Ellen Knauff, this was the phrase which kept her detained at
Ellis Island for most of her three-year contest to be admitted
info the United States. 2 3
231. Id.
232. Act of Dec. 28, 1945, ch. 591, 59 Stat. 659.
233. For a chronology of the major events concerning her stay at Ellis Island, see the
list presented at E. Knauff, supra note 226, at 235.
234. A list of Ellen Knauff's court and administrative battles are listed in her bibliog-
raphy, E. Knauff, supra note 226, at 237, which is summarized as follows: United States
ex rel. Knauff v. Watkins, (1949) (dismissing her first writ of habeas corpus in an unre-
ported opinion), aff'd, 173 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.) (1949) (before Augustus N. Hand, J.), cert.
granted, 336 U.S. 966 (1949), aff'd sub nom. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaugh-
nessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
A second writ of habeas corpus was dismissed in the District Court for the Southern
District of New York in an unreported opinion, in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Mc-
Grath, rev'd & remanded, 181 F. 2d 839 (2d Cir. 1950) (before L. Hand, C.J.), dismissed
(S.D.N.Y. 1950) (unreported opinion) aff'd, 182 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1950), dismissed as
moot, 340 U.S. 940 (1951).
While contesting her exclusion, Mrs. Knaufl's application for naturalization was de-
nied in Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 88 F. Supp. 607 (1949), aff'd, 179 F.2d 628 (1950).Ellen Knauff was eventually released into the United States when the Board of Im-
migration Appeals (BIA) found there was not adequate evidence to justify her order of
exclusion in In re Ellen Raphael Knauff or Boxhorn or Boxhornova, BIA file A-6937471
(Aug. 29, 1951) (order approved by Attorney General McGrath on November 2, 1951).
These last two decisions are reproduced in the appendix of E. Knauff, supra note 226.
The unreported opinions mentioned above are described in her autobiographical ac-
count. Id. supra note 226, at 237.
235. Act of Dec. 28, 1945, ch. 591, 59 Stat. 659.
236. Id. (first section).
237. Id.
238. 338 U.S. at 546.
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The authority to exclude Ellen Knauff was based on a presi-
dential proclamation of May 27, 1941, in which President
Roosevelt proclaimed an unlimited national emergency.2 3 9 This
239. Proclamation No. 2487, 3 C.F.R. 234 (1938-1943), reprinted in 55 Stat. 1647
This proclamation provided the basis for excluding and detaining Ellen Knauff without
notification of charges against her and without a hearing. In response to presidential
Proclamation No. 2487, Congress passed the Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 210, 55 Stat. 252,
which amended the Act of May 22, 1918, ch. 81, 40 Stat. 559. Section 1(a) of the 1918
Act authorized the President during wartime to issue rules and regulations governing the
entry of aliens into the United States. The 1941 Act augmented the President's authority
by allowing him to issue rules and regulations during the existence of the national emer-
gency declared on May 27, 1941. The Act also authorized the President to issue rules and
regulations governing the entry of aliens when two or more states were engaged in war.
All of these allowances were conditioned upon a presidential finding that the interests of
the United States required additional rules and regulations pertaining to the entry of
aliens beyond what was already provided for by any other laws.
On the basis of these authorizations, and the outbreak of war in the Eastern Hemi-
sphere, on November 14, 1941, President Roosevelt issued Proclamation No. 2523, 3
C.F.R. 270 (1938-1943), reprinted in 55 Stat. 1696, in which he imposed restrictions on
the entry of aliens into the United States.
The November 14, 1941 Proclamation prohibited the entry of aliens into the United
States who lacked the proper documentation unless the aliens were exempted by rules
and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of State and Attorney General. Pursuant to
the authority conferred in this Proclamation, the Attorney General and Secretary of
State prescribed regulations which allowed for the exclusion and detention of aliens
without charges and without a hearing. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Watkins, 173
F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir. 1949).
The authorizing legislation for the presidential proclamation and subsequent rules
and regulations, which was contained in the Act of May 22, 1918, ch. 81, 40 Stat. 559,
was repealed by the Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, § 403(a)(15), 66 Stat. 163, 279. These
wartime restrictions are now generally covered by § 215 of the INA, 66 Stat. 190 (current
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1982)), which authorizes the President to prescribe "reasona-
ble rules, regulations, and orders" to govern the entry of aliens into the United States.
Notably absent from the current provision are the requirements that the United States
must either be at war or experiencing a national emergency as proclaimed by the Presi-
dent, or that a state of war must exist between two or more foreign states. Title 8 U.S.C.
§ 1185(a) (1982) provides that "[u]nless otherwise ordered by the President, it shall be
unlawful-(1) for any alien to . . . enter . . . the United States except under such rea-
sonable rules, regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as
the President may prescribe."
It is to be noted, pursuant to the Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-426, § 707(e), 92
Stat. 963, 993, that current § 1185 is entitled, "Travel documentation of aliens and citi-
zens," rather than, as previously titled, "Travel control of aliens and citizens in time of
war or national emergency." When the 1978 amendment was passed, the basis for presi-
dential regulations allowing the detention of excluded aliens without notice or hearing no
longer rested upon war powers, but arguably upon presidential powers to conduct foreign
affairs as well as Congress' ability to authorize the President to act on behalf of Con-
gress' naturalization powers. Since the war powers provide a broader base of authority
than do other sources of government power, the source of powers to authorize § 1185 is
correspondingly diminished, and absent invocation of war powers during wartime or na-
1987] NOTE
proclamation was not repealed until April 28, 1952, when Presi-
dent Truman proclaimed the termination of the wartime emer-
gency.2 4 President Truman's proclamation followed the Treaty
of Peace with Japan that was signed in San Francisco on Sep-
tember 8, 1951.1 The May 1941 proclamation gave the Attor-
ney General and Secretary of State indirect authority to issue
rules and regulations for the detention of certain categories of
excludable aliens. The regulations they prescribed did so with-
out providing a hearing and without presentment of any
charges. 42 The presidential power both to-proclaim as well as to
terminate the existence of such emergencies is established under
the aegis of the executive's sweeping war powers.43
The Knauff decision is vulnerable to attack on two fronts.
First, it failed to give full consideration to the purpose behind
the War Brides Act. Second, its continued relevance is extremely
limited in a modern era that is not operating under the ordeal of
total war and in which the sweeping war powers have not been
legally invoked. Arguably, Knauff was wrongly decided in that it
tional emergency, current application of § 1185 must be restricted with due considera-
tion of competing rights which § 1185 would otherwise curtail. Similarly, the current
version of § 235(c) of the INA, 66 Stat. 163, 199 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (1982))
should be read in the same relatively restricted light. The trend in decisions relating to
both these sections has been to circumscribe government claims of broad authority. See,
e.g., El-Werfalli v. Smith, 547 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) and additional cases dis-
cussed infra at note 393.
Knauff was decided under special circumstances on the basis of rules and regula-
tions issued pursuant to congressional authorization which, in turn, had been issued
upon consideration of presidential Proclamation No. 2487, which was an executive decla-
ration of total war. For that reason Knauff should not be loosely cited for broad asser-
tions of government authority to detain excludable aliens without notice or a hearing
when there is no presidential proclamation of war in effect, no invocation of the war
powers, and no congressional concurrence in the executive's invocation of such powers.
The rule from Knauff is confined to applications during wartime emergencies.
240. Proclamation No. 2974, 3 C.F.R. 158 (1949-1953), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app.,
note prec. § 1 (1982), and in 66 Stat. c31. See also Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 140
n.3 (1948); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
241. Reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app., note prec. § 1 (1982).
242. For the current judicial response to similar rules, see Abourezk v. Reagan, 785
F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), discussed in the text accompanying note 347 infra.
243. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). In Knauff, 173 F.2d 599, 603,
the Second Circuit decided that the regulations "were within the wide sweep of delega-
tion to executive discretion under the war power." See also Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (removal of Japanese from West Coast area upheld); Ex parte Endo,
323 U.S. 283 (1944). The Supreme Court has held there are limits on even these powers.
See note 250 infra.
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defeated the pupose of the War Brides Act.""4 The purpose of
that Act was to allow servicemen in Europe to bring home their
alien wives.2 45 Knauff was decided by only four members of the
Court.246 Thus a case that may be criticized for its harshness and
utilized for the proposition of nearly unchallengeable govern-
ment authority to detain excludable aliens was not decided by a
majority or plurality of the Court. Justice Minton's opinion de-
nied the Knauffs the benefit of the .War Brides Act by constru-
ing the clause "if otherwise admissible under the immigration
laws ' 24 7 to allow for her exclusion on the basis of the Attorney
General's undisclosed information.
The legal invocation of sweeping war powers during the Sec-
ond World War has not been replicated in modern times. Under
a proclamation of August 17, 1949,248 President Truman
amended President Roosevelt's proclamation of November 14,
1941249 to allow for a continuation of the rule-making power by
lower officers of the executive branch. President Truman's proc-
lamation referred to the same two statutory authorities as did
President Roosevelt's proclamations, but it is debatable whether
those statutes empowered the President to issue the 1949 procla-
mation because by that time the Second World War had ended
and the United States was not faced with an unlimited national
emergency.250
244. Act of Dec. 28, 1945, ch. 591, 59 Stat. 659.
245. 338 U.S. at 550 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
246. See Carrington, The Problem of Minority Decisions, 44 A.B.A.J. 137 (1958). Jus-
tices Clark and Douglas took no part in the Knauff decision. Justices Jackson, Black,
and Frankfurter dissented.
247. Act of Dec. 28, 1945, ch. 591, 59 Stat. 659.
248. 3 C.F.R. 27 (1949-1953), 14 Fed. Reg. 5173 (1949).
249. Presidential Proclamation No. 2523, 3 C.F.R. 270 (1938-1943), reprinted in 55
Stat. 1696.
250. See discussion at note 239 supra. The Korean conflict was not proclaimed to be
a national emergency until December 6, 1950, about 16 months after President Truman
recontinued President Roosevelt's wartime proclamation. See Proclamation No. 2914, 3
C.F.R 99 (1949-1953), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app., note prec. § 1 (1982), and in 64 Stat.
A454. The Korean conflict did not authorize the President to exercise wartime powers as
fully as that office desired. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure
Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Ellen Knauff expressed her personal response to her treatment: "I believe that the
ways of the Immigration Service are in complete antithesis to the deeply traditional and
overwhelming prevailing American respect for the individual." E. Knauff, supra note
226, at 170.
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President Roosevelt issued the proclamation of November
1941 as an exercise of presidential war powers.2 " It provided
that no alien could enter the United States if the Secretary of
State was satisfied that such entry would be prejudicial to the
interests of the United States as provided by rules and regula-
tions issued by the Secretary of State and the Attorney Gen-
eral.252 Under this authorization the Attorney General and Sec-
retary of State issued regulations that allowed the Attorney
General to deny entry where the Attorney General determined
the alien was excludable "on the basis of information of a confi-
dential nature, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to
the public interest. ' 253 There is no question that at times such
absolute discretion properly lies within the powers of the Attor-
ney General for reasons of national defense, security, conduct of
foreign affairs, and sovereignty.254 The difficulty arises less in
the theoretical underpinnings for the power than in the
problems arising in practical operation. The Attorney General
does not act individually but has a multitude of immigration of-
ficers beneath him who vicariously exercise his absolute discre-
tion. The large number of officers alone constitutes a complex
bureaucracy peopled with individuals fundamentally as subject
to all of the frailties to which the rest of mankind is heir.255 No
one can question that a terrorist attempting to enter the United
States should be denied entry. The overwhelming majority of
aliens seeking to enter the United States, however, clearly do
not pose a categorical threat to the existence of the United
States nor come close to fitting such a characterization. The
danger of such unlimited discretion in the Office of the Attorney
251. 40 Stat. 559, as amended by Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 210, 55 Stat. 252 (war
powers), coupled with presidential powers during an unlimited national emergency as
proclaimed by the Proclamation of May 27, 1941, No. 2487, 3 C.F.R. 234 (1938-1943),
reprinted in 55 Stat. 1647.
252. Proclamation No. 2523, subd. (3), 3 C.F.R. 270, 271 (1938-1943), reprinted in 55
Stat. 1698.
253. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, at 541 n.3 (quoting 8
C.F.R. § 175.57(b) (1945 Supp.)) (footnote omitted).
254. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20
(1936); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893).
255. See, e.g., Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232 (1981)(INS officer shot a fleeing
alien rendering him a quadriplegic); United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239 (1974)(rein-
stating original conviction of an immigration inspector who was involved in a scheme to
defraud nonresident aliens as well as the INS).
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General 50 lies in the abuses which arise where a member of a
large bureaucracy has authority to affect the well-being of others
in a system that allows individual files to be lost or misplaced,
and where, until recently, there was little recourse for contesting
categorization as a threat to the national security of a nation of
over 200,000,000 people. 57 For example, when some witnesses
eventually surfaced to testify against Ellen Knauff, the sum to-
tal of all testimony was hearsay uncorroborated by direct evi-
dence.2"8 The only reason Ellen Knauff could provide for the ex-
istence of such rumours against her was the jealousy of another
woman that was provoked by Ellen's courtship to a soldier who
was a United States citizen.259 Obviously, this is not a basis for
conducting foreign policy and a national defense. Also, the im-
migration officers were free to levy unfounded charges against
Ellen Knauff including that she functioned as a spy for Czecho-
slovakia in Great Britain during her service with the Royal Air
Force in 1943 to 1946, and during her employment with the War
Department of the United States in Germany up until 1948. In
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) opinion 260 that eventu-
ally held for her release into the United States, the Board noted
that prior to 1948 "the Czechoslovakian Government was not an
enemy but supposedly a friendly power. Czechoslovakia was one
of the liberated countries, and the Communist Coup did not
take place there until February 25, 1948. ' '211 Under a system of
absolute discretion there is no basis upon which to defend
against erroneous and unfounded allegations.
In the present-day context, section 235(c) of the INA,22
provides similarly for the detention of excludable aliens on the
basis of undisclosed, confidential information without a hearing.
This section did not become law until 1952, well after the legal
256. See, e.g., Roberts, The Exercise of Administrative Discretion Under the Immi-
gration Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 144 (1975); see also United States ex rel. Accardi v.
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
257. E. Knauff, supra note 226, at 46 (lost file).
258. In re Ellen Raphael Knauff or Boxhorn or Boxhornova (BIA, File A-6937471),
reprinted in E. Knauff, supra note 226, appendix at 16.
259. Ellen Knauff refers to this situation in various points in her book. E. Knauff,
supra note 226, at 54-55, 57, 135, & 187.
260. Reprinted in E. Knauff, supra note 226 (appendix).
261. Id. supra note 226, appendix at 17.
262. Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163, 199 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (1982)).
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wartime footing of the United States had been repealed. Section
235(c), and the rules and regulations flowing from it, are crea-
tures of Congress.25 Part of Congress' authority to pass section
235(c) rests upon its power to regulate naturalization under arti-
cle I, section 8, clause 4 of the Constitution. This is a different
source of power than the President's emergency wartime powers.
The constitutional power authorizing section 235(c) was not the
same power which President Roosevelt exercised to protect the
United States from Nazi Germany. When a modern court seeks
to examine the full scope of the section 235(c) power, it is appro-
priate to turn to President Roosevelt's proclamations to consider
an analogous authority; but, the authorization for section 235(c)
and the authorization that detained Ellen Knauff are not identi-
cal. Increasingly, the courts have found inroads into the expan-
sive powers suggested by section 235(c) and restrictions have ac-
cordingly developed.2 64 Since the basis for a claim of wide,
unreviewable authority by the government to exclude and detain
Ellen Knauff in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy
was based upon President Roosevelt's wartime proclamations,
absent similar presidential proclamations of wartime emergen-
cies, it is inappropriate to cite Knauff for the proposition that
the government may treat excludable aliens however it
pleases.2 6
The Knauff opinion is well-known for the statement that
"[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due
process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned."266 This
phrase should not be read without consideration of Chief Justice
Marshall's observation in Cohens v. Virginia 6 7 that general ex-
263. 8 C.F.R. § 235 (1987).
264. See note 393 infra.
265. The argument of Clarence S. Darrow and Edgar L. Masters in United States ex
rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 288 (1904) is particularly appropriate: "[tihe rule
of stare decisis only arises in respect of decisions directly upon the points at issue." See
also Cohens v. Virginia, 5 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 82, 97 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.), quoted infra at
note 268.
266. 338 U.S. at 544. This phrase appears elsewhere in Supreme Court decisions. See,
e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 870 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (directly quoted);
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (directly quoted);
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) ("As to [aliens), the decisions
of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Con-
gress, are due process of law.").
267. 5 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 82 (1821).
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pressions in opinions should not control the Court's judgment in
a subsequent suit.26 8 Knauff can be confined as a decision inter-
preting the executive's wartime powers to exclude aliens during
an unlimited national emergency. In fact, the Court strongly
cautioned against an overly broad reading of its holding. The
Court conceded that the enabling statutes269 authorized the
''special restrictions on the entry of aliens only when the United
States is at war or during the existence of the national emer-
gency proclaimed May 27, 1941. For ordinary times Congress has
provided aliens with a hearing. ' 27 0 The peacetime hearing to
which the Court referred had been enacted in two sections by
the Act of February 5, 1917.271 These sections did not authorize
the executive to issue rules and regulations permitting the exclu-
sion and detention of an alien without a hearing before a board
of inquiry, nor exclusion and detention based upon undisclosed
information. The Court in Knauff upheld a statutory and regu-
latory scheme that did provide for such measures because that
scheme was based upon the sweeping executive and legislative
powers which exist during an unlimited wartime emergency. The
Court did not pass upon the propriety of such a statutory and
regulatory scheme during ordinary peacetime. 72
268. Id. at 97-98.
It is a maxim, not to be disregarded that general expressions, in every opin-
ion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are
used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control
the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision.
The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the court is
investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles which
may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case decided, but
their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated.
269. Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 210, 55 Stat. 252, amending Act of May 22, 1918, ch.
81, 40 Stat. 559.
270. 338 U.S. at 544-45 (footnote omitted).
271. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § § 16, 17, 39 Stat. 874, 885-887 (codified at the time
of the Knauff decision at 8 U.S.C. § § 152, 153), repealed by Act of June 27, 1952, ch.
477, § 403(a)(13), 66 Stat. 163, 279.
272. In criticizing the Court's decision in Knauff, Justice Jackson summarized the
facts of the case from the viewpoint of the naturalized husband:
Now this American citizen is told he cannot bring his wife to the United
States, but he will not be told why. He must abandon his bride to live in his own
country or forsake his country to live with his bride.
So he went to court and sought a writ of habeas corpus, which we never tire
of citing to Europe as the unanswerable evidence that our free country permits
no arbitrary official detention. And the Government tells the Court that not even
2. Deportations in th6 Post-War Setting
In 1950, in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,73 the Court held
that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)274 applied to de-
portation proceedings 175 The statutory largesse of Congress pro-
vided resident aliens with some additional procedural safeguards
in the deportation process. The facts in Wong Yang Sung in-
volved a Chinese crewman who overstayed his shore leave. 76
The Supreme Court noted that one of the fundamental purposes
of the APA was "to curtail and change the practice of embody-
ing in one person or agency the duties of prosecutor and
judge."' 277 The Court also found that the Constitution's require-
ment of due process of law guarantees an alien undergoing a de-
portation some type of procedural safeguards. These include a
hearing for those aliens whose entry into the United States was
not clandestine even if they remained in the country illegally for
278some time.
Section 5 of the APA of 1946 provided that the Act's safe-
guards would apply to those "adjudication[s] required by stat-
ute.271 9 The Court accepted the petitioning alien crewman's ar-
gument that earlier Court decisions required a hearing before
effecting a deportation, even though such a requirement did not
appear expressly in the statutes. 80 The Court reasoned, there-
fore, that deportation hearings fell within the ambit of the
APA.28" The Court appeared at cross-purposes with itself: At
a court can find out why the girl is excluded. But it says we must find that
Congress authorized this treatment of war brides and, even if we cannot get any
reasons for it, we must say it is legal; security requires it.
338 U.S. at 550-51.
273. 339 U.S. 33 (1950) (Jackson, J.).
274 Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237.
275. Deportation was provided for under the Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29,
§ 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889.
276. 339 U.S. at 35.
277. Id. at 41. E.g., § 5(c) of the 1946 Act, 60 Stat. at 240, provided for a separation
between those officers involved in a decision-making function and those officers acting in
an investigative capacity.
278. 339 U.S. at 49-50. Limits on the reach of the constitutional safeguards are exem-
plified in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
279. Ch. 324, § 5, 60 Stat. at 239.
280. See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 160 (1945) (concurring opinion);
Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920); Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immi-
grant Case), 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
281. 339 U.S. at 50.
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one time it found that the safeguards of the APA applied to a
deportation hearing because such hearings were required by
statute.28 2 Simultaneously, the Court appeared to be trying to
make a more forceful statement of the law, finding a constitu-
tional guarantee to a fair hearing in a deportation proceeding.28
The strength of the Court's decision in Wong Yang Sung is
uncertain. The language of the APA of 1946 indicated that it
applied to all adjudications required by statute. The Court de-
termined a deportation hearing is such an adjudication and
therefore. subject to the procedural safeguards provided in the
APA. But the Court did not indicate that Congress could not
alter the APA, and, in doing so, curtail even minimum rights
afforded an alien in a deportation proceeding. The language the
Court adopted suggested it would uphold certain minimum safe-
guards in a deportation proceeding as constitutionally based,
without going into details.284
For a short time following the Supreme Court decision de-
nying Ellen Knauff entry into the United States, the Court
placed some restrictions upon the leeway with which it permit-
ted the Attorney General to function. This affected agency regu-
lations that denied hearings and allowed for determinations of
excludability "on the basis of information of a confidential na-
ture, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public
interest.285 In Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,8 e the Court prohib-
282. Id.
283. We do not think the limiting words render the Administrative Procedure
Act inapplicable to hearings, the requirement for which has been read into a
statute by the Court in order to save the statute from invalidity.. . . We would
hardly attribute to Congress a purpose to be less scrupulous about the fairness
of a hearing necessitated by the Constitution than one granted by it as a matter
of expediency.
Indeed, to so construe the Immigration Act might again bring it into constitu-
tional jeopardy. When the Constitution requires a hearing, it requires a fair one,
one before a tribunal which meets at least currently prevailing standards of im-
partiality. A deportation hearing involves issues basic to human liberty and hap-
piness and, in the present upheavals in lands to which aliens may be returned,
perhaps to life itself. It might be difficult to justify as measuring up to constitu-
tional standards of impartiality a hearing tribunal for deportation proceedings
the like of which has been condemned by Congress as unfair even where less
vital matters of property rights are at stake.
Id. at 50-51.
284. See quote at note 283 supra.
285. 8 C.F.R. § 175.57(b) (Supp. 1945), reproduced in United States ex rel. Knauff v.
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ited application of this secret decision-making procedure where
the individual involved was a returning lawful permanent resi-
dent seaman, and for a brief while, signalled that an individual
with significant ties to the United States would enjoy some legal
protection when entering the country. In Kwong Hai Chew, the
returning Chinese seaman was married to a native born Ameri-
can for five years before his exclusion,287 owned a home in New
York, served with honor in World War II in the United States
Merchant Marine, and passed Coast Guard security clearances
for employment on a merchant vessel.2"'
Earlier Supreme Court cases indicated, however, that the
government had the power to remove resident aliens who had
even greater ties to the United States when the rationale for ex-
ercising such power was founded upon a claim of national secur-
ity or defense.28 9 These decisions helped form the basis for the
Supreme Court's application of the Knauff doctrine to bar the
reentry of a resident alien who had previously enjoyed a very
long period of residence in the United States with concomitant
extended family ties, in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei.290
In Kwong Hai Chew, because the individual seeking to reen-
ter the United States was a resident alien, the Court reasoned he
was a person under the fifth amendment and entitled to due
process of law prior to deprivation of the liberty to remain at
large in the United States.2 91 The procedural protection entitled
the alien to notice of the nature of the charges against him and
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 n.3 (1950). The modern counterpart of this regulation
may be found at § 235(c) of the INA, 66 Stat. 163, 199 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)
(1982)).
286. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
287. Kwong Hai Chew was married in June 1946, United States ex rel. Kwong Hai
Chew v. Colding, 97 F. Supp. 592, 593 (E.D.N.Y. 1951), and was detained upon his at-
tempted reentry into the United States in March of 1951. 344 U.S. at 594.
288. Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 592-95.
289. Harrisiades v. Shaugnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 584 (1952) (resident aliens, members of
the Communist Party, in the United States each for over 30 years, one with a wife and
two citizen children, another with an American citizen husband and children possessing
citizenship at birth; the lower courts found that the Communist Party "taught and advo-
cated overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence"); Carlson
v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952); but cf. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
290. 345 U.S. 206 (1953), discussed infra at text accompanying note 295.
291. 344 U.S. at 596.
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at least some type of hearing before an executive or administra-
tive tribunal.2 2 Prior Supreme Court decisions provided a check
upon any claim on behalf of Congress to the power to expel a
resident alien without a fair opportunity to be heard.293 In
Kwong Hai Chew, the Court reasoned that the regulations deny-
ing notice and a hearing did not apply to a returning resident
alien. The Court did not squarely base its decision upon any
claimed unassailable right of such resident alien to fifth amend-
ment protection.2 94
In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,2 "5 the Court
again considered the application of those agency regulations that
denied excludable aliens notice and a hearing and which permit-
ted their indefinite detention.29 6 The Court upheld application
of these rules against a returning resident alien who had much
stronger ties to the United States than the returning alien in
Kwong Hai Chew.
Mezei involved a cabinetmaker who was determined to be a
deportable security risk.2 7 He was born in Gibraltar and lived in
the United States as a resident alien for twenty-five years from
1923 to 1948. He was married to a native born American citizen,
owned a house in Buffalo, New York, and his children were born
in the United States.29 8 He tried to visit his dying mother in Ru-
mania in 1948, but was denied entry into that country. He re-
mained in Hungary for 19 months because of difficulty in ob-
taining an exit permit. When he finally returned to the United
States in 1950, he was excluded and confined on Ellis Island. 99
Since none of the approximately fifteen countries to which he
292. Id. at 597.
293. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950); Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253
U.S. 454 (1920); Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86 (1903);
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); but cf. United States ex rel.
Polymeris v. Trudell, 284 U.S. 279 (1932); United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commis-
sioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103 (1927); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924).
294. The Court stated that "[w]here neither Congress, the President, the Secretary of
State, nor the Attorney General has inescapably said so, we are not ready to assume that
any of them has attempted to deprive such a person of a fair hearing." 344 U.S. at
601-02 (footnote omitted).
295. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
296. 8 C.F.R. § 175.57(b) (1945 Supp.), reprinted at 345 U.S. at 212, n.8.
297. Alien, Long Held, Freed, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1954, at 10, col. 4.
298. United States ex rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, 195 F.2d 964, 966 (2d Cir. 1952).
299. 345 U.S. 208-9.
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applied would accept him, Mezei remained on Ellis Island. °0  He
was finally released "after four years' imprisonment only
through executive action as a matter of grace"301 in 1954.302
Mezei was simply, a man without a country, °3 but in this re-
gard, he was by no means unique. 4
The Attorney General excluded Mezei without a hearing
"on the 'basis of information of a confidential nature, the dis-
closure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest.'
That determination rested on a finding that [Mezei's] entry
would be prejudicial to the public interest for security rea-
sons." 30 5 The executive branch declined to divulge whatever evi-
dence it may have had to the district court even in camera,0 '
thereby adopting the position that the executive and legislative
branches could avoid judicial review and circumvent the tripar-
tite system of checks and balances in the implementation and
execution of general immigration powers. District Judge Kauf-
man stated "[w]ithout much doubt his conduct as a resident
alien between 1923 and 1948 was unexceptionable. ' 30 7 The dis-
trict court, in hearing Mezei's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, based its decision to release him on parole30 8 on the ra-
tionale that the court "has the power to release an alien from
custody who has been detained an unreasonably long time where
his deportation cannot be effectuated. '" 30 9 The decision of the
Supreme Court in Mezei relied upon the same statutory authori-
zation for the exercise of broad executive powers during a period
300. Id. at 209.
301. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 n.36 (1958) (Warren, C.J.).
302. Alien, Long Held, Freed, supra note 297.
303. Id.
304. E.g., consider the experience of the Cubans and Haitians, in the cases cited at
notes 404 and 568 infra.
305. 345 U.S. at 208.
306. Id. at 209.
307. United States ex rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, 101 F. Supp. 66, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
In the Supreme Court opinion, combined dissents of Justices Jackson and Frankfurter
commented that "[t]his man, who seems to have led a life of unrelieved insignificance,
must have been astonished to find himself suddenly putting the Government of the
United States in such fear that it was afraid to tell him why it was afraid of him." 345
U.S. at 219.
308. For the practice of paroling excluded aliens into the country generally, see Leng
May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S 185 (1985), discussed infra at note 566.
309. 101 F. Supp. 66, 68. Basically, this has been the position recent lower federal
courts have adopted. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980).
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of war or national emergency as was proclaimed by President
Roosevelt. By the date of the decision in Mezei, however, the
United States was clearly not embroiled in the national emer-
gency of the Second World War"'0 and cries that the nation ex-
ists on a perpetual full wartime footing are chillingly Orwellian
in vision.
The practice of using confidential undisclosed information
was extended in Jay v. Boyd311 to be used against resident aliens
in the United States to deny their application for suspension of
an order of deportation.3 12 By regulations promulgated by the
Attorney General, the immigration authorities could act upon
secret information in order to effectuate the resident alien's re-
moval from the country. An immigration officer could unilater-
ally decide the disclosure of such information would be prejudi-
cial to the public interest, safety, or security, and not be
required to give the alien notice."' The practice was upheld
even where the alien in Jay had resided in the United States
more than forty years 1 4 and was sixty-five years of age. 1 5 Presi-
dent Eisenhower described the statutory provisions under which
Jay became deportable as an "injustice[]. ' 3 6 According to one of
the dissenting voices in Jay, and as was the case concerning El-
len Knauff, "[n]o nation can remain true to the ideal of liberty
310. See notes 239-40 supra and accompanying text. Mezei was excluded from the
United States on February 9, 1950, before President Truman terminated the national
emergency. Mezei was excluded as a national security risk. 345 U.S. at 216. In adopting
the position that Mezei was entitled to a fair hearing with notice of the charges against
him, Justice Jackson's dissent in Mezei stated: "[it is inconceivable to me that this mea-
sure of simple justice and fair dealing would menace the security of this country." 345
U.S. at 228.
311. 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
312. The statute provided discretionary suspension of deportation at § § 244(a)(5),(c)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 215, 216 (cur-
rent version at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a), (c) (1982)).
The resident alien in Jay was ordered deported following passage of the Internal
Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987, as a former member of the Communist Party
from 1935 to 1940, over the alien's claim that non-membership was not a condition of his
original entry into the United States in 1921. Jay v. Boyd, 222 F. 2d 820 (9th Cir. 1955),
reh'g denied, 224 F. 2d 957 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 931 (1956), aff'd, 351
U.S. 345 (1956).
313. 351 U.S. at 347-48.
314. Id. at 362 (dissenting opinion of Warren, C.J.).
315. Id. at 364 (dissenting opinion of Black, J.).
316. 351 U.S. at 363 n.1 (describing the message from President Eisenhower to Sena-
tor Arthur V. Watkins, of April 6, 1953).
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under law and at the same time permit people to have their
homes destroyed and their lives blasted by the slurs of unseen
and unsworn informers. '3 1 7
Deep-rooted attachment to the United States will also not
prevent the forcible eviction of aliens who have run afoul of the
immigration laws. For example, aliens who enter the United
States merely to bear a child who will thus obtain United States
citizenship at birth will not necessarily be saved from deporta-
tion.3 18 Furthermore, excluded aliens who are temporarily pa-
roled319 into the United States while awaiting deportation will
not necessarily be considered as having established ties strong
enough to allow them to remain within the United States. They
are not within the United States for purposes of the immigration
statutes.2 0 In Leng May Ma v. Barber 21 the Court stated that
"[p]hysical detention of aliens is now the exception, not the rule,
and is generally employed only as to security risks or those likely
to abscond." 322 But even this turning point in the treatment of
aliens has suffered recent erosion. Developments occurring when
perceived large influxes of Haitians and Cubans arrived in the
United States, in the early 1980s, and changes brought by the
Reagan Administration, challenged the general rule stated in
Leng May Ma.
323
III. CONGRESS' PLENARY POWER TO DECIDE WHO SHALL ENTER:
VISAS, ASYLUM, AND REFUGEES
An unchecked federal authority to regulate immigration
continuously risks intervening with issues historically left to the
states and upsetting the nation's distinctive brand of federalism
and dual sovereignty. The extent to which the federal govern-
ment may interfere with domestic affairs of states and the lives
of private citizens under a claim of regulating immigration was
317. 351 U.S. at 365 (Black, J., dissenting).
318. United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72 (1957).
319. Provision for the paroling of excluded aliens was provided for in § 212(d)(5) of
the INA, 66 Stat. 163, 188 (currently codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1982)).
320. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958); Rogers v. Quan, 357 U.S. 193
(1958). See Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, discussed at text accompanying note 208 supra.
321. 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
322. Id. at 190.
323. See discussion in notes 404 and 568 infra.
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restricted by the Supreme Court in Keller v. United States.324
In that opinion, the Court announced that Congress does not
have the power to control all dealings between citizens and resi-
dent aliens.32 5 The decision found unconstitutional an immigra-
tion statute that made it a felony for anyone to support or har-
bor an alien woman for the purpose of prostitution.2 6
Ideology, however, has been held to be a permissible basis
on which to remove a long-time resident alien from the country,
or to deny entry into the United States.2 In Turner v. Wil-
324. 213 U.S. 138 (1909) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
325. Id. at 148.
The act charged is only one included in the great mass of personal dealings
with aliens. It is her [the alien's] own character and conduct which determines
the question of exclusion or removal. The acts of others may be evidence of her
business and character. But it does not follow that Congress has the power to
punish those whose acts furnish evidence from which the Government may de-
termine the question of her expulsion. Every possible dealing of any citizen with
the alien may have more or less induced her coming. But can it be within the
power of Congress to control all the dealings of our citizens with resident aliens?
If that be possible, the door is open to the assumption by the National Govern-
ment of an almost unlimited body of legislation. . . . If the contention of the
Government be sound, whatever may have been done in the past, however little
this field of legislation may have been entered upon, the power of Congress is
broad enough to take cognizance of all dealings of citizens with aliens. That
there is a moral consideration of the special facts of this case, that the act
charged is within the scope of the police power, is immaterial, for, as stated,
there is in the Constitution no grant to Congress of the police power. And the
legislation must stand or fall according to the determination of the question of
the power of Congress to control generally dealings of citizens with aliens. In
other words, an immense body of legislation, which heretofore has been recog-
nized as peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the States, may be taken by Con-
gress away from them. Although Congress had not largely entered into this field
of legislation it may do so, if it has the power. Then we should be brought face
to face with such a change in the internal conditions of this country as was never
dreamed of by the framers of the Constitution. While the acts of Congress are to
be liberally construed in order to enable it to carry into effect the powers con-
ferred, it is equally true that prohibitions and limitations upon those powers
should also be fairly and reasonably enforced.
213 U.S. at 148-49.
326. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 898, 899-900. Apparently, Keller v.
United States is a lesson Congress overlooked in passing the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359. The IRCA makes it
unlawful to employ an unauthorized alien and provides for criminal penalties, including
imprisonment, against those employers who do. See § 101 of the IRCA (adding a new §
274A(a)(1), (f)(1), 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a(a)(1), (f)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)).
327. See e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (Jackson, J.); see also Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S.
405 (1960); cf. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967) (reentry denied on basis of homosex-
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liams,3 28 the Court rejected a first amendment claim made by an
alien anarchist to have a right to remain in the United States in
order to espouse his political philosophy. The facts in the case
involved an alien facing deportation who had impermissibly en-
gaged in various activities as a labor organizer.
A. Visa Allocations
Another example illustrating the tension between the lib-
erty of United States citizens and the need for the government
to regulate its borders arose in Kleindienst v. Mandel,32 9 where
the Court held that the first amendment right of citizens to hear
an alien is qualified by Congress' plenary power to exclude
aliens. 330 In Mandel, a Belgian citizen who was an "internation-
ally respected scholar," 3 1 was denied entry into the United
States and barred from speaking upon invitation at various uni-
versities because he advocated "the economic, governmental,
uality). See also Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570-71 ("it shall be lawful for the
President of the United States at anytime during the continuance of this act, to order all
such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States...
to depart out of the territory of the United States" (emphasis in the original)).
328. 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904) ("[Tlhose who are excluded cannot assert the rights in
general obtaining in a land to which they do not belong as citizens or otherwise."). The
statute prohibited the entry of "anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the
overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States or of all govern-
ment or of all forms of law, or the assassination of public officials." Act of Mar. 3, 1903,
ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214. The Court noted that removal from the United States
could occur where the alien's only difference with the United States was his philosophi-
cal outlook despite the fact that he was not disposed toward violence:
If the word "anarchists" should be interpreted as including aliens whose an-
archistic views are professed as those of political philosophers innocent of evil
intent, it would follow that Congress was of opinion that the tendency of the
general exploitation of such views is so dangerous to the public weal that aliens
who hold and advocate them would be undesirable additions to our population,
whether permanently or temporarily, whether many or few, and, in the light of
previous decisions, the act, even in this aspect, would not be unconstitutional, or
as applicable to any alien who is opposed to all organized government.
194 U.S. at 294.
329. 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (Blackmun, J.) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting, joined by Brennan, J.).
330. The plenary powers of Congress to regulate immigration exist during periods of
war or national emergency, and the Court's insistence upon extending the power beyond
this restricted scope is a continual process of broadening the reach of precedent. See
discussion at notes 223-323 supra.
331. 408 U.S. at 774 n.4 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
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and international doctrines of world communism.31 32 His visa
was denied despite claims by university professors that their
first and fifth amendment rights were denied by being prevented
from hearing and speaking with Mandel. In dicta, the Court
stated that the "congressional power to make policies and rules
for the exclusion of aliens"3 33 is plenary.3 34 The actual holding of
the case, however, is that when the executive exercises a con-
gressional delegation of power to exclude aliens, and such power
is exercised "on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide
reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that
discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the
First Amendment interests of those who seek personal commu-
nication with the" alien. 3 6
The Court specifically stated that it was not addressing the
question of what the result would be if the executive offered "no
justification whatsoever"3" for the exercise of its discretion. The
"facially legitimate and bona fide reason" to deny the scholar's
entry was that in a previous trip to the United States, Mandel
"went far beyond the stated purposes of his trip, on the basis of
which his admission had been authorized. '" 37 According to Jus-
tice Marshall's dissent, however, "[m]erely 'legitimate govern-
mental interests' cannot override constitutional rights," 8 such
as the first amendment right of United States citizens to hear a
speaker of their choice, absent a "compelling governmental in-
terest." 339 Justice Marshall stated that "government has no le-
gitimate interest in stopping the flow of ideas. '3 40
Justice Marshall did not believe prior cases upholding con-
gressional power to exclude aliens need be overruled to support
his position, since the issues involved in Mandel hinged upon
the rights of United States citizens to hear a speaker. According
to Justice Marshall, "[a]t least when the rights of Americans are
332. Id. at 756 (footnote omitted).
333. Id. at 769.
334. See Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional
Power, 1986 IMMIGR. & NATIONALITY L. REV. 81 (1986).
335. 408 U.S. at 770.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 759 (quoting INS letter to counsel).
338. Id. at 777.
339. Id. at 779.
340. Id. at 780.
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involved, there is no basis for concluding that the power to ex-
clude aliens is absolute."' " Where the Bill of Rights protects cit-
izens' free speech and association rights, it also functions as a
restriction on the congressional power to exclude aliens. Follow-
ing this line of reasoning, the older alien exclusion cases were
distinguishable because those decisions did not involve rights of
United States citizens. 2
There was no compelling government interest to exclude
Mandel. According to Justice Douglas' dissent "national security
[was] not involved.3 8 3 Additionally, Justice Douglas argued that
"[tihought control is not within the competence of any branch of
government.. . . [T]he Congress did not undertake to make the
Attorney General a censor."3"4 Discretion was invested in the At-
torney General for purposes not relevant in Mandel, according
to Justice Douglas, such as for reasons of national security, im-
portation of drugs, and similar matters.
There have been at least three significant developments
since Kleindienst v. Mandel which have severely undermined
the force of its holding: (1) The Helsinki Final Act;3"5 (2) The
341. Id. at 782.
342. Id. at 783. Justice Marshall further expounded upon this theme in Fiallo v. Bell,
430 U.S. 787 (1977), when he considered the rights of United States citizens as they are
affected by operation of the federal immigration laws. See discussion at text accompany-
ing note 1122.
The federal powers to regulate immigration are so extensive that the rights of
United States citizens practically disappear by the wayside. For example, in Burrafato v.
United States Department of State, 523 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
910 (1976), the court of appeals affirmed the district court's holding
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint which claimed that
the constitutional rights of a citizen wife had been violated by denial of her hus-
band's visa application without reason by the United States Consul in Palermo,
Italy, and that failure of the Department of State in accordance with its regula-
tions to specify the reason for denial of the husband's visa application denied
him procedural due process.
523 F.2d at 554-55. Similarly, in Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975), the
court decided that no constitutional right of a citizen is violated by the deportation of
his or her alien spouse. See also Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971); Swartz v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 338(D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
357 U.S. 928 (1958).
343. Id. at 772.
344. Id.
345. 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1292-1325 (1975). See V. MASTNY, HELSINKI, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY (1986). See also Kampelman, The Helsinki Final Act:
Peace Through Diplomacy, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 327 (1983); Paust, Transnational
Freedom of Speech: Legal Aspects of the Helsinki Final Act, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
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McGovern Amendment;s4e and (3) Abourezk v. Reagan.3 47 On
August 1, 1975, the Helsinki Declaration was signed by thirty-
four nations participating in the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe. 4 8 The McGovern Amendment uses the
53 (1982); Dean, Beyond Helsinki: the Soviet View of Human Rights in International
Law, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 55 (1980); Chalidze, The Humanitarian Provisions of the Hel-
sinki Accord: a Critique of Their Significance, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 429 (1980);
Comment, Politics Among the Airwaves: an Analysis of Soviet and Western Perspec-
tives on International Broadcasting and the Right to Exchange Ideas and Information
Regardless of Frontiers, 7 Hous. J. INT'L L. 237 (1985).
346. 22 U.S.C. § 2691 (1982). The most recent provisions of the McGovern Amend-
ment are:
(a) Application by excludible aliens
For purposes of achieving greater United States compliance with the provi-
sions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(signed at Helsinki on August 1, 1975) and for purposes of encouraging other
signatory countries to comply with those provisions, the Secretary of State
should, within 30 days of receiving an application for a nonimmigrant visa by
any alien who is excludible from the United States by reason of membership in
or affiliation with a proscribed organization but who is otherwise admissible to
the United States, recommend that the Attorney General grant the approval
necessary for the issuance of a visa to such an alien, unless the Secretary deter-
mines that the admission of such alien would be contrary to the security inter-
ests of the United States and so certifies to the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate. Nothing in this section may be construed as authorizing or requiring the
admission to the United States of any alien who is excludible for reasons other
than membership in or affiliation with a proscribed organization.
(b) Nonadmission of labor organization representatives of a totalitarian
state
This section does not apply to representatives of purported labor organiza-
tions in countries where such organizations are in fact instruments of a totalitar-
ian state.
(c) Nonadmission of aliens connected with Palestine Liberation
Organization
This section does not apply with respect to any alien who is a member, of-
ficer, official, representative, or spokesman of the Palestine Liberation
Organization.
(d) Waiver recommendations
The Secretary of State may refuse to recommend a waiver for aliens from
signatory countries which are not in substantial compliance with the provisions
of the Helsinki Final Act, particularly the human rights and humanitarian af-
fairs provisions.
347. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J. dissenting), vacat-
ing 592 F. Supp. 880 (D. D.C. 1984), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct. 666 (1986).
348. The High Representatives who signed the agreement were Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Dem-
ocratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
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term "Final Act" to refer to part four of the Helsinki Declara-
tion which pertains to compliance with the purposes of the Dec-
laration. 49 United States domestic law created a Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (Commission) 350 to monitor
programs and activities of the United States Government with a
view of promoting "a greater interchange of people and ideas be-
tween East and West" in compliance with the Helsinki Final
Act.3 51
Numerous provisions of the Final Act encourage an en-
hanced exchange of people and ideas between East and West.3 51
For example, the Act supports the easing of barriers to allow for
the movement of migrant workers. 53 The Final Act encourages
Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Yugo-
slavia. The Holy See was also a signatory. 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1292. This list includes
the nine members of the European Economic Community, and all the European States,
both Communist and non-Communist, with the exception of Albania. Historical note to
22 U.S.C.A. § 3002 (West 1979).
349. See the historical note to 22 U.S.C.A. § 3002 (West 1979).
350. 22 U.S.C. § 3001 (1982).
351. 22 U.S.C. § 3002 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
352. The participating states, under the language of the Final Act, declared it to be
their aim to facilitate freer movement and contacts, individually and collec-
tively, whether privately, or officially, among persons, institutions and organiza-
tions of the participating States, and to contribute to the solution of the human-
itarian problems that arise in that connexion.
14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1313. The participating States declared themselves ready to take
measures to implement these provisions. Id. at 1313.
353. 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1311. The Final Act aims
to ensure, through collaboration between the host country and the country
of origin, the conditions under which the orderly movement of workers might
take place, while at the same time protecting their personal and social welfare
and, if appropriate, to organize the recruitment of migrant workers and the pro-
vision of elementary language and vocational training;
to ensure equality of rights between migrant workers and nationals of the
host countries with regard to conditions of employment and work and to social
security, and to endeavour to ensure that migrant workers may enjoy satisfac-
tory living conditions, especially housing conditions;
to endeavour to ensure, as far as possible, that migrant workers may enjoy
the same opportunities as nationals of the host countries of finding other suita-
ble employment in the event of unemployment . . ..
14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1311. Notably, the recently passed Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act of 1986 (IRCA) takes a diametrically opposite view toward migrant workers by
severely restricting eligibility for inclusion within the class of legal migrant workers, de-
nying employment eligibility for most individuals who cross the United States border,
and by making illegal the employment of illegal aliens who migrate across the border.
Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359.
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cross-border visitation between family members without distinc-
tion on the basis of country of origin or destination. 5 As appli-
cable to Mandel, the Final Act requires simplification and flexi-
bility concerning procedures for entry into the United States
when admission is for professional purposes. The Act also re-
quires the easing of regulations to permit movement of citizens
of participating states while within the foreign countries. 55 The
Act promotes free exchanges and contacts between organizations
representing student interests.3 56 These provisions address the
facts as they existed in Mandel where various universities had
invited Mandel to speak at their campuses. The Act also sup-
ports facilitating conventions of nongovernmental organizations,
associations, and individuals.5
The Final Act provides generally for an enhanced flow of
information between the participating states358 including im-
proving conditions under which journalists from one participat-
ing state may function in another participating state. 59 Under
these provisions, lecture tours by specialists from other partici-
pating states are encouraged.36 0 Conceivably, these provisions
describe Mandel's situation rather closely as he was a journalist
for a Belgian paper.3 6' Additionally, under the Final Act, jour-
nalists are to have visa requests examined in a "favorable
spirit." '362 The Act also contemplates cultural cooperation and
exchanges,363 including the development of contacts between
teachers and specialists. 6 The Helsinki Final Act envisions ex-
pansion of contacts among individuals in the field of educa-
tion 6 ' which arguably applies to individuals such as Mandel.
3 6
354. INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1313-14.
355. Id. at 1314 ((d) Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons).
356. Id. at 1315 ((f) Meetings among Young People).
357. Id. at 1315 ((h) Expansion of Contacts).
358. Id. at 1315-17.
359. Id. at 1315.
360. Id. at 1316 ((a) Improvement of the Circulation of, Access to, and Exchange of
Information (i) Oral Information).
361. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 756.
362. 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1317 ((c) Improvement of Working Conditions for
Journalists).
363. Id. at 1317-21.
364. Id. at 1320.
365. Id. at 1321-24.
366. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 774.
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The Final Act encourages improved access for scholars to educa-
tional institutions within the other participating states for
symposiums and seminars. 3 7 Mandel was a respected scholar in
his field and conceivably would have fallen within the ambit of
these allowances.3 68 The Act supports coordination of programs
to foster exchanges of information concerning the disciplines of
philosophy, political science, and economics369-a broad designa-
tion under which Mandel certainly would have fallen had the
Act been in existence at the time of his attempted entry into the
United States.
Although the Helsinki Final Act was not ratified as a treaty,
its provisions were selectively implemented by United States do-
mestic law through the passage of the McGovern Amendment 7 '
and other provisions related to foreign relations law which es-
tablished the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope.371 The McGovern Amendment specifically allows for the is-
suance of temporary visas to aliens who are members of, or
affiliated with "proscribed organization[s] ' '37' as long as they are
otherwise qualified for admission into the United States and as
long as the Secretary of State does not determine that the ad-
mission would be contrary to the security interests of the United
States.373 Thus, an alien such as Mandel, would now likely ob-
tain a visa despite his advocacy on behalf of the doctrines of
world communism.3 74 Under the McGovern Amendment, the
367. 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1322 ((b) Access and Exchanges).
368. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 774.
369. 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1323.
370. 22 U.S.C § 2691 (1982).
371. 22 U.S.C. § § 3001 (1982), 3002-03 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), 3004-06 (1982),
3007-08 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), 3009 (Supp. III 1985).
372. 22 U.S.C. § 2691(a) (1982). The "proscribed organization[s]" are the orgainza-
tions described in § 212(a)(28) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA)
(Communists and anarchists) (current version in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28) (1982)). See
Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1057, 1058 n.18.
373. 22 U.S.C. § 2691(a) (1982).
374. Section 212(a)(28)(D), (G)(v) of the INA of 1952, 66 Stat. 185 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(D),(G)(v) (1982)), formerly required exclusion. Under §
212(d)(3)(A) of the INA of 1952, 66 Stat. 187 (currently codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1182(d)(3)(A) (1982)), the Attorney General and Secretary of State together may consent
to the admission of an alien otherwise excludable under § 212(a)(28), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(28). The McGovern Amendment now directs the Secretary of State to recom-
mend to the Attorney General that an alien affiliated with a proscribed organization (and
not otherwise excludable) receive a nonimmigrant visa as long as the security interests of
1987]
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Secretary of State is authorized to make the decision that the
admission would be contrary to the "security" interests of the
United States. 7 5 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), the Attorney General retains authority to do likewise." 6
The McGovern Amendment specifically restricts its application
to aliens who are excludable for the sole reason that they are
members of, or affiliated with, a proscribed organization.3 " For
example, an alien who is affiliated with the Communist Party
could still be excluded as a threat to the security of the United
States under section 212(a)(27) of the INA37e or under the Mc-
Govern Amendment's similar provision.3 79
A circuit court, in Abourezk v. Reagan, grappled with the
problem of whether application of section 212(a)(27) completely
eviscerates the potency of the McGovern Amendment and de-
cided squarely that it does not."' The circuit court in Abourezk
remanded the case to develop a more substantive record to aid
in determining the contours of section 212(a)(27)P1 but the Su-
preme Court, in granting certiorari, 82 may have decided to per-
form this task itself.
The Court in Abourezk decided that the Secretary of State
cannot bar the admission of an alien into the United States for
the sole reason of membership in a proscribed organization." 3
The Court reasoned that the "prejudice to foreign policy"3 ' that
arises is not significant enough to warrant denial of admission
for national security purposes. The circuit court emphasized
the United States are not jeopardized and that "instances in which the Attorney General
rejects action in the foreign policy realm that the Secretary recommends will be ex-
traordinary." Abourezk, 785 F.2d 1043, 1059 n.22.
375. 22 U.S.C. § 2691(a) (1982).
376. Section 212(a)(27) of the INA of 1952, 66 Stat. 184 (currently codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) (1982)) (barring entry of aliens who would "engage in activities
which would be prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or
security of the United States").
377. 22 U.S.C. § 2691(a) (1982) (last sentence).
378. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) (1982).
379. 22 U.S.C. § 2691(a) (1982).
380. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that
"[tihe Executive may not use subsection (27) to evade the limitations Congress ap-
pended to subsection (28)." 785 F.2d at 1057.
381. 785 F.2d at 1056.
382. 107 S.Ct. 666 (1986).
383. 785 F.2d at 1057.
384. Id.
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that the executive branch, acting under the security provision of
section 212(a)(27), must not evade the will of Congress as ex-
pressed in the McGovern Amendment.38 5 The court held that
the reason for denying admission under section 212(a)(27) must
be "independent of"'38 the fact of the alien's membership in, or
affiliation with, the proscribed organization. The executive agen-
cies cannot succeed on a claim that membership alone is suffi-
ciently prejudicial to the security of the United States to bar
admission.
The circuit court in Abourezk also expressed a growing dis-
pleasure in the lower federal courts for arguments by the execu-
tive which would deny the safeguard of judicial review when the
issue concerns immigration matters. 8 7 This judicial self-asser-
tion came in the majority's response to the dissent388 in which
the majority rejected the argument that the State Department
could exclude members of proscribed organizations believed to
be affiliated with specific unfriendly governments. " Since rela-
tions with foreign governments lie least of all within the ambit
of judicial cognizance, the court recognized that acceptance of
such an argument would eliminate judicial review of State De-
partment activities. This result would bar effective implementa-
tion of the McGovern Amendment. The judicial self-assertive-
ness thereby evinced contrasts with the earlier deference the
courts gave the executive when treating immigration matters.
For example, in Knauf3 90 and Mezei,3 91 the Attorney General
refused to divulge information forming the basis for the exclu-
sions for in camera review by a judge even in the absence of
opposing counsel.392 Nonetheless, the Attorney General in each
385. Another court faced with this problem was Allende v. Schultz, 605 F. Supp. 1220
(D.Mass. 1985), discussed infra at note 393.
386. 785 F.2d at 1057, 1058 (emphasis added by the court).
387. 785 F.2d at 1058 n.20.
388. 785 F.2d 1043 (Bork, Circuit Judge, dissenting).
389. 785 F.2d at 1058 n.20. The court decided that an individual can be denied a visa
on the basis of his or her affiliation with a government that is hostile to the United
States under § 212(a)(27). But the court clarified this point by explaining that such affili-
ation cannot be presumed merely "because of the applicant's membership or participa-
tion in a subsection (28) organization" 785 F.2d at 1059.
390. 338 U.S. 537 (1950). See discussion supra at text accompanying note 226.
391. 345 U.S. 206 (1953). See discussion supra at text accompanying note 295.
392. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 209; Knauff, 338 U.S. 537 (nondisclosed information). Con-
cerning the government's refusal to disclose information about the alien, even in ex parte
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case prevailed because of the great deference the Court extended
to claims concerning national security.
In the relatively short span of time since Knauff and Mezei,
the lower federal courts, aided by new statutes, judicial deci-
sions, and agency regulations, have greatly reduced the applica-
bility of the former, self-imposed doctrine of judicial passivity in
matters relating to immigration law.3 93 This development arrives
in camera proceedings, see note 272 and text accompanying note 305 supra.
393. For example, in Allende v. Schultz, 605 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Mass. 1985) (denying
motion for summary judgment), motion to dismiss denied, 624 F. Supp. 1063 (D. Mass.
1985) where the widow of former Chilean President Salvador Allende was refused a non-
immigrant visa by the Department of State on the basis of § § 212(a)(28)(C) and (27) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, the court refused to consider the State Depart-
ment's classified documents in its motion for summary judgment, not out of judicial def-
erence to the executive on immigration matters, but because the United States citizen
plaintiffs (scholars, politicians, and religious leaders) were denied access to the classified
materials and thus could not counter them. The court not only refused to give deference
to a "national security" argument, but also, the court decided the motion by expressly
refusing to consider, ex parte, the classified documents the government possessed, and
denied the government's motion for summary judgment. Also, the court recognized that
first amendment rights of United States citizens are implicated when the government
refuses to grant a visa to an alien with whom United States citizens wish to speak. Al-
lende, 624 F. Supp. at 1065.
In El-Werfalli v. Smith, 547 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)(Sofaer, J.) the court ex-
amined classified materials in deciding that a Libyan aeronautics student's entry into the
United States would aid Libyan policies and objectives which would threaten the public
interest and welfare of the United States. El-Werfalli involved § 235(c) of the INA of
1952, 66 Stat. 199, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (1982), which allows for the exclusion of aliens
on the basis of information of a confidential nature, the disclosure of which the
Attorney General, in the exercise of his discretion . . . concludes would be preju-
dicial to the public interest, safety, or security [whereby such alien may] be ex-
cluded and deported without any inquiry or further inquiry by a special inquiry
officer ....
The court decided the statute does not "eliminate the very limited judicial review tradi-
tionally applied in this area." 547 F. Supp. at 153. Examination by the court of the
classified material satisfied the court that the government's explanations were sufficient
under Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, to justify the exclusion. Under the Mandel standard, ac-
cording to El-Werfalli, the government may exclude for "a facially legitimate and bona
fide reason" but the court is limited from probing into the wisdom or the basis of the
reasons. 547 F. Supp. at 153.
The importance of El- Werfalli is that the court will look at classified or confidential
material (which it did not do in Knauff nor Mezei, see note 392 supra) in evaluating the
government's claim that an alien is inadmissible under § § 212(a)(27), & 235(c) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § § 1182(a)(27), & 1225(c) (1982).
The situation of an alien who is excluded as a danger to the national security of the
United States, who simultaneously advances a claim for asylum, was considered in Ellis
v. Ferro, 549 F.Supp 428 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), where the court held that the alien was enti-
tled to a district court hearing, on habeas corpus, concerning his asylum claim and a
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as a balanced correction for the excessive docility the judiciary
review of the Regional Commissioner's determination based on § § 235(c) and 212(a)(27)
of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § § 1227(c), and 1182(a)(27) (1982), under an "abuse of discretion"
standard. 549 F. Supp. at 434.
The net result of these decisions is that an alien may challenge an INS determina-
tion that he is a danger to the security of the United States under certain circumstances.
In Azzouka v. Sava, 777 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1985), the court decided that although an alien
has no right to an asylum hearing under the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94
Stat. 102, if the Regional Commissioner determines, under the procedures of § 235(c) of
the INA, that the alien is a danger to the national security of the United States under §
212(a)(27) of the INA, the courts will nonetheless require an "explicit finding" under the
§ 235(c) procedures that the alien in fact poses a present danger to the security of the
United States. Azzouka, 777 F.2d 68, 76. The courts will no longer merely give rubber-
stamp approval to a claim of national security put forward by the government. Failure
by the government to establish such a finding will result in the ability of the alien to
advance an asylum petition with all the associated opportunities for judicial review of his
or her claim. 777 F.2d at 76.
In Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, at 1061, the court specifically rejected the
proposition that an alien can be faced with an exclusion decision against him "based on
evidence he was never permitted to see and rebut." Under 8 CFR § 208.10(c) (1987)
(record and non-record evidence) the immigration judge can receive classified informa-
tion (under Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983) (containing 1982 compilation))
as non-record evidence and the alien must "be informed as to whether the character of
the evidence concerns political, social or other conditions in a specified country, or [is]
personally related to the applicant." There may be limited disclosure of such evidence to
the alien. 8 C.F.R. § 208.10(d) (1987). Even without a consideration of international law,
United States domestic law has moved a great deal toward eroding the underpinnings of
the broad dicta announced in Knauff and Mezei, discussed supra at text accompanying
notes 226 and 295.
These recent developments represent a break with the past, or at least a minor sepa-
ration. For example, in Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956), the Court held that confidential
information, undisclosed to the alien, may be used in rulings upon applications for sus-
pension of deportation. Even in Jay, however, the Court recognized that "where there is
no compelling reason to refuse to disclose the basis of a denial of an application, the
statute does not contemplate arbitrary secrecy." 351 U.S. at 358. Justice Black, in his
dissent, expounded
What is meant by "confidential information"? According to officers of the
Immigration Service it may be "merely information we received off the street";
or "what might be termed hearsay evidence, which could not be gotten into the
record... "; or "information from persons who were in a position to give us the
information that might be detrimental to the interests of the Service to disclose
that person's name" ....
351 U.S. at 365.
The combination of these recent procedural safeguards places United States immi-
gration law closer to the international standards announced in the Geneva Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6260, T.I.A.S. 6577. Although
the United States is not a party to this Convention, it is a party to the Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees, January 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. 6577, which incor-
porates Articles 2 through 34 of the Geneva Convention. The applicable articles in this
context are illustrated by the following:
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has formerly displayed and diminishes the danger that the polit-
ical voices of the other two branches will secretly include within
the rubric of national security considerations reaching the lives
of innocuous individuals whose personal politics may be offen-
sive but who by no leap of the imagination pose a threat to the
national existence. There is no point in ceding judicial review-
ability of the actions of an executive agency when judges can
keep a secret as well as bureaucrats, and can take adequate pre-
cautions against uninvited disclosures. In a tripartite scheme of
checks and balances there is much to be said against one branch
refusing to play the role the Founding Fathers assigned to it re-
gardless of the convenience and economy that may be engen-
dered. Recognition that a government is sovereign by no means
dispenses with the fact that it remains a government of enumer-
ated powers. Once conceded that there are inherent powers ac-
companying a government's sovereignty, it is illogical to con-
clude that one or two branches of the government were given
such powers to the exclusion of the judiciary."" '
Article 32 (Expulsion)
1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their terri-
tory save on grounds of national security or public order.
2. The expulsion of such refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision
reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling reasons
of national security otherwise require, the refugee shall be allowed to submit
evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be represented for the purpose
before competent authority or a person or persons specially designated by the
competent authority.
Article 33 (Prohibition of Expulsion or Return ("Refoulement"))
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would
be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a par-
ticular social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a
refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the se-
curity of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final
judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community
of that country.
Arguably, these provisions, in force since 1951, have risen to the level of customary inter-
national law, which is binding upon United States courts. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
677 (1900). On related developments, see generally Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64
FOREIGN Aiw. 901 (1986).
394. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320 (J. Madison) (Mentor ed. 1961), where it is
explained that it is intended that the separate branches of government will "by their
mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places." See also E.
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In Abourezk, the circuit court went so far as to direct the
district court to make certain that the aliens were "accorded ac-
cess to the decisive evidence to the fullest extent possible, with-
out jeopardizing legitimately raised national security inter-
ests."' 9 5 The circuit court noted "grave concern about the
district court's heavy reliance upon [the executive's] in camera
ex parte evidence when it granted the [executive's] motion for
summary judgment."3 6 In a step away from the broad judicial
deference to the executive in immigration matters, the Abourezk
court cut an inroad by holding "that a court may not dispose of
the merits of a case on the basis of ex parte, in camera submis-
sions. '' 97 On immigration issues, the judiciary shows signs of
moving out of its former mold of complete deference to the
other two branches.3 98
B. Political and Refugee Asylum
Federal immigration law applies different standards in its
evaluation of requests for political 9 9 and refugee 00 asylum. Two
HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL 148-54 (1985) (subparts: Judicial Abdication and the
Rights of Aliens, and Citizenship and Sovereignty: Two Dangerous Abstractions).
395. 785 F.2d. at 1060.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 1061.
398. The Abourezk court pronounced limitations on the broad power to regulate
immigration:
The Executive has broad discretion over the admission and exclusion of
aliens, but that discretion is not boundless. It extends only as far as the statu-
tory authority conferred by Congress and may not transgress constitutional limi-
tations. It is the duty of the courts, in cases properly before them, to say where
those statutory and constitutional boundaries lie.
785 F.2d at 1061.
399. In this paper, the term "political asylum" refers to asylum in the United States
on the basis of a withholding of deportation brought about by the operation of §
243(h)(1) of the INA of 1952, 66 Stat. 214, as amended by Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-236, § 11(f), 79 Stat. 918, as amended by Act of Oct. 30, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-549,
§ 104, 92 Stat. 2066, as amended by Act of Mar. 17, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(e),
94 Stat. 107 (Refugee Act of 1980) (currently codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982)),
which states:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to a country
if the Attorney General determines.that such alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion.
(emphasis added).
400. "Refugee asylum" is a reference to the combined operation of § § 101(a)(42)(A)
and 208 of the INA, as added by the Act of Mar. 17, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § § 201(a),
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cases decided within the space of one year illustrate the differ-
ence: in Garcia-Mir v. Smith,' 10 the burden of proving de-
portability ultimately fell upon the government; in INS v.
Stevic, 02 the deportable alien had to demonstrate, by a clear
probability, that he would suffer persecution if returned to his
native land.0 s
(b), 92 Stat. 102, 103 (Refugee Act of 1980) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § § 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158
(1982)). Section 101(a)(42) provides:
The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country of
such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is
outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion ....
(emphasis added). Section 208(a) of the INA provides:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically
present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of
such alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in
the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that
such an alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A) of this
title.
See OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES
AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1967 CONVENTION AND THE
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES; See also Helton, The Legality of De-
taining Refugees in the United States, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 353 (1986);
-- , Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: an Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 243 (1984).
401. 469 U.S. 1311 (1985) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice)(application to vacate stay).
402. 467 U.S. 407 (1984) (Stevens, J.). See generally Helton, The Proper Role of Dis-
cretion in Political Asylum Determinations, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 999 (1985); Tasoff,
Legislation Relating to the Deportation of Refugees, 7 WHITTIER L. REV. 669 (1985);
Rood, The Alien Facing Potential Persecution and the Clear Probability Standard for
Relief from Deportation under Immigration and Naturalization Act Section 243(h), 10
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 275 (1985); Casenote, The Refugee Act of 1980-What Bur-
den of Proof: Controversy Lives on After Stevic, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L., 875 (1985);
Note, Immigration Law-Deportation-The Section 243(h) Burden after Stevic: The
Sixth Circuit Clarifies Alien's Burden of Proof to Avoid Deportation, 9 SUFFOLK TRANS-
NAT'L L.J. 173 (1985); Note, Asylum and Withholding of Deportation under the Refugee
Act of 1980, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J., 367 (1985).
403. Regardless of the standard of proof used to establish the likelihood of persecu-
tion, as well as upon whom the burden is placed, the fact of an alien's resettlement in a
third country before coming to the United States is a relevant factor in evaluating a
request for asylum. The Burger Court held, in Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49,
(1971)(Black, J.)(Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, Brennan and Marshall, JJ.),
that resettlement could defeat the alien's request for asylum within the United States. In
Yee Chien Woo, the alien-applicant fled mainland China in 1953, lived in Hong Kong
until 1959, and stayed within the United States from 1960 to 1966. The Court reasoned
that because prior statutes allowing refugee asylum had considered whether the alien
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The Cubans who fled to the United States as part of the
Mariel Boatlift in 1980 obtained in chambers review of a circuit
court order in Garcia-Mir v. Smith in 1985.4 A district court
had firmly resettled in an intervening country, the standard still applied under'a condi-
tional entry pursuant to § 203(a)(7) of the INA, as amended, Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-236, § 3, 79 Stat. 913 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1982)), which
provided:
Conditional entries shall next be made available by the Attorney General
to aliens who satisfy an Immigration and Naturalization Services officer at
an examination in any non-Communist or non-Communist dominated country,
(A) that (i) because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, or political opinion they have fled (I) from any Communist or Commu-
nist-dominated country or area . . . and (ii) are unable or unwilling to return to
such country or area on account of race, religion, or political opinion, and (iii)
are not nationals of the countries or areas in which their application for condi-
tional entry is made ....
(emphasis added). See, e.g., Tsamenyi, The 'Boat People': Are They Refugees?, 5 HuM.
RTS. Q. 348 (1983)(discusses people fleeing Vietnam after the fall of Saigon in 1975, in-
cluding the condition of the Hoa, the ethnic Chinese, in Vietnam); see also, In re Por-
tales, 18 I. & N. Dec. 239 (BIA 1982) (Int. Dec. No. 2905) where requests for asylum and
withholding of deportation were held to be properly denied to natives and citizens of
Cuba who were granted "nonimmigrant resident refugee status [by Peru entitling them]
to work, attend school, practice their religion, and requir[ing them] to pay taxes." Id. at
240-41. The BIA indicated that "[an alien is deemed firmly resettled if offered perma-
nent resettlement by another country as a consequence of his flight from persecution,
unless it is established that the conditions of his residence in that country have been
substantially and consciously restricted by the authorities of that country." Id. at 242.
See also 8 C.F.R. § § 207.1(b) & (c), 208.8(f)(1)(ii), and 208.14 (1987).
For an analysis of the standard of proof used in the deportation context, see
Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (government's burden of proof in a deportation
proceeding is to establish the facts supporting deportability by clear, unequivocal and
convincing evidence). For a discussion of the development of the evidentiary standard
utilized in denaturalization proceedings and expatriations, see infra notes 1304-53 and
accompanying text.
404. 469 U.S. 1311 (1985) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), which represents the tip of
the iceberg concerning litigation arising between the Cubans who arrived in the United
States as part of the Mariel Boatlift and the efforts by the federal government to expel
or incarcerate them. This episode in United States history is chronicled in the court
decisions concerning the Cubans' claims. A recital of the major cases follows. For an
argument that the Haitian boat people were received differently by the United States
than were the Marielitos merely on the basis of the color of their skin, see, E. HULL,
WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ALIENS (1985).
In Soroa-Gonzales v. Civilleti, 515 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (Shoob, J.), an
excludable Cuban under § 212(a)(20) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20) (1982))
(lack of proper entry documents) whose parole under § 212(d)(5) (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1982)) had been revoked by the INS, and who had subsequently
been incarcerated for one year in a maximum security federal prison, the Atlanta Federal
Penitentiary, was granted habeas corpus relief and released on parole under order of the
district court since the government failed to show that the Cuban detainee was "a risk to
the national security . . . likely to abscond," or an individual whose release "would be
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had set aside the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) orders of
against the public interest." Id. at 1061. The alien was released into the custody of two
individuals willing to sponsor him.
Factors which apparently weighed in the alien's favor were as follows. The judge
accepted that the entire boatlift had occurred at the President's invitation. Id. at 1051.
The alien had been detained soley because he entered without the proper entry docu-
ments although some 130,000 other Cubans fitting the same description were nonetheless
free on parole. Id. Additionally, the alien was being held indefinitely in prison. The court
concluded that the alien's treatment was "neither fair, reasonable nor humane." Id. The
court indicated that it was acting upon the writ, additionally, out of an "absence of gov-
ernment policy" where the alternative was to permit the continued indefinite incarcera-
tion of the alien. Id. at 1051 n.1. The court recognized that Cuba would not accept the
detainee or other participants in the "freedom flotilla." Id. at 1053 n.1.5.
The Court distinguished the Knauff, 338 U.S. 537 (1950), and Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953) cases, discussed supra at text accompanying notes 226 and 295, by taking the
position that the alien was not a threat to national security, and that his presence in the
United States was in response, in part, to the invitation President Carter extended to the
Cubans originally.
Regarding international law, the.court indicated it was avoiding a decision on these
issues, but that
[w]ere the Court forced to decide, however, whether petitioner's continued in-
carceration pursuant to INS' refusal to reinstate parole amounted to "arbitrary
detention" in violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article
9), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 9, para. 1),
and the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 7, para. 3), the Court
would conclude that petitioner's further detention was arbitrary. He is being
treated as if he had been found to have committed a crime in Cuba despite the
fact that the opposite was found to be the case.
515 F. Supp. at 1061 n.18.
In Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 91 F.R.D. 117 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (Shoob, J.), the district
court conditionally certified the
class of all Cuban nationals whose parole ...[had] been revoked by the INS,
who [were at the time of certification] incarcerated at the Atlanta Federal Peni-
tentiary or who [would] be incarcerated there, and who [had] arrived in the
United States from Cuba as part of the "Freedom Flotilla" in 1980.
Id. at 126 (italicized language deleted from the certification in 91 F.R.D. 244). The Cu-
ban detainees were known as the "Mir" class. 91 F.R.D. at 119-120. The court refused to
delay judicial proceedings in deference to the executive's July 22, 1981 proposed plan to
reconsider release of the detained Cubans which had been entitled the "Status Review
Plan and Procedures." Id. at 121. The court indicated a willingness to consider claims by
the government concerning those aliens whose release on parole "(a) [would] constitute a
serious threat to national security; (b) [would] likely result in the detainee's absconding;
or (c) [would] be against the public interest for reasons not readily apparent." Id. at 125.
Further, the court indicated the government would bear the burden of convincing the
court that any particular individual Cuban fell within one of the 3 detainable classes
listed above. The court conditionally certified 12 subclasses, within the major class
grouping, of excludable detainees. The subclassifications were determined by the basis
upon which individual subclass members were excludable. These subclasses included va-
rious groupings of Cubans who had violated § 212(a)(20) by arriving in the United States
without proper documentation; Cubans who had committed crimes in Cuba which would
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have constituted misdemeanors in the District of Columbia, as well as those with felony
backgrounds; and Cubans who fell within the insanity provisions of § 212(a)(2), (3), or
(4) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), (3), or (4) (1982)). The court ordered all of
these Cubans released from detention within less than one month (many Cubans had
been detained in a maximum security prison for 14 months), unless the alien fell within
one of the three detainable exceptions listed above. The court described the govern-
ment's request for more detention time of the aliens as "but another refrain of a tune
that has played too long." 91 F.R.D. at 122. The degree of rights bestowed upon the
aliens, as well as the judicial assessment of decision-making traditionally marked for the
sovereign powers of the political branches, distinguish this opinion from the judiciary's
earlier position in Knauff and Mezei.
In Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 91 F.R.D. 239 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 1981) (Shoob, J.)
the court granted "classwide habeas relief" to subclasses (1) to (4) of those Cuban de-
tainees excludable from the United States on the basis of 212(a)(20) (lack of proper en-
try documents) which subclasses were defined in the earlier decision conditionally certi-
fying the class. An attempt by the State of Florida to intervene as a party defendant in
the habeas case was denied in Mir v. Smith, 521 F. Supp. 446 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (Shoob, J.)
The Fernandez-Roque court decided that "the indefinite detention of persons not con-
victed of crime is not an acceptable alternative to exclusion." 91 F.R.D. at 243. The
government had not objected to the release of these subclasses on any articulated basis
such as that release would be "a threat to national security or to the public interest, or
that they are likely to abscond." Id. at 243. Rather, the government had objected on
"general grounds" which the court found unacceptable. Id. at 241.
The court agreed with a government plan that for the Cubans to be released they
would have to be "sponsor[ed] or resettle[d] by the United States Catholic Conference"
or some other acceptable agency; and those who were witnesses to crimes were "required
to report by telephone monthly to the [FBI]," as well as to the INS "Service Office as
directed by the INS." Id. at 241. The court indicated that it was not annulling the aliens'
excludability, but was drawing a line pertaining to parole decisions by the Attorney Gen-
eral that "continued incarceration in a maximum security prison-after approximately
15 months . . . is an abuse of parole discretion." Id. at 242-43. Cf. Leng May Ma v.
Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958). Finally, in seeing the government take earnest steps to im-
plement its "Status Review Plan and Procedures," the court indicated it was willing to
tolerate government efforts to regulate the entire process of evaluating the Cubans'
claims for release. The court established itself as an unwilling and hesitant intervenor
which would nonetheless intervene if the Attorney General and government simply did
"nothing." Id. at 244. Plans were made to transfer a number of Cuban and Haitian refu-
gees from a detention center in Florida to Fort Allen in Puerto Rico. See Colon v. Carter,
507 F. Supp. 1026 (D. Puerto Rico, 1980), vacated, 633 F.2d 964 (1st Cir. 1980); and
Puerto Rico v. Muskie, 507 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Puerto Rico, 1981), vacated sub nor.
Marquez-Colon v. Reagan, 668 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1981). Approximately 122,000 Cuban
nationals and 9,500 Haitians entered the United States. 507 F. Supp. at 1041. The Dis-
trict Court for Puerto Rico stated that "in other times and circumstances the so-called
refugee facility would be referred to as a concentration camp." Id. at 1043. It also noted
that "under the present posture of things it is unlikely that any but Haitians will be
interned at Fort Allen, thus converting it into a de facto Haitian ghetto." Id. at 1043 n.8.
Efforts were made to delay the opening of the detention centers. See, e.g., Colon, 507 F.
Supp. 1026 (enjoining government from preparing Fort Allen until Environmental Im-
pact Statement (EIS) filed), vacated, 633 F.2d 964; Puerto Rico v. Muskie, 507 F. Supp.
1035 (permanently enjoining transfer of the detainees to Fort Allen), vacated, 668 F.2d
611, 616 (1981) (despite "allegations of human suffering and deprivation at Fort Allen.").
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Ultimately, the injunction against transfering the aliens to Puerto Rico was lifted. Id.
Litigation concerning the arrival of the Cuban "Marielitos" continued in the follow-
ing cases: Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 535 F. Supp. 741 (N.D.Ga. 1981) (Shoob, J.) (join-
ing the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Director of
the Office of Refuge Resettlement as defendants in class action habeas corpus case); Fer-
nandez-Roque v. Smith, 671 F.2d 426 (11th Cir. 1982) (Tuttle, J.) (concluding that the
government had consented to a district court's temporary restraining order (TRO)
prohibiting it from deporting any of the 1800 detained Cubans with a suspected criminal
background and, as a TRO, the district court's order was therefore nonappealable, and
remanding to the district court to decide the jurisdictional issue); Fernandez-Roque v.
Smith, 539 F. Supp. 925, 935, 948 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (Shoob, J.) (indicating "[tihere is no
significant difference between the provisions of Article 33 [of the Protocol] and those of 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h)," (footnote omitted) and emphasizing that "in the absence of action
from the other branches, and to the extent that its jurisdiction is properly invoked, this
Court has heard and decided plaintiffs' claims and will continue to do so, it is hoped, on
a rational and responsible basis."); Mir v. Smith, 521 F. Supp. 446 (1981) (Shoob, J.)
(denying motion by State of Florida to intervene as a party defendant in a habeas pro-
ceeding); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 557 F. Supp. 690, 691 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (Shoob, J.)
(denying writs of habeas corpus for Cuban detainees who had "been approved for release
• . . but remain incarcerated awaiting sponsors," while closely and critically examining
restrictions placed upon potential sponsors of Cuban detainees in consideration of the
adverse effects of continued incarceration); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp.
1115, 1128 (N.D.Ga. 1983) (Shoob, J.) (a liberty interest arises on behalf of the alien
detainee requiring justification for continued incarceration on the basis of a procedurally
adequate finding).
Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 1984) (Henderson, J.) (a consoli-
dated appeal rev'g 557 F. Supp. 690 and 567 F. Supp. 1115, and remanding); Fernandez-
Roque v. Smith, 599 F. Supp. 1103 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (BIA abused its discretion in denying
Cubans their classwide motions to reopen their asylum claims); Fernandez-Roque v.
Smith, 599 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D.Ga. 1984) (Shoob, J.) (denying motion by the government
to stay the order from 599 F. Supp. 1103 pending appeal of that order); Fernandez-
Roque v. Smith, 600 F. Supp. 1500 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (Shoob, J.) (ordering release on pa-
role of 34 of 147 Cuban detainees; noting also that the vast majority of these "Marie-
litos" were released on parole rather than remaining in detention camps and prisons);
Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 469 U.S. 1311 (1985) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice) (refusing to mod-
ify the Eleventh Circuit's stay of the district court order of 1984 (at 599 F. Supp. 1103)
that had vacated and remanded the outstanding order of exclusion for reevaluation of
the Cubans' asylum claims-therefore, those aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) (1982)
were deportable); Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478, 1483-85 (11th Cir. 1985) (per
curiam) (in consolidating the two separate appeals of 599 F. Supp. 1103 and 600 F. Supp.
1500, the circuit court stated that the excluded Cubans should not be treated to the
same legal protections given to those who have effected a legal entry into the United
States, where the Attorney General had a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for
suspending release of the detainees because "Cuba's agreement to take back 2,746 Mariel
Cubans increased the likelihood that an alien would abscond if released on parole.").
Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 896, 903 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (Shoob, J.)
(President's "invitation" to the Cubans "gave rise to a protected liberty interest in con-
tinued parole that cannot be impaired without due process of law," but the Attorney
General's involvement in their detention can be considered a "controlling executive act"
removing such act from the bounds of international law (footnote omitted)); Garcia-Mir
v. Meese, 781 F.2d 1450, 1455 (11th Cir. 1986) (Johnson, J.) ("indicating that "the cost of
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exclusion.4 1°  The United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit had partially stayed the district court's decision
and reactivated the orders of exclusion against some of the
Cubans. Justice Rehnquist's opinion continued the order of ex-
clusion against those Cubans who had serious, nonpolitical,
criminal backgrounds and who were thus ineligible under section
243(h)(2)401 of the INA for a withholding of deportation. Cubans
more days, weeks, months, or even years in the penitentiary for those already held for
five years is incalculable. . . .these refugees have been indefinitely incarcerated by a
process that ignores the fundamental fact that they are human beings").
Perhaps the most significant decision to arise from the Cuban episode, was Fernan-
dez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D.Kan. 1980) (Rogers, J.) The facts involved a Cu-
ban who was detained for over one and a half years at the United States penitentiary at
Leavenworth, Kansas, a maximum security prison. He had admitted the commission of
various petty crimes while in Cuba. Cuba refused to accept his return. According to Fer-
nandez, 505 F. Supp. at 789, "the Government has been unable to expeditiously carry
out the order of deportation and cannot even speculate as to a date of departure. No
other country has been contacted about possibly accepting petitioner." The court held
that "an excluded alien may [not] be detained in a maximum security prison indefinitely
awaiting deportation." Id. at 791. Section 237 of the Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 201, provided
for the immediate deportation of an excluded alien "to the country whence he came" but
has subsequently been amended by Act of Dec. 29, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 7, 95 Stat.
1615 (currently codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (1982)). Under § 242(c) of the INA (current
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1982)), the Attorney General has six months to deport a
deportable alien although not necessarily to the country whence he came. See also § 243
of the INA (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (1982)). The Court reiterated in Fernan-
dez that "detention was intended for the sole purpose of effecting deportation ... , Once
it became evident that deportation was not realizable in the foreseeable future, the con-
tinued detention of the alien was found to be without cause." Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at
793. The court objected to the "indeterminate detention" of the excluded alien who had
not been convicted of a crime in the United States nor found to be a security risk. Id. at
794. The court also distinguished Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, on the basis that the Cuban de-
tainee was not "deemed a national security risk, and . . . statutory authority for parole
of excluded aliens now exists." Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 794. Compare this reception
with 'the one the Haitians received, described in note 568 infra.
405. 469 U.S. at 1312.
406. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) (1982), provided that the withholding of deportation of-
fered in § 243(h)(1) in the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1982),
shall not apply to any alien if the Attorney General determines that-
(A) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the
persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, or mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion;
(B) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly
serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United States;
(C) there are serious reasons for considering that the alien has commit-
ted a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to the arrival
of the alien in the United States; or
(D) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to
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without criminal backgrounds, who were not automatically de-
portable by operation of section 243(h)(2), were to have their
requests for asylum considered under sections 101(a)(42) and
208 of the INA which define a refugee and prescribe a procedure
for granting asylum. 07
According to the definition in section 101(a)(42), refugees
include those aliens who are unable to return to their home
country because of a "well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of . . .membership in a particular social group. '4 8 The
Cubans claimed this provision was applicable since they believed
they would be persecuted in Cuba in retaliation against their
participation in the Mariel boatlift. The result of upholding the
Eleventh Circuit's partial stay, however, was to place the burden
of establishing each Cuban's ineligibility to remain in the United
States on the government by requiring it to demonstrate that
the Cubans fell within one of the exceptions to the withholding
of deportation allowance. According to Justice Rehnquist, ordi-
narily the burden is on the alien to show he or she qualifies for
asylum.0 9
One year before this decision, the Court decided INS v.
Stevic,410 which held that an alien must establish a clear
probability of persecution in his home country if he is to avoid
deportation under the asylum provision in 243(h)(1). This stan-
dard had been used in section 243(h) determinations at least
since the early 1970s.'" Stevic found that a "well-founded fear
of persecution" standard was inapplicable in a withholding of
deportation proceeding. Despite the similarity between sections
243(h) and 101(a)(42)(A), the Stevic decision declined to enforce
a uniform standard for evaluating the likelihood of persecution.
The Refugee Act of 1980412 added section 101(a)(42)(A) to
the INA, which encompasses the "well-founded fear of persecu-
tion" standard, while simultaneously amending section 243(h) of
the security of the United States.
407. Sections 101(a)(42) & 208 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § § 1101(a)(42)(A), & 1158
(1982), respectively. See supra note 400.
408. See supra note 400.
409. 469 U.S. at 1314.
410. 467 U.S. 407 (1984) (Stevens, J.).
411. See e.g., In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 318-20 (BIA 1973) (Int. Dec. No.
2192).
412. Act of Mar. 17, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 109.
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the INA to include language parallel to that appearing in section
101(a)(42)(A). Simultaneous legislation on both issues suggests
Congress intended these sections to be read in light of one an-
other.41 3 Section 243(h)(1) provides that the Attorney General
413. Immediately after the decision in Stevic, the circuit courts of appeals were at
odds in determining how different, if at all, the two evidentiary standards are. Before the
Supreme Court decided Stevic, the Second Circuit indicated that both § 243(h) and §
101(a)(42)(A) requests should be considered under the same standard. Stevic v. Sava,
678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982) (as a result of the United States accession to the 1968 Proto-
col and passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, courts should apply the well-founded fear of
persecution standard to evaluate both asylum requests under § 208 of the INA and re-
quests for withholding of deportation under § 243(h)), rev'd sub nom. INS v. Stevic, 467
U.S. 407 (1984).
Following the Supreme Court's decision, the circuit courts were somewhat divided
over whether the well-founded fear of persecution standard and the clear probability
standard are different burdens, or in actual practice, virtually the same. The majority of
the courts recognized the two standards to be different, with a minority, particularly the
Third Circuit, describing the two standards as the same. Basically, the issue was settled
by the Supreme Court in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987), aff'g 767 F.2d
1448 (9th Cir. 1985) (the well-founded fear standard is more generous than the clear
probability standard; they are not identical), discussed in text accompanying note 416
infra. Before this, the circuits were fragmented on this issue. See, e.g., Sankar v. INS,
757 F.2d 532, 533 (3d Cir. 1985) (the well-founded fear standard "does not differ from
the 'clear probability' standard") (natives and citizens of Syria); Sotto v. United States
INS, 748 F.2d 832 (3rd Cir. 1984) (Stevic does not undermine Rejaie) (Marcos' Philip-
pines); Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS, 699 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1983) (the two standards
equate) (deportation to Mexico), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984); Rejaie v. INS, 691
F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982) (indicating the BIA did not err in equating the clear probability
of persecution standard with the well-founded fear of persecution standard) (Iranian);
but see Bahramnia v. United States INS, 782 F.2d 1243, 1248 (5th Cir. 1986) (does not
decide whether clear probability test is more exacting because alien failed even under a
less onerous burden of proof) (Iranian citizen); Young v. United States Dept. of Justice,
INS, 759 F.2d 450, 456 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that the clear probability standard is
"strict" while the well-founded fear standard is "possibly more liberal") (Guatemalans);
Lemus v. INS, 741 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1984) (error to follow the Second Circuit's decision
in Stevic).
The Sixth Circuit eventually joined the mainstream of judicial thought as well. See
Dolores v. INS, 772 F.2d 223 (6th Cir. 1985) (repeating that the well-founded fear stan-
dard is "more generous" than the clear probability standard); Moosa v. INS, 760 F.2d
715, 719 (6th Cir. 1985) (repeating the statement in Stevic that the well-founded fear
standard is "more generous" than the clear probability of persecution standard);
Youkhanna v. INS, 749 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1984) (well-founded fear requires less than the
clear probability standard) (Iraqis); Reyes v. INS, 747 F.2d 1045 (6th Cir. 1984) (apply-
ing clear probability standard in a petition for asylum or the withholding of deportation
under § 243 (h)), vacating 693 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1982) (Philippines); Nasser v. INS, 744
F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1984) (indicating that the clear probability standard is very close to
the well-founded fear of persecution standard) (Iraqi); but see Dally v. INS, 744 F.2d
1191, 1196 n.6 (6th Cir. 1984) (applying the clear probability of persecution standard to
an asylum request made after the commencement of a deportation hearing since the
642 HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL [Vol. IV
shall not deport any alien whose "life or freedom would be
regulations (8 C.F.R. § 208.3 (b) (1983)) suggested that "requests for asylum made after
the institution of deportation proceedings 'shall also be considered as requests for with-
holding exclusion or deportation pursuant to section 243(h).' ") (Iraqis).
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit adjusted to the Supreme Court's opinion in Stevic.
See Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984) (the well-founded fear standard
is similar, but not identical, to the clear probability standard) (native of Chile and for-
mer citizen of Argentina); but see Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1977) ("the
'well founded fear' standard contained in the Protocol and the 'clear probability' stan-
dard ...will in practice converge"; the Protocol and the § 243(h) standard are the
same) (Iranian). The Eighth Circuit did not clearly speak on the issue: Perwolf v. INS,
741 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir. 1984) (dismissing a claim for refugee status by citing the Su-
preme Court's decision in Stevic, for the proposition that under § 243(h), a clear
probability of persecution must be shown, thereby suggesting that the two standards are
interchangeable and not clearly differentiating between the two) (Austrian); Minwalla v.
INS, 706 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1983) (treats an asylum claim filed during a deportation
proceeding as identical to an application for withholding of deportation) (Pakistani).
The Ninth Circuit most decidedly pronounced the distinctions between the two
standards and the Supreme Court affirmed in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207
(1987), aff'g 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985). See also Canjura-Flores v. INS, 784 F.2d 885,
890 (9th Cir. 1985) (well-founded fear is "less stringent" than the clear probability stan-
dard.); Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1986) (well-founded fear is more
generous than clear probability) (El Salvadoran denied asylum); Kaveh-Haghigy v. INS,
783 F.2d 1321, 1322 (9th Cir. 1986) (clear probability is a "higher burden of proof" than
well-founded fear) (Iranian denied asylum); Quintanilla-Ticas v. INS, 783 F.2d 955, 956
(9th Cir. 1986) (well-founded fear is "more generous" than clear probability); Larimi v.
INS, 782 F.2d 1494, 1496-97 (9th Cir. 1986) (establishing well-founded fear "is less diffi-
cult") (Iranian); Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1491 (9th Cir. 1986) (well-founded
fear is a "lesser burden" than clear probability) (Guatemalan); Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS,
777 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 1985) (section 208(a) requirements are considerably less strin-
gent than section 243(h) requirements: also, "[o]n November 5, 1982, the INS errone-
ously deported Hernandez-Ortiz to El Salvador [in violation of a stay pending an ap-
peal]. Aware of its error, the United States government agreed to arrange and pay for her
return to the United States."); Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1985) (well-
founded fear is more generous) (El Salvadoran); Garcia-Ramos v. INS, 775 F.2d 1370
(9th Cir. 1985) (clear probability is more stringent, and well-founded fear is more gener-
ous) (El Salvadoran); Estrada v. INS, 775 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1985) (well-founded fear is
more generous than clear probability) (Guatemalan); Lopez v. INS, 775 F.2d 1015 (9th
Cir. 1985) (similar proposition) (El Salvadoran); Maroufi v. INS, 772 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1985) (similar proposition) (Iranian); Chatila v. INS, 770 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1985) (well-
founded fear is more generous than the clear probability standard) (Lebanese living in
Venezuela); Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1985) (the two standards
are not the same); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984) (decided
1984, amended March and June 1985, superceding the opinion df 749 F.2d 1316) (well-
founded fear standard is more generous than the clear probability of persecution stan-
dard); Sagermark v. INS, 767 F.2d 645, 648-49 (9th Cir. 1985) (Supreme Court in Stevic
"strongly hinted ...that the 'well-founded fear' standard was less stringent than the
'clear probability' test"); Saballo-Cortez v. INS, 761 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1985) (decided
1984, amended May 28, 1985) (does not decide what constitutes a prima facie showing of
well-founded fear); Argueta v. INS, 759 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1985) (well-founded fear is
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threatened in [the recipient country] on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or po-
litical opinion. 4 14 Similarly, section 101(a)(42)(A) states that
refugee status will be conferred on any alien facing persecution
at home "on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion. "415 Since the
language is the same, one would expect the standards applicable
to each section also to be the same. In Stevic, however, the
Court recognized two separate standards. It confined the "well-
founded fear of persecution" standard to section 101(a)(42)(A)
and applied the "clear probability of persecution" standard to
section 243(h). The Court reaffirmed the use of these two dis-
tinct standards in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca/1 e where it held that
the "well-founded fear of persecution" standard in section
101(a)(42)(A) is a more generous standard than the "clear
probability" standard utilized in withholding of deportation pro-
ceedings under section 243(h).
The unfortunate consequence of using the "clear probability
of persecution" standard is the difficulty in proof it engenders.
Under this standard, it must be demonstrated that the threat of
persecution is directed against the particular alien-applicant in-
dividually. 17 This is typically an extraordinarily difficult thing
to prove. The "clear probability" standard invokes an objective,
rather than a subjective gauge for evaluating asylum requests4 18
which usually cannot be proven until the alien returns home and
his or her fears tragically materialize. 419 To impose this standard
more generous than clear probability of persecution) (El Salvadoran); Espinoza-Martinez
v. INS, 754 F.2d 1536 (9th Cir. 1985) (Nicaraguan) (does not decide what constitutes a
prima facie showing of well-founded fear) (Nicaraguan); Saballo-Cortez v. INS, 749 F.2d
1354 (9th Cir. 1984) (similar); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1984)
(well-founded fear of persecution standard is more generous than clear probability test).
414. See note 399 supra.
415. See note 400 supra.
416. 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987) (Stevens, J.) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in the judgment) (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White,
J.).
417. See cases at note 413 supra.
418. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987).
419. On the factors affecting the creation of refugees, the country of El Salvador
serves as one of the more controversial case studies. Information from reports compiled
by the Americas Watch Committee follows. Cf. COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1982 (1983) (submitted to Congress by the Department of State).
On March 6, 1980, a state of siege was declared in El Salvador via State of Siege
1987]
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on political asylum requests defeats the purpose of an asylum-
Decree (No. 155):
Article I of Decree No. 155 suspended, in accordance with the specific terms
of Article 175 of the Constitution, the following four constitutional guarantees:
freedom of movement and residence (Article 154); freedom of thought and ex-
pression (Article 158, par. 1); inviolability of correspondence (Article 159); and
the right of assembly, except for meetings or assemblies for cultural or industrial
purposes (Article 160).
(emphasis added). AMERICAS WATCH COMMITTEE AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS ON EL SALVADOR 17 (1982).
The conditions in El Salvador are that of an army at war with its own people:
we believe that the overall situation must be considered in the light of the indis-
criminate attacks by the Salvadoran armed forces on civilian noncombatants in
conflict zones. Thousands of noncombatants are being killed in indiscriminate
attacks by bombardment from the air, shelling, and ground sweeps. Thousands
more are being wounded. And hundreds of thousands are being driven from
their homes and forced into the misery of displacement.
As best we can determine, these attacks on civilian noncombatants in con-
flict zones are part of a deliberate policy. The aim seems to be to force civilians
to flee these zones, depriving the guerrillas of a civilian population from which
they can obtain food and other necessities. The cost of pursuing this policy, in
terms of human suffering, is beyond measurement. And, of course, it is a policy
that flagrantly violates the laws of war.
AMERICAS WATCH COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, FREE FIRE, A RE-
PORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR iii (1984 5th Supp.). According to the report
compiled by Americas Watch, the State Department comes "close to categorical[ly] re-
jecting any suggestion that the Salvadoran armed forces are engaged in such attacks." Id.
at iv.
The overall report discusses the killing of civilian noncombatants by government
forces; the approximately 1,000,000 displaced refugees within the country, or about 20%
of the population, resulting from such government policies; the continued, albeit dimin-
ished, number of "disappearances" occurring in the country; and human rights violations
by the guerillas (which occurs on a much smaller scale than that perpetrated by the
Salvadoran government forces).
There has been a decrease in the number of death squad killings which the report
defines as "killings by paramilitary groups not in uniform." Id. at 1. As difficult as the
numbers are to obtain, it appears that the number of deaths resulting from indiscrimi-
nate attacks by the government armed forces surpasses the number of killings formerly
attributable to the death squads. According to the report:
We attribute the reduction in death squad killings in large part to pressure ex-
erted by the United States Embassy in San Salvador during the past nine
months. A highlight of that pressure was Vice President Bush's December 11,
1983 meeting with 31 top leaders of the Salvadoran armed forces in which the
Vice President apparently made explicit and forceful statements that U.S. mili-
tary aid would stop unless abuses were curbed.
Our findings indicate that pressure from the United States is vital-far
more important than we previously realized-in shaping human rights practices
in El Salvador.
Id. at 3. The report estimates the number of "internally displaced persons" within the
country to be 500,000 people and that approximately 750,000 people have "left El Salva-
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granting provision. To insist upon a "clear probability" standard
dor entirely" as a result of "indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population in conflict
zones." Id. at 6. The report states that "most of the civilian noncombatants dying in El
Salvador are being killed in indiscriminate attacks by the armed forces in conflict zones."
Id. at 7.
The number of displaced individuals which result from such wholesale destruction is
described by the report: "A recent study ... estimates that as much as one-fifth of El
Salvador's population of 5 million is now internally displaced." Id. at 32 (footnote omit-
ted). Figures obtained from Tutela Legal, "the human rights monitoring office of the
Roman Catholic Archdiocese," id. at i, state that in 1983 there were 3625 "civilian non-
combatants [killed] by the regular armed forces of El Salvador." Id. at 40-41. In the first
6 months of 1984, there were 1331 such killings. Id. at 40. There is a degree of uncer-
tainty surrounding these figures because of the disruptive and dangerous conditions ex-
isting in El Salvador.
The issue of international law violations in El Salvador is also addressed in the re-
port. It notes that El Salvador is a contracting party to
Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions, which applies to conflicts of a non-inter-
national character 'which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed
groups.' (Article I) As El Salvador is a contracting party, Protocol II applies to
the conflict underway there. Article 13 provides:
1) The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protec-
tions against the dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to
this protection, the following rules shall be observed in all circumstances.
2) The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be
the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which
is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.
3) Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Part, unless and for
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.
In our view, it appears that a purpose of the indiscriminate attacks by the
Salvadoran armed forces on villages in guerilla-controlled zones of El Salvador is
to spread terror among the civilian population so that they will flee those zones,
thereby depriving the guerrillas of a civilian population from which it can obtain
food and other necessities. Accordingly, we believe the Salvadoran armed forces
are engaged in systematic violations of their commitments under international
laws of war.
Id. at 42-43. The report turns to Protocol I of the General Conventions (Article 51) to
look to a definition of "indiscriminate attacks."
The report also describes human rights abuses by the guerrillas, the Farabundo
Marti de Liberaci6n Nacional (FMLN), Id. at 51-59, which, as of the date of the report,
paled in comparison to those abuses committed by the government armed forces.
The number of Salvadorans who have been displaced and turned into refugees ap-
proach 20% of the country's population. Id. at 73. Additionally, "some 750,000
Salvadorans are estimated to have left the country since 1979." Id. at 73 (note). The
Salvadorans who are in the United States are frequently here without permission of the
federal government, and thus their status as foreigners within the United States is as
"illegal aliens." By and large, a Salvadoran's request for asylum as a refugee in the
United States is almost always denied (see the cases involving El Salvadorans in note
413 supra). Estimates of the total number of illegal aliens present in the United States
vary widely because many of these individuals are hiding from the law and figures who
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is to ignore United States adherence to the 1967 United Nations
could represent authority. However, the estimates that have been compiled place the
number of illegal aliens within the United States within the range, on the low side, of
about 2 to 3 million aliens, to as many as 10 to 12 million on the high side. See, e.g., S.
REP. No. 132, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 5 (1985), which indicated that perhaps the number
in 1978 was in the range of 3.5 to 6 million. Accepting a high estimate for just a moment,
it is easy to see that if most, if not all, Salvadorans who have fled their unfortunate
country have tried to come to the United States, their numbers in the United States
could represent as low as 6.25% of the total illegal alien population in the United States,
to a percentage which is substantially higher (i.e., as much as 75% of the total illegal
alien population). It is not unreasonable to conclude that a large number of the 750,000
Salvadorans who have fled their country have tried, and probably been successful, in
coming to the United States. In the first place, no other country in the Western Hemi-
sphere is as attractive and as accessible to one who is severely limited financially as far
as choice of transportation. In other words, it is relatively easy to come to the United
States: one need not be able to afford a plane ticket. Second, the refugee camps in coun-
tries neighboring El Salvador, while holding several tens of thousands of Salvadorans,
still do not adequately, or even remotely, account for all those who have fled El Salvador.
In fact, Honduras, as of 1984, announced a "get tough" policy regarding El Salvadoran
refugees. According to the Americas Watch report under examination in this note:
A third factor accounting for the recent increase in El Salvador's displaced
population [i.e., within its borders] is the Honduran government's announce-
ment on December 30, 1983 that Salvadoran refugees living in border camps
would be required to move deep into the Honduran interior. Salvadorans living
in these camps strongly oppose the move, in part because they believe they will
be more vulnerable to attacks by the Honduran military if they are relocated to
the interior. A number of refugees in the border camps have already chosen to
return to El Salvador rather than be relocated in Honduras.
Id. at 75-76. Therefore, the United States remains as one of the options available to a
Salvadoran fleeing his or her country. Even the strongest measures the United States
may take against an illegal alien are very minor when compared with the unrestrained
license with which Honduras treats the Salvadoran refugees.
The America's Watch report evaluated the so-called "democratic" elections of 1984
which elected President Duarte.
[T]hose political allies of the guerrillas who attempted to take part in the politi-
cal process have paid dearly, among them, the six top leaders of the Democratic
Revolutionary Front who were kidnapped from a press conference in November
1980 by a 200 man military contingent that surrounded the high school where it
was taking place, who tortured, mutilated and then murdered them; the 17 lead-
ers of the FDR and labor unions allied to it who were kidnapped in San Salva-
dor in October 1982 and tortured, some of them turning up alive in prison, while
others disappeared; and the October 1983 murder of Victor Manuel Quintanilla
Ramos, the highest ranking spokesman for the FDR still in El Salvador. No at-
tempt was made to guarantee physical safety to FDR activists if they would take
part in the 1984 elections. Given what happened to their colleagues, an offer to
take part in the elections could hardly be considered meaningful without such a
guarantee.
Id. at 105 (also describing other election abuses).
The following conclusions can be drawn from this report for the purposes of this
paper: (1) individuals fleeing Salvador are refugees who are entitled to asylum because
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Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees which invoked the
"well-founded fear of persecution" language. 2 0 Additionally, the
"clear probability" standard is contrary to the changes made by
the armed forces are persecuting, in an unchecked fashion, the entire population of that
country; (2) the only serious way to curb the number of illegal aliens arriving in this
country who are fleeing conditions at home which give them cause to fear their safety
and well-being, is for the United States to use its influence to stop the persecution and
repression. Admittedly, for many countries, this is not possible because the United
States simply does not have the persuasive ability to cause repressive regimes to change
their tactics. El Salvador is an exception: there, the United States has a great deal of
influence. The Americas Watch Report of 1984 establishes that the most serious persecu-
tion in El Salvador could not be accomplished without United States materiel, training,
financing, advice, and guidance. The responsibility of the United States for the intense
and shocking level of persecution that has occurred in El Salvador is something which
should disturb United States citizens to the very depths of their consciences.
By 1986, the number of death squad killings and the number of civilian deaths re-
sulting from bombing raids by the El Salvadoran Air Force had subsided. See AMERICAS
WATCH COMMITTEE, SETTLING INTO ROUTINE, HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN DUARTE'S SECOND
YEAR (1986 8th Supp.). But the numbers of casualties remain shocking. For the purpose
of this paper, regardless of how conditions have changed in El Salvador over the past few
years, the routine denial of refugee or asylum status to El Salvadorans during the years
of the Reagan Administration, and particularly during the most brutal periods, evidences
a failure in the execution of United States immigration law to achieve any type of coher-
ent and politically non-biased refugee or asylum policy. See also AMERICAS WATCH COM-
MITTEE, CRITIQUE: A REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATES' COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1985 (1986); --- , THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S RECORD ON
HUMAN RIGHTS IN 1985 (1986); ---- , "-IN THE FACE OF CRUELTY": THE REAGAN ADMIN-
ISTRATION'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD IN 1984 (1985); -, HAITI: RIGHTS DENIED, A RE-
PORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAITI IN 1984 TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS (1985); --- , REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE: OCTOBER - NOVEMBER 1984
(1985); -- , REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE: DECEMBER 1984 - JANUARY 1985
FROM THE CHILEAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1985); -- , EL SALVADOR'S OTHER
VICTIMS: THE WAR ON THE DISPLACED (1984); --- , FAILURE: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRA-
TION'S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY IN 1983 (1984); , HONDURAS, ON THE BRINK: A RE-
PORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS BASED ON A MISSION OF INQUIRY (1984). See also AMNESTY INTER-
NATIONAL, TORTURE IN THE EIGHTIES/AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (1984); -- , CHILE,
EVIDENCE OF TORTURE: AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT (1983); - -, AMNESTY IN-
TERNATIONAL REPORT (1982); --- , EL SALVADOR PACKET (1982); -- , REPORT ON
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION TO SINGAPORE, 30 Nov. - 5 DEC. 1978 (1980); -
SHORT REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKI-
STAN, 20 - 25 JAN. 1978 (1978); --- , ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN: AN AMNESTY IN-
TERNATIONAL REPORT INCLUDING THE FINDINGS OF A MISSION TO PAKISTAN, 23 APR. - 12
MAY 1976 (1977); --- , REPORT ON AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION TO ARGENTINA, 6 -
15 Nov. 1976 (1977); - -, THE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT: 1 JUNE 1975 - 31
MAY 1976 (1976); --- , REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION TO THE REPUB-
LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, 27 Nov. - 5 DEC. 1975 (1976); - -, The Amnesty International
Report: 1 June 1975-31 May 1976 (1976).
420. 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6260, T.I.A.S. No. 6557, binding parties to the terms of Articles
2-34 of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150
(1951).
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
the 1980 Refugee 'Act21
IV. ALIENS AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW
The Burger Court considered a number of cases addressing
the issue of due process of law and the operation of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act (INA). Since the federal govern-
ment, rather than the individual states, is usually involved, the
due process clause of the fifth amendment applies rather than
that of the fourteenth amendment. The fifth amendment's guar-
antee of due process of law as applied against the federal gov-
ernment was held, during the era of the Warren Court, to in-
clude the fourteenth amendment promise of equal protection
under the laws. 22 There are, however, many immigration issues
where the Supreme Court has not ruled whether there is a fifth
amendment guarantee of due process of law or, if one exists, how
it should be applied. Other authority, namely statutes and regu-
lations, according individuals with some degree of due process
protection, must then be examined to fill in these gaps. Whether
an individual will be accorded any level of due process, or the
extent to which he or she will receive it, turns upon that individ-
ual's status within the immigration law, the relief he or she
seeks, and the particular procedural provision of the INA which
is being invoked.2 s Specifically, recent decisions discussed in
421. Act of Mar. 17, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 109.
422. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (Warren, C.J.), discussed infra in
note 581. See also, Gordon, Due Process in Immigration Proceedings, 50 A.B.A.J. 34
(1964).
423. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 107 S. Ct. 2148 (1987) (Marshall, J.)
(Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting, joined by White and O'Connor, JJ.) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
where the Court indicated that "fundamentally fair" deportation hearings include ade-
quately informing aliens of their right to counsel at the hearing. Additionally, the Court
stated that any waiver by an alien of an important right, such as the right to apply for
suspension of deportation, must be entered into knowingly. On the basis of Mendoza-
Lopez, a deportation order that is not obtained in conformity with due process cannot
later be used as an element forming the basis of criminal charges against the alien. There
must be an opportunity for "some meaningful review of the administrative proceeding"
by the judiciary. 107 S. Ct. 2154, 2155 n.15. See also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21,
25-27 (1982)(O'Connor, J.)(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
where Justice O'Connor highlighted the differences between the due process protection
afforded an alien in a deportation hearing (§ 242(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(1982)) as contrasted with the relatively few procedural safeguards furnished in
an exclusion hearing (§ 236 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1982)). The cases have also
limited the application of key constitutional protections in deportation hearings and re-
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this section consider due process afforded nonimmigrant
aliens," individuals claiming United States citizenship, 25 legal
permanent residents,'4 2 and illegal aliens requesting "parole. 427
lated criminal proceedings. See note 826 infra.
In a deportation hearing, the alien is physically present within the United States. In
an exclusion hearing, the alien technically has not entered the United States, but seeks
admission. Therefore, an exclusion hearing is generally held at the port of entry, whereas
a deportation hearing may be held near the alien's residence within the United States.
Under the federal regulations, an alien in a deportation hearing is generally provided
with seven days notice of the charges against him (8 C.F.R. § 242.1(b) (1982)), whereas
an exclusion hearing does not require advanced notice to the alien of the charges against
him.
If an alien is unsuccessful in a deportation hearing, he or she may appeal directly to
the court of appeals under § 106(a), as added by Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-
301, 75 Stat. 651 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(1982)), but an alien may challenge a
determination reached at an exclusion hearing only by a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus under § 106(b) (8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b)(1982)). Within certain limits, an alien may
choose the country to which he or she is deported under § 243(a), (8 U.S.C. §
1253(a)(1982)); or a deportable alien may be permitted to depart from the United States
voluntarily, under § 244(e) (8 U.S.C. § 1254(e)(1982)); and following an order of deporta-
tion under § 244 of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1254(1982)), an alien may seek a suspension of
deportation. An alien in an exclusion hearing does not have these three options.
Finally, in seeking to return to the United States, although a deported alien techni-
cally has a more difficult route to follow, the obstacles may be circumvented by the de-
portable alien initially choosing a voluntary departure from the United States. Under §
212(a)(17) of the INA, as amended by Act of Dec. 29, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, 95 Stat.
1611 (currently codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(17)(1982)), a deported alien who did not
obtain a voluntary departure must obtain a prior approval of the Attorney General
before entering the United States within five years of deportation. Voluntary departure
saves the alien from application of this rule under § 242(b) of the INA (8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(1982)). No prior approval is needed for an excluded alien to return after one
year's absence under § 212(a)(16) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(16)(1982)). Further
distinctions are discussed in Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958).
424. A "nonimmigrant alien" is any alien who is not an immigrant. That is, a nonim-
migrant is in the United States temporarily, with the permission of the government,
under some form of visa. See § 101(a)(15) of the INA (8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(West
Supp. 1987)). In AI-Karagholi v. INS, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting from
denial of cert.), the alien was present in the United States as a student. Student visas are
available under § 101(a)(15)(F) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(1982)). See the
discussion of Al-Karagholi accompanying the text at note 481 infra.
425. Agosto v. INS, 436 U.S. 748 (1978), (Marshall, J.) (Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.,
dissenting). See the discussion of this case at text accompanying note 494 infra.
426. A legal permanent resident is an alien whose status has been adjusted from that
of an alien who has been admitted or paroled into the United States to that of an alien
with a stronger claim for residence within the United States. Usually, this adjustment of
status occurs under § 245 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1982), although there are other
routes available in order to achieve this status. As a legal permanent resident (lpr), the
alien is assured a larger selection of rights which he or she may exercise in his or her
relations with the federal and state governments. See the discussion of Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) at the text accompanying note 549 infra and § 101(a)(20)
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A. Development of Judicial Review
Before passage of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946
(APA), 2 s aliens depended almost exclusively upon habeas
corpus in order to obtain review of an order of deportation.42 9 In
1953, in Heikkila v. Barber,30 the Court held that the validity of
a deportation order issued under section 22 of the Internal Se-
curity Act of 1950,431 making membership in the Communist
Party a ground for deportation, could be reviewed only by
habeas corpus rather than through any review procedures in the
APA. Section 10 of the APA of 1946432 provided for more expan-
sive judicial review of agency actions unless review was pre-
cluded by prior statutes. 33 Section 19(a) of the Immigration Act
of 1917'4 made a determination by the Attorney General final
of the INA (8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(20) (1982)) (definition of "lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence") quoted in note 840 infra.
427. The category of illegal aliens includes those who have escaped an inspection and
formal admittance into the United States. Such aliens may be eligible for parole into the
United States at the Attorney General's discretion, under § 212(d)(5)(A) of the INA (8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1982)). See the discussion of Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J.)(Marshall, J., dissenting joined by Brennan, J.) at text accompanying note
567 infra.
428. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237.
429. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 230 (1953); Wong Yang Sun v. McGrath, 339
U.S. 33 (1950); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 167 (1945)(Stone, C.J., dissenting);
Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927); Mahler v. Eby, 264
U.S. 32, 42-43 (1924); Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153 (1923)(Brandeis, J.); Ng
Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922)(Brandeis, J.).
430. 345 U.S. 229 (1953) (Clark, J.)(Frankfurter and Black, JJ., dissenting).
431. 64 Stat. 1006, amending Act of Oct. 16, 1918, 40 Stat. 1012, also amended by
Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 251, 41 Stat. 1008 and Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439,54 Stat. 670,
673.
432. 60 Stat. 237, 243-44.
433. Id. Section 10 provided: "Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review
434. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 890 ("In every case where any person is
ordered deported from the United States under the provisions of this Act, or of any law
or treaty, the decision of the Secretary of Labor shall be final."). Under § 1 of the Reor-
ganization Plan No. V of 1940, 54 Stat. 1238, this power was transferred to the Attorney
General. Although the Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 874, was repealed by passage of
the INA of 1952, § 403(a)(13), 66 Stat. 163, 279, a different provision, § 242(b) of the
INA of 1952, 66 Stat. 210, continued to provide that the Attorney General's decision to
deport an alien was final. However, § § 242(c), (e), 66 Stat. at 210, 211, expressly recog-
nized a right to judicial review of a final order of deportation. See Rubenstein v. Brown-
ell, 206 F.2d 449, 452 (1953), aff'd, 346 U.S. 929 (1954).
The Heikkila Court recognized that there was not a clear-cut issue of law. "That the
Attorney General's decisions are 'final' does not settle the question. The appellant prop-
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and was' interpreted in Heikkila as barring the review contem-
plated in the APA of 1946.115 Under a proceeding in habeas
corpus, the scope of review was limited to "enforcement of due
process requirements" as defined under the Constitution.4 36 The
judicial review provided under section 10(e) of the APA was
much broader in scope.437 Under the result obtained in Heikkila,
orders of deportation were rendered immune from "direct
attack. 4 38
Heikkila v. Barber was distinguished to the point of being
overruled in Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro.439 The Court held that
since the language in section 242(b) 440 of the INA, providing for
determinations of deportability, did not expressly modify the
language in the APA of 1946, language in the APA evincing a
right to judicial review was unaffected by the subsequently
passed INA.441 Under the result in Pedreiro, an alien with an
erly emphasizes the ambiguity in that term. Read alone, it might refer to the doctrine
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before judicial process can be invoked."
345 U.S. at 233. But the Court looked to the policy behind early immigration laws divin-
ing that "Congress had intended to make these administrative decisions nonreviewable
to the fullest extent possible under the Constitution." Id. at 234. The policy of the APA
to make judicial review more available, once an administrative order became final, was
dismissed as less clearly the "legislative understanding" of the enactment in comparison
to the policy behind immigration statutes. Id. at 232-33.
435. Notably, the INA of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, lacked a counterpart of the current § 106
providing for judicial review. Section 106 was not passed until Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L.
No. 87-301, § 5(a), 75 Stat. 650, 651 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(1982)).
436. Heikkila, 345 U.S. at 236. But see McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162 (1950),
where the Court determined that the Attorney General's refusal to grant an alien's re-
quest for a suspension of deportation, where the refusal was based on an administrative
determination of ineligibility to obtain citizenship, could be challenged through a declar-
atory judgment proceeding while the alien was free from custody. The alien did not have
to await his arrest in order to bring a habeas corpus proceeding. The Court did not
consider the applicability of § 10 of the APA, 60 Stat. 243. McGrath, 340 U.S. at 169. See
also Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939)(declaratory action to settle citizenship status).
437. 60 Stat. 243-44.
438. Heikkila 345 U.S. at 236. But now there may be a collateral attack against an
order of deportation. Section 106(a)(6) of the INA (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(6)
(1982)) provides that the validity of a deportation order that has not been judicially
determined may be challenged collaterally in a criminal proceeding against the alien
under § 242(d)(violation of supervision regulations prescribed by the Attorney General
following order of deportation), or (e)(failure to depart from the United States following
an order of deportation) of the INA (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d), (e)(1982)).
439. 349 U.S. 48 (1955) (Black, J.)(Minton, Reed, Burton, JJ., dissenting).
440. 66 Stat. 163, 209-10.
441. Section 12 of the APA, 60 Stat. 244, stated "No subsequent legislation shall be
held to supersede or modify the provisions of this Act except to the extent that such
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outstanding order of deportation would not have to wait for his
or her arrest in order to challenge the order under a writ of
habeas corpus. Rather, the alien could bring suit immediately
upon receiving the order of deportation in a motion for a declar-
atory judgment,442 and thus be saved the personal hardship of
waiting for confinement before initiating suit. Although this re-
sult is undoubtedly more in line with the intent of the APA,"4
Pedreiro is a departure from the Heikkila decision, with only a
brief per curiam opinion decided, by an equally divided Court
between the time of these two decisions presaging the change.444
The Court's 1955 decision in Pedreiro interpreted the "fi-
nality" of the agency action to allow judicial review rather than
curtailment of all review. Since Heikkila did not consider the
effect of final orders under the 1952 Act,445 the Court in
Pedriero was uninhibited from reexamining the new legisla-
tion.4 6 The Court concluded that the 1952 Act did not super-
sede the allowance in the APA that provided for more extended
judicial review than is available through habeas corpus.
The quality of judicial review that will be applied to an ad-
ministrative order depends upon whether the order is character-
ized as final. The courts of appeals have been statutorily
vested 4 7 with "exclusive jurisdiction to review final orders is-
legislation shall do so expressly." The policy of the APA is more reasonably applied to
subsequent legislation. Congress can create an exception to judicial review by stating
"the APA does not apply." The conservative approach to interpreting the APA in rela-
tion to prior legislation was founded on the difficulty a legislature has in foreseeing fu-
ture enactments and expressly denying their applicability.
Where Congress had enacted, however, a fundamental change in the legal approach
to administrative due process, the evolution of due process, and its fundamental fairness
requirement, could reasonably have been the basis for a contrary decision in Heikkila.
Such arguments are rarely found in majority opinions. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985) (Marshall, J. concurring in
judgment in part, dissenting in part).
442. Section 10(b) of the APA, 60 Stat. 243, allowed for declaratory judgments, writs
of prohibitory or mandatory injunction, and habeas corpus.
443. See Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51-52, and Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in
Heikkila, 345 U.S. 229, 237-41.
444. Brownell v. Rubenstein, 346 U.S. 929 (1954) (per curiam), af'g (by an equally
divided Court), 206 F.2d 449 (1953) (deportation order can be reviewed in a declaratory
action under § 10 of the APA).
445. 345 U.S. 229, 232 n.4.
446. 349 U.S. at 50.
447. Section 106(a) of the INA, as added by Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-
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sued by specified federal agencies." 4 8 Under section 106(a) of
the INA, that exclusive jurisdiction is granted to the court of
appeals, with certain exceptions, to review "all final orders of
deportation" issued under section 242(b) or "comparable" statu-
tory provisions. " Section 242(b)" 50 of the INA authorizes the
agency to issue deportation orders. That section provides a "de-
tailed administrative procedure for determining whether an
alien may be deported." 51 When circumstances arise in which
section 106(a) is not applicable, the alien may be entitled to a
district court proceeding."52 Section 106(a) economizes the use of
judicial resources and limits access to the trial courts. The
breadth of the section 106 phrase "all final orders of deporta-
tion" has been ruled upon in a number of Supreme Court
opinions.453
In Foti v. INS 454 the Supreme Court held that section
106(a) authorizes the federal appellate courts to exercise initial
and exclusive jurisdiction to review directly the Attorney Gen-
eral's discretionary refusal to grant a request for suspension of
an outstanding order of deportation. 55 This result prevents an
alien from exercising the delaying tactic, to avoid deportation, of
appealing an order of deportation to the court of appeals while
seeking review of a denial of a request for a suspension of depor-
tation in a district court..4 5 Foti limited the scope of the review
301, 75 Stat. 651, as amended by Act of Dec. 29, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 18(b), 95
Stat. 1620 (currently codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(1982)).
448. Cheng Fan Kwok V. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 210 (1968).
449. Section 106(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1982).
450. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163, 209-10, as amended by Act of Dec.
29, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 18(h)(1)(A), 95 Stat. 1611, 1620.
451. Cheng Fan Kwok, 392 U.S. at 209.
452. Id. at 210.
453. For example, in Li Sing v. United States, 180 U.S. 486 (1901), described in text
accompanying note 106 supra, the Court determined that a decision permitting an alien
to enter the United States is not a final order for the purposes of limiting review of that
decision to one particular administrative officer.
454. 375 U.S. 217 (1963) (Warren, C.J.).
455. Section 244(a)(5) of the INA of 1952, 66 Stat. 215-16, as amended by Act of Oct.
24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-885, § 4, 76 Stat. 1247 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1982)).
See also Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670, 672, as amended by 62 Stat. 1206.
Early provisions provided for suspension of deportation. See also Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S.
345, 353 n.15 (1956).
456. Nonetheless, petition for review in the court of appeals automatically stays an
order of deportation "unless the court otherwise directs." § 106(a)(3) of the INA (codi-
fied at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(3)(1982)).
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available in the appellate courts. Under section 106(a)(4), find-
ings of fact supporting a determination of deportability are nor-
mally binding on the appellate court "if supported by reasona-
ble, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered
as a whole. 4 57 Since the statutory provision under scrutiny in
Foti provided for a discretionary form of relief from an order of
deportation,458 the Court limited the scope of appellate review of
a denial of that relief to a restricted inquiry concerning whether
the denial by Attorney General was either arbitrary or an "abuse
of administrative discretion."459
The Court in Foti specifically did not pass upon whether
section 106(a) grants the courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction
to review orders denying motions to reopen deportation proceed-
ings.46 ° In Giova v. Rosenberg,46' the Court held that the court of
appeals has jurisdiction to review the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals' (BIA) 62 denial of a motion to reopen"6" a deportation pro-
ceeding before the BIA.
In Chen Fan Kwok v. INS,46' the Supreme Court slackened
the trend toward increased direct access to the courts of appeals.
Whereas the language of Foti suggested that final discretionary
determinations relating to deportation would receive direct court
of appeals review, Chen Fan Kwok held that a discretionary de-
termination by a district director 65 denying a request for a stay
of deportation 466 does not fall within the ambit of section 106(a),
since such a denial is not entered under section 242(b) of the
Act. Jurisidiction to review the denial of the stay vested in the
district court rather than in the court of appeals. 67 Following
457. Section 106(a)(4), quoted in Foti, 375 U.S. at 228.
458. See note 594 infra. The 1962 amendment, 76 Stat. 1247, modified the suspen-
sion of deportation provision significantly, although the relief remains discretionary. Sec-
tion 244 of the INA is currently codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982).
459. Foti, 375 U.S. 217, 228, 229 n.15.
460. Id. at 231.
461. 379 U.S. 18 (1964)(per curiam), rev'g 308 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1962).
462. The BIA is organized and authorized under 8 C.F.R. § § 3.1-3.8 (1987).
463. Currently allowed by regulation. 8 C.F.R. § 242.22 (1987).
464. 392 U.S. 206 (1968).
465. District directors are delegated their authority under 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(n) (1987).
466. A stay of an order of deportation may be granted by a district director "for such
time and under such conditions as he may deem appropriate." 8 C.F.R. § 243.4 (1987).
467. Cheng Ho Mui v. Rinaldi, 262 F. Supp. 258 (D.N.J. 1966), aff'd on other
grounds, 408 F.2d 28 (3rd Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 963 (1969).
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Chen Fan Kwok, an alien who has received an order of deporta-
tion after a section 242(b) proceeding can obtain review in a dis-
trict court by making an unsuccessful motion for a stay of de-
portation and then have a second opportunity of judicial review
before the court of appeals. A deportable alien who fails to move
for a stay of deportation will have but one opportunity of lim-
ited judicial review before the court of appeals when directly ap-
pealing the deportation order. Anomalously, an alien who has
technically not entered" 8 the country, and who has been ordered
excluded following an exclusion proceeding," 9 may obtain judi-
cial review before a district court, albeit under the strict limita-
tions on judicial review inherent in a habeas corpus proceed-
in47 If unsuccessful, before the district court, the excluded
alien may procure judicial review a second time by advancing
into the court of appeals. By contrast, an alien, long a resident
in the United States, following a section 242(b) deportation pro-
ceeding, may discover he has but one chance to press his claim
in court. The soundness of this result lies in the fact that a de-
nial of a stay of deportation is not technically a final order of
deportation and the denial can be issued months after the order
of deportation in a proceeding "entirely distinct" from the origi-
nal deportation proceeding.471 The result in Chen Fan Kwok re-
stricts "the application of § 106(a) to orders entered during pro-
ceedings conducted under § 242(b), or directly challenging
deportation orders themselves. '4 72
468. See the discussion of this term beginning at text accompanying notes 506-581
infra.
469. Exclusion proceedings are prescribed in § 236 of the INA, 66 Stat. 163 (codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1982)). See note 423 supra.
470. An alien who has been ordered excluded from the United States may obtain
judicial review only by habeas corpus. Section 106(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § §
1105a(b)(1982). But see Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956)(statutory
scheme did not bar declaratory judgment action brought by excluded alien). Apparently,
§ 106(a) does not apply to alien crewmen who are deported under § 252(b) of the INA, 8
U.S.C. § 1282(b) (1982). See, e.g., INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 68 n.6 (1969), reh'g de-
nied, 395 U.S. 987 (1969).
471. Chen Fan Kwok, 392 U.S at 212-13.
472. Id. at 215 (footnote omitted). Recently, as a peripheral issue, the Court noted
that the jurisdictional grant in § 106(a) encompasses an alien's constitutional challenge
to a final order of deportation issued by the Attorney General pursuant to a decision by
one House of Congress, under 244(c)(2) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982), to veto
the Attorney General's prior decision to suspend that alien's deportation, even though
such congressional determination was not made under a § 242(b) deportation proceeding,
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The Supreme Court has indicated, in Jay v. Boyd,473 that
the extent of the Attorney General's discretion in deportation
cases can be very broad. It is "unfettered 4 7 4 even where the
alien has resided in the United States more than 40 years.475
Congress may even eliminate an alien's recourse to judicial pro-
ceedings and order that aliens be removed from the United
States by executive proceedings. 76 Should the executive pro-
ceeding order deportation without a fair hearing, the alien can
obtain judicial review through habeas corpus."7 What consti-
tutes a "fair hearing" depends largely upon the underlying rea-
sons for the deportation and has varied through time.478
If a person arrested is not an alien, the executive branch
will lose jurisdiction that would otherwise empower it to order
deportation. 79 If the person claiming to be a citizen makes a
nor with regard to a motion to reopen such proceeding. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983), discussed below at text accompanying note 603 infra. Chadha is consistent with
Foti, discussed in text accompanying note 454 supra, to the extent that the Court in Foti
decided § 106(a) provided for direct appellate review of a denial of an alien's request for
suspension of deportation under § 244(a)(5) of the 1952 Act, 66 Stat. 214. Foti allowed §
106(a) review of a decision rendered pursuant to § 244. Since its inception, § 244 con-
tained a one-House veto provision (Q 244(b), 66 Stat. at 216) and it was carried over to
the provision under scrutiny in Chadha (Q 244 (c)(2)), which was an amendment of the
1952 language. Act of Oct. 24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-885, 76 Stat. 1247, 1248 amending
Act of June 27, 1952, Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163, 214.
473. 351 U.S. 345 (1956) (Reed, J.)(dissenting separate opinions by Warren, C. J.,
Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas, JJ.).
474. Id. at 354.
475. Id. at 362 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
476. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 280 (1922) (Brandeis, J.), discussed supra at
text accompanying note 203; Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275 (1912)(deportation
"inquiry may be properly devolved upon an executive department or subordinate offi-
cials thereof").
477. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) See Gordon, Habeas Corpus-New Lim-
its for an Ancient Remedy?, IMMIGR. J., Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 7. A good point at which to
start an historical tracing of the statutory scheme providing habeas corpus relief is REV.
STAT. § 751-66 (2d ed. 1878).
478. For an example, an attempt to deport an alien alleged to be a member of, or
affiliated with, the Communist Party under the Alien Registration Act of 1940, 54 Stat.
673, in Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 156 (1945), failed because the executive proceed-
ing misconstrued the term "affiliation" and evidence was improperly received in the pro-
ceeding without which it was "wholly speculative whether the requisite finding would
have been made" leading to the order of deportation. But cf. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345
(1956), where the use of undisclosed confidential information did not constitute an unfair
practice. See those cases concerning § 235(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
described in note 393 supra.
479. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922); United States ex rel. Bilokun-
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showing that his or her claim is not frivolous, he or she is enti-
tled to a judicial determination of the claim and a writ of habeas
corpus will be issued.480
B. Curtailing Judicial Review
In Al-Karagholi v. INS,"'8 Justice Douglas dissented from
the Court's denial of certiorari in a case where the Board of Im-
migration Appeals (BIA) had observed that the denial of an
Iraqi student's request by a special inquiry officer'"" "for an ex-
tension of his student visa-was not appealable or subject to re-
view. '"483 Justice Douglas pointed out that under rules promul-
gated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
"there is no review available of the decisions on applications for
extension of student visas."'"' According to Justice Douglas, the
denial of review violated a fundamental concept of due process
of law. Justice Douglas maintained that a denial of extension of
time on a valid visa is a "final order and must be subject to judi-
cial review. ' '14 He asserted that the review contemplated by the
agency regulations was "so limited as to be nonexistent"'4 6 and
that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) required judicial
review.48 7 His rationale was that the APA provides that where an
sky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153 (1923)(Brandeis, J.) ("[Allienage is a jurisdictional fact.").
480. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. at 284-85. See Agosto v. INS, 436 U.S. 748, at
text accompanying note 494 infra.
481. 409 U.S. 1086 (1972).
482. Provision is made for a special inquiry officer who conducts deportation pro-
ceedings under § 242(b) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982)).
483. 409 U.S. at 1087.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 1088.
486. Id. at 1089.
487. Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 392-93 (currently codified at 5
U.S.C. § 704 (1982)) which states:
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. A
preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly re-
viewable is subject to review on review of the final agency action. Except as oth-
erwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the
purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or determined
an application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsideration, or, unless
the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is
inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority.
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agency ruling is not "directly reviewable,"' 58 that ruling becomes
reviewable when the "final agency action"' 8 9 is reviewed. Justice
Douglas's position is consistent with that of Justice Brandeis,
who recognized that deportation can amount to a deprivation of
liberty, "property and life; or all that makes life worth living."' 9
When such important matters are at stake, there is properly a
concern that the safeguards of due process be enforced.
Although a denial of certiorari does not represent a ruling
on the underlying substantive issues, Al-Karagholi is a minor
portent along the way to later developments where the Burger
Court more clearly has taken a stand on the due process and
equal protection claims advanced by aliens in a number of dif-
ferent statuses. Historically, the road leads from concern for
such rights as expressed by Justice Brandeis, through sharp cur-
tailment and denial of such claims in opinions authored during
the height of the Cold War, through expansion of some rights
during the later days of the Warren Court, and a general reluc-
tance to expand those rights, if not to restrict them, in the Bur-
ger Court.
C. Modern Protection Against Deportation of Citizens
From early times, an individual alleged to be an alien who
asserted a claim of United States citizenship and who supported
the claim by substantial evidence, would be entitled to a trial in
the appropriate district court. The executive agency which oth-
erwise administered the deportation proceeding would thereby
lose jurisdiction. The point in time at which the judiciary inter-
vened, however, might not be until after the executive agency
had rendered a decision. 9
488. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1982).
489. Id.
490. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
491. Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22, 34-35 (1939) (dicta) (also, the decision pertain-
ing to effect of membership in the Communist Party was set aside by § 23 of the Alien
Registration Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 673); United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263
U.S. 149, 152-53 (1923)(Brandeis, J.); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 281, 283-85
(1922)(Brandeis, J.) (resident's claim of citizenship entitled, on habeas corpus, to judicial
trial, since claim was supported by sufficient evidence); United States v. Sing Tuck, 194
U.S. 161, 167-170 (1904)(Holmes, J.)(intimating that it may be beyond the power of
Congress to make the decision of an executive agency final upon the question of citizen-
ship). If the petitioner seeks entry upon a claim of citizenship, the hearing should be
[Vol. IV
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The government has been given the burden of proving
alienage in a deportation proceeding rather than placing the
burden of proving citizenship upon the alleged alien.4 9 The pro-
tection offered to the alien is diminished, however, since the
Court has adopted the view that "[s]ilence is often evidence of
the most persuasive character" and an individual who is mute in
such a proceeding may be assumed to be an alien.493
In Agosto v. INS,494 the INS had attempted to deport an
individual who claimed to be a United States citizen by birth;
the INS maintained the petitioner was born in Italy. The peti-
tioner argued he had moved to Italy, from Ohio, as a very young
child. At issue was the application of section 106(a)(5)(B) of the
INA.495 Although section 106(a) had eliminated district court re-
view of INS deportation determinations, subsection 106(a)(5)(B)
provides an exception where the petitioner claims to be a United
States citizen. If a claim of citizenship is not made, the review
directed to the district court: Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920); Chin Yow v.
United States, 208 U.S. 8, 13 (1908)(Holmes, J.); but see Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S.
at 276, 282; Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U.S. 673 (1912); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S.
253 (1905)(Holmes, J.); see also Tod v. Wadman, 266 U.S. 113, 119-20 (1924)(issues of
alien's educational qualifications, eligibility for refugee status, and the likelihood of be-
coming a public charge, as affecting a question of entry into the United States, can be
decided by appropriate executive agency).
492. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153 (1923)(Brandeis, J.);
but see Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 283 (1922)(Brandeis, J.)(some persons of the
Chinese race, under § 3 of the Act of May 5, 1892, 27 Stat. 25, had the burden of estab-
lishing their right to remain in the United States); Ah How v. United States, 193 U.S. 65
(1904)(Holmes, J.); Chin Bak Kan v. United States, 186 U.S. 193 (1902).
493. Bilokumsky, 263 U.S. at 153-54 (individual's "failure to claim that he was a
citizen and his refusal to testify on this subject had a tendency to prove that he was an
alien"); United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904).
494. 436 U.S. 748 (1978)(Marshall, J.) (Powell J. dissenting).
495. As added by Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650, 652 (codi-
fied at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(5)(B) (1982)), which provides:
(5) whenever any petitioner, who seeks review of an order under this sec-
tion, claims to be a national of the United States and makes a showing that his
claim is not frivolous, the court shall (A) pass upon the issues presented when it
appears from the pleadings and affidavits filed by the parties that no genuine
issue of material fact is presented; or (B) where a genuine issue of material fact
as to the petitioner's nationality is presented, transfer the proceedings to a
United States district court where the petitioner has his residence for hearing de
novo of the nationality claim and determination as if such proceedings were orig-
inally initiated in the district court under the provisions of section 2201 of title
28, United States Code.
(emphasis added).
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typically goes directly to the court of appeals which must base
its decision upon the "administrative record.""9" In Agosto, while
appealing the INS decision to deport him in the court of ap-
peals, the petitioner requested and was granted a de novo judi-
cial determination by the finder of fact in the district court.
Earlier, the BIA had decided the INS had demonstrated its
case against the petitioner in a "clear, convincing and unequivo-
cal '4 9 7 fashion. Agosto, the petitioner, appealed to the court of
appeals and requested a district court hearing. The Supreme
Court was faced with deciding the applicable standard the court
of appeals should use in order to arrive at a decision whether to
send a claim from the court of appeals to the district court for a
de novo hearing.
The INA requires that a claim of United States citizenship
not be "frivolous," and that "a genuine issue of material fact"
exists.498 The Supreme Court announced that the "frivolous"
standard is analogous to the one used in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(6),499 in which a motion to dis-
miss will be granted for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. This goes "to the merits of the legal theory un-
derlying the citizenship claim. '50 0 The Court also noted that the
"genuine issue of material fact" standard in section 106(a)(5)(B)
is "virtually identical" to the language used in FRCP 56, which
governs motions for summary judgment. 0 ' Under the decision in
Agosto, the language in section 106(a)(5)(B) is interpreted simi-
larly with summary judgment principles controlling.502 A de
novo district court review of a claim of United States citizenship
will be granted if the evidence presented would be sufficient to
overcome a motion for summary judgment and entitle the peti-
tioner to a trial. In considering the evidence, the court of appeals
may not evaluate its credibility, because that function is re-
served to the trier of fact.503 In Agosto, the petitioner's evidence
496. 436 U.S. at 753.
497. Id. at 751.
498. See the statutory language in note 495 supra.
499. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
500. 436 U.S. 748, 754 n.4.
501. Id. at 754. The standard appearing in FED R. Civ. P 56 examines whether there
is a "genuine issue as to any material fact."
502. 436 U.S. at 756.
503. Id. at 756-57.
[Vol. IV660
NOTE
consisted of testimony by live witnesses in which cross-examina-
tion, available in a district court proceeding, would have been
valuable in assessing the credibility of the witnesses' assertions.
Although the documentary evidence which the INS submitted
established a convincing case for its argument, the Supreme
Court recognized the possibility that such evidence could be re-
futed if the trier of fact chose to believe the petitioner's wit-
nesses." 4 In accepting the summary judgment standard, as well
as the nonfrivolousness requirement, the Court rejected applying
the "reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence" standard
to section 106(a)(5)(B) although this latter standard appears
elsewhere in the INA.505
D. Development of the Reentry Doctrine
Under the early statutes,50 6 as is still true today,507 alien
prostitutes are excludable. In the past, the test to determine
whether such women were in fact prostitutes, within the mean-
ing of the applicable statutory scheme, was whether they were
discovered practicing the profession within a specified number
of years following their entry into the United States.50 8 Under
the Act of February 20, 1907,509 the applicable time period was
three years following entry into the United States.510 In Lapina
v. Williams, 51 1 an alien remained in the United States beyond
the three-year period and then made a temporary visit abroad.
The issue became one of whether the three-year period started
running anew upon her reentry into the United States. The re-
curring issue in numerous immigration cases is whether an
alien's subsequent reentries into the United States should be
504. Id. at 760-61.
505. E.g., 106(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1105a(a)(4)(1982). Section 106a(5) is an exception to
that standard.
506. E.g., Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898, 899, as amended by Act of Mar.
26, 1910, ch. 128, 36 Stat. 263, 264; Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 3 (prostitution), § 21
(three-year period to commence deportations), 32 Stat. 1213, 1214.
507. Section 212(a)(12)(prostitutes), (a)(13)(immoral sexual acts), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(12), (a)(13)(1982), but see § 212(h) (nonapplicability of § 212(a)(12) in certain
instances), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (1982).
508. Congress has the power to place such restrictions on the activities of aliens fol-
lowing their entry into the United States. Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272 (1912).
509. 34 Stat. 898.
510. Section 3, 34 Stat. 898, 899-900. Also, § § 20, 21, 34 Stat. 904, 905.
511. 232 U.S. 78 (1914).
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subjected to the same scrutiny that an alien's first-time entry
into the United States receives.
In Lapina, a woman who first entered the United States in
1897 or 1898, remained within the country for about ten years,
and then- made a short trip to Russia. Fourteen months after her
return to the United States she was arrested for engaging in
prostitution.512 The issue in similar cases is basically one of
whether an alien who makes a brief departure from the United
States can be considered "domiciled" in the United States and
thereby, in some fashion, exempted from the exclusion provi-
sions of the immigration statutes.513 Lapina provided an answer
to this question by dening reentry into the United States. 14
Similarly, in Lewis v. Frick,51 5 an alien who resided in the
United States for approximately six years and who was found to
have spent one day in Canada for the purpose of importing a
woman into the United States for an immoral purpose, was held
to be deportable upon his attempted reentry into the United
States. Under the statutory scheme involved in Lewis, as was
also the case in Lapina, the executive had three years after the
512. Id. at 82-83.
513. Id. at 87-91.
514. In earlier cases, the Court was reluctant to find that all people entering the
United States were covered by the reach of the terms of exclusion in the then current
immigration statutes. For example, in Taylor v. United States, 207 U.S. 120 (1907), Jus-
tice Holmes found that an alien sailor who jumped ship was not the type of individual
Congress had in mind when it passed legislation penalizing the relevant shipowners and
ship officers for the prohibited landing of such an alien into the United States under the
Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 18, 32 Stat. 1213, 1217. See also Lau Ow Bew v. United
States, 144 U.S. 47 (1892), where a returning Chinese merchant who had a residence in
the United States for 17 years and who made a return visit to China for 11 months was
held not to fall within the terms of the Chinese Restriction Act of May 6, 1882, 22 Stat.
58, ch. 126, as amended by Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115, which otherwise
required all Chinese (other than laborers) coming into the United States to possess a
certificate from the Chinese Government permitting their entry into the United States.
The Court reasoned that the requirement of a certificate from the Chinese Government
involve[d] the exaction of the unreasonable and absurd condition of a foreign
government certifying to the United States facts in regard to the place of abode
and the business of persons residing in this country, which the foreign govern-
ment cannot be assumed to know, and the means of information in regard to
which exist here, unless it be construed to mean that Congress intended that the
certificate should be procured only by Chinese residing in China or some other
foreign country, and about to come for the first time into the United States for
travel or business or to take up their residence.
Lau Ow Bew, 144 U.S. at 60-61 (emphasis added).
515. 233 U.S. 291 (1914).
alien's entry to effect the deportation. 16 In Lewis, the Court de-
cided that the three-year period "runs not from the date when
the alien first entered the country, but from the time of the pro-
hibited entry" which was the alien's return to the United
States. 1 The Court also stated that if the alien departed the
country "even for a brief space of time" he would be subject to
exclusion "as if he had had no previous residence or domicile in
this country. 518
In United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day,5 9 an alien seaman
who first entered the United States in 1912, and who subse-
quently served as a seaman on other American ships, was found
to have departed the United States as soon as the vessel he
sailed upon visited a foreign port. His return to the United
States was treated like an initial entry. In Claussen, the statu-
tory scheme required the deportation of any alien sentenced to
imprisonment for one year or more because of a conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, such as manslaughter, within
five years of entry into the United States. The five-year period
was calculated on the basis of the seaman's most recent entry
into the United States.2 0
In United States ex rel. Stapf v. Corsi,521 the alien seaman
remained beyond a three-year period described in the Immigra-
tion Act of 1917 for instituting a deportation proceeding.522 The
Court stated that the alien's stay in the United States could
"not be converted into ... lawful residence by the mere fact
that the then applicable statute limited the time within which
deportation proceedings could be had." '523 While the alien sea-
516. Act of the Mar. 26, 1910, ch. 128, 36 Stat. 263, amending Act of Feb. 20, 1907,
ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898.
517. Lewis, 233 U.S. at 297.
518. Id.
519. 279 U.S. 398 (1929)(interpreting § § 19, 32, 33, and 35 of the Immigration Act of
1917).
520. Statutes may place the burden of proof upon the aliens to show they have the
right to reenter. United States v. Trudell, 284 U.S. 279 (1932) (Holmes, J.) (interpreting
§ § 13(a), (b), and 23 of the Immigration Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 153, 161, 165). See also,
United States ex rel. Stapf v. Corsi, 287 U.S. 129, 130 (1932)(The "vessel stayed in Ger-
many two and a half days; but it does not appear whether petitioner went ashore.").
521. 287 U.S. 129 (1932).
522. Section 34, 39 Stat. 874, 896.
523. 287 U.S. at 133. See Philippides v. Day, 283 U.S. 48 (1931) (Holmes, J.); United
States ex rel. Cateches v. Day, 283 U.S. 51 (1931) (Holmes, J.); Carr v. Zaja, 283 U.S. 52
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man in Stapf resided in the United States, the Immigration Act
of 1924 eliminated the three-year limitation.2 4 When the alien
seaman subsequently sailed as a crew member aboard a vessel
going to Germany, under the rule in Claussen, his return to the
United States constituted a separate entry which left him vul-
nerable to, and excludable under, the provisions of the more re-
cent legislation.
Similarly, the Court held in United States ex rel. Volpe v.
Smith,5 125 that a resident alien who is convicted in the United
States of a crime involving moral turpitude, such as counterfeit-
ing, who leaves the United States temporarily, may be excluded
upon his attempted reentry. Under the rationale of this case, the
ability to deny entry into the United States "includes any com-
ing of an alien from a foreign country into the United States
whether such coming be the first or any subsequent one. '526 This
result is obtained although it is possible that a resident alien
convicted of the same crime in the United States who never left
the country could, through the passage of time, become nonde-
portable on the basis of the prior conviction because the time
period in which a deportation proceeding could 'be commenced,
if so limited by the statute, has expired.22
The severity of these prior decisions has been lessened to
(1931) (Holmes, J.); see also Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341 (1932)(the Court re-
fused to read a five-year statute of limitations into § 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917,
ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 889, where an alien, who had been in the United States for a period
longer than five years, managed a house of prostitution); Lehmann v. United States ex
rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685 (1957), reh'g. denied, 354 U.S. 944 (1957) (despite the fact that
more than five years had elapsed since an alien stowaway had entered the United States,
the five-year limitation in § 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 889, did not bar
the alien's deportation under § 241(a)(1) of the INA of 1952, 66 Stat. 204 (current ver-
sion at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982)), since this latter section provided for the deporta-
tion of any alien who was excludable at the original time of entry into the United States,
and as a stowaway, the alien was excludable at the time of his initial entry); Mulcahey v.
Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692,,693 (1957)(rejecting claim to " 'status' of nondeportability").
524. Section 20(d) of the Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153, 165.
525. 289 U.S. 422 (1933).
526. Id. at 425.
527. Id. at 426. In Volpe, the resident alien was convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude more than five years after his initial entry into the United States. Section 19 of
the Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 889 provided for the deportation of any
alien convicted within five years after entry. Therefore, if Volpe had remained in the
United States, the statutory deportation requirement might not have applied to him.
Upon his attempted reentry into the United States within three years of his conviction,
the deportability provision became operative and he was excluded.
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some extent in relatively recent opinions. In Delgadillo v. Car-
michael,528 for example, a resident alien working aboard a
torpedoed American merchant ship was rescued and taken to
Havana, Cuba during World War II. The alien's return to the
United States, after receiving care for about one week in Cuba,
was held not to constitute an "entry" that would be subjected to
the statutory restrictions in effect at the time. 29 Thus, when the
alien in Delgadillo was convicted of second-degree robbery
within two years of his return to the United States, the statutory
requirement of deportation of any alien so convicted within five
years of making an entry into the United States was held to be
inapplicable. The Court started the process of distinguishing the
earlier "entry" cases by confining prior decisions to those factual
circumstances where the alien "plainly expected or planned to
enter a foreign port or place. '530 The Court looked for a volun-
tary act by the alien to reach foreign soil, but found none.531
When confronted with two entries by an alien, in Bonnetti
v. Rogers,532 one in 1923 and the other in 1938, combined with
the fact that after the 1923 entry the alien was a member of the
Communist Party but quit the Party before leaving the United
States in 1937, relinquished all claim of right to residence in the
United States, fought in the Spanish Civil War, and following
his 1938 return to the United States never rejoined the Commu-
nist Party, the Court selected the alien's 1938 return to the
United States as the relevant entry where the statutory scheme
required that any alien should be deported who became a mem-
ber of the Communist Party after his entry into the United
States. 33 Delgadillo and Bonnetti can be harmonized. The
528. 332 U.S. 388 (1947) (Douglas, J.).
529. Section 19(a) of the Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 874, 889, as
amended, Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670, 671.
530. Delgadillo, 332 U.S. at 390.
531. Id. at 391. It is arguable that this trend toward ameliorating an otherwise poten-
tially harsh rule concerning the reentry doctrine was set in motion by Judge Learned
Hand in Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947)(reentry does not occur
when an alien takes an overnight sleeper railroad car from Buffalo to Detroit via Canada:
the necessary intent to leave the country and must include knowledge by the alien that
he will in fact go to foreign territory and cross the United States border).
532. 356 U.S. 691 (1958).
533. Section 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987, 1008, amending the
Anarchist Act of October 16, 1918, 40 Stat. 1012, as amended by, Act of June 5, 1920, ch.
251, 41 Stat. 1008, and Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 673, provided for the
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Court in Bonnetti based its analysis upon the alien's most recent
entry into the United States following the alien's earlier volun-
tary departure. In Delgadillo, the Court looked to the alien's
original entry when his intervening departure was involuntary.
The sequence of decisions aiming to avoid hardship or sur-
prise, as well as to ameliorate the possibly severe and unex-
pected consequences of a temporary trip abroad, reached a high
point in Rosenberg v. Fleuti.13 4 Fleuti, a resident alien in the
United States, made an "afternoon trip" across the border into
Mexico and was denied reentry into the United States under the
charge that he was excludable as an alien afflicted with a "psy-
chopathic personality" in so much as he was a homosexual. 3
Following Delgadillo v. Carmichael,5 6 the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952 (INA) had been enacted, which included
"entry" into the United States in its list of definitions. 53 7 A
number of Supreme Court cases had also addressed the issue
deportation of any alien who becomes a member of the Communist Party "at any time"
after entering the United States. Section 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 also
provided for exclusion on the basis of membership in the Communist Party, 64 Stat.
1006, but was not applicable when the alien returned to the United States in 1938. Upon
the alien's return to the United States in 1938, in Bonnetti, federal "law did not exclude
members or past members of the Communist Party." Bonnetti at 700 (dissenting opinion
of Justice Clark). Cf. Klig v. Brownell, 244 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (permitting deporta-
tion on the basis of past membership in the Communist Party), vacated and remanded
as moot sub noma., Klig v. Rogers, 355 U.S. 605 (1958).
Sections 1 and 4(a) of the Anarchist Act of October 16, 1918, as amended, were
repealed by § 403(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 279.
The 1952 Act continued as a basis of exclusion any membership in the Communist
Party. Section 212(a)(28)(C)(iv), 66 Stat. 182, 184-85. Concerning subsequent develop-
ments on this point of law, see the discussion of Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1982), the Hel-
sinki Accords, 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1292 (1975), the McGovern Amendment, 22 U.S.C. §
2691 (1982), and Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), at text accompany-
ing notes 329-98 supra.
534. 374 U.S. 449 (1963) (Goldberg, J.) (Clark, Harlan, Stewart, and White, JJ.,
dissenting).
535. Id. at 451. The relevant statutory provision was § 212(a)(4) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 66 Stat 182, (currently codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1982)).
536. 332 U.S. 388 (1947).
537. "Entry" is currently defined in the statute at § 101(a)(13) of the INA (codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1982)). The definition appears infra at note 556. Under the
language of the definition, the suggestion in Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, that
an alien's departure from the United States must be, in some fashion, voluntary in order
to constitute a subsequent "entry," would appear to be confined to cases involving resi-
dent aliens (legal permanent residents) rather than applying broadly to all categories of
aliens.
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and general problems arising out of the definition of this term. 3a
538. Entry cases: I.L.W.U. Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 223 (1954) (Frankfurter,
J.) (Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting)(absence of valid case or controversy barred the
Court from enjoining the District Director from so construing the Act of 1952 "as to
treat aliens domiciled in the continental United States returning from temporary work in
Alaska as if they were aliens entering the United States for the first time" under §
212(d)(7) of the INA, (currently codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(7) (1982))); Barber v.
Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 638-39 (1954) (Warren, C.J.) (Minton, Reed, Burton, JJ., dis-
senting) (individual "who was born a national of the United States in the Philippine
Islands, who came to the continental United States as a national prior to the Philippine
Independence Act of 1934, and who was sentenced to imprisonment in 1941 and 1950 for
crimes involving moral turpitude" did not make an "entry" for the purposes of a depor-
tation statute under the Immigration Act of 1917 because prior to the 1934 Philippine
Independence Act the islands could not be regarded as a foreign port or place); but cf.
Rabang v. Boyd, 353 U.S. 427, 431 (1957) (Brennan J.), reh'g denied, 354 U.S. 944 (1957)
(under the Act of 1931, 46 Stat. 1171, as amended, 54 Stat. 673 (1940), an individual
born in the Philippine Islands, who lived in the United States since 1930, was deportable
for violating federal narcotics laws despite the fact that when he came to the United
States the Philippines were a territory of the United States and not a foreign country
because the 1931 Act was "silent as to whether 'entry' from a foreign country [was] a
condition of deportability" thereby distinguishing Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1
(1904), discussed in note 138 supra); Mrvica v. Esperdy, 376 U.S. 560 (1964) (interpret-
ing § 249 of the INA, 66 Stat. 163, 219, as amended, 72 Stat. 546 (1958) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1259 (1982), as amended by Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359, 3405), which, in some instances, will grant an alien present in the United States a
record of lawful admission for the purposes of gaining permanent residence). Compare
also the different results obtained in Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120 (1964) (Stewart, J.)
(White and Clark, JJ., dissenting)(Harlan, J., taking no part), with United States ex rel.
Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521 (1950) (Burton, J.) (Frankfurter, Black, Jack-
son, JJ., dissenting) (Douglas and Clark, JJ., taking no part). In Costello, a statutory
provision for deportation of any alien who was convicted of two crimes after entry was
held not to apply to an individual who committed the crimes while in the status of a
naturalized citizen, although he was subsequently denaturalized and restored to the sta-
tus of an alien when the deportation proceeding was attempted. In the earlier case, Eich-
enlaub, naturalized citizens convicted of offenses in violation of the Espionage Act of
1917, 40 Stat. 217, upon their subsequent denaturalization, were held deportable even
though the convictions were obtained when they enjoyed the status of citizens. The dif-
ference between the two results was explained in Costello as dependent upon a statuto-
rily available form of relief in the latter case which apparently did not apply in the
earlier Eichenlaub decision. Under the deportation statute in Costello, § 241(a)(4) of the
INA of 1952, (currently codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1982)), following a conviction,
the sentencing court could recommend that the alien not be deported via operation of §
241(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2) (1982). This provision allowed for such relief to aliens
upon their conviction, but did not so provide for naturalized citizens. The sentencing
court thus lacked jurisdiction to provide such relief to a citizen. Since the relief Congress
accorded to an alien who was found deportable under § 241(a)(4) did not apply to an
individual who is a naturalized citizen when convicted, the Costello Court refused to
apply the deportation requirement of § 241(a)(4) to an individual who was a citizen at
the time of his convictions. Costello, 376 U.S. at 126-128. The statute under considera-
tion in Eichenlaub, the Act of May 10, 1920, 41 Stat. 593-94, did not have a similar relief
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Since Fleuti made his first entry into the United States several
months before the 1952 Act became effective, 53 9 he was not then
excludable as a "psychopathic personality" as that exclusion
provision was not yet law. Rather, the issue was whether Fleuti's
return to the United States in 1956 after a brief trip across the
Mexican border was an "entry" that would call into play all of
the various provisions for excluding aliens.40
The Court noted that earlier Supreme Court cases which
created a judicial definition of entry were harsh in application
and in the consequences which they wrought upon returning
aliens,""' thereby suggesting the 1952 Act had, at least on this
point, taken the sting out of prior Supreme Court doctrine,"4 2
since Congress had implemented the exception in Delgadillo
concerning involuntary departures from the United States.
Fleuti defined a departure from the United States as an absence
from the United States that is "meaningfully interruptive of the
alien's permanent residence."5 4 For an absence to be "meaning-
fully interruptive of the alien's permanent residence," it must be
intentional. Without defining intent, the Court indicated that
lack of intent is established where a resident alien's trip outside
the United States is "innocent, casual, and brief. '544 An alien's
intention to depart, according to Fleuti, may be drawn by infer-
ence. The Court listed three factors which will help decide
whether such an inference is warranted. These factors are (1)
length of time the trip takes; (2) the purpose of the trip; and (3)
whether travel documents are required for the trip. 46 A trip
which has as its purpose "some object which is itself contrary to
some policy reflected in our immigration laws" would likely, al-
provision to influence that earlier Court's decision.
539. Fleuti entered the United States for permanent residence on Oct. 9, 1952. The
Act became effective Dec. 24, 1952. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 453 n.2.
540. The 33 current grounds for exclusion are listed at § 212(a)(1-33) of the INA, 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1-33) (1982).
541. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 453.
542. But cf. Justice O'Connor's opinion relying upon these earlier cases in the recent
decision of Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982), discussed at text accompanying note
549 infra, and INS v. Phinphathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984), discussed at text accompanying
note 615 infra. The Immigration Reform and Control (IRCA) Act of 1986 overruled
Phinpathya. See note 642 infra.




though not definitely, 5 6 constitute a meaningful interruption of
the alien's residence. Also, whether an alien must procure travel
documents "might well cause the alien to consider more fully the
implications involved in leaving the country."5"7 The result in
Fleuti is "that an innocent, casual, and brief excursion by a resi-
dent alien outside the country's borders may not have been 'in-
tended' as a departure disruptive of his resident alien status and
therefore may not subject him to the consequences of an 'entry'
into the country on his return." 48
E. Extension of Due Process in Some Exclusion Hearings
Some additional rights have been extended to aliens in-
volved in exclusion proceedings in Landon v. Plasencia.4 9 In an
exclusion proceeding, the rights of an alien to any due process
guarantees are de minimis 50 In Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion in Plasencia, the right to some due process of law was
extended to a legal permanent resident 551 who underwent an ex-
clusion proceeding55 2 after returning to the United States from a
short trip to Mexico. The wisdom, however, of assigning a resi-
dent alien to an exclusion hearing rather than a deportation pro-
ceeding is not clearly established. The legal permanent resident
in Plasencia naturally desired a deportation hearing,53 rather
546. The language the Court uses is "it would appear that the interruption of resi-
dence thereby occurring would properly be regarded as meaningful." Fleuti, 374 U.S. at
462. The Court did not require that all trips which have as a purpose an object contrary
to some immigration policy must necessarily constitute a meaningful interruption of the
alien's residence in the United States. But cf. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982),
discussed at text accompanying note 549 infra.
547. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 462.
548. Id.
549. 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (O'Connor, J.) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); see also, Young, Exclusion Hearing Enough for Illegal Alien Smuggler, 69
A.B.A.J. 352 (1983); Casenote, Immigration Law, 1983 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 837 (1984);
Note, Exclusion v. Deportation: Does Hope Lie in Between? 10 W. ST. U.L. REV. 213
(1983); Casenote, Ensuring Due Process in Alien Exclusion Proceedings After Landon v.
Plasencia, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 911 (1983); Casenote, Immigration Law: Process Due Resi-
dent Aliens Upon Entering the United States, 24 HARV. INT'L L.J. 198 (1983); Casenote,
Getting Back In: The Plasencia Decision and the Permanent Resident Alien's Right to
Procedural Due Process, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 969 (1982).
550. Section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1982). See note 423 supra.
551. See note 426 supra.
552. See notes 423 supra.
553. Section 242(b) of the INA (currently codified at 8 U.S.C § 1252(b) (1982), as
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than an exclusion hearing, since an alien is vested with more
rights under the INA in a deportation hearing.5 Justice
O'Connor decided, however, that the proper forum in which to
hear the legal permanent resident was an exclusion hearing.
An alien who has not entered the United States may be ex-
cluded from admission into the United States for any of at least
33 reasons enumerated in section 212 of the INA.555 In order to
fall within the excludability provisions in section 212 of the INA,
the alien must also be engaged in making an "entry" 5 6 into the
United States. The word "entry," in immigration law, has devel-
oped into a technical word of art.55 7 Arguably, upon her return
to the United States, a legal permanent resident is making an
"entry" and is subject to the exclusion qualifications in section
212(a) in an exclusion hearing under section 236(a) of the
INA.558 This conclusion, however, counters the great weight of
the cases previously discussed.559 The purpose of restricting the
amended by Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3445). See note 423
supra.
554. See note 423 supra.
555. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982). In Plasencia, the returning legal permanent resident was
charged with bringing into the United States a number of aliens in violation of law. This
is a basis for exclusion under § 212(a)(31) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(31) (1982).
Similarly, the smuggling of aliens into the United States is also a basis for deportation of
the alien smuggler who is within the United States, under § 241(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(13) (1982). Since an alien has a greater repertoire of rights in a deportation pro-
ceeding, there is a motivation for the alien to argue for the latter, rather than an exclu-
sion hearing.
556. This term is defined at § 101(a)(13) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1982):
The term "entry" means any coming of an alien into the United States,
from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether voluntary or
otherwise, except that an alien having a lawful permanent residence in the
United States shall not be regarded as making an entry into the United States
for the purposes of the immigration laws if the alien proves to the satisfaction of
the Attorney General that his departure to a foreign port or place or to an outly-
ing possession was not intended or reasonably to be expected by him or his
presence in a foreign port or place in an outlying possession was not voluntary:
Provided, That no person whose departure from the United States was occa-
sioned by deportation proceedings, extradition, or other legal process shall be
entitled to such exception.
(emphasis added).
557. See text accompanying note 506-48 and note 556 supra.
558. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1982).
559. See cases discussed at text accompanying notes 506-48 supra. Additionally, in
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953), a legal permanent resident returning
to the United States was held to be entitled to some due process rights in a proceeding
to expel him from the country.
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definition of "entry" to certain types of border crossings is to
protect a legal permanent resident who briefly leaves the United
States during an "innocent, casual, and brief" excursion. 6 °
Where the brief departure is too short-lived to disrupt the
alien's legal permanent resident status, the alien is entitled to
the protections of a deportation hearing rather than an exclusion
hearing. When the alien's departure is not "meaningfully inter-
ruptive" '56 of his permanent residence, his return to the United
States is not an "entry" and exclusion proceedings are
inappropriate.
Although the Court's decision in Plasencia extended some
additional rights to a legal permanent resident in an exclusion
proceeding, non-legal permanent resident aliens did not receive
these additional protections. Paradoxically, Plasencia represents
a curtailment on some fronts regarding the right of a legal per-
manent resident to appear in a deportation proceeding. On the
face of the facts, it was not clear in Plasencia that the legal per-
manent resident had been away from the United States in any
manner as to constitute a meaningful departure as defined in
Rosenberg v. Fleuti.562 By placing the returning legal permanent
resident alien in an exclusion hearing, she was effectively denied
the opportunity to answer the charges of smuggling other aliens
into the United States which had been levied against her.
Through this procedural mechanism, the Court foreclosed upon
the woman's ability to present evidence to defend herself.
F. Requests for Parole
The Immigration and Nationality Act allows aliens to be pa-
roled into the United States pending a determination whether
they will be excluded or permitted to enter the United States.""
560. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 462.
561. Id.
562. 374 U.S. 499 (1963).
563. Section 212(d)(5)(A) of the INA, 66 Stat. 188 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §
1182(d)(5)(A) (1982)) (Parole of Alien Applying for Admission into the United States)
provides:
The Attorney General may, except as provided in subparagraph (B), in his
discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he
may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public
interest any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole
of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the
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Parole will not alter the alien's status in the eyes of the immi-
gration law. If an exclusion hearing ultimately determines the
alien is excludable from the United States, the alien will not be
considered to be "within the United States ' 564 for the purposes
of eligibility for suspension or withholding of deportation.565 Ac-
cording to the Court in Leng May Ma v. Barber, "parole of
aliens seeking admission is simply a device through which need-
less confinement is avoided while administrative proceedings are
conducted." 566
purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been
served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which
he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the
same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.
This section of the statute is implemented by regulations in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (1987).
564. The quoted phrase is from § 243(h) of the INA of 1952, 66 Stat. 214. The phrase
does not appear in the current amended withholding of deportation provision in the Act.
See the amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-549, Title I, § 104, 92 Stat. 2066; and 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-212, Title II, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 107; Act of Dec. 29, 1981, Pub. L. 97-116, §
18(i), 95 Stat. 1620. The basic principle remains that an alien paroled into the United
States is not considered to have made an entry and thereby remains subject to exclusion
rather than deportation proceedings. See note 565 infra.
565. Under § 243(h) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982). The case which an-
nounced this rule is Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958). See also Kaplan v.
Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925) discussed supra at text accompanying note 208; Zartarian v.
Billings, 204 U.S. 170 (1907), discussed supra at text accompanying note 145; United
States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1903), discussed supra at text accompanying note 142.
Indeed, these cases were decided prior to the passage of the 1952 Act. Therefore, al-
though the 1952 provision has been amended to remove the phrase "within the United
States," the rule barring a change of immigration status on the basis of a grant of parole
predates the statute and was not affected by the subsequent statutory amendment.
566. 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958) (Clark, J.) (Douglas, J., concurring). The Court also
stated on the same page that "[p]hysical detention of aliens is now the exception, not the
rule, and is generally employed only as to security risks or those likely to abscond....
Certainly this policy reflects the humane qualities of an enlightened civilization." Re-
cently, the rule became the exception and at least one observer commented that the
decision whether or not to grant parole became dependent upon such factors as skin
color or country of origin. See, E. HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF ALIENS (1985). For some groups, lengthy confinement replaced parole. Compare
the treatment accorded to various subgroups of the Cubans in the Mariel Boatlift, de-
scribed in note 404 supra and the different treatment accorded to the Haitians, de-
scribed in note 568 infra. Some groups never make it to the United States because they
are selectively interdicted upon the high seas and returned to their home countries. See
Executive Order No. 12324, 46 F.R. 48,109 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182 app., at
992-93 (1982); Proclamation No. 4865, 46 F.R. 48107 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182
app. at 993 (1982). This practice, of course, violates the nonrefoulement provisions of the
1968 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223. T.I.A.S. No. 6577. In
the cases concerning the Haitian Boatlift, Haitians were picked up by the Coast Guard
and asked, in the presence of Haitian government officials, whether they sought asylum
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In Jean v. Nelson567 a group of Haitians who were illegally
in the United States requested to be paroled 56 8 into the country.
The Haitians claimed the INS officials had denied them parole
and had discriminated against them on the basis of race and na-
tional origin. Justice Rehnquist directed the petitioning Haitians
to look to the rules and regulations promulgated by the INS 569
for whatever protection the law might afford them. In dicta
throughout the opinion, Justice Rehnquist demonstrated his
fundamental agreement with the INS "that the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment has no bearing on an
unadmitted alien's request for parole. ' 570 The aliens were di-
rected to turn to the rules of the INS to find protection from
discrimination which, according to Justice Rehnquist, would not
in the United States out of a fear of persecution in Haiti. The Haitian officials were
linked to Haiti's dreaded Touton Macoute. See note 393 supra.
567. 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.) (Marshall, J., dissenting with Brennan, J.).
See Casenote, From Mezei to Jean: Toward the Exit of the Entry Doctrine, 22 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1143 (1985); Note, Expansion of the 'Entry Doctrine' Fiction, 15 SOUTH-
WESTERN UL. REv. 575 (1985); Note, Immigration-Admissibility-Excludable Haitian
Aliens Possess No Constitutional Rights Regarding their Admission, 9 SUFFOLK TRANS-
NATIONAL L.J. 147 (1985); Note, Immigration Law: Rights of Detained Aliens, 25 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 232 (1984); Note, A Stark Pattern of Discrimination, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1005
(1982).
568. As with the Cubans, the Haitian Boatlift resulted in a myriad of litigation. See
note 404, supra, discussing the Cuban litigation. The factual conditions in Haiti from
which the Haitians were fleeing, as well as a contrast in subsequent treatment which the
Haitians were afforded once in the United States, as compared with the much more wel-
come reception granted the Cubans in the Mariel Boatlift, can be discovered in a reading
and comparing of the Cuban litigation and the Haitian efforts to obtain asylum in the
United States.
The Cubans who had difficulties entering the United States basically were limited to
those with serious criminal backgrounds or insanity; while the Haitians, as a whole, were
denied admission into the United States. See generally, Haitian Refugee Center v. Civi-
letti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), judgment modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee
Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957
(11th Cir. 1984), reh'g denied, Jean v. Nelson, 733 F.2d 908(11th Cir. 1984), cert.
granted, 469 U.S. 1071 (1984), aff'd. 472 U.S. 846 (1985). Also, see the related litigation:
Louis v. Nelson, 624 F. Supp. 836 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 644
F. Supp. 382 (S.D. Fla. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Meese, 791 F.2d
1489 (11th Cir 1986); Louis v. Meissner, 530 F. Supp. 924 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Louis v.
Meissner, 532 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.Fla. 1982); Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.Fla.
1982); Jean v. Nelson, 683 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982); Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455
(11th Cir. 1983), reh'g granted, 714 F. 2d 96(11th Cir. 1983), on reh'g 727 F.2d 957 (11th
Cir. 1984); Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.Fla. 1982); Sidney v. Howerton, 777
F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1985).
569. In particular, 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (1985).
570. Jean, 472 U.S. at 854.
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otherwise be prohibited by the Constitution of the United
States. 7 Justice Rehnquist concluded that because the regula-
tions do not explicitly permit the INS officers to take race or
national origin into account when deciding whether to grant pa-
role to aliens,572 that the regulations thereby require "that INS
parole decisions must be neutral as to race or national origin." 5"s
Justice Rehnquist did not indicate the source of the authority
that required race neutrality.
Justice Marshall, in his dissent, stated that neither the INA
nor the INS regulations prohibit the discrimination of which the
aliens had complained. There were, in other words, no "noncon-
stitutional constraints" 574 on the agency's authority to employ
"national-origin distinctions. '' M Turning to the fifth amend-
ment, however, Justice Marshall concluded that there are consti-
tutional constraints upon making such distinctions, stating that
the Haitians had a "Fifth Amendment right to parole decisions
free from invidious discrimination based on race or national ori-
gin. '5 76 He pointed out that the majority's restrictive interpreta-
tions of the INS regulations concerning the Attorney General's
parole authority could affect and similarly restrict the Attorney
General's discretion in other areas. Further, Justice Marshall ex-
plained that the proposition that excludable aliens do not come
within the reach of the fifth amendment is one which has been
applied in instances where the government faced national secur-
ity concerns 77 which were not present in Jean. Justice Marshall
571. Id. at 857.
572. See § 212(d)(5)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1982) and 8 C.F.R. §
212.5 (1987).
573. Jean, 472 U.S. at 856 (footnote omitted).
574. Id. at 858.
575. Id. at 859 (footnote omitted).
576. Id. at 858.
577. Id. at 877-79. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537, (1950); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, (1953); see also
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, (1953).
In consideration of the aliens' fifth amendment claim, Justice Marshall in Jean
sought to narrow the application of Mezei. Justice Marshall pointed out that in Mezei,
the Court considered that aliens legally or illegally within the country are entitled to
some measure of due process when faced with expulsion. Also, Justice Marshall ex-
plained that the language in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. at 600, supporting
the proposition that excludable aliens are not covered by the protection of the fifth
amendment, is dictum, because the actual holding in Chew was that the "alien's due
process rights had been violated." Jean, 472 U.S. at 872.
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maintained that the rights of unadmitted aliens include a degree
of equal protection and due process rights; he denied that the
issue is "whether the Due Process Clause can be invoked at
all. 5 78 Justice Marshall concluded that the INS may not take
race or national origin into account when deciding whether to
grant parole or when there is lacking any connection between
such discrimination and proper "immigration concerns 5 79 such
as national security. The older cases support the conclusions
that aliens, even ones illegally present in the United States, are
persons protected under the fifth amendment who are entitled
to some degree of due process of law5' as well as the equal pro-
tection of the laws. 581
V. REQUESTS FOR SUSPENSION OR WAIVER OF DEPORTATION AND
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DISCRETION
Once an alien has made an "entry 5 82 into the United
States, section 241(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) lists 20 grounds for deportation.5 83 Coupled with the pro-
cedures established in section 242,584 the statute makes possible
the removal of aliens who are in the United States.58 5 The power
578. Jean, 472 U.S. at 877. Justice Marshall invoked Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
(1982); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886) as illustrative of how these rights have been extended to aliens within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the United States, and would extend some protections to unadmitted
aliens physically upon the nation's border. These cases are discussed in the text accom-
panying notes 1088 and 1115 infra, and note 47 supra.
579. Jean, 472 U.S. at 882.
580. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (involving a legal permanent
resident); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950); Yamataya v. Fisher (The
Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86 (1903). See also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
763 (1950); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
581. Under Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (Warren, C.J.), the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause may be invoked against the federal government
through the fifth amendment's due process clause. Additionally, there are* occasions
where "discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Bolling,
347 U.S. at 499 (footnote omitted).
582. See discussion of this term in text accompanying notes 506-81 supra.
583. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982), as amended by Act of Oct. 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
570, § 1751(b), 100 Stat. 3207-47; Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 303(b), 100
Stat. 3431; Act of Nov. 10, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, § 2(b), 100 Stat. 3541; Act of Nov.
14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653, § 7(c), 100 Stat. 3657.
584. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982), as amended by Act of Nov. 6,1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, §
701, 100 Stat. 3445.
585. This may be contrasted with § 212(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1982,
1987]
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of Congress to prescribe such categories of removable aliens is
well established within boundaries developed by the judiciary." 6
It is currently a felony punishable by up to two years imprison-
ment for a deported alien to return to the United States58 un-
less certain statutory exemptions apply.
5 88
Some types of relief under the INA are available to deport-
able aliens to prevent their initial removal from the United
Supp. I 1984, & Supp. III 1985), as amended by Act of Oct. 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
570, § 1751(a), 100 Stat. 3207-47; Act of Nov. 10, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, § 6(a), 100
Stat. 3543; Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653, § 7(a), 100 Stat. 3657; and § 236 of
the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1982), which provide 33 grounds for exclusion of aliens from
the United States, and the general procedure in an exclusion hearing, respectively. An
alien who is removed from the United States as the result of either the statutorily dis-
tinct exclusion or deportation proceedings is nonetheless said to be deported.
586. United States ex rel. Polymeris v. Trudell, 284 U.S. 279 (1932) (Holmes, J.) (re-
turning resident aliens must depend on rights granted them by the government when
seeking to return from a trip abroad); United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of
Immigration, 273 U.S. 103 (1927)(alien could subsequently be found deportable for pre-
viously being a member of an excluded class during his original entry into the United
States); United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131 (1924) (Brandeis, J.) (warrant of
deportation will be upheld where the proceeding was not hasty, arbitrary, unfair, nor an
abuse of discretion); but cf. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924)(defect in a warrant of
deportation is jurisdictional where the executive agent failed to make a finding of unde-
sirability as required in the stautory framework).
587. Section 275 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982) (felony illegal entry), as amended
by Act of Nov. 10, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, § 2(d), 100 Stat. 3542; § 276 of the INA, 8
U.S.C. § 1326 (1982) (reentry by a deported alien); see, e.g., United States v. Rojas-
Contreras, 106 S.Ct. 555 (1985) (Burger, C.J.) (Blackmun J., concurring, joined by Bren-
nan, J.), where the Court applied the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(2) (1982), to
an illegal alien indicted for the felony of returning to the United States. According to the
Court, the unambiguous language in the Act required a determination that the thirty-
day trial preparation period begins to run from the date when the defendant first makes
an appearance through counsel, and not from the date of the filing of a superseding
indictment when the purpose of the superseding indictment was to correct the date given
on the previous indictment concerning a predicate conviction for the crime of making an
illegal entry into the United States. See also United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 107 S.Ct.
2148 (1987) (Marshall, J.) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by White and O'Connor,
JJ.) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alien may assert invalidity of underlying deportation order
when subsequently prosecuted in a criminal proceeding for illegal entry following depor-
tation under § 276 of the INA (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1982))).
588. A deported alien who desires to return to the United States must obtain permis-
sion from the Attorney General to reapply for admission. Section 276(1), (2)(A) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(1), (2)(A) (1982). This requirement remains upon an excluded alien
for one year following his exclusion from the United States, § 212(a)(16) of the INA, 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(16)(1982), and for five years for certain types of aliens who were de-
ported following a deportation proceeding. Section 212(a)(17) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(17) (1982).
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States.58 9 With the exception of "powers, functions, and duties
conferred upon the President, the Secretary of State, or diplo-
matic or consular officers," the Attorney General is "charged
with the administration and enforcement" of the INA,59 ° includ-
ing the power to decide whether to grant relief from deporta-
tion.591 The Attorney General is authorized to delegate these re-
sponsibilities to the INS, the Commissioner of Immigration, the
Department of Justice, or to others.5 92 Some forms of relief from
deportation allow for broad discretion by the officer making the
decision whether to grant it while other relief may be required if
the statutory prerequisites are established. 9 s
A. Discretionary Suspension of Deportation
The INA provides that an alien may obtain a suspension of
an order of deportation when certain statutory requirements are
met.5 94 The relief may be accorded to an alien by the Attorney
589. E.g., § 244(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C § 1254(a) (1982)(discretionary suspension of
deportation), as amended by Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 315(b), 100 Stat.
3439; § 241(f) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f) (1982) (discretionary waiver of deportation);
§ 243(h) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982) (nondiscretionary political asylum, or
withholding of deportation).
590. Section 103 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982).
591. The Attorney General is charged with administering the provisions pertaining to
relief from deportation listed in note 589, supra.
592. Section 103 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982).
593. See sections cited in note 589, supra.
594. The requirements are set forth in § 244(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1982):
As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in his
discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, in the case of an alien . . . who applies to the
Attorney General for suspension of deportation and-
(1) is deportable under any law of the United States except the provi-
sions specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection; has been physically pre-
sent in the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven
years immediately preceding the date of such application, and proves that
during all of such period he Was and is a person of good moral character; and
is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General,
result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who
is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence.
(emphasis added). If the alien is deportable under § 241(a)(4)-(7), (11), (12), (14)-(18), 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)-(7), (11), (12), (14)-(18), the statute requires physical presence in the
United States for a continuous period of 10 years. Section 244(a)(2) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254(a)(2) (1982).
The 1986 amendment added the following paragraph: "(3) An alien shall not be con-
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General or by his appointed delegate.9 5 In INS v. Rios-
Pineda,5 9 the Supreme Court held the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) did not exceed its discretionary authority in de-
nying a motion brought by two Mexican citizens, a married
couple, to reopen59 7 a request for suspension of deportation.
Prior to the initiation of their deportation proceeding, the wife
bore a child, a United States citizen, and before the couple's ap-
peal reached the Supreme Court, she bore another child, also a
United States citizen.59 The Supreme Court approved the BIA
holding that the section 244(a)(1) requirement that an alien
maintain a continuous presence in the United States for seven
years in order to become eligible for a suspension of deportation
was not satisfied when the seven-year period accrued during the
pendency of the aliens' appeals from the date the suspension of
deportation was first denied. 99 This result is at variance with
sidered to have failed to maintain continuous physical presence in the United States
under paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) if the absence from the United States was
brief, casual, and innocent and did not meaningfully interrupt the continuous physical
presence." Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 315(b), 100 Stat. 3439.
595. Section 103 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982) authorizes the Attorney General
to delegate such discretionary authority.
596. 471 U.S. 444 (1985) (White, J.) (Powell, J., took no part in the decision); see also
Stewart, Time not on Alien's Side, 71 A.B.A.J. 110 (1985).
597. Motions to reopen are provided for in 8 C.F.R § 3.2 (1987). The decision to grant
such a motion is discretionary. INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 188 n.6 (1984); INS v.
Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 n.5 (1981).
598. Since the children were born in the United States and were subject to its juris-
diction, they were citizens at birth. Section 301 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1982). Giv-
ing birth to a child in the United States does not give an alien an open door to remaining
in the United States, as is illustrated in the deportations in Rios-Pineda, and in INS v.
Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (per curiam), rev'g 622 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1980),
reh'g denied, 451 U.S. 964 (1981), discussed infra at text accompanying note 600. An
alien couple may argue that deportation would result in "extreme hardship" to their
United States citizen children and possibly obtain a suspension of deportation, but only
at the discretion of the Attorney General, § 244(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)
(1982). The other provisions of that section must be complied with as well. See note 594
supra.
In INS v. Hector, 107 S.Ct. 379 (1986) (per curiam) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Bren-
nan, J., would grant the petition and set the case for oral argument), the Supreme Court
limited consideration of extreme hardship only as it applies, in the event of an alien's
deportation, to the alien's "spouse, parent, or child." The Court refused suspension of
deportation regardless of a "parental type relationship" demonstrating strong family ties
between the alien woman and her two nieces, both of whom were United States citizens.
Id. at 381. The two nieces were 10 and 11 years old and had resided with their aunt in
the United States.
599. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. at 449-50. The Court also approved the BIA denial of the
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the explicit recognition in INS v. Jong Ha Wang,600 that the
seven-year requirement may accrue during the course of the
aliens' litigation. In Jong Ha Wang, an alien couple was author-
ized to remain in the United States from 1970 to 1972. The sub-
sequent five years the couple spent unsuccessfully in litigation
over their deportability and their requests for adjustment of sta-
tus. By 1977, the couple made a claim for suspension of deporta-
tion under section 244 of the INA, and the Supreme Court
stated, albeit in dictum, that the aliens "by then had satisfied
the 7-year-continuous-physical-presence requirement of that
section."600
In both Rios-Pineda and Jong Ha Wang, the Court de-
ferred to the authority of the Attorney General and his delegates
whose responsibility it is to administer the INA.62 The defer-
ence in Rios-Pineda is misplaced because it fails to take into
account the intervening result obtained in INS v. Chadha,0 3 in
motion to reopen based upon the aliens' violation of provisions of the INA. For example,
the aliens violated federal law in entering the United States and in failing to depart
voluntarily after one alien's request for voluntary departure had been granted by the
INS. Accordingly, the Attorney General may distinguish among aliens "on the basis of
the flagrancy and nature of their violations." Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. at 451.
600. 450 U.S. 139 (1981) (per curiam), rev'g 622 F.2d 1341(9th Cir. 1980), reh'g de-
nied, 451 U.S. 964. See Griffith, Exclusion and Deportation-Waivers under Section
212(c) and Section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 32 DE PAUL L.
REV. 523 (1983); Leigh, Aliens-Immigration and Nationality Act-Deportation- "Ex-
treme Hardship" Standard, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 952 (1981); Note, Significant Develop-
ments in the Immigration Laws of the United States 1980c,1981, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
195 (1981)
601. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 142 (1981). The alien couple ultimately failed in
their claim on the basis of their inability to meet the.narrow "extreme hardship" require-
ment of § 244 of the INA (currently codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982)). Their motion to
reopen after deportation had been ordered was ultimately denied.
602. Referring to § 103 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982). See, Rios-Pineda, 471
U.S. at 451, and Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. at 144. The Court has seen fit, however, to
interfere with the exercise of the Attorney General's discretion to the extent of ordering
the INS as to which subsection of a former version of the suspension of deportation
statute, § 244(a)(1), 66 Stat. 163, 214 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1)(1982)),
was to be considered in evaluating an alien's request for waiver of deportation. Des-
salernos v. Savoretti, 356 U.S. 269 (1958).
603. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (Burger, C.J.) (Powell, J., concurring) (White, J. dissenting)
(Rehnquist and White, JJ., dissenting). Almost five years have passed since Chadha and
although the Republic has still not fallen, the commentary the decision has spawned
continues: see, Horan, Adjusting the Separation of Powers: the "Legislative Veto" and
the United States Supreme Court's Decision in the Chadha Case, 14 ANGLO-AM. L.REv.
205 (1985); Gaetke, Separation of Powers, Legislative Vetoes, and the Public Lands 56
U. COLO. L. REV. 559 (1985); Buchanan, In Defense of the War Powers Resolution:
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Chadha Does Not Apply, 22 Hous. L. REV. 1155 (1985); Franck & Bob, The Return of
Humpty-Dumpty: Foreign Relations Law after the Chadha Case, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 912
(1985); Mak, One Fell Swoop: the Chadha Decision and the Need for Clarification, 9
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 161 (1985); Glennon, The War Powers Resolution Ten Years
Later: More Politics Than Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 571 (1984); Comly French, Can Home
Rule in the District of Columbia Survive the Chadha Decision?, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 811
(1984); Lungren & Krotoski, The War Powers Resolution after the Chadha Decision, 17
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 767 (1984); Levitas and Brand, The Post Legislative Veto Response: A
Call to Congressional Arms, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 593 (1984); Bolton & Abrams, The Ju-
dicial and Congressional Response to the Invalidation of the Legislative Veto, 1 J. L. &
POL. 299 (1984); Braveman, Chadha: The Supreme Court as Umpire in Separation of
Powers Disputes 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 735 (1984). Biden, Jr., Who Needs the Legislative
Veto?, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 685 (1984); Goldsmith, INS v. Chadha and the Nondelega-
tion Doctrine: A Speculation 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 749 (1984); Rabin, An Overview of the
Chadha Case 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 703 (1984); Banks, Efficiency in Government: Separa-
tion of Powers Reconsidered, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 715 (1984); Spann, Deconstructing the
Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. REV. 473 (1984); Brubaker, Slouching Toward Constitu-
tional Duty: The Legislative Veto and the Delegation of Authority, 1 CONST. COMMEN-
TARY 81 (1984); Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law by Any Other Name?, 21
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1984); Young, Chadha Veto Violated Bicameral Presentment
Clauses, 69 A.B.A.J. 1288 (1983); Rumblings over the Fall of the Legislative Veto, 69
A.B.A.J. 1632 (1983); Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the
Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789; Smith & Struve,
Aftershocks of the Fall of the Legislative Veto, 69 A.B.A.J. 1258 (1983); Comment, The
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982: Does Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha Veto the Congressional Override?, 21 TULSA L.J. 694 (1986); Comment,
FLPMA's Legislative Veto Provisions and INS v. Chadha: Who Controls the Federal
Lands?, 12 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L. REV. 791 (1985); Note, GAO Bid Protest Procedures under
the Competition in Contracting Act: Constitutional Implications after Buckley and
Chadha, 34 CATH. UL. REV. 485 (1985); Note, Resolving Challenges to Statutes Contain-
ing Unconstitutional Legislative Veto Provisions, 85 COL. L. REV. 1808 (1985); Note, The
Aftermath of Chadha: The Impact of the Severability Doctrine on the Management of
Intragovernmental Relations, 71 VA. L. REV. 1211 (1985); Note, Chadha and the
Nondelegation Doctrine: Defining a Restricted Legislative Veto, 94 YALE L.J. 1493
(1985); Note, The Fate of the Legislative Veto after Chadha, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 168
(1984- 85); Comment, Characterization of the Legislative Veto: Courts Should Focus on
the Power Itself, 22 DUQ. L. REV. 927 (1984). Comment, Applying Chadha: the Fate of
the War Powers Resolution, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 697 (1984); Note, INS v. Chadha
and the Impoundment Control Act of 1974: A Shift in the Balance of Power, 45 U. PITr.
L. REV. 673 (1984); Note, Separating Power: No Legislative Veto of Agency Action, 49
Mo. L. REV. 404 (1984); Comment, Immigration-Legislative Veto-The Constitutional-
ity of Legislative Vetoes in Deportation Proceedings, 8 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. J. 123
(1984); Note, Severability of Legislative Veto Provisions: A Policy Analysis, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1182 (1984); Note, Constitutional Law-Legislative Veto Held Unconstitutional,
24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 243 (1984); One-House Legislative Veto Held Unconstitu-
tional-Suspension of Deportation in Hardship Cases, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 226 (1984);
Comment, The Death Knell for the Legislative Veto?, 69 IOWA L. REV. 513 (1984); Com-
ment, Legislative Oversight in the Federal System: What Survives Constitutional Scru-
tiny in New Jersey?, 7 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 167 (1984); Note, Re-separating the Powers:
The Legislative Veto and Congressional Oversight after Chadha, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
145 (1984). Comment, Severing the Legislative Veto Provision: the Aftermath of
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which section 244(c)(2) (the one-House veto)60 4 of the INA was
held unconstitutional. Accordingly, Congress lost the method it
had chosen to regulate the powers it had granted to the Attor-
ney General to suspend deportations.0 5 Section 244(c)(2) indi-
cated a congressional design to oversee the Attorney General's
decision to grant suspension of deportation. In both Rios-Pineda
and Jong Ha Wong the aliens were in a converse situation in
Chadha, 21 CAL. W.L. REV. 174 (1984); Note, An Escape for the Escape Clause Veto?, 8
MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 277 (1984); Comment, Scope of Review of Rulemaking after
Chadha: A Case for the Delegation Doctrine ?, 33 EMORY L.J. 954 (1984); Note, The
Court Vetoes the Legislative Veto, 11 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 841 (1984); Note, Congressional
Oversight through Legislative Veto after INS v. Chadha, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1244
(1984); Comment, The Status of Statutes Containing Legislative Veto Provisions after
Chadha-Does the EEOC have the Authority to Enforce the Equal Pay Act and the
Age Discrimination In Employment Act?, 59 WASH. L. REV. 549 (1984); Comment, The
Concurrent Resolution Provision of the War Powers Resolution: Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service v. Chadha and the Sources of Presidential Warmaking Power, 45 OHIO
ST. L.J. 983 (1984); Comment, Effect of INS v. Chadha on Executive Reorganization, 18
U.RICH. L. REV. 121 (1983).
604. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982), which provides:
In the case of an alien specified in paragragh (1) of subsection (a) of this
section-
if during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or prior to
the close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a
case is reported, either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a
resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the suspension of such
deportation, the Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien or au-
thorize the alien's voluntary departure at his own expense under the order of
deportation in the manner provided by law. If, within the time above speci-
fied, neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives shall pass such a
resolution, the Attorney General shall cancel deportation proceedings.
Prior statutes which gave Congress a veto over the Attorney General's decision to sus-
pend deportation appear in the Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, § 20, 54 Stat. 671
(concurrent resolution); Act of July 1, 1948, ch. 783, 62 Stat. 1206 (concurrent resolution
to approve the Attorney General's suspension); Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
§ 244, 66 Stat. 214 (concurrent resolution approving suspension required as well as al-
lowing one-House veto).
605. Section 244(c)(2) provided that once the Attorney General decided upon a sus-
pension of deportation, either the Senate or the House alone could veto such a determi-
nation. If neither the Senate nor the House acted within a prescribed period of time, the
suspension of deportation became effective. Section 406 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, note
(1982), provided for separability of the remainder of the provisions of the Act if a partic-
ular provision were declared unconstitutional. Thus, § 244(c)(1), granting the Attorney
General the discretion to suspend deportation, survived the decision in Chadha. It is to
be noted that the concurrent resolution proviso of § 244(c)(3) (the two-House veto),
which avoids presidential presentment, was not ruled upon in Chadha and conceivably
may still be effective, although suffering from one of the shortcomings decried in
Chadha, namely presentation to the President.
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that the Attorney General decided not to exercise his discretion
to grant a suspension of deportation. Before the Chadha deci-
sion in 1983, the Court was properly concerned about the judici-
ary "improvidently encroach[ing] on the authority which the Act
confers on the Attorney General and his delegates" 06 because
there existed in place a congressional mechanism to regulate the
Attorney General's power in section 244(c)(2). The effect of
Chadha was to change the administrative environment regarding
suspension of deportation issues. Congress has not yet re-
sponded to curtailment of its reviewing scheme over the Attor-
ney General. One would expect the Court to proceed cautiously
when construing the breadth of the power conferred to the At-
torney General and his delegates, now that the congressional
role as watchdog has been eliminated by judicial decree. Rios-
Pineda fails to consider the absence of reviewable authority over
the Attorney General created by Chadha. This is somewhat sur-
prising when one considers that Rios-Pineda's author, Justice
White, raised a dissenting voice in Chadha where he expressed
concern over precisely the effect achieved in Rios-
Pineda-namely that Congress would lose its check on the
power granted the Attorney General.60 7 In Rios-Pineda, the case
of Jay v. Boyd s08 is cited in delineating the scope of the Attor-
ney General's discretion to suspend deportation. According to
606. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. at 144 (1981).
607. Justice White stated in Chadha:
If Congress may delegate lawmaking power to independent and Executive
agencies, it is most difficult to understand Art. I as prohibiting Congress from
also reserving a check on legislative power itself. Absent the veto, the agencies
receiving delegations of legislative or quasi-legislative power may issue regula-
tions having the force of law without bicameral approval and without the Presi-
dent's signature.
462 U.S. at 986-87.
608. 351 U.S. 345 (1956) (Reed, J.) (Warren, C.J., and Black, Frankfurter, and Doug-
las, JJ., each separately dissenting). In Jay v. Boyd, the alien entered the United States
in 1921 and remained there until 1952 when he was ordered deported for having been a
member of the Communist Party from 1935 to 1940. He was qualified for suspension of
deportation, but the Attorney General, exercising his discretion, refused to grant it. Ac-
cording to Chief Justice Warren's dissent, suspension was denied "on the basis of undis-
closed 'confidential' information." 351 U.S. at 362. He cautioned that "[i]f sanction of
this use and effect of 'confidential' information is confirmed against this petitioner by a
process of judicial reasoning, it may be recognized as a principle of law to be extended
against American citizens in a myriad of ways." Id. Justice Black characterized the "un-
fettered discretion" which the Court recognizes in the Attorney General as "more accu-
rately, 'arbitrary power'." Id. at 366.
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Boyd, such discretion is "unfettered" and even a legal perma-
nent resident alien is not entitled to a hearing in which there is
"full disclosure of the considerations entering into a decision." ''"9
B. Discretion Pretermitting Consideration of Statutory
Eligibility
Where a provision in the INA vests an INS officer with dis-
cretion in deciding whether to grant available statutory relief
that officer may exercise his or her discretion without reaching a
decision on the individual statutory eligibility requirements.
This allows for a potentially arbitrary application of the law. In
INS v. Bagamasbad10 the Supreme Court upheld the exercise of
the district director's discretion where the director and an immi-
gration judge had denied a request by an alien for a section
245(a) 11 adjustment of status to that of a legal permanent resi-
dent. The alien had "overstayed her tourist visa by 4 years." '1
The basis for the refusal to exercise discretion on the alien's be-
half was that the alien "had made serious misrepresentations to
the United States consul who had issued her visa."6 '3 Section
245(a) does not list misrepresentation as a factor affecting its
eligibility requirements. In appealing the adverse decision, she
claimed the INS had failed to determine whether she met the
statutory eligibility requirements of section 245(a). The Court
held the agency did not have to make such determinations since
whether or not she met the requirements of section 245(a), her
initial misrepresentations would disqualify her, as a matter of
discretion, from obtaining an adjustment of status. The alien ar-
gued any future application for a visa to the United States
609. 351 U.S. at 354.
610. 429 U.S. 24 (1976) (per curiam), rev'g. 531 F.2d 111 (3rd Cir. 1976).
611. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1982) (Adjustment of Status of Nonimmigrant to that of
Person Admitted for Permanent Residence). Subsection (a) provides:
The status of an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the
United States may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and
under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence if (1) the alien makes an application for such adjust-
ment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to
the United States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immedi-
ately available to him at the time his application is filed.
(emphasis added).
612. 429 U.S. at 24.
613. Id. at 25.
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would meet with prejudice since the government officers would
examine her record to find a denial of her section 245(a) request
and would therefore assume she had not met its particular re-
quirements. The Supreme Court indicated, however, that it
would "be clear .. .no eligibility determination"614 had been
made if the alien later applied for another visa and the United
States consul would therefore not give the discretionary denial
of a section 245(a) request undue weight. According to the
Court, the review of the alien's initial request for adjustment of
status was properly confined to a finding of misrepresentation
without examining whether or not the specific section 245(a) re-
quirements had been met.
C. Continuous Presence
The Supreme Court opinion in INS v. Phinpathya,1 5 inter-
preted another aspect of section 244(a)(1) of the INA. 16 In
Phinpathya, an alien woman left the United States for Thailand
in January 1974 and returned three months later.1 7 The issue,
upon her attempted return to the United States, was whether
her "continuous presence" within the United States had been
broken by her brief return to her native land. One requirement
for eligibility for suspension of deportation under section
244(a)(1) is that the alien be "physically present in the United
States for a continuous period of not less than seven years im-
mediately preceding" the requested suspension of deportation. 18
614. Id. at 26.
615. 464 U.S. 183 (1984) (O'Connor, J.) (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall,
and Stevens, JJ.); see also, Mrvica v. Esperdy, 376 U.S. 560 (1964)(absence from the
United States for several months interrupts a period of continuous residence in an appli-
cation for a record of lawful admission under the Act of June 27, 1952, § 249, 66 Stat.
163, 219 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (1982), as amended by Act of Nov. 6, 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 203(a),(b), 100 Stat. 3405)). See generally, Pelta, INS v.
Phinpathya: Literalist Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 23 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 401 (1986); Young, Deportation Act is to be Given Literal Interpretation, 70
A.B.A.J. 130 (1984); Note, Immigration-Suspension of Deportation-Supreme Court
Mandates Literal Interpretation of Section 244(a)(1)'s "Continuous Physical Presence"
Requirement, 8 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 401 (1984); Note, Immigration-Suspension of
Deportation not Available to Aliens who do not Maintain a Continuous Physical Pres-
ence in the United States during the Statutory Period, 19 TEX. INT'L L.J. 511 (1984).
616. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1982). See note 594 supra.
617. 464 U.S. at 186.
618. See note 594 supra.
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Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, defined the "continu-
ous physical presence" '19 requirement by basing her interpreta-
tion upon "the plain meaning" rule of statutory interpreta-
tion. 20 Justice Brennan pointed out in his concurrence that this
rule of construction can cut both ways. 2' The majority, however,
insisted upon referring to the "ordinary meaning" of the words
in the statute 2 in such a way as would not allow any breaks in
the seven-year-continuous-presence requirement of section
244(a)(1).
Justice O'Connor used the phrase "continuous physical
presence'623 in her argument for a literal interpretation of sec-
tion 244(a)(1) even though this phrase does not appear in sec-
tion 244(a)(1). Rather, section 244(a)(1) requires a "continuous
period of not less than seven years.""" The "continuous physical
presence" requirement appeared in former section 301(b) of the
INA625 and was repealed in 1978, five and one-quarter years
619. This is the language adopted in the opinion, although the statutory section
under scrutiny does not contain this exact phrase. See, e.g., 464 U.S. at 185.
620. 464 U.S. at 188.
621. In his concurrence, Justice Brennan stated:
Moreover, if we are to understand that the Court implicitly approves of a
literal interpretation of the statute, the error of the analysis is patent. It is a
hornbook proposition that "[aill laws should receive a sensible construction.
General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injus-
tice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be pre-
sumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language, which would
avoid results of this character. The reason of law in such case should prevail over
its letter."
Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 198, (quoting United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482
(1868)).
622. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 189.
623. Id.
624. See note 594 supra.
625. Former § 301(b) of the INA, added by Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-584,
86 Stat. 1289 (formerly codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b)), stated:
(b) Any person who is a national and citizen of the United States under
paragraph (7) of subsection (a) shall lose his nationality and citizenship un-
less-(1) he shall come to the United States and be continuously physically pre-
sent therein for a period of not less than two years between the ages of fourteen
years and twenty-eight years; ... In the administration of this subsection ab-
sences from the United States of less than sixty days in the aggregate during
the period for which continuous physical presence in the United States is re-
quired shall not break the continuity of such physical presence.
(emphasis added). This subsection was repealed by an Act of Oct. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-432, 92 Stat. 1046. The reference in former § 301(b) to paragraph (7) of subsection (a)
is an allusion to § 301(a)(7) of the Act of June 27, 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 235, and is repro-
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prior to the Phinpathya decision. The repealed section stated
requirements with which United States citizens born abroad had
to comply or lose their citizenship. The statutory provision
under scrutiny in Phinpathya, however, pertained to requests
for suspension of deportation. Former section 301(b) of the INA
mandated that foreign-born United States citizens reside for a
period of not less than two years within the United States while
between the age of 14 and 28. The section provided that the in-
dividual claiming United States citizenship "be continuously
physically present" 2 within the United States during that two-
year period. In Phinpathya the language in section 244(a)(1) of
the INA was interpreted to connote the same rigorous standard
requiring the alien who applied for a suspension of deportation
to be continuously physically present during all of the seven-
year period specified in section 244(a)(1).
Prior to Phinpathya, the Supreme Court had relaxed the
standard with which it analyzed the continuity of an alien's
"continuous presence" within the United States.2 Additionally,
the repeal of section 301(b) of the INA suggests Congress sought
to eliminate reliance upon that section for the purpose of judi-
cial construction. The Court in Phinpathya, however, concluded
that because Congress was once capable of requiring "two years
of 'continuou[s] physica[l] presen[ce]' "628 for the purposes of
former section 301(b), and that because Congress expressly pro-
vided under former section 301(b) that "absence from the
United States of less than sixty days in the aggregate during the
period for which continuous physical presence in the United
States is required shall not break the continuity of such physical
presence 6 29 that Congress could be explicit when it wanted to
be, and could state in clear language when an absence from the
duced infra at note 1182. Paragraph (7) was redesignated paragraph (g) by the Act of
Oct. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-432, § 3, 92 Stat. 1046, and is currently codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(g) (1982), as amended by, Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653, § 12, 100
Stat. 3657 (reducing the number of required years of residence in the United States).
626. See § 301(b)(1) of the INA at note 625 supra.
627. See text at notes 506-81 supra supporting this conclusion. See also, McLeod v.
Peterson, 283 F.2d 180, 186 (3rd Cir. 1960) (dicta: "circumstances can be suggested
where an absence of even several years would not prevent an alien from being continu-
ously present").
628. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 189-90.
629. Section 301(b), 86 Stat. 1289, repealed by Act of Oct. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
432, 92 Stat. 1046. See note 625 supra.
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United States would not affect the alien's rights. 30 The former
judicial presumption that Congress intended to allow breaks in
prescribed periods of continuity unless explicitly stating the con-
trary was reversed in Phinpathya.
In an earlier case, Rosenberg v. Fleuti,63' a similar provision
in section 316 of the INA63 2 concerning the required period in
which a legal permanent resident must reside in the United
States before being naturalized was interpreted to permit brief
departures by aliens from the United States. A number of cases
have similarly held that brief absences from the United States
do not constitute a meaningful departure from the United
States. 33 In Fleuti, Justice Goldberg argued that the general
body of immigration law had been "liberalized" 34 and provided
with an "enlightened concept of what constitutes a meaningful
interruption of the continuous residence '635 requirement by the
language of section 316 of the INA. Section 316(a) is a residence
630. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. at 190-92.
631. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
632. Section 316 of the 1952 Act, 66 Stat. 242-43 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (1982)).
This section is still effective and allows for absences from the United States by aliens for
periods of less than half of a required five-year waiting period leading to a legal perma-
nent resident's naturalization. Section 316(b) permits any absence to be up to six months
before affecting or endangering the alien's status. Justice O'Connor could have easily
used this section of the Code, rather than repealed § 301(b) to make her argument, and
thereby have obtained a contrary result consistent with earlier decisions. Section 316(a),
(b) (8 U.S.C. § 1427(a), (b) (1982)) provides:
(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this title, shall be natural-
ized, unless such petitioner (1) immediately preceding the date of filing his peti-
tion for naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted
for permanent residence, within the United States for at least five years and
during the five years immediately preceding the date of filing his petition has
been physically present therein for periods totaling at least half of that time,
and who has resided within the State in which the petitioner filed the petition
for at least six months, (2) has resided continuously within the United States
from the date of petition up to the time of admission to citizenship ...
(b) Absence from the United States of more than six months but less than
one year during the period for which continuous residence is required for admis-
sion to citizenship, immediately preceding the date of filing the petition for nat-
uralization, or during the period between the date of filing the petition and the
date of final hearing, shall break the continuity of such residence, unless the
petitioner shall establish to the satisfaction of the court that he did not in fact
abandon his residence in the United States during such period.
(emphasis added).
633. See text at notes 506-81 supra.
634. 374 U.S. at 459.
635. Id.
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requirement for legal permanent residents who petition for nat-
uralization. The requirement that the legal permanent resident
have "resided continuously" within the United States for a set
period before applying for naturalization is defined by section
316(a)(1) as a period where the legal permanent resident is actu-
ally "physically present" in the United States for a period "to-
taling at least half' 6 6 of the pre-naturalization time-period re-
quirement. An absence from the United States for up to 50
percent of the five-year time period, or two and one-half years, is
permissible and is not considered as terminating the alien's con-
tinued physical presence in the United States. Certainly, an ar-
gument can be advanced that by repeal of section 301(b) of the
INA, and by the continued effectiveness of section 316 of the
INA, the latter section's interpretation of continuous presence is
controlling.
Justice O'Connor argued in Phinpathya, however, that
Fleuti was irrelevant to a section 244(a)(1) claim since Fleuti
was an "entry" decision based on the definition of that term in
section 101(a)(13). 87 This fact does not undermine section 316
of the INA, nor Justice Goldberg's interpretation of it in Fleuti,
especially since the alternative basis of the opinion, section 301,
had been repealed. The concept of an "entry" into the United
States in Fleuti achieved significance only to the extent that the
alien had meaningfully departed from the United States. In
Fleuti, the Court found no meaningful departure from the
United States when the legal permanent resident made an ex-
cursion into Mexico.5 8 The alien's brief departure from the
United States did not constitute an interruption of his continu-
ous presence in the United States. Indeed, in current section
316(b) of the INA, a legal permanent resident is not considered
to have abandoned his residence in the United States until his
absence lasts at least six months but it may be as long as one
year without terminating such residence. 39
The passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986640 put these controversies to rest by overruling INS v.
636. See note 632 supra (emphasis added).
637. See note 556 supra.
638. See the discussion of Fleuti at text accompanying note 534 supra.
639. See note 632 supra.
640. Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 315(b), 100 Stat. 3439.
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Phinpathya. Section 315(b) of the 1986 Act added a third para-
graph to section 244(b) which provides that an alien's "continu-
ous physical presence in the United States" shall not be consid-
ered disrupted if the departure "was brief, casual, and innocent
and did not meaningfully interrupt the continuous physical
presence."'" The legislative history indicates that the intention
behind the provision was to overrule Phinpathya142
D. Waiver of Deportation and the Attorney General's
Discretion
Section 241(f) of the INA643 provides relief from deportation
to some deportable aliens who are relatives of United States citi-
641. See note 594 supra.
642. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 1, at 124 (1986). There it is stated:
Section 315(b) permits an alien to maintain a continuous physical presence
if his absence from the United States was brief, casual, and innocent. This
amendment would overrule INS v. Phinpathya, 104 S.Ct. 584 (1984), which held
that any absence, however, brief, breaks the continuity of physical presence.
See also, INS v. Hector, 107 S.Ct. 379, 383 n.7 (1986).
643. Currently, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f) (1982). At the time of Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619
(1975), the Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 16, 75 Stat. 650, 655-56, was in
force and provided:
(f) The provisions of this section relating to the deportation of aliens within
the United States on the ground that they were excludable at the time of entry
as aliens who have sought to procure, or have procured visas or other documen-
tation, or entry into the United States by fraud or misrepresentation shall not
apply to an alien otherwise admissible at the time of entry who is the spouse,
parent, or a child of a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for
permament residence.
(emphasis added). This amended § 241 of the 1952 Act, 66 Stat. 204. The forerunner of
this section appeared in the Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, § 7, 71 Stat. 639,
640-41. Section 241(f) was substantially amended by the Act of Dec. 29, 1981, Pub. L.
No. 97-116, § 8, 95 Stat. 1611, 1616. Relief under this section is now at the Attorney
General's discretion.
The House Judiciary Committee Report on the 1981 amendment noted the confu-
sion concerning § 241(f). The Report indicated that the purpose behind restricting the
applicability of § 241(f) to immigrants (rather than nonimmigrants) who make either an
innocent or fraudulent misrepresentation, as well as the purpose behind making adminis-
tration of § 241(f) a matter of the Attorney General's discretion, was to reduce the
amount of litigation that has occurred over § 241(f). 1981 U.S.CoD CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS, 2593, 2593-94. However, neither the Report nor the amendment answer the ques-
tion raised by the cases described in the text accompanying note 646 infra which is
whether § 241(f) applies to § 241(a)(2) deportations. Since the decision whether to grant
the waiver of deportation is now discretionary, the decisions by the Attorney General or
his delegates should be less subject to challenges.
In the time period between INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966), and Reid v. INS, 420
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zens or permanent residents. It is another statutory remedy to
deportation which aliens may pursue along with a request for
suspension of deportation under section 244(a)(1). 6 44 Section
241(f) provided relief from deportation to those aliens who were
otherwise admissible into the United States when they entered,
but who "sought to procure, or have procured visas or other doc-
umentation, or entry into the United States by fraud or misrep-
resentation" and who were either "the spouse, parent, or a child
of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence." 6" The Warren and Burger Courts each
ruled upon this section with differing results.
In Reid v. INS,646 two aliens from British Honduras who
were husband and wife entered the United States by falsely rep-
resenting themselves to be United States citizens. Subsequently,
they had two children born in the United States who were citi-
zens at birth.647 The INS sought to deport the parents on the
basis of section 241(a)(2) of the INA648 for entering the United
States without proper inspection at the border.6 49 The aliens
contended that they were eligibile for relief from deportation
under section 241(f) of the INA since they had entered the coun-
try by fraud or misrepresentation and they were parents of
United States citizens. The Court held, however, that section
U.S. 619 (1975), the Supreme Court vacated a judgment of the Ninth Circuit which had
granted § 241(f) relief to a § 241(a)(2) deportation. INS v. Vitales, 405 U.S. 983 (1972),
vacating 443 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1971) and remanding with directions to dismiss. This
summary disposition was an early indication of how the Court would separate from the
Errico decision subsequently in Reid.
644. See note 594 supra.
645. See note 643 supra.
646. 420 U.S. 619 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall,
J.) (Douglas, J. took no part).
647. Children born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction are citizens at
birth. Section 301 of the 1952 Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1982).
648. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1982). The applicable provision provides:
Any alien in the United States (including an alien crewman) shall, upon the
order of the Attorney General, be deported who-
(2) entered the United States without inspection or at any time or place
other than as designated by the Attorney General or is in the United States
in violation of this Act or in violation of any other law of the United States
649. A returning United States citizen is not subject to the same level of scrutiny an





Under the statutory scheme at the time of the Reid deci-
sion, section 241(f) relief applied to aliens deportable under sec-
tion 241(a)(1) of the INA650 if they were deportable by reason of
having been excludable651 at the time of entry into the United
States under section 212(a)(19) of the INA. 2  The Court de-
cided section 241(f) relief did not apply to an alien who is de-
portable under section 241(a)(2) of the INA, even where the un-
derlying basis for deportability pursuant to section 241(a)(2) is
section 212(a)(19) excludability. The Court reached this conclu-
sion based on the similarity in language between section 241(f)
and section 212(a)(19).51 Section 241(a)(1) incorporated by ref-
erence all 33 grounds for exclusion contained in section 212(a),
including section 212(a)(19). 6 5' According to Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion in Reid, since section 212(a)(19) was incorpo-
rated by reference into section 241(a)(1), the relief provided by
section 241(f) applied to section 241(a)(1) deportations. Under
this logic, section 241(f) did not apply to section 241(a)(2) de-
portations since the link between section 212(a)(19) and section
241(a)(2) was not present.
It is interesting to note that section 241(f) physically fol-
lowed presentation of all of the grounds for deportability listed
in section 241(a). Section 241(f) did not explicitly limit its appli-
650. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982). The applicable provision provides:
Any alien in the United States (including an alien crewman) shall, upon the
order of the Attorney General, be deported who-
(1) at the time of entry was within one or more of the classes of aliens
excludable by the law existing at the time of such entry ....
651. Thirty-three grounds for exclusion at the time of entry are listed in § 212(a) of
the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182 (1982).
652. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1982) states:
Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, the following classes of aliens shall
be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the
United States:
(19) Any alien who seeks to procure, or has sought to procure, or has
procured a visa or other documentation, or seeks to enter the United States,
by fraud, or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact . ...
(emphasis added). This section was amended by the Act of Nov. 10, 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-639, § 6(a), 100 Stat. 3543.
653. Compare the language emphasized in notes 643 and 652 supra.
654. I.e., § 241(a)(1) refers to all aliens who were excludable at the time of entry
under the body of law existing at the time of that entry. Currently, § 212(a) is the sub-
section which lists the grounds for excludability.
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cation to aliens who were deportable under section 241(a)(1).
Section 241(f) provided relief from deportation to those aliens
who were within certain categories of relatives of United States
citizens or of legal permanent residents, but who obtained entry
through willful misrepresentation or fraud. Logically, an alien
who violated section 241(a)(2) by eluding inspection upon entry
into the United States by misrepresenting himself or herself to
be a United States citizen was the type of alien for whom section
241(f) contemplated relief. The decision in Reid rendered the set
of all aliens to whom section 241(f) relief was available to be the
null set, since any alien who was deportable under section
241(a)(1) because he or she was excludable under section
212(a)(19) was generally also deportable under section 241(a)(2).
The Court in Reid, however, refused to apply section 241(f) re-
lief to an alien deportable under section 241(a)(2). Reid sig-
nalled the judicial repeal of section 241(f) of the INA.
In INS v. Errico,55 the Warren Court had extended the
availability of relief from deportation under section 241(f) to
aliens who entered the United States without complying with
documentary requirements specified in the existing version of
section 211 of the INA.6 56 The result in Errico supported the
holdings by administrative authorities that section "241(f)
waives any deportation charge that results directly from the mis-
representation regardless of the section of the statute under
which the charge was brought, provided that the alien was 'oth-
erwise admissible at the time of entry.' ,e The purpose of sec-
tion 241(f) is to keep families with United States citizens or legal
permanent residents together and to avoid overly technical read-
ings of the statute that would invite draconian results. In Reid,
the Court shifted from this perspective. Congress followed this
655. 385 U.S. 214 (1966) (Warren, C.J.) (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Harlan,
and White, JJ.).
656. Section 211(a)(4) of the INA, 66 Stat. 163, 181 as amended by Act of Oct. 3,
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 9, 79 Stat. 917.
657. 385 U.S. at 217 (footnote omitted). The administrative decisions which support
this position under the forerunner of current § 241(f) (namely, § 7 of Pub. L. No. 85-316,
Act of Sept. 11, 1957, 71 Stat. 639, 640) are e.g.: In re S-, 7 I & N Dec. 715, 716 (BIA
1958) ("it is immaterial that the respondent's deportation is not sought under section
241 of the Immigration and Nationality Act"); In re Y-, 8 I & N Dec. 143, 149
(1953)(deportation relief provided by forerunner of § 241(f) applies regardless of section
of the statute under which alien was deportable).
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lead by expressly disallowing application of section 241(f) relief
to aliens excludable under current section 212(a)(19) of the
Act.658 With this move, Congress also circuitously expressed dis-
satisfaction with Reid, because the underlying rationale in that
decision was that section 241(f) relief applied only to a deporta-
tion subsection in section 242 that was linked to the section
212(a)(19) exclusion provision.
VI. FOURTH AMENDMENT DEFERENCE TO THE NATURALIZATION
CLAUSE
Article I, section 8, clause 4 of the Constitution empowers
Congress to regulate the nation's borders. It is a grant of author-
ity over immigration and naturalization. 59 It empowers Con-
gress to require all entrants into the United States to identify
themselves as "entitled to come in. '660 The extent of permissible
governmental intrusion into individual lives cannot be evaluated
properly without considering the safeguard which the fourth
amendment guarantees to individuals to "be secure in their per-
sons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures."6 The
tension between the power of the government to regulate its bor-
ders, and the right of the individual to be free from unreasona-
ble searches and seizures resurfaces continually in fact patterns
involving the government and one of the least protected of all
groups-aliens. As there is no singular set of physical traits that
distinguish aliens from non-aliens, there is a constant danger
that a government technique which may prove effective to regu-
late the lives of aliens may easily be applied to encroach upon
the lives of citizens. The rights which accompany United States
citizenship are one of the most valuable of all possessions and
they must be zealously protected. They should not be dispensed
with in the government's pursuit of economically efficient tech-
658. Act of Dec. 29, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 8, 95 Stat. 1616.
659. Article I, § 8, cl. 4 of the United States Constitution grants "The Congress shall
have power ... To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization."
660. Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
661. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
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niques to regulate aliens. 2
A. Bodily Integrity Subordinated to National Integrity
In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,6 1 customs offi-
cials at a Los Angeles airport detained Rosa Elvira Montoya de
Hernandez, a woman who had arrived on a flight from BogotA,
Colombia, because she met the criteria of a drug-courier profile
and was suspected of smuggling balloons filled with cocaine
within her alimentary canal. Justice Rehnquist's majority deci-
sion described the circumstances which gave the customs offi-
cials a reasonable suspicion the woman was trafficking drugs:
BogotA is considered a "source city"6 64 of narcotics; Montoya de
Hernandez arrived around midnight at the airport; she had
made eight recent trips to the United States; she could not
speak English and had no friends or relatives in the United
States; she explained she had come to the United States in order
to take taxicabs to various retail stores to purchase items for her
husband's business in Bogota; she carried $5,000 in cash; she
had no hotel reservations; she could not remember the events
surrounding the purchase of her airline ticket; she had four
changes of clothing, and only a pair of high heels which she was
wearing. Based upon these observations and responses to their
questioning, the customs officials suspected de Hernandez as an
alimentary-canal smuggler and she underwent frisking and a
strip search which revealed she was wearing "two pairs of elastic
underpants with a paper towel lining the crotch area."6 5 She
agreed to have an x-ray, but then stated she was pregnant. Then
she consented to a pregnancy test, but withdrew her consent
when she was told she would be required to go to a hospital in
handcuffs. Her request to make a telephone call was denied. She
was given a choice to return to Colombia on the next flight, or to
submit to an x-ray, or to remain in continued detention until she
662. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), discussed supra in text
accompanying note 329. See also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing), discussed infra at text accompanying note 1122.
663. 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.) (Stevens, J. concurring)(Brennan and Mar-
shall, JJ., dissenting).
664. 473 U.S. at 533.
665. Id. at 534.
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had a "monitored bowel movement." 66 She decided to return to
Colombia but the next available flight was on a Mexican airline
which declined to take her since she did not have a visa to land
in Mexico City. At that point the customs officials refused to
release her and she "was informed she would be detained until
she agreed to an x-ray or her bowels moved."66 Following her
detention for 16 hours, the customs officials requested a court
order from a federal magistrate which was obtained 8 hours later
"which authorized a rectal examination and involuntary x-ray,
provided that the physician in charge considered [the] claim of
pregnancy." 6 ' An initial examination discovered a balloon filled
with cocaine, and eventually eighty-seven other cocaine-filled
balloons were discovered.
Justice Rehnquist prefaced the Supreme Court opinion with
a basic proposition that the fourth amendment requires that
searches and seizures must be reasonable. Reasonableness re-
quires consideration of "all of the circumstances surrounding the
search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure it-
self." '669 As in fourth amendment cases generally, the necessary
inquiry required a balancing between the "intrusion on the indi-
vidual's Fourth Amendment interests against [the] promotion of
legitimate governmental interests. '670 From these general prem-
ises, Justice Rehnquist proceeded to the legal particulars of the
case. Because the woman's seizure occurred at an "international
border," '7 the Court tipped the scales in favor of the sovereign's
interests. Justice Rehnquist explained that "[s]ince the founding
of our Republic, Congress has granted the Executive plenary au-
thority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border,
without probable cause or a warrant 672 to aid its efforts to col-
lect duties and to regulate the flow of contraband. According to
Justice Rehnquist, the "Fourth Amendment's balance of reason-
ableness is qualitatively different at the international border
666. Id.
667. Id. at 535.
668. Id.
669. Id. at 537.
670. Id., (quoting United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983),
discussed at note 719 infra); see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).




than in the interior ' '17 ' and requires neither reasonable suspicion
nor probable cause to conduct a routine search.
Since Montoya de Hernandez's detention was far from rou-
tine, however, the Court analyzed the level of suspicion which
the customs agents must have in order to justify detention. The
Court noted that the lower court utilized a "'clear indication'
[standard] as an intermediate fourth amendment standard be-
tween 'reasonable suspicion' and 'probable cause'. '67 Justice
Rehnquist rejected what he considered to be a new fourth
amendment level of suspicion. He explained that the "clear indi-
cation" standard is one which necessitates a "particularized sus-
picion" 75 that the individual under scrutiny is carrying narcot-
ics within his or her body and is therefore a facet of the
"reasonable suspicion" standard. 76
The Court held that the fourth amendment's reasonable
suspicion standard is the appropriate measure by which to gauge
the justifiability of a nonroutine customs search. The suspicion
may arise based upon all of the facts pertaining to the traveler
and her trip." Under a reasonable suspicion standard, the cus-
toms officials must have a "'particularized and objective basis
for suspecting the particular person' of alimentary canal smug-
gling. 678 In light of United States v. Cortez,T the customs in-
spector may act upon "common-sense conclusions about human
behavior." 680 According to the Court, the reasonable suspicion
standard justified the frisking and strip search that immediately
followed the initial observation and questioning of de Her-
nandez. Furthermore, the ensuing twenty-four-hour incommuni-
cado detention prior to issuance of a federal magistrate's order
673. Id. at 538.
674. Id. at 540. The intermediate standard was taken from Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).
675. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540.
676. Id. at 541. See also, United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, at 417 (1981) (em-
ploying particularized suspicion standard in meeting the reasonableness requirement);
United Statesv. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975) (requiring "specific articulable
facts" about an individual to meet the reasonable suspicion standard).
677. See e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), discussed at text accompa-
nying note 781 infra.
678. 473 U.S. at 541-42, (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417 (1981)).
679. 449 U.S. 411(1981).
680. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, quoted in Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 542.
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"was not unreasonably long"68' because alimentary-canal smug-
gling cannot be detected by mere frisking and strip searches.
Since the episode occurred at an international border, "the
Fourth Amendment balance of interests leans heavily to the
Government." 82
Justice Brennan's dissent characterized the facts of the case
as "a 'disgusting and saddening episode' at our Nation's bor-
der."683' He would have held that the treatment which Rosa
Montoya de Hernandez received is not permissible "without the
sanction of a judicial officer. 68 4 He would not have allowed such
detention when "based on nothing more than the 'reasonable
suspicion' of low-ranking investigative officers that something
might be amiss." ' Justice Brennan lamented that "[ijndefinite
involuntary incommunicado detentions 'for inspection' are the
hallmark of a police state, not a free society." ' 6 He would not
differentiate between an impermissible detention in the interior
of the country as compared with the border and he would re-
quire approval by a magistrate under a standard of probable
cause for criminal investigations undertaken at the border. 8
Justice Brennan's simple message is that at some point much
earlier in Rosa Montoya de Hernandez's detention, the low-
ranking executive officers could have sought a magistrate's per-
mission to carry on their invasive procedures. This is not such a
burden to law enforcement as would allow criminals to go free.
Justice Brennan reported that a low percentage of the peo-
ple singled out for "'internal searches'-rectal and vaginal ex-
aminations and stomach pumping"6 88 are discovered to be carry-
681. 473 U.S. at 544.
682. Id.
683. Id. at 545, (quoting United States v. Holtz, 479 F.2d at 94 (9th Cir. 1973)(Ely, J.
dissenting)).
684. Montoya de Hernandez at 549.
685. Id.
686. Id. at 550.
687. Id. Justice Brennan referred to Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,
279-85 (1973) for the requirement of prior judicial approval before the search is con-
ducted. Almeida-Sanchez required probable cause for a roving border patrol to conduct
a search of an automobile near the border. See discussion at text accompanying note 727
infra.
688. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 557. Justice Brennan called for a re-exami-
nation of United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1970), which permitted border searches
of incoming mail into the United States without the requirement of probable cause or a
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ing illicit contraband. Many innocent people are therefore
subjected to the humiliation of body searches. Justice Brennan
would require that a detention or search, although conducted at
the border, must be founded upon probable cause when consent
is otherwise lacking. Any claim of concern for "national self-pro-
tection"68 9 must be subject to the Bill of Rights. According to
Justice Brennan, the deplorable result in Montoya is that once
the alien is on United States soil at the border, "he is fully sub-
ject 'to the criminal enforcement powers of the Federal Govern-
ment' [but] he is not fully protected by the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights applicable everywhere else in the country. 69 0
B. Workplace Searches and Seizures
In INS v. Delgado,691 the Supreme Court ruled on the per-
missibility of INS factory sweeps seeking illegal alien employees.
The INS technique of posting armed agents at the entrances and
exits of the factories while other armed agents moved among the
employees and questioned them concerning their citizenship was
upheld. The Court held that factory sweeps were not a seizure of
the entire work force, and that questioning employees individu-
ally about their citizenship does not constitute a "detention or
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. ' 692 Four employees had
warrant. Arguably, the right to be secure in one's person has a greater liberty interest
attached to it than does the right to privacy in the mail system. Justice Rehnquist saw
the two as roughly the same. 473 U.S. at 538.
689. 473 U.S. at 563 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 154 (1925)).
690. Id.
691. 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (Rehnquist, J. 1984)(with separate concurrences by Justices
Stevens, Powell, and a partial concurrence and dissent by Justice Brennan with whom
Justice Marshall joined). See also Erickson & Neighbors, Pronouncements of the U.S.
Supreme Court Relating to the Criminal Law Field: 1983-1984, 13 CoLo. LAW. 1569
(1984); Young, "Factory Surveys" for Illegal Aliens Held Constitutional, 70 A.B.A.J. 110
(Jul. 1984); Caldwell, Seizures of the Fourth Kind: Changing the Rules, 33 CLEv. ST. L.
REV. 323 (1984). Comment, Brief Encounters of the 'Alien' Kind-Challenges to Factory
Sweeps and Detentive Questioning, 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 473 (1985); Comment, Factory
Surveys to Enforce Immigration Laws Do Not Violate the Fourth Amendment, 26 S.
TEx. L.J. 347 (1985); 'Comment, Judicial Expansion of INS Power: Interrogation of
Workers During Factory Surveys, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 1123 (1985); Note, Search and
Seizure-Immigration-INS Factory Surveys do not Violate Fourth Amendment, 15
SETON HALL L. R. 397 (1985); Note, Enhancing the Power of the INS, 38 Sw. L.J. 1039
(1984); Note, The Fourth Amendment: in Search of Illegal Aliens, 18 AKRON L. REV. 339
(1984).
692. 466 U.S. at 212.
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challenged the INS practice: two of them were United States cit-
izens; the other two were legal permanent residents.6 9' The fac-
tory sweeps lasted "from one to two hours." 194 The entire work
force was ruled not to have been seized during each factory
sweep since the employees were able to continue working. Jus-
tice Brennan pointed out in his separate opinion 9 ' that the
workers' mere agreement to be at the workplace for the sake of
their employers did not constitute consent to undergo govern-
ment interrogation.6 96
The majority opinion also ruled that no individual employee
had been seized by the agents' questioning. The Court an-
nounced a standard to determine whether there is a seizure of
an individual under the conditions of a factory-wide sweep: "Un-
less the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to
demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he
was not free to leave if he had not responded, one cannot say
that the questioning resulted in a detention under the Fourth
Amendment. 6 97 Under the "so intimidating" standard, none of
the employees in the factory sweeps had been seized nor de-
tained by the mere questioning. Although the raids occurred in
privately owned factories, the INS had either the consent of the
employer or warrants to search for illegal aliens. The warrants
had been "issued on a showing of probable cause by the INS
that numerous illegal aliens" 98 were present. Under these cir-
cumstances, the Court stated that the standard of regulating the
INS conduct while questioning the employees involved "the
same considerations attending contacts between the police and
693. Id. at 213, n.1.
694. Id. at 214.
695. Id. at 225. Justice Brennan referred to the majority's view that there was no
seizure of the individual employees with stinging epithets. He alluded to the majority
opinion's "studied air of unreality," its "considerable feat of legerdemain," and its
"sleight of hand," that allowed the Court to conclude that the complaining parties had
not been "seized" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 466 U.S. at 226. Justice
Brennan described the majority's efforts as "rooted more in fantasy than in the record of
the case" and as "unrealistic" and "fanciful." 466 U.S. at 229.
696. Justice Brennan wrote: "The mere fact that the employer has consented to the
entry of the INS does not mean that the workers' expectation of privacy evaporates." 466
U.S. at 238.
697. 466 U.S. at 216.
698. Id. at 212.
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citizens in public places." '699
The Court referred to United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,0 0
for the proposition that "the protection against unreasonable
seizures also extends to 'seizures that involve only a brief deten-
tion short of traditional arrest.' ,,701 Since the Court concluded
that neither the work force nor any individual employee had
been seized, those protections were not applicable. More pre-
cisely, however, Brignoni-Ponce stands for the proposition that
interrogations of individuals are not justified when the only rea-
son for questioning them is their apparent Mexican ancestry. 2
In the factory sweeps in Delgado it is likely employees were sin-
gled out for interrogation on the basis of their apparent
ancestry.
Justice Brennan agreed with the majority's first conclusion
that the factory sweeps "did not result in the seizure of the en-
tire work force for the complete duration of the surveys.170 He
nonetheless emphasized that the issue of whether individuals
were seized may be determined by events occurring during a fac-
tory sweep. Under this analysis, Justice Brennan concluded that
there was an unreasonable seizure by the INS agents of the four
employees bringing the suit.
Justice Brennan recognized the two competing fourth
amendment interests at stake: the individual's right to be free of
"unwarranted governmental interference"7 °0 versus the neces-
sary police "latitude in gathering information from those indi-
viduals who are willing to cooperate. 7 0 5 Within this framework,
Justice Brennan concluded that the four employees had been
seized. He cited a number of factors leading to this conclusion.
First, the "show of authority"706 by the INS was "of sufficient
size and force to overbear the will of any reasonable person. "707
699. Id. at 217 n.5.
700. 422 U.S. 873 (1975) See the discussion of Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975),
at text accompanying note 739, and of Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975), at 758 infra.
701. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at
878 (1975)).
702. See text accompanying note 739 infra. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886-87.
703. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 225.
704. Id. at 226.
705. Id.




Next, "the widespread disturbance among the workers .. and
the intimidating atmosphere created by the 7 0 8 INS using sur-
prise searches with agents moving "systematically through the
rows of workers" 709 while handcuffing suspected illegal aliens as
well as conspicuously posting INS agents at factory exits,
achieved an overall effect that was a "frightening picture of peo-
ple subject to wholesale interrogation under conditions designed
not to respect personal security and privacy, but rather to elicit
prompt answers from completely intimidated workers."71
Justice Brennan invoked Brignoni-Ponce711 for the proposi-
tion that "brief detentions may be justified on 'facts that do not
amount to the probable cause required for an arrest.' ",712 The
individual searches must conform to the requirements of the
reasonable suspicion standard of the fourth amendment.71 3 In a
factory sweep situation, this translates into a requirement that
there be a "particularized suspicion 7 1 4 that the person about to
be questioned is in fact an illegal alien. In conformity with
Brignoni-Ponce, an individual may not be questioned solely on
the basis of physical appearance or ancestry.
An underlying concern of Justice Brennan's opinion was to
protect the rights of United States citizens who happen to work
alongside illegal aliens in factories that are raided by the INS."'
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte 6 for example, fixed auto-
mobile checkpoint stops were permitted in part because their
fixed and permanent locations eliminated the element of sur-
prise and discomfort which citizens experienced when required
to stop. In a factory sweep, however, the elements of surprise
and anxiety are integral components. Additionally, the INS
agents in a factory sweep have "unfettered discretionary judg-
ment"71 7 in selecting whom to stop and question. Such discre-
708. Id. at 229-30.
709. Id. at 230.
710. Id. at 231.
711. 422 U.S. 873. See text accompanying note 739 infra.
712. Delgado, 466 U.S. 232 (quoting Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 880).
713. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 232.
714. Id. at 233.
715. For example, Justice Brennan did not object to Congress' broad powers over
aliens. He referred to Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) and Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787 (1977) which represent broad powers to regulate aliens.
716. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). See text accompanying note 767 infra.
717. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 237.
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tion could easily be abused. In instances where fixed traffic
checkpoints have been upheld, the discretionary judgment in-
vested in low-level INS officers has been reduced to a minimum.
This means that personal passions play less a role in the process
that determines who will be chosen for questioning. Rather,
high-level officers who are removed from the scene make com-
mand decisions such as selecting the locations for fixed check-
point sites, as well as deciding when to apply for judicial consent
to conduct further investigations. In further distinguishing a fac-
tory sweep situation from a permissible fixed traffic checkpoint,
Justice Brennan pointed out that the workplace possesses "an
element of privacy" 718 which one cannot expect when using the
public highways. The basic thrust of Justice Brennan's position
is that merely because Congress has not provided the necessary
funding for the INS to carry out its responsibilities, fundamen-
tal constitutional rights of United States citizens should not be
jeopardized or eliminated when the INS attempts to regulate
aliens through the most economically efficient means available.
C. Border Traffic Stops and Searches
This section is organized along the lines suggested in Al-
meida-Sanchez v. United States:
The Border Patrol conducts three types of surveil-
lance along inland roadways, all in the asserted interest
of detecting the illegal importation of aliens. Permanent
checkpoints are maintained at certain nodal intersec-
tions; temporary checkpoints are established from time
to time at various places; and finally, there are roving pa-
trols such as .. .one that stop[s] and search[es moving
vehicles] .719
718. Id. at 238.
719. 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973) (Stewart, J.) (Powell, J., concurring)(White, Burger,
Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). The government has greater freedom to in-
spect boats on open waters. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579
(1983) (Rehnquist, J.)(Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting)(Stevens, J., joining in part
one of Justice Brennan's dissent)(suspicionless boarding of sailboat in a waterway offer-
ing ready access to the open sea is permissible under the fourth amendment, although
random stops without any articulable suspicion of cars or other motor vehicles on land
away from the border are not permissible); see also Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501
(1927)(Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., concurring)(Coast Guard could seize an American yes-
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In fact, Supreme Court decisions have not drawn sharp distinc-
tions in the law between permanent as opposed to temporary
traffic checkpoints. A distinction, albeit one that appears to be
diminishing, exists between the standards applicable to roving
patrols and investigations conducted at fixed checkpoints. A key
factor determining whether a traffic stop or search passes consti-
tutional muster is whether the location of the stop or search can
be said to be at the international border of the United States.
Fourth amendment requirements are considerably less in an
area that is part of the country's border region. However, it is
not always easy to determine whether a stop or search has oc-
curred within the border region of the United States. For exam-
ple, an international airport in the heart of the country is plainly
regarded as part of the international border to which the border-
exception applies. 2 ° In the Southwest, where there are long
stretches of highway in isolated areas, various factors contribute
to the determination: the number of land or air miles from the
border; 2' frequency of intersections by roads leading into the
interior; how well-traveled or populated the surrounding coun-
tryside. 2 Congressional pronouncements in the form of legisla-
tion and subsequently promulgated regulations 2 3 have been
considered, if not endorsed, 72  by the Court. Even whether a
road runs parallel with the border so as not to intersect it for
long distances will go into the consideration. 25 In short, the law
has been less than well-illumined by the Court on this point.
These factors are not always determinative, and others may
shape the Court's opinion, including the distinction described
above between a roving patrol or fixed checkpoint investigation.
In this regard, whether the controversy involves merely stopping
a vehicle to question its occupants, or to make a full-blown
sal in waters beyond the territorial limit).
720. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973); United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
721. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1987) (100 air miles).
722. See generally, cases cited at note 726 infra.
723. Section 287(a)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1982), 66 Stat. 233.
724. For example, in United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 892-93 (1975), a check-
point site was 62 air miles (66 land) from the Mexican border. The government did not
contend the checkpoint was the functional equivalent of the border, and neither did the
Court, despite the availability of such provisions as 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (1987).
725. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 267-68 (1973).
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search, will direct the Court to the appropriate fourth amend-
ment standard.72' As the Court has struggled to enunciate a con-
sistent standard, the border-exception to the fourth amendment
has been extended at various times to apply to situations touch-
ing more closely upon the traditional notion of this country's in-
terior. At other times, the exception's application has been con-
stricted, and a fuller array of fourth amendment protections
have been enforced despite mere proximity to the border.
1. Roving Patrols and Automobile Searches Beyond the Border
Area
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,727 a Mexican citizen
who possessed a United States work permit was stopped and
searched by the Border Patrol about 25 miles from the Mexican
border. The Border Patrol stopped the car he was driving with-
out having probable cause to believe any wrongdoing had oc-
curred or was in progress. The Border Patrol also lacked a rea-
sonable suspicion that the law was being broken. A search of the
alien's car uncovered 161 pounds of marijuana. Justice Stewart
held that there must be probable cause to believe a law was be-
ing broken in order to permit a "search of a moving automobile"
at a location removed from the border or its functional
equivalent.728 The basic authority for this view appeared in Car-
roll v. United States,2 e which allowed a search of an automobile
without a warrant when there was probable cause to believe it
was transporting illegal alcoholic beverages.
The element of probable cause was absent in Almeida-
Sanchez. There was no reason to believe the car had crossed the
border or was involved in any violation of law. Justice Stewart
recognized that searches may be conducted by the federal gov-
ernment to exclude aliens at the border as well as at the border's
726. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)(roving patrol stop);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)(fixed checkpoint stops); United
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975)(fixed checkpoint search); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (vehicle stop in order to allow questioning by roving patrol);
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)(search by roving patrol).
727. 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (Stewart, J.)(Powell, J. concurring)(White, J. dissenting with
Burger, C.J. and Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ.).
728. Id. at 269.
729. 267 U.S. 132 (1925); see also Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) (Stone,
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"functional equivalents. 73 0 A remote location at least 20 miles
from the Mexican border did not come within a border-excep-
tion to the fourth amendment.7 31 A search conducted at such a
locale had to respect the dictates of the fourth amendment. Jus-
tice Stewart was concerned with the untold number of "perfectly
innocent drivers" 732 who had been searched without any proba-
ble cause to believe they were engaged in any wrongdoing. De-
spite a need to enforce the country's immigration laws, accord-
ing to Justice Stewart, the Supreme Court must uphold "the
Constitution's protections of the individual against certain ex-
cesses of official power."7 3 Justice Stewart emphasized the
rights of the individual over the authority of government. By the
time of the decision in INS v. Delgado,34 the Court's emphasis
had changed.
Justice Powell's concurrence in Almeida-Sanchez indicated
that there may be "under appropriate limiting circumstances
a constitutionally adequate equivalent of probable cause to
conduct roving vehicular searches in border areas. ' '7 However,
one who travels near the border cannot automatically be consid-
ered to have given up fourth amendment rights in exchange for
some special benefit granted in border areas. According to Jus-
tice Powell, there must exist probable cause to suspect some
wrongdoing to justify a warrantless search of a moving vehicle.
Probable cause is defined as "specific knowledge about a partic-
ular automobile. 7 36 Justice Powell suggested relevant factors in
considering whether probable cause exists:
they include (i) the frequency with which aliens illegally
in the country are known or reasonably believed to be
transported within a particular area; (ii) the proximity of
the area in question to the border; (iii) the extensiveness
and geographic characteristics of the area, including the
roads therein and the extent of their use, and (iv) the
probable degree of interference with the rights of inno-
730. 413 U.S. at 272.
731. Id. at 273.
732. Id. at 273 n.5.
733. Id. at 273.
734. 466 U.S. 210 (1984). See text accompanying note 691 supra.




cent persons, taking into account the scope of the pro-
posed search, its duration, and the concentration of ille-
gal alien traffic in relation to the general traffic of the
road or area.1 7
Additionally, a warrantless search of an automobile may be con-
ducted when probable cause is present, since the automobile
could move out of the local jurisdiction before a warrant can be
obtained.738 The requirement of probable cause underwent sig-
nificant revisions in subsequent Court decsions.
2. Roving Patrols and Automobile Stops within the Border
Area
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,7 39 the Supreme Court
held that a roving border patrol may not stop automobiles in
areas near the Mexican border when the only reason to do so is
that the automobile's occupants appear to be of Mexican de-
scent. The Court interpreted Almeida-Sanchez740 to stand for
the proposition that "the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use
of roving patrols to search vehicles, without a warrant or proba-
ble cause, at points removed from the border and its functional
equivalents. '7 4 ' The dispute in Brignoni-Ponce did not concern
the Border Patrol's authority to search such vehicles which
would require a showing of probable cause; the controversy in-
volved the Border Patrol's authority to question individuals in
the stopped vehicle concerning "their citizenship and immigra-
tion status.174
Justice Powell's opinion in Brignoni-Ponce repeated a num-
ber of themes suggested in his concurrence in Almeida-Sanchez.
He posited that under appropriate conditions, merely question-
737. Id. at 283-84 (footnote omitted).
738. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
739. 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (Powell, J.)(Rehnquist, J. concurring) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring)(Burger, C.J. concurring, joined by Blackmun, J., in a single concurrence for United
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 899, as well)(White, J. concurring, joined by Blackmun, J.). See
also, Comment, License Check Stops and the Fourth Amendment, 68 CALIF. L. REV.
1167 (1980).
740. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
741. 422 U.S. at 875.
742. Id. at 874.
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ing an individual can amount to a seizure. 743 According to Jus-
tice Powell, such seizures must be reasonable.7 44 "Reasonable-
ness" depends upon "a balance between the public interest and
the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary in-
terference by law officers."' 7 5 Justice Powell noted that facts not
amounting to the probable cause standard used for making an
arrest could justify a modest intrusion into a private individual's
life. 46 Concerning automobiles, a permissible modest intrusion
includes "visual inspection . . . limited to those parts of the ve-
hicle that can be seen by anyone standing alongside '7 4 7 and may
permit brief questioning of one's "'right to be in the United
States.' ,,7,8 In balancing the public interest against the individ-
ual's right to privacy, the Court suggested that the factor that
will tip the scales in the government's favor is an "absence of
practical alternatives for policing the border. '74 9
In Brignoni-Ponce, the Court did not renounce entirely the
individual's right to privacy, since it maintained a Border Patrol
must have a "reasonable suspicion to justify roving patrol
stops. '750 However, the Court more precisely defined its position
concerning the two components of a roving patrol stop. The ini-
tial stop of a vehicle in a border area may be based upon a rea-
sonable suspicion there is or has been a violation of the immi-
gration laws. Almeida-Sanchez did not squarely address the
level of suspicion required to make the initial stop. According to
Brignoni-Ponce, the second component of a roving patrol stop,
the actual search of the automobile must be motivated according
to the standards of probable cause, as was the case in Almeida-
Sanchez. In Brignoni-Ponce, the Court was unable to find a jus-
tifiable reasonable suspicion for the Border Patrol's stop where
the only reason for stopping the automobile was its occupants'
apparent Mexican ancestry.
The Court presented the concept of the border-exception to
743. Id. at 878.
744. Id.
745. Id.
746. Id. at 880. In other passages, the Court refers to such an intrusion as a permissi-
ble "limited 'search' or 'seizure'." 422 U.S. at 881.
747. Id. at 880.
748. Id. Justice Powell quoted from the government's brief.
749. Id. at 881.
750. Id. at 882 (footnote omitted).
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the fourth amendment, and thereby limited the applicability of
Almeida-Sanchez. When a roving patrol is away from the border
it must have probable cause to stop a vehicle, which must in-
clude "specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences
from the facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehi-
cles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country." '751 In
this regard, Almeida-Sanchez is to be read as a case which oc-
curred away from the border. The Court, through Justice Pow-
ell, cited a number of factors which are to be considered in de-
ciding whether a reasonable suspicion is warranted, but it did
not indicate that such a list is exhaustive. The enumeration is a
refinement of the position Justice Powell adopted in his concur-
rence in Almeida-Sanchez152 listing factors to determine
whether the Border Patrol has probable cause to search a
vehicle:
Officers may consider the characteristics of the area in
which they encounter a vehicle. Its proximity to the bor-
der, the usual pattern of traffic on the particular road,
and previous experience with alien traffic are all relevant.
...They also may consider information about recent il-
legal border crossings in the area. The driver's behavior
may be relevant, as erratic driving or obvious attempts to
evade officers can support a reasonable suspicion ...
Aspects of the vehicle itself may justify suspicion. For in-
stance, officers say that certain station wagons, with large
compartments for fold-down seats or spare-tires, are fre-
quently used for transporting concealed aliens. . . . The
vehicle may appear to be heavily loaded, it may have an
extraordinary number of passengers, or the officers may
observe persons trying to hide.. . . The Government also
points out that trained officers can recognize the charac-
teristic appearance of persons who live in Mexico, relying
on such factors as the mode of dress and haircut. . . . In
all situations, the officer is entitled to assess the facts in
light of his experience in detecting illegal entry and
smuggling. 53
751. Id. at 884 (footnote omitted).
752. The list appears at the text accompanying note 737 supra.
753. 422 U.S. at 884-85.
708 [Vol. IV
Brignoni-Ponce stands for the proposition, however, that reli-
ance upon the one single factor of "apparent Mexican ances-
try" '7 54 is not a sufficient basis for arriving at a reasonable suspi-
cion, although such appearance remains a "relevant factor." '755
3. Fixed Traffic Checkpoints and Searches Beyond the Func-
tional Equivalent of the Border 756
In line with the preceding decisions on roving patrols, the
Supreme Court held that a search by the Border Patrol at a
fixed checkpoint 62 miles from the Mexican border must be on
probable cause.757 In United States v. Ortiz, 758 the respondent
was discovered smuggling aliens in his car. The Border Patrol
did not have a "special reason" to stop the driver. 59 Justice
Powell's majority decision considered two differences between
fixed checkpoints and roving patrols. First, the discretion in-
volved in choosing a particular fixed checkpoint site is exercised
"by high-level Border Patrol officials, using criteria that include
the degree of inconvenience to the public and the potential for
safe operation, ' '"7 ° whereas the individual officers in roving pa-
trols are less restrained and less answerable for their actions.
Second, checkpoint stops are less intrusive than roving patrols
since they are less frightening and annoying to the motorist.
754. Id. at 885-86.
755. Id. at 887. In response to this, see Justice Brennan's opinion in INS v. Delgado,
466 U.S. 210, 234 n.4 (1984):
Indeed, the proposition that INS agents, even those who have considerable
experience in the field, will be able fairly and accurately to distinguish between
Spanish-speaking persons of Mexican ancestry who are either native-born or
naturalized citizens, and Spanish-speaking persons of Mexican ancestry who are
aliens is both implausible and subject to discriminatory abuse. The protection of
fundamental constitutional rights should not depend upon such unconstrained
administrative discretion, for, as we have often observed, "[wihen ... a stop is
not based on objective criteria, the risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices
exceeds tolerable limits."
Quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979). INS v. Delgado is discussed at text
accompanying note 691 supra.
756. The phrase "a functional equivalent of the border" occurs in United States v.
Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 892 (1975).
757. 422 U.S. 898 (1975).
758. 422 U.S. 891 (1975) (Powell, J.) (Rehnquist, J. concurring)(Burger J., concurring,
joined by Blackmun, J.) (White, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring).
759. Id. at 892.
760. Id. at 894.
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Nonetheless, Justice Powell reached the conclusion that "[w]hile
the differences between a roving patrol and a checkpoint would
be significant in determining the propriety of the stop. . . they
do not appear to make a difference in the search itself."'76 '
The rationale behind placing the roving patrol and the fixed
checkpoint together to gauge the propriety of searches rests
upon Justice Powell's consideration that a fixed checkpoint does
not necessarily limit "to any meaningful extent the officer's dis-
cretion to select cars for search. '76 ' Therefore, the potential for
favoritism and abuse remains even at a fixed checkpoint. Justice
Powell stated that "[a] search, even of an automobile, is a sub-
stantial invasion of privacy. To protect that privacy from official
arbitrariness, the Court has always regarded probable cause as
the minimum requirement for a lawful search. '7 3 Justice Powell
restricted the decision to automobile searches, but indicated
that "[n]ot every aspect of a routine automobile 'inspection'...
necessarily constitutes a 'search' for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment."'764 Justice Rehnquist's concurrence confined the
requirement of probable cause to "full searches, '765 adding that
the decision "does not extend to fixed checkpoint stops for the
purpose of inquiring about citizenship. '766
761. Id. at 895.
762. Id.
763. Id. at 896 (footnote omitted).
764. Id. at 897 n.3.
765. Id. at 898.
766. Id. Additionally, in United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Mar-
shall, J.), and Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916 (1975) (Powell, J.) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (Brennan, J., dissenting,
joined by Marshall, J.), the Court held Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) will not be
applied retroactively. In Peltier, the respondent had been stopped by a roving border
patrol which found 270 pounds of marijuana in the trunk of his car. Justice Rehnquist
wrote that Atmeida-Sanchez will not be applied retroactively "[diespite the conceded
illegality of the search under" that decision. Peltier, at 534. In Bowen, the Border Patrol
stopped the petitioner's camper at a traffic checkpoint about 36 miles from the Mexican
border. After determining the petitioner was a United States citizen, the Border Patrol
found 356 pounds of marijuana and some benzedrine tablets. The government did not
contend that the Border Patrol had probable cause to open the camper.
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4. Permanent Checkpoints and Traffic Stops Beyond the Bor-
der Area
The next Supreme Court decision concerning traffic stops
and aliens was United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,717 where per-
manent traffic checkpoints were operated by the Border Patrol
away from the Mexican border. The Supreme Court held that a
vehicle could be stopped for "brief questioning of its occupants
even though there is no reason to believe the particular vehicle
contains illegal aliens. '768 Additionally, no warrant was neces-
sary to operate the fixed checkpoint stops. Martinez-Fuerte con-
sidered two traffic checkpoints. At one, vehicles were slowed and
singled out without cause for further questioning about the oc-
cupants' rights to be in the United States. At a second check-
point, every motorist was questioned except for those local in-
habitants whom the Border Patrol recognized.
The Court decided that routine stops and interruptions do
not offend the fourth amendment. As in prior decisions, the
Court weighed the public interest in effective immigration law
enforcement against the individual's fourth amendment rights.
The Court interpreted Almeida-Sanchez769 to require probable
cause for a roving patrol's search of an automobile, 7 0 and inter-
preted Ortiz7 71 to require probable cause for a search at a fixed
checkpoint site. Although the Court, in Martinez-Fuerte, de-
picted checkpoint stops as seizures under the fourth amend-
ment,772 such stops were not prohibited even when a reasonable
suspicion was absent, notwithstanding the rule laid down in
Brignoni-Ponce.773
One reason for the Court's determination to dispense with
the reasonable suspicion standard was the impracticality of ad-
ministering the immigration laws on major highways, where traf-
fic is frequently heavy and it is difficult to form a reasonable
767. 428 U.S. 543 (1976)(Powell, J.) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.)
See also, Grossman, Sobriety Checkpoints: Roadblocks to Fourth Amendment Protec-
tions, 12 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123 (1984).
768. 428 U.S. at 545.
769. 413 U.S. at 266 (1973). See text accompanying note 727 supra.
770. 428 U.S. at 555.
771. 422 U.S. at 891. See text accompanying note 758 supra.
772. 428 U.S. at 556.
773. Id. at 556.
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suspicion as to any particular vehicle. The Court reasoned that
any intrusion upon the fourth amendment rights of individuals
is limited. The Court reported that motorists are less surprised
and frightened at a fixed checkpoint stop than during a roving
patrol's examination. The Court explained that fixed sites "in-
volve less discretionary enforcement activity.""' That is, there
can be "post-stop judicial review" 775 of both the choice of the
site and the manner in which the site is operated. There is also
"less room"' 776 for harassment of individuals at fixed sites than
during a roving patrol's surveillance. Operation of the perma-
nent checkpoint sites encouraged "effective allocation of limited
enforcement resources. '777 Finally, according to Martinez-Fu-
erte, an individual's interest in privacy is not as great in an au-
tomobile on a public highway as it is at home.
As a result of Martinez-Fuerte, no individualized suspicion
is necessary to stop and question a vehicle's occupants at a per-
manent fixed checkpoint. Drivers and passengers pan be singled
out for additional examination "on the basis of criteria that
would not sustain a roving-patrol stop [including] referrals...
made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry. '778
Justice Brennan's dissent recognized the Court's departure
from the development in Ortiz, Brignoni-Ponce, and Almeida-
Sanchez. He stated:
Almeida-Sanchez and Ortiz ...required a showing
of probable cause for roving-patrol and fixed checkpoint
searches, and Brignoni-Ponce . . . required at least a
showing of reasonable suspicion based on specific articul-
able facts to justify roving-patrol stops. Absent some dif-
ference in the nature of the intrusion, the same minimal
requirement should be imposed for checkpoint stops.
779
Justice Brennan would have applied the "reasonable suspicion"
standard from Brignoni-Ponce7 80 and saw the majority opinion
774. 428 U.S. at 559.
775. Id. (footnote omitted).
776. Id.
777. Id.
778. Id. at 563 (footnote omitted).
779. Id. at 570.




in Martinez-Fuerte as abandoning the Brignoni-Ponce principle
that Mexican appearance alone is an insufficient basis to interro-
gate suspected aliens.
5. Roving Patrols 'and a New Formulation for Stopping
Vehicles
In United States v. Cortez,7 81 a roving Border Patrol
stopped a van that was transporting a number of aliens from the
Mexican border in violation of section 274(a) of the Act.782 The
Court did not mention any distinction between a roving border
patrol and a fixed checkpoint. Rather, the Court addressed the
issue of "what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a
person. "783 The Court utilized a "totality of the circum-
stances '7 84 standard to decide the justifiability of the search:
"Based upon [the] whole picture the detaining officers must
have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the par-
ticular person stopped of criminal activity. '785 Cortez employed
some of the factors listed in Brignoni-Ponce: (1) information
about recent border crossings; and (2) type of motor vehicle in-
volved. 86 The Court reiterated that probable cause is not the
test to be used in deciding whether to stop the vehicle. The issue
involved the propriety of the stop and not the subsequent
search, since one of the passengers voluntarily opened the van's
door. According to the Court, stops "may be justified under the
circumstances less than those constituting probable cause for ar-
rest or search. '7817 The "totality of the circumstances" standard
is an analysis which considers "various objective observations,
information from police reports, if such are available, and con-
sideration of the mode or patterns of operation of certain kinds
781. 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (Burger, C.J.) (Marshall, J., concurring) (Stewart J., concur-
ring). See also, Erickson, Investigatory Stops 7 NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF. 202 (Spring 1981);
Young, Search and Seizure . . .Investigatory Stops, 67 A.B.A.J. 350 (1981);
782. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982)(punishable by up to five years in prison and a two
thousand dollar fine). Although this section was amended by the Immigration Reform
and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3381, the basic prohibi-
tion remains.
783. 449 U.S. at 417.
784. Id.
785. Id. at 417-18.
786. The factors appear in this text accompanying note 753 supra.
787. 411 U.S. at 421.
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of lawbreakers. '78 These considerations must yield a "particu-
larized suspicion ... that the particular individual being
stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. 7 89 Justice Stewart concurred
in believing that the Brignoni-Ponce factors had been met in
this case of alien smuggling. The decision in Cortez, however,
did not cite compliance with every factor listed for consideration
in Brignoni-Ponce.790
D. The Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply to Deportation
Proceedings
In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, T the Supreme Court balanced
arguments for application of the exclusionary rule in a deporta-
tion proceeding against concern for administrative convenience
in enforcing the immigration laws. Respondents were two citi-
zens of Mexico by the name of Lopez-Mendoza and Sandoval-
Sanchez. Lopez-Mendoza claimed he was arrested illegally by
the INS while at his place of employment. The arresting agents
did not have a warrant to search the work premises nor to arrest
any particular individual. The employer refused to allow the
INS agents to interview employees, but one agent questioned
Lopez-Mendoza while another agent kept the employer dis-
tracted. In response to their questioning, Lopez-Mendoza admit-
ted he was from Mexico. Sandoval-Sanchez, after being detained
by the INS, admitted to his unlawful entry into the United
States, but later contended "he was not aware that he had a
right to remain silent."7 9 Both aliens argued their fourth
amendment rights had been violated; in particular, they claimed
788. Id. at 418.
789. Id.
790. See text accompanying note 753 supra.
791. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (O'Connor, J.) (Burger, C.J., concurring except to part five
of the opinion) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., each separately dissenting).
See generally: Scolnic, Immigration Law, 1985 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 161 (1986); Schwartz,
Cost-Benefit Analysis in Administrative Law: Does it Make Priceless Procedural Right
Worthless? 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1985); Erickson & Neighbors, Pronouncements of the
U.S. Supreme Court Relating to the Criminal Law Field: 1983cC1984, 13 CoLo. LAW.
1569 (1984); Young, Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply in Deportation, 70 A.B.A.J. 124
(Sept. 1984); Comment, The Exclusionary Rule in Deportation Proceedings, 20 U.S.F.L.
REV. 143 (1985); Comment, The Uncertainty of Applying the Exclusionary Rule to Civil
Proceedings, 1985 DET. C.L. REV. 665 (1985); Comment, The Exclusionary Rule's Appli-
cability in Deportation Hearings, 18 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 125 (1985).
792. 468 U.S. at 1037.
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entry into evidence of their admissions violated the exclusionary
rule's proscription against receiving into evidence "the fruit of
an unlawful arrest. 79
3
Justice O'Connor first dismissed Lopez-Mendoza's claim.
She observed that a deportation is a civil action and not a crimi-
nal proceeding. Regardless of the categorization, she explained
that "[t]he 'body' or identity of a defendant or respondent in a
criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit
of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful
arrest, search, or interrogation occurred. '79 4 Since Lopez-Me-
nodza objected to an unlawful arrest alone, the Court was un-
willing to ignore the other evidence offered against him. In the
context of a deportation proceeding, this additional evidence is
basically the physical body of the deportable alien. 95
Justice O'Connor proceeded to Sandoval-Sanchez's claim
that evidence offered at his proceeding was suppressible by op-
eration of the exclusionary rule. Justice O'Connor explained that
the exclusionary rule in its general application requires that "in
a criminal proceeding .. .statements and other evidence ob-
tained as a result of an unlawful, warrantless arrest are sup-
pressible if the link between the evidence and the unlawful con-
duct is not too attenuated. ' 796 Justice O'Connor stated that the
purpose of, and the benefit derived from, application of the ex-
clusionary rule is to "deter future unlawful police conduct. '7 97
She decided that the rule does not apply in deportation proceed-
ings by balancing "the likely social benefits of excluding unlaw-
fully seized evidence against the likely costs." '98 Cost, however,
is a relative term with various meanings, and in one context is
merely equivalent to raising the issue of whether Congress has
authorized enough funding to permit a particular agency to
793. Id.
794. 468 U.S. at 1039.
795. But for the illegal arrest, the INS would have had no "body" to present in the
deportation proceeding.
796. 468 U.S. at 1040-41.
797. Id. at 1041 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. at 446 (1976), which re-
fused to extend the exclusionary rule to a "civil proceeding of one sovereign of evidence
seized by a criminal law enforcement agent of another sovereign." 428 U.S. at 460.). The
quoted passage in the text concerning deterrence also appears in United States v. Calan-
dra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
798. 468 U.S. at 1041.
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achieve its legislated goals. By deciding not to apply the exclu-
sionary rule to deportation proceedings, Justice O'Connor de-
cided that Congress can circumvent the Constitution through re-
fusal to exercise its power of the purse. According to Justice
O'Connor, the social costs of applying the rule include the "loss
of often probative evidence and all of the secondary costs that
flow from the less accurate or more cumbersome adjudication
that therefore occurs." '799 However, the Court failed to give ap-
propriate emphasis to the costs accompanying a failure to apply
the exclusionary rule which, in the light of INS practices,
amounts to the continual spectre of potentially extensive gov-
ernment interference into the lives of private citizens. Justice
O'Connor reasoned that the "likely deterrence value of the ex-
clusionary rule in deportation proceedings is difficult to as-
sess." 800 The rule is "likely to be most effective when applied to
'intrasovereign' violations"801 of the fourth amendment where
the "agency officials who effect the unlawful arrest are the same
officials who subsequently bring the deportation action. '80 2 De-
terrence is nonetheless diminished when "evidence not derived
directly from the arrest is sufficient to support deportation, '" 803
since all the government need establish in order to obtain a de-
portation are the identity as well as the alienage of the de-
tainee. 0 4 Under Justice O'Connor's first ruling concerning Lo-
pez-Mendoza, the alienage and identity of a detainee are easily
established by mere presentation of the detainee's body along
with any other evidence obtained independently of the alien's
arrest. Justice O'Connor explained that a suspected alien's "per-
son and identity . . . are not . . . suppressible" 05 in a deporta-
tion hearing. Under this line of logic, it does not matter how the
INS gets the body before an immigration judge.806 Justice
799. Id.
800. Id. at 1042.




805. 468 U.S. at 1043.
806. This position contrasts with the statement by Justice Brandeis that "[it may be
assumed that evidence obtained by the [executive agency] through an illegal search and
seizure cannot be made the basis of a finding in deportation proceedings." United States
ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923).
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O'Connor concluded that the exclusionary rule has no place in
deportation hearings." 7
Justice O'Connor also reasoned that since the INS has its
own rules for governing its agents, additional supervision by the
courts is unnecessary. 80 8 According to Lopez-Mendoza, the exis-
tence of the INS's own regulations diminishes the deterrence
value that application of the exclusionary rule would have in de-
portation proceedings. Although the aliens argued that applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule "is necessary to safeguard the
Fourth Amendment rights of ethnic Americans, "809 Justice
O'Connor concluded that the deterrence value of applying the
rule is too slight to "add significant protection to [such] Fourth
Amendment rights."810 First, the majority of deportable aliens
never challenge the circumstances of their arrest, so even if the
exclusionary rule applied in such challenges, INS agents would
realize the circumstances of the arrest would rarely be attacked.
Thus, agents would not be deterred from undertaking such un-
lawful conduct. Since a key purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
deter future police misconduct, a deportable alien who is about
to leave the country has no interest in whether or not such prac-
tices by the INS are curtailed.8 ' The fact that INS agents know
807. Justice O'Connor drew distinctions between a criminal proceeding and the civil
nature of a deportation hearing. Justice White argued to the contrary. Justice O'Connor
stated that "regardless of how the arrest is effected, deportation will still be possible
when evidence not derived directly from the arrest is sufficient to support deportation."
468 U.S. at 1043. Justice White responded that the same is true in criminal proceedings,
so the distinction is really no distinction at all. Justice White stated: "The suppression of
some evidence does not bar prosecution for the crime, and in many cases even though
some evidence is suppressed a conviction will nonetheless be obtained." Id. at 1054. In
response to Justice O'Connor's argument that the exclusionary rule should not be used
in deportation proceedings since few aliens ever bring a fourth amendment challenge,
and thus no deterrence effect upon INS agents would result, Justice White explained
"that the fact that many criminal defendants plead guilty [does not dilute] the rule's
deterrent effect in criminal cases" Id. at 1054.
808. Basically, this relegates fourth amendment protection to the status of a mere
regulation.
809. 468 U.S. at 1045.
810. Id.
811. Lopez-Mendoza did not confront the issue of an alien's standing to make the
fourth amendment challenge. As a fait accompli, the two aliens in Lopez-Mendoza did
so without the Court dismissing them for a failure to have standing. The Court referred
to standing in a brief passage where it contemplated "the possibility of declaratory relief
against the agency . . . when standing requirements for bringing such an action can be
met." 486 U.S. at 1045. The Court referred to INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984), dis-
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beforehand that the Bill of Rights, in practice, would rarely be
raised against them is not a compelling reason to dispense with
it.
On the other side of the balance, Justice O'Connor reasoned
that "the social costs of applying the exclusionary rule in depor-
tation proceedings are both unusual and significant. '81 2 She
shifted the terminology customarily given as the reason for the
existence of the exclusionary rule and offered that terminology
to support the objective of deportations. Justice O'Connor stated
that the purpose of a deportation proceeding against an alien is
"not to punish past transgressions but to prevent their continu-
ance or renewal." 813 The Court implicitly found that all deport-
able aliens continuously break the law by their continued pres-
ence in the United States. The Court depicted illegal alienage as
a "status" crime that is a continuing, ongoing offense as long as
the alien remains in the United States." 4 The Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) does not support this blanket conclusion.
Justice White's dissent pointed out that the INA does not
make all aliens who are in the United States without permission
of the federal government into criminals unless the alien is will-
fully unregistered with the INS pursuant to sections 262 and 266
of the INA. 1 Since it was not shown that Sandoval-Sanchez
cussed at text accompanying note 691 supra where the Court noted the four employees
in various factories had standing to challenge the INS factory sweeps. See 466 U.S. 210,
217, n.4, where it is noted that the INS did not challenge the employees' standing.
812. 468 U.S. at 1046.
813. Id.
814. In criminal law, the Supreme Court has ruled that "status" crimes, such as pen-
alties against drug addiction, are unconstitutional. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962); but see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514(1968)(alcoholism).
815. Section 262 of the INA (Registration of Aliens in the United States), 66 Stat.
224 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982)) provided:
(a) It shall be the duty of every alien now or hereafter in the United States, who
(1) is fourteen years of age or older, (2) has not been registered and fingerprinted
... and (3) remains in the United States for thirty days or longer, to apply for
registration and to be fingerprinted before the expiration of such thirty days.
Section 266 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1306 (1982) (Penalties), provides for penalties against
those aliens who do not comply with the registration requirements, as well as with other
requirements of the INA. Additionally, § 275 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982), as
amended by 100 Stat. 3542 (1986), and § 276 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1982) make
the initial act of making an illegal entry or reentry into the United States a misdemeanor




had "willfully failed to register," '16 his release following the in-
vocation of the exclusionary rule would not necessarily promote
the continuation of a crime. To support his position, Justice
White explained that case law has resisted application of a "con-
tinuing offense" analysis concerning illegal aliens and has re-
stricted their violation of the immigration laws to discrete points
in time when actual transgressions occurred. 1 7
Justice White also pointed out that Justice O'Connor ar-
gued that the deterrent value of applying the exclusionary rule
is minimal because "immigration officers receive a thorough edu-
cation in Fourth Amendment law." 18 According to Justice
White, in the same breath, Justice O'Connor argued that in a
deportation proceeding "[n]either the hearing officers nor the at-
torneys participating in those hearings are likely to be well
versed in the intricacies of Fourth Amendment law."8 9 Justice
White concluded that "[tihe implication that hearing officers
should defer to law enforcement officers' superior understanding
of constitutional principles is startling indeed." 820 According to
the majority, however, the administrative concern for "stream-
lined"'8 2' justice in deportation proceedings outweighs the fourth
amendment interests at stake.2 2 Justice White indicated that
the deportation proceeding at issue was not in any sense "collat-
eral 8 23 to some other procedure for which the disputed evidence
816. 468 U.S. at 1058.
817. E.g., in United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 408 n.6 (1958), the Court stated in
dictum that "[t]he offense here is unlike the crimes of illegal entry set out in § § 275 and
276 of the Act. . . . Those offenses are not continuous ones, as 'entry' is limited to a
particular locality and hardly suggests continuity." Cores held, however, that an alien
crewman who willfully remains in the United States past the date allowed on his landing
permit is guilty of a continuing offense. Cores interpreted a different section of the stat-
ute. The crewman was in violation of § 252(a) of the INA, 66 Stat. 220 (1952) (currently
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1282(a)(1982)).
818. 468 U.S. at 1058.
819. Id. at 1048.
820. Id. at 1058.
821. Id. at 1048.
822. Justice Marshall would have applied the exclusionary rule in deportation pro-
ceedings in order to enable "the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official
lawlessness and [to assure] the people-all potential victims of unlawful government
conduct-that the government would not profit from its lawless behaviour, thus mini-
mizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in government." 468 U.S. at
1060-61 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 357 (1974)).
823. 468 U.S. at 1053.
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was obtained. The evidence gathered by the INS was obtained
for the direct purpose of the deportation proceeding. This dis-
tinguishes Lopez-Mendoza from other cases where the exclu-
sionary rule had been held not to apply. According to Justice
White, the exclusionary rule has been held inapplicable in those
cases where evidence was gathered for other proceedings illegally
and such evidence was never intended to be used in the proceed-
ing for which it was finally offered.
In Lopez-Mendoza the INS claimed to instruct its agents in
fourth amendment law and to have regulations in effect which
uphold that amendment's standards. 24 Justice White reasoned
that INS regulations already respected some fourth amendment
standards because the agency was originally concerned that the
exclusionary rule would be enforced by the courts. He argued in
favor of applying the exclusionary rule to deportation hearings
because its application would ensure that "the agency [would
continue] to adopt policies and procedures that conform to
Fourth Amendment standards." 2 " The effect of Lopez-Mendoza
may be that the INS will dispense with fourth amendment con-
cerns altogether.8 6
824. For example, up until the decision in Lopez-Mendoza, it was unclear whether
the exclusionary rule applied in deportation proceedings. According to Justice White,
many commentators thought that it did, thus supplying a reason why the INS would
have some regulations adhering to the exclusionary rule's standards. 468 U.S. at 1055.
Addressing the issue of misconduct by INS agents, Justice White stated that "over a
period of four years 20 officers were suspended or terminated for misconduct toward
aliens ...and it appears that the 11 officers who were terminated were terminated for
rape or assault." 468 U.S. at 1054 n.2. See the cases listed at note 255 supra.
825. Id. at 1054.
826. Other constitutional guarantees have been held not to apply to aliens in a depor-
tation proceeding. For example, in the following cases, the Court either stated or held
that the ex post facto clause does not afford an alien protection in a deportation proceed-
ing: Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (Frank-
furter, J.); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952)(Jackson, J.); Mahler v. Eby,
264 U.S. 32 (1924). In Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952), the Court held in part
that the eighth amendment does not forbid holding an alien in custody without bail
when that alien is awaiting a deportation proceeding and is charged with either member-
ship in a group advocating the violent overthrow of the United States government or
who is otherwise classifiable as a threat to the security of the United States.
In United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923) (Brandeis, J.) the
Court accepted the rule that an involuntarily obtained confession may be used in a de-
portation proceeding, but limited the application of this rule to bar confessions or evi-
dence when a procedural defect or executive practice is so unfair as to lead "to a denial
of justice" or where "one of the elements deemed essential to due process" is absent.
Bilokumsky at 157. It appears logical to read the Bilokumsky formula in light of present
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VII. ALIENS WITHIN THE LAND OF OPPORTUNITY: FEDERAL AND
STATE REGULATION
Once in the United States, aliens are subject to discrimina-
tion from the federal and state governments, as well as from pri-
day understanding of what constitutes due process.
The Supreme Court has also considered, or actually limited, the protections afforded
to aliens by the Bill of Rights in contexts that extend beyond deportation proceedings.
See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960)(disapproving use of an INS warrant for
the purpose of collecting evidence in a criminal case, but finding that a search of an
alien's hotel room by the INS, during the alien's arrest by the INS, while FBI agents
observed, was conducted for the purpose of discovering weapons and evidence of alienage
and therefore was a search properly incidental to a valid administrative arrest, and was
not a search conducted for the purpose of circumventing restrictions on criminal law
enforcement; the Court stated: "If anything, we ought to be more vigilant, not less, to
protect individuals and their property from warrantless searches and seizures made for
the purpose of turning up proof to convict than we are to protect them from searches for
matters bearing on deportability," id. at 237; and while this is undoubtedly wise, the
Court then proceeded to allow into evidence in the criminal proceedings the items for-
merly seized from the alien's hotel room for the original purpose of, and under the lesser
standard pertaining to, a deportation proceeding).
Outside the context of the deportation proceeding, the alien has fared little better.
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the issue of Miranda warnings,
Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 301
(1971) (Stewart, J.) would have decided whether Miranda warnings are necessary before
asking an alien to produce his alien registration card. The majority avoided the issue by
adhering to a strict statutory interpretation.
In a criminal setting, alienage may play a factor in restricting the defendant's rights.
Concerning traditional sixth amendment protections, the Supreme Court has ruled that
an illegal alien may be denied the right to confrontation when witnesses have been de-
ported. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.) (Black-
mun J., concurring) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Mar-
shall, J.). Concerning a criminal defendant's right to an impartial jury, the Supreme
Court held there was no reversible error in the voir dire afforded a smuggler of aliens
although the trial judge failed to ask prospective jurors whether they would be
prejudiced against the defendant on the basis of his Mexican descent. Rosales-Lopez v.
United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981) (White, J.)(Rehnquist, J., concurring, joined by Bur-
ger, C.J.) (Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
In Rosales-Lopez, the petitioning defendant was a Mexican descendant. He was
tried for illegally bringing aliens to the United States in violation of several statutory
provisions. The Supreme Court indicated the trial judge's failure to ask the prospective
jurors whether they would be prejudiced on account of the defendant's Mexican ancestry
would be "reversible error only where the circumstances of the case indicate that there is
a reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice might have influenced the jury."
451 U.S. at 191. This standard was not met. The decision whether the prejudice existed
lay with the trial judge. An additional mollifying factor was that the trial judge "ques-
tioned the prospective jurors as to their attitude toward aliens." 451 U.S. at 193.
In Valenzuela-Bernal, the respondent was a citizen of Mexico who was charged with
smuggling aliens in the United States. He was an alien who had illegally entered the,
United States through the aid of some smugglers for whom he later agreed to drive a car
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vate parties. The distinction between alien and citizen is high-
lighted in the workplace and in eligibility to receive community
financial benefits. The Supreme Court's responses to these dis-
tinctions have depended on the legal source authorizing the dis-
crimination and the status of the aliens involved.
A. Federal Regulation of Employment
To a large extent, the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA)827 has nullified the effect of the Burger Court opinions
concerning illegal aliens and employment. The basic doctrines
which the Court has delineated, however, such as that concern-
ing federal preemption, remain unaffected. Additionally, the an-
alytical methods which the Burger Court utilized in arriving at
its determinations remain unchanged.
transporting several other illegal aliens to Los Angeles. After he was apprehended by the
Border Patrol he admitted his illegal entry as well as knowingly transporting other illegal
aliens.
One of the illegal aliens "was detained to provide a nonhearsay basis for establishing
that respondent had transported an illegal alien in violation of" statute while the others
were deported. 458 U.S. at 861. The respondent claimed violation of fifth amendment
due process and the sixth amendment's guarantee "to compulsory process for obtaining
favorable witnesses." Id. The respondent claimed he had been denied an "opportunity to
interview the two remaining passengers to determine whether they would aid in his de-
fense." Id. In upholding the government's tactics, the Court permitted the fifth and sixth
amendment claims to be susperseded by the executive's responsibility to enforce the im-
migration laws passed by Congress. The Court provided that in order for the respondent
to prevail upon his sixth amendment claim, he would have to show the deportees' testi-
mony "would have been material and favorable to his defense." Id. at 873. Justice Bren-
nan's dissent voiced a concern that
when the Executive Branch chooses to prosecute a violation of federal law, it
incurs a constitutional responsibility manifestly superior to its other duties:
namely, the responsibility to ensure that the accused receives the due process of
law.
Id. at 880-881. Compare Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Valenzuela-Bernal with Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C. Va. 1807)(No.
14,694) for a contrast between a twentieth century reading of the Constitution, and the
understanding of an individual present during the framing of that document. See also,
Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973) (Stewart, J.) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)(Douglas, J., dissenting)(neither the just compensation nor
the due process clause of the fifth amendment are violated when illegal aliens are paid
one dollar per day by the federal government while incarcerated and waiting to appear as
material witnesses prior to a trial of those who illegally smuggled them into the United
States).
827. Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359.
NOTE
1. Migrant Workers
Saxbe v. Bustos8 28 involved a dispute over whether a group
of aliens was illegally employed in the United States. Members
of the group had homes in Canada and Mexico, and they com-
muted, either daily or seasonally, to employment in the United
States with INS consent. Suit for an injunction was brought by
United States laborers through their collective bargaining agent
to discontinue this allowance. At issue was the predecessor of
current section 101(a)(27)(A) of the Immigration and National-
ity Act (INA),8s 9 which had created a class of aliens known as
"special immigrants." Under the INA, one category of "special
immigrants" included legal permanent resident aliens returning
from a temporary visit abroad. They could reenter the United
States "without being required to obtain a passport, immigrant
visa, reentry permit or other documentation. '"830 Instead, they
needed only a "green card"'83 ' to reenter without regard to
quotas 2 or labor certification requirements. 3
Justice Douglas started his statutory analysis by noting that
the INA "presumes that an alien is an immigrant 'until he es-
tablishes . . . that he is entitled to a nonimmigrant status.' ',834
828. 419 U.S. 65 (1974) (Douglas, J.) (White, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, and
Blackmun, JJ.).
829. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(A) (1982). The predecessor of this provision was the Act
of June 27, 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 169, as amended by Act of Oct. 3, 1965, § 8, 79 Stat. 910,
916, which created a § 101(a)(27)(B) to read as follows: "The term 'special immigrant'
means- . . . (B) an immigrant, lawfully admitted for permanent residence, who is re-
turning from a temporary visit abroad." Clause (B) was later redesignated to current
clause (A) by Act of Oct. 20, 1976, § 7(a), 90 Stat. 2703, 2706, and may be found at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(A) (1982).
830. Act of June 27, 1952, § 211(b), 66 Stat. 163, 181, as amended by Act of Oct. 3,
1965, § 9, 79 Stat. 910, 917, subsequently amended by Act of Oct. 20, 1976, § 7(c), 90
Stat. 2703, 2706 (current version in 8 U.S.C. § 1181(b) (1982)).
831. 419 U.S. at 66. See e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 211.1(b)(1) (1987), which provides in part:
An Alien Registration Card may be permitted in lieu of an immigrant visa by an
immigrant alien who is returning to an unrelinquished lawful permanent resi-
dence in the United States after a temporary absence abroad, and who is: (i)
Returning after a temporary absence abroad not exceeding one year ....
832. The quotas are established in § § 211(a), 201-203 of the INA of 1952 (current
versions in 8 U.S.C. § § 1181(a) (1982); 1151 (1982); 1152 (1982), as amended by Act of
Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 311(a), 100 Stat. 3434, and by Act of Nov. 14, 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-653, § 4, 100 Stat. 3655; and 1153 (1982)).
833. 419 U.S. at 67-68, described in text following note 839 infra.
834. 419 U.S. at 67 (footnote omitted), quoting Act of'June 27, 1952, § 214(b), 66
Stat. 163, 189(current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b) (1982)).
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This presumption was created by section 214(b) of the INA. 5
The rationale behind it is that all foreigners are expected to in-
tend to take permanent root, as immigrants, within the United
States unless it can affirmatively be shown that they plan to
leave. Further, an "immigrant" is every alien who does not fit
into one of the specific temporary-visitor nonimmigrant classes
enumerated in section 101(a)(15). 8 6 In Saxbe, the collective bar-
gaining agent argued that both the seasonal and daily commut-
ing aliens were nonimmigrants who fell within section
101(a)(15)(H)(ii) of the INA, 5 7 as aliens "having a residence in a
foreign country which [they have] no intention of abandoning
• . . (ii) who [are] coming temporarily to the United States to
perform temporary services or labor, [where] unemployed per-
sons capable of performing such service or labor cannot be found
in'838 the United States. Aliens who enter the United States
under a visa issued pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(H) have to
835. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b)(1982) provides:
Every alien shall be presumed to be an immigrant until he establishes to the
satisfaction of the consular officer, at the time of application for a visa, and the
immigration officers, at the time of application for admission, that he is entitled
to a nonimmigrant status under § 1101(a)(15) of this title.
836. 66 Stat. 163, 167. The current version appears in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (1982)
and begins "Itihe term 'immigrant' means every alien except an alien who is within one
of the following classes of nonimmigrant aliens."
837. Act of June 27, 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 168, as amended by Act of Apr. 7, 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-225, § 1(a), 84 Stat. 116 (current version in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)
(1982), as amended by Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 301(a), 100 Stat. 3411).
Before the 1986 amendment, this was referred to as an H-2 visa. The 1986 legislation
substantially modified the labor provisions while still making allowances for agricultural
workers (H-2(a)), as well as for other temporary workers (H-2(b)), provided there is a
shortage of such workers in the United States.
838. 419 U.S. 70 (quoting § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii) of the 1952 Act, as amended by the
1970 Act). See the section cited in note 837 supra. The early predecessor to this proviso
was discussed by the Court in Karnuth v. United States ex rel. Albro, 279 U.S. 231
(1929), where the Court held that a British subject and an alien alleging Canadian citi-
zenship who were both seeking employment in the United States could be barred from
entering the United States by the operation of statutory provisions regulating the entry
of immigrants into the United States and that the aliens did not fall within an exception
to this ban provided to aliens coming to the United States temporarily for business pur-
poses as otherwise allowed in § 3(2) of the Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153,
154. This result was obtained despite article III of the Jay Treaty of 1794, 8 Stat. 116,
117, between Great Britain and the United States, which had allowed for free passage by
British subjects into the United States. The Court reasoned that the War of 1812 had
terminated operation of article III "since the passing and repassing of citizens or subjects
of one sovereign into the territory of another is inconsistent with a condition of hostil-
ity." 279 U.S. at 239.
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comply with labor certification requirements under section
212(a)(14) of the INA."s9 These requirements basically necessi-
tate a finding by the Secretary of Labor that there are not
enough workers in the United States to perform the specified
labor and that the employment of the aliens will not adversely
affect working conditions for other workers in the United States
similarly employed. Under these restrictions, the collective bar-
gaining agent in Saxbe sought unsuccessfully to terminate the
ability of the commuting aliens to work in the United States.
The Court concluded that the commuters were in fact aliens
lawfully admitted for permanent residence under section
101(a)(20) of the INA.840 Therefore, the commuters were eligible
for "special immigrant" status since, under the statutory defini-
tion, one kind of special immigrant is an immigrant lawfully ad-
mitted for permanent residence.8 ' As immigrants, Justice Doug-
las reasoned that section 101(a)(15)(H)'s regulation of
nonimmigrants was inapplicable and the requirement of a labor
certification which goes along with operation of section
101(a)(15)(H) also did not apply. Further, in compliance with
section 101(a)(20), the commuting aliens had not lost their sta-
tus as legal permanent residents through the operation of any
839. Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 183, as amended by Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-236, § 10, 79 Stat. 917. The current version appears at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982) and
provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter the following classes of aliens
shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the
United States:
(14) Aliens seeking to enter the United States, for the purpose of per-
forming skilled or unskilled labor, unless the Secretary of Labor has deter-
mined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that
(A) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally
qualified in the case of aliens who are members of the teaching profession or
who have exceptional ability in the sciences or the arts), and available at the
time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the
place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and (B)
the employment of such aliens will not adversely affect the wages and work-
ing conditions of the workers in the United States similarly employed.
840. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1982) provides:
The term "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" means the status of
having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the
United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such
status not having changed.
841. Defined at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(A) (1982). See note 829 supra.
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provision of the INA."4 2
According to Justice Douglas, as a legal permanent resident,
the aliens were not required to take up a permanent residence
within the United States but could live as commuters moving
between countries. The fact that the legal permanent resident
commuters may not have originally complied with the labor cer-
tification requirements in the INA was an acceptable possibility,
since many of the aliens were originally able to enter the United
States and obtain permanent resident status in 1964 or earlier
when a program known as the bracero program was in effect. 84 3
The Court explained that aliens under the bracero program with
Mexico were originally nonimmigrants, but many changed their
status to that of immigrants by becoming permanent
residents.
In 1965 the labor certification requirements were made
stricter by Congress.45 Justice Douglas explained: "We find in
the reports in the 1965 Act no suggestion that the commuter
program was to be uprooted in its entirety." 46 The implicit as-
sertion therefore is that these aliens maintained their immigrant
status and fell within the provision concerned with "special im-
migrants" rather than one dealing with temporary workers as
nonimmigrants.
Prior to the 1965 amendment, a nonimmigrant alien who
fulfilled all other statutory requirements was admissible unless
the Secretary of Labor had affirmatively certified there were suf-
ficient United States workers for the job sought or the Secretary
of Labor had determined the presence of the alien workers
would adversely affect United States workers. After the amend-
ment, the presumption reversed, and all aliens were assumed to
be taking a job away from United States citizens or were as-
sumed to affect adversely United States workers, unless the Sec-
842. See, e.g., § 247 of the 1952 Act, 66 Stat. 163, 218 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §
1257 (1982)), which allows for the adjusting of status of certain resident aliens to nonim-
migrant status.
843. 419 U.S. 75-76, referring to the Act of July 12, 1951, 65 Stat. 119 (establishing
an agricultural worker program), as well as 56 Stat. 1759 (agreement between United
States and Mexico of August 4, 1942, respecting the temporary migration of Mexican
agricultural workers).
844. 419 U.S. at 76.
845. Id. See Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 10, 79 Stat. 917.
846. 419 U.S. at 76 n.29.
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retary of Labor expressly certified otherwise. These provisions
were worked into the 1965 legislation. 47 The result of Saxbe is
that the Court found the commuting workers were not employed
illegally since they were "special immigrants" rather than
nonimmigrants.
2. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986
The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986
greatly affected the role of temporary foreign workers in United
States agriculture. Section 301(a) of the 1986 Act amended sec-
tion 101(a)(15)(H)(ii) to create a visa to allow for aliens to enter
the United States specifically to "perform agricultural labor or
services" while also providing for visas for aliens to enter the
United States "to perform other temporary service or labor." '
Section 301(c) of the IRCA added a new section 216 to the INA
prescribing the preconditions necessary for approval of a visa re-
quest under new section 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a). To the extent that
Saxbe involved special immigrants who were already permanent
residents in the United States, that decision's limited result is
unchanged. As Saxbe noted, the bracero program, which had
provided the basis for the Mexican workers to first enter the
United States, had lapsed by 1964.49 Seasonal or daily commut-
ers coming to the United States in pursuit of agricultural labor
now must follow the requirements under the recent legislation.
Section 302 of the IRCA has created a new category of alien sta-
tus for eligible agricultural workers which is known as lawful
temporary residence.8 0 In harmony with the Saxbe rule, the
IRCA allows alien agricultural workers who possess the status of
lawful temporary residence to commute from a residence
abroad.8 51
847. See note 839 supra. The presumption that was reversed by the 1965 amendment
appeared in the 1952 Act, 66 Stat. 183.
848. 100 Stat. 3411 (creating new subsections (ii)(a), (b) in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)
(1982)).
849. 419 U.S. 76.
850. 100 Stat. 3417, adding a new § 210 to the INA providing for lawful temporary
residence, 8 U.S.C.S. § 1160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
851. Section 302(a) of the IRCA of 1986, 100 Stat. 3417, 3418, providing a new §
210(a)(4) in the INA (8 U.S.C.S. § 1160(a)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)). See also, §
303(a) of the IRCA of 1986, 100 Stat. 3422, providing similarly for agricultural workers
who may be admitted up through 1993, in a new section 210A(d)(3) of the INA (8
1987]
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3. State Laws Banning Employment of Illegal Aliens and the
Federal Preemption Doctrine
In De Canas v. Bica,852 employers violated a California stat-
ute853 by knowingly employing aliens not "lawfully admitted to
residence in the United States '8 54 with a resulting "adverse ef-
fect on lawful resident workers."8 55 The Court held that the
state law did not violate the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution;5 ' that the field had not been preempted by
the federal INA; and that the state law was not an impermissible
attempt to regulate immigration and naturalization. The Califor-
nia statute imposed criminal penalties on "employers who know-
ingly employ aliens who have no federal right to employment
within the country. 8 57 The Court stated "the fact that aliens are
the subject of a state statute does not render it a regulation of
immigration, which is essentially a determination of who should
or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions
under which a legal entrant may remain. "858
U.S.C.S. § 1161(d)(3)(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)). Other relevant legislation affecting alien
agricultural workers appears in the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protec-
tion Act, Act of Jan. 14, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-470, 96 Stat. 2583, as amended by § 101(b)
of the IRCA of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3372.
852. 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (Brennan, J.) (Stevens, J., took no part).
853. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805(a) (West Supp. 1987) ("No employer shall knowingly em-
ploy an alien who is not entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such employ-
ment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers.").
854. 424 U.S. at 353.
855. Id. at 352, quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805(a) (West Supp. 1987).
856. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
857. 424 U.S. at 355, referring to CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805(b) (West Supp. 1987). The
federal scheme did not, at the time of De Canas decision, so provide. See § 274 of the
INA, as codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1982). This section has been significantly amended,
however, by the IRCA of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 112, 100 Stat. 3381, and § 101, 100
Stat. 3360 (creating a new § 274A of the INA, 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1987), which makes employment of unauthorized aliens illegal). See discussion below at
text accompanying note 879 infra.
858. 424 U.S. at 355. But cf. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915)(State may not
forbid employment of lawful resident alien; the Court stated that "[lit requires no argu-
ment to show that the right to work for a living . . . is of the very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to
secure."). The Court in De Canas, referred to Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), and Rich-
ardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), but these cases are distinguishable since the aliens there
were legal permanent residents. In general, the Sugarman, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), line of
cases focuses on legal permanent residents, and not aliens who are unlawfully within the
United States. Under the California statute in De Canas, however, it was possible that
additional burdens were imposed upon lawfully admitted aliens, or even citizens, who
NOTE
The Court did not find that the federal statute had pre-
empted the field. Rather, it referred to the state's broad police
powers to regulate employment. Part of the rationale it provided
was that "acceptance by illegal aliens of jobs on substandard
terms as to wages and working conditions can seriously depress
wage scales and working conditions of citizens and legally admit-
ted aliens; and employment of illegal aliens under such condi-
tions can diminish the effectiveness of labor unions." 59 The
Court also stated that there had been no showing "Congress in-
tended to preclude even harmonious state regulation touching
on aliens in general."' 0 The Court concluded that whether the
California statute conflicted with the INA would be a question
to be decided on remand.8 6 '
The Court indicated that unlike the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA), 62 Congress will not exclude any and all state
regulations "even if harmonious ' 3 with the INA, because Con-
gress did not "require national uniformity of regulation."'86 4 The
Court recognized that the then applicable version of section
274(a) of the INA865 excluded employers who hire illegal aliens
from the criminal sanctions imposed against individuals who
otherwise, harbor illegal aliens. But the Court interpreted this
provision of the INA as a "peripheral concern with employment
of illegal entrants." '6 De Canas gave the states considerable lee-
way in regulating the employment of illegal aliens. Since the
Court was uncertain as to the construction of the California stat-
ute, it remanded to the California court prior to determining
might be refused employment by being mistaken for illegal aliens. For a discussion of
Sugarman and the related cases, see text accompanying note 975 infra.
859. 424 U.S. at 356-57. But cf. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. 883 (1984), accompanying note
889 infra, which contradicts this rationale. Recent changes brought about by the IRCA
of 1986 greatly change the law on this issue.
860. 424 U.S. at 358.
861. The opinion is inconsistent with Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), which de-
cided upon a resident alien's right to work for a living.
862. Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § § 151-59
(1982), 160 (1982, Supp. II 1984, & Supp. III 1985), 161-69 (1982)).
863. 424 U.S. at 359 n.7.
864. Id.
865. 66 Stat. 228, 229, provided: "for the purposes of this section, employment (in-
cluding the usual and normal practices incident to employment) shall not be deemed to
constitute harboring." This proviso has been repealed by § 112 of the IRCA of 1986, 100
Stat. 3381. See discussion below at text accompanying note 889 infra.
866. 424 U.S. at 360 (footnote omitted).
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whether the statute could be " 'enforced without impairing the
federal superintendence of the field' covered by the INA." '
The precise holding of the Court was that the California Court
of Appeal "erred in holding that Congress in the INA precluded
any state authority to regulate the employment of illegal
aliens."""8 With the passage of the IRCA barring employment of
illegal aliens, the point of inquiry now is how far each state may
advance its laws along humanitarian lines to aid impoverished
and unemployed aliens without running afoul of the preemption
doctrine and the harsh and ungenerous policies expressed in the
recent legislation.86 9
In De Canas, the state regulation of employment of illegal
aliens was not per se preempted by federal authority. The Court
recognized that the federal government has exclusive authority
to regulate immigration, 870  and thereby acknowledged that
where Congress is constitutionally empowered, if it expressly so
desires, it may occupy the legislative field entirely.8 7' This is in
867. 424 U.S. at 363 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. at
142 (1963)). E.g., the De Canas Court pointed out employed aliens under CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 2805(a) "must be 'entitled to lawful residence'." 424 U.S. at 364. Under the INA, there
are some aliens who are not entitled to lawful permanent residence yet are entitled to be
employed, such as the new class of lawful temporary residents, in § § 301-303 of the
IRCA of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, or are entitled to other benefits. See,
e.g., Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978), and Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982),
(101(a)(15)(G)(iv) visa-holders), discussed at text accompanying note 1070 infra.
868. 424 U.S. at 356. Two cases are contrary to this result: Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52 (1941); and Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
869. See the discussion of the provisions requiring fines and possible imprisonment
for employers who hire illegal aliens, infra at text accompanying note 881.
870. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) is customarily cited for this
principle, but see the discussion of this case at text at note 73 supra. See also, Hender-
son v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876)(state may not tax aliens arriving by ship
nor require posting of enormous bonds to safeguard against such aliens becoming public
charges); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876)(similarly); Smith v. Turner (The
Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 282 (1849)(state tax on aliens arriving from a foreign
port is a regulation of foreign commerce which power is vested exclusively in Congress);
but see Mager v. Grima, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 503 (Taney, C.J.) (state may tax a French
subject residing in France on an inheritance of property even though state citizens were
not similarly taxed).
871. Cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117
(1973)(federal preemption will not occur when the federal act illustrates a congressional
intent that state policies should operate vigorously); New York Dep't of Social Services
v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973) (dicta: congressional intention to preempt state regula-
tion concerning a field in which Congress is constitutionally empowered to act may be
accomplished when Congress expresses such intention in direct and unambiguous lan-
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fact what has happened by passage of the IRCA.aT' Section
101873 of the recent legislation has made it illegal for an em-
ployer to hire an unauthorized alien or to hire an individual
without complying with various verification and identification
requirements.8 7 An unauthorized alien is defined as an individ-
ual who is neither lawfully admitted for permanent residence
nor authorized to work by any other provisions of the Act or by
the Attorney General.8 75 The new federal statute states specifi-
cally that it preempts all state laws in the field. 78 Similarly, any
state or local law purporting to regulate the admissibility of tem-
porary nonimmigrant workers has been preempted by express
language in the new section 216(h)(2) of the INA. '" Admissibil-
ity of these workers is regulated by the federal scheme estab-
lished in the new section 216 of the INA and the amended sec-
tion 214 of the INA. 78
guage); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963)(federal standard
concerning sale of out-of-state avocados in California does not displace a more stringent
California standard since it was not impossible for the two regulatory schemes to coexist
and there was no indication Congress intended to preempt the field); Schwartz v. Texas,
344 U.S. 199 (1952) (absent clear congressional intention to act in the field, a federal
statute making intercepted telephone conversations inadmissible in evidence will not bar
the introduction of that evidence into a state criminal proceeding); California v. Zook,
336 U.S. 725 (1949) (dicta: congressional purpose to displace compatible state law must
be clearly manifested for preemption to occur); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218 (1947)(when Congress exercises one of its powers and expressly preempts state regu-
lation, even state laws which merely seek to supplement the federal regulation are
displaced).
872. Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359.
873. 100 Stat. 3360 (inserting a new § 274A into the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (Law. Co-
op Supp. 1987)).
874. See § 274A(a)(1), and § 274A(b), contained in § 101 of the IRCA of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3360. This effectively repealed the former proviso in § 274 (8
U.S.C. § 1324 (1982)), which allowed employers under the federal scheme to hire illegal
aliens.
875. Section 274A(h)(3), contained in § 101 of the IRCA of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603,
100 Stat. 3368.
876. Section 274A(h)(2), contained in § 101 of the IRCA of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603,
100 Stat. 3368 states that "[tihe provisions of this section preempt any state or local law
imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon
those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens."
877. Added by § 301(c) of the IRCA of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3416.
878. Section 214(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c) (1982), was amended by § 301(b)
of the IRCA of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3411.
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4. Nullification of the Right of Illegal Aliens to Unionize
By section 274A of the INA, 78 the employment of unautho-
rized aliens 880 was made unlawful. An employer can be subjected
to fines ranging from $250 to $10,000 or imprisonment for up to
6 months for a violation resulting from the employment of illegal
or unauthorized aliens.88' Section 274A does not provide for new
penalties against an unauthorized alien who is found working in
the United States.8 2 Indeed, nowhere in the new IRCA are com-
parable penalties prescribed against an individual alien who
works in the United States without proper authorization, other
than against the fraud or perjury which the unauthorized alien
may commit by falsely using documentation or giving false at-
testations as to his eligibility to work in the United States. 3
The penalties against an unauthorized alien who works in the
United States remain what they were under the former immigra-
tion scheme-primarily deportation.8 " Although the IRCA cre-
ates a new class of aliens authorized to work in the United
States, who are known as temporary legal residents,8 5 those
879. This section was added to the INA by § 101 of the IRCA of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-603, 100 Stat. 3360.
880. For a description of what constitutes an unauthorized alien, see text and accom-
panying notes starting at notes 873-75 supra.
881. See § 274A(e)(4)(A)(i-iii)(fines), § 274A(f)(1)(criminal penalty), as added by 100
Stat. 3366, 3367 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § § 1324a(e)(4)(A)(i-iii), (f)(1)(Law. Co-op Supp.
1987), respectively). See also § 274A(b)(2)(employer, recruiter, or other individual may
be subject to penalty for perjury for falsely attesting alien is authorized to be employed),
as added by 100 Stat. 3362 (codified at 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a(b)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1987)).
882. Section 274A(b)(2) (codified at 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a(b)(2)(Law. Co-op. Supp.
987)), provides for enforcing the penalty against perjury against someone who makes a
false attestation, but this subsection appears to apply against the "person or entity [who]
must attest . . . that it has verified that the individual [seeking employment] is not an
unauthorized alien" as expressed in § 274A(b)(1)(A) (8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a(b)(1)(A)(Law.
Co-op Supp. 1987)). In other words, the penalty provided for in § 274A(b)(2) applies
against the employer.
883. See, e.g., § 103 of the IRCA of 1986, amending 18 U.S.C. 1546 (1982).
884. The general penalty provisions in existence before passage of the IRCA can be
found in § § 271-280 of the INA, (codified at 8 U.S.C. § § 1322-1330 (1982)). For an
illustration that deportation can immediately follow, see Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S.
883, 887 (1984), discussed at text accompanying note 889 infra.
885. Section 201 of the IRCA, 100 Stat. 3394, adding § 245A to the INA (codified at 8
U.S.C.S. § 1255a(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)). Section 245A(a) creates a temporary resident
status. One of the requirements under this section is that the alien "entered the United
States before January 1, 1982, and that he has resided continuously in the United States
in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed under
NOTE
aliens working in the United States who do not fall within this
new categorization or any other authorized category, remain ex-
actly what their ancestors under the former version of the INA
were-illegal aliens.
The Act does not fully address whether the rights of illegal
aliens are diminished, in some areas, in comparison with their
rights under preexisting law. For example, Sure-Tan, Inc. v.
NLRB858 held that the NLRA887 applied to unfair labor practices
committed against illegal aliens and that illegal aliens have a
right to unionize in the United States. In Sure-Tan, the em-
ployer was found to have committed an unfair labor practice
when he notified the INS some of his employees were illegal
aliens in retaliation against their participation in union activi-
ties. Under the new labor environment created by the IRCA,
employers operate under a great disincentive to hire illegal
aliens. If the employer sanctions in the IRCA are not actively
enforced, employers will lose this disincentive. External factors
existing outside the United States, such as heightened violence
in other countries,888 or worsening economies, may still propel
illegal aliens to come to the United States and descend more
deeply underground than has yet been observed. To the extent
that third countries, such as Canada, do not recieve this flow of
illegal aliens, these aliens may consider the risk and hardship in
the United States under the new law an acceptable alternative
when compared with what would await them at home. In other
words, there may still be a pool of illegal aliens in the United
States after the IRCA, although the disincentives against their
continued presence in the United States, at least on paper, are
stronger than at any time in United States history. This new
subclass, as all people, will have to seek food and shelter and
this subsection." An alien who has gained temporary residence is on an expedited route
toward gaining lawful permanent residence under § 245A(b) (8 U.S.C.S. § 1255a(b)(Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1987)), whereas an alien who attempted to comply with the pre-existing
law from January 1, 1982 to 1986 by obtaining a legal status in the United States, even if
on a temporary visitor's visa, is penalized for his efforts to comply with the law by being
ineligible for the new benefits. Such an alien is not, by the language of § 245A(a)(2) (8
U.S.C.S. § 1255a(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)), eligible to have his status adjusted to
that of a lawful temporary resident.
886. 467 U.S. 893 (1984), discussed at text accompanying note 889 infra.
887. Full cite appears at note 862 supra.
888. See, e.g., note 419 supra describing conditions in El Salvador.
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therefore employment. To those employers who find that the
IRCA is not a strong disincentive when weighed against
whatever perceived benefits they see in employment of illegal
aliens, the two groups will find a complementing need and use
for each other. Should this happen, the issue will then arise as to
the continuing validity, if any, of the Sure-Tan decision.
a. The Sure-Tan Decision
In Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,88 ' an employer reported undocu-
mented alien employees to the INS in retaliation for their efforts
to unionize. The Court held that the employer had violated the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 890 by discharging the ille-
gal aliens but did not support the court of appeal's award of
back pay to the aliens. The Court reasoned that the NLRA ap-
plied to "unfair labor practices committed against undocu-
mented aliens."89' The Court also considered that to include the
undocumented aliens within the definition of "employees" in the
NLRA protects and encourages "the collective-bargaining pro-
cess" 892 while maintaining the wage level of United States citi-
zens. The result in Sure-Tan was designed to avoid the creation
of a subclass of unprotected workers.
The Court also discovered no conflict between the INA and
the NLRA concerning undocumented aliens. At the time of the
decision, the INA specifically exempted employment of aliens
from the prohibition against the harboring of aliens in section
274(a) of the INA. 893 Under that proviso it was not a crime for
the employer to hire them and it was not a crime for them to
accept the work. The entire relationship was therefore not ille-
gal.894 This has now been changed by the IRCA of 1986 which
889. 467 U.S. 883 (1984) (O'Connor, J.) (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, JJ.,
concurring in part, and dissenting in part)(Powell J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part, joined by Rehnquist, J.). See generally: Young, NLRA Protects Illegal Alien Work-
ers, 70 A.B.A.J. 170 (Oct. 1984); Comment, Immigration Law-Labor-Undocumented
Aliens are Protected by the National Labor Relations Act, 9 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. J.
195 (1985).
890. Full cite appears at note 862 supra.
891. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 891.
892. Id. at 892.
893. 66 Stat. 228, 229 (formerly codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982)), amended by §
112 of the IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3381. See note 865 supra.
894. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 893.
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makes the employer's participation in the relationship illegal.895
The Sure-Tan decision was also based upon the consideration
that "Congress has not made it a separate criminal offense for
an alien to accept employment after entering this country
illegally."89
Under the IRCA, it is now true that an employer may not
knowingly employ an illegal alien8 97 nor continue the employ-
ment of an unauthorized alien once the employer learns the in-
dividual is present in the United States in violation of the immi-
gration laws. 98 Under the NLRA, the employer's motivation for
dismissing employees has been closely scrutinized even where
the employer can lay a claim that the dismissal occurred in or-
der to comply with the law rather than to punish union member-
ship. 99 But even an otherwise lawful act by the employer in this
regard will run afoul of the NLRA when the employer's efforts
to comply with the law are nothing more than a transparent at-
tempt to destroy the union.9 0 In Sure-Tan, it was clear on the
facts that the employer's only purpose in calling the INS to have
his employees deported was to break the union.901 Following the
rule in Sure-Tan in the post-IRCA world, an employer who se-
lectively observes section 274A(a)(2)'s requirement by firing ille-
gal aliens who support union efforts while knowingly keeping in
his employment those illegal aliens who oppose unionization
would violate the NLRA. The employer's option is either to fire
all the illegal aliens or to keep them all. Since the penalties pro-
vided by the IRCA against the employer can become rather ex-
895. See the discussion at text accompanying note 879 supra.
896. 467 U.S. at 893. See also, 119 CONG. REc. 14,184 (1973)(remarks by Rep.
Dennis).
897. Section 274A(a)(1)(A) of the INA, as added by § 101 of the IRCA of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3360 (codified at 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1987)).
898. Section 274A(a)(2) of the INA (8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1987)).
899. Cf. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983)(employer
must bear the risk that the confluence of his legal and illegal motives in discharging an
employee cannot be separated).
900. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
901. The employer in Sure-Tan knew about the employees' illegal status for months,
but did not notify the INS until the union was certain to win the organization election.
467 U.S. at 895.
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pensive and lead to imprisonment, 90 2 doubtlessly the employer
will decide to fire the illegal employees. Firing them is a far dif-
ferent result from reporting them to the INS to face deporta-
tion. There is no requirement under section 274A(a)(2) that the
employer who must discontinue the employment of illegal aliens
must also turn them into the INS. An employer who does so in
retaliation against his employees' pro-union efforts is very likely
exhibiting the degree of anti-union animus which the rule in
Sure-Tan prohibited. Following Sure-Tan and the IRCA of
1986, an employer can fire an illegal alien employee, who is a
union member, and not run afoul of the NLRA when the em-
ployer's motivation is not solely one of anti-union animus.
Should the disgruntled employer, in the process, call the INS, he
is doing more than the IRCA requires and more than Sure-Tan
permits.
The passage of the IRCA of 1986 sharpens the conflict be-
tween immigration and national labor policies. The existence of
these competing policies is analogous to other situations which
the Court has already addressed, such as where the require-
ments of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,903 have con-
flicted with NLRA provisions that would otherwise uphold a col-
lective bargaining agreement. In W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local
Union 759904 precisely this type of conflict arose when an em-
ployer agreed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC)9 °5 to keep women strike replacements despite
the fact that in doing so, the company was in violation of the
seniority provisions of its collective bargaining agreement with
an existing union. Collective bargaining agreements are the fa-
vored child of the NLRA.906 In W.R. Grace, a conflict arose be-
tween a collective bargaining agreement that the NLRA would
promote and an EEOC order to alleviate sex-based discrimina-
tion that the Civil Rights Act disallowed. In W.R. Grace, the
Court required the employer to assume both liabilities by paying
902. Section 274A(e)(4) of the INA (8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a(e)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1987)).
903. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (current version at 42
U.S.C. § § 2000e-2000e-17 (1982)).
904. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
905. The EEOC operates under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
See note 903 supra.
906. See, e.g., § § 7 and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § § 157, 158(a)(3) (1982).
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monetary damages to the men who were laid off in violation of
their collective bargaining agreement, while also following the
requirements of the EEOC by maintaining employment of the
requisite number of women.
By analogy, an employer caught between the INA and the
NLRA would incur liability under both statutory schemes. This
includes civil fines and criminal penalties now imposed by the
INA as well as satisfaction of union and employee rights under
the NLRA. Satisfaction of the unionized employees' rights in
W.R. Grace came in the form of monetary damages rather than
reinstatement to their jobs. Justice O'Connor, in Sure-Tan, how-
ever, specifically barred a monetary award to the deported illegal
alien employees. Therefore, the relief W.R. Grace contemplated
is unavailable to illegal aliens under the Sure-Tan rationale.
Since the IRCA makes it unlawful for an employer to continue
the employment of an alien once he knows the alien to be ille-
gally present in the United States, 0 the only relief the Sure-
Tan opinion offered the illegal alien employee appears to have
been abolished. The tiny foothold which the illegal alien had
only recently obtained in the United States workforce has been
eliminated by the IRCA.
This is an unfortunate development since the Sure-Tan
Court based its decision on a number of persuasive considera-
tions. For example, the Court considered that unionizing illegal
aliens would serve to protect American workers since the lower
wage pool of illegal aliens is absorbed into the general wage pool.
Since all employees must be paid the same, there is no incentive
to try to beat the union by hiring illegal aliens.90 These consid-
erations remain true despite passage of the IRCA. Lacking such
incentive on the part of the employer, the illegal alien may
therefore lose his inducement, to some extent, to come to the
United States. 09 The same effect may now have been achieved
by the IRCA, but at the risk of creating an underground sub-
class of illegal aliens in the United States who will fear the law
more deeply than ever before and thereby be subjected to
907. Section 274A(a)(2) of the INA, as added by § 101 of the IRCA (codified at 8
U.S.C.S. § 1324a(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)).
908. 467 U.S. at 893.




The Sure-Tan Court conditioned the employer's necessary
"offers of reinstatement on the employees' legal reentry" 911 into
the United States in order to avoid a conflict between the INA
and the NLRA. Justice Brennan's concurrence took exception to
the Court's remedy in an opinion that would have sent the ille-
gal aliens in Mexico monetary damages in order to penalize the
employer for his anti-union animus. The concurrence espoused a
practical implementation of the majority's finely-crafted solu-
tion. Without Justice Brennan's insistence on a monetary award
to the aliens, regardless of the aliens' absence from the United
States, the employer has little incentive not to repeat union-
busting activities. However, the Court considered that the one-
time employees were "'unavailable' for work"9"' by virtue of de-
portation and therefore ineligible for back pay during the time
period when they were "not lawfully entitled to be present and
employed in the United States.191 3 One rationale for an award of
back pay is to make whole an individual who has been illegally
discharged and is unable to find a new job. Sure-Tan did not
consider whether the alien employees were unsuccessful in their
efforts to obtain employment in Mexico.
b. Employee Verification: Authorization and Identification
The IRCA makes it unlawful to employ an individual with-
out complying with certain paperwork requirements contained
in section 274A(b) which establishes an employment verification
system. 4 If an employer refuses to comply with the verification
system, he or she can be forced into compliance by an order 1 '
910. For an extreme example of hostility which some foreign laborers have received,
and the need to protect such foreigners under the aegis of the law, see Allee v. Medrano,
416 U.S. 802 (1974).
911. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 903.
912. Id.
913. Id.
914. Section 101 of the IRCA, 100 Stat. 3361 (adding a new § 274A(b) to the INA (8
U.S.C.S. § 1324a(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987))). This system provides the means by
which an individual can establish that he or she is authorized to work in the United
States, § 274A(b)(1)(A),(B), and (C) (8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a(b)(1)(A), (B), and (C) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1987)), and the means by which the individual may establish his identity, §
274A(b)(1)(A),(B), and (D) (8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a(b)(1)(A), (B), and (D) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1987)).
915. Section 274A(e)(4)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a(e)(4)(B) (Law. Co-op.
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issued by an administrative law judge." ' The employment verifi-
cation system provides that five types of documents can be used
to establish an individual's identity and authorization to work. 1'
These documents are: (1) a United States passport; (2) a certifi-
cate of United States citizenship; (3) a certificate of naturaliza-
tion; (4) an unexpired foreign passport if properly endorsed by
the Attorney General to authorize employment; or (5) a resident
alien card or alien registration card which meets certain other
requirements sufficient to identify the bearer of the card as au-
thorized to work in the United States. Those native born citi-
zens who do not possess these documents do not qualify under
section 274A(b)(1)(B)'s documentary employment eligibility ver-
ification requirements. Under section 274A(b)(1)(A)(ii), 1 8 these
individuals must produce two documents to establish employ-
ment eligibility. First, under section 274A(b)(1)(C) they must
produce one of three documents to establish work authoriza-
tion-either (1) a social security card; (2) a birth certificate; or
(3) other documentation which the Attorney General prescribes.
Under section 274A(b)(1)(D), these people must also produce ei-
ther a driver's license or other document used for identification
purposes by a state containing a photograph of the holder or
other personal identification information which the Attorney
General approves. 99 It is not difficult to imagine the case of a
native born citizen who possesses neither a United States pass-
port nor a driver's license who is thereby technically barred from
employment in the United States. In the case of minors under
16 who do not have a driver's license and who live in a state
which issues no other type of identification documents, the At-
torney General may intervene by regulations to provide for a
system of identifying such individuals.92 '0 Although the Act spe-
Supp. 1987)).
916. Section 274A(e)(3)(C) of the INA (8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a(e)(3)(C) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1987))
917. Section 274A(b)(1)(B)(i-iv) of the INA (8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a(b)(1)(B)(i-iv) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1987)).
918. 100 Stat. 3361 (codified at 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a(b)(1)(A)(ii)(Law. Co-op. Supp.
1987)).
919. Section 274A(b)(1)(D)(i) of the INA (8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a(b)(1)(D)(i) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1987)).




cifically provides that it is not to be read as authorizing a na-
tional identification card system,92' the message is clear that for
purposes of identifying those individuals, including native born
citizens, as authorized to work in the United States, if the states
do not provide the system, the Attorney General will. The state
driver's license or similar identification card must conform to
the Attorney General's requirements.2 2 The identification re-
quirements for minors also must conform to the Attorney Gen-
eral's specifications. 23 Both the employer and the employee
must swear under penalty of perjury on forms provided by the
Attorney General that the employee is authorized to be em-
ployed in the United States.2 4
The Act provides indirectly for federal oversight as to the
identity and work authorization of all people in the United
States. Although the Act states that it does not purport to au-
thorize a national identification card system, it does contemplate
that in the future the President may recommend a "major
change" in the employment verification system that would, fol-
lowing two years notice and congressional review, achieve pre-
cisely this result.2 5 A national identification card system would
expand federal involvement into the lives of individuals in a way
never before experienced by the states and citizenry. The IRCA
additionally authorizes a study of the feasibility of a computer-
ized telephonic employment eligibility system.2 6 The statute
limits the uses to which personalized information collected in a
nationwide employee verification system could legally be put.92
The inclusion of these limitations in the IRCA indicates already
the potential for abuse which the system invites, including mis-
use of personal information by other "Government agencies, em-
ployers, and other persons" beyond what is required to "verify
921. Section 274A(c) of the INA, 100 Stat. 3363 (codified at 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a(c)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)).
922. Section 274A(b)(1)(D)(i) of the INA, 100 Stat. 3362 (8 U.S.C.S. §
1324a(b)(1)(D)(i) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)).
923. Section 274A(b)(1)(D)(ii).
924. Section 274A(b)(1)(A), (b)(2).
925. Section 274A(d)(3)(D)(i), 100 Stat. 3365 (8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a(d)(3)(D) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1987)) (allowing for creation by the federal government of a new card or docu-
ment designed specifically for the employee verification system).
926. Section 101(d) of the IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3373.
927. See, e.g., § 274A(d)(2)(C-F) of the INA, added by 100 Stat. 3364 (8 U.S.C.S. §
1324a(d)(2)(C-F) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)).
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that an individual is not an unauthorized alien";925 violations of
individual privacy; " denial of employment eligibility by any of
the parties involved, such as government officials or employers,
for reasons "other than that the employee or prospective em-
ployee is an unauthorized alien";930 and use by law enforcement
officials for purposes other than enforcement of the INA or vari-
ous proscriptions concerning fraudulent use or procurement of
identification documents.931 The basic issue, through this litany
of prospective abuses, remains, as ever, the amount of individual
freedom the average citizen is willing to sacrifice to facilitate
achievement of immigration policies that are vague and unclear.
The IRCA allows for the termination of employer sanc-
tions" by 19908-1 if the Comptroller General finds the system
results in "a widespread pattern of discrimination . ..against
citizens or nationals of the United States or against eligible
workers seeking employment." ' The termination of employer
sanctions would dispense with the need for a national identifica-
tion card system. Through this indirect route, the path remains
open to place United States citizens on the same legal footing
they possessed before passage of the IRCA, and closer toward
the goal expressed in the Supreme Court's general observation
that "[iut requires no argument to show that the right to work
for a living . . . is of the very essence of. . .personal freedom
and opportunity.""9 5
5. Federal Protection of Domestic Workers
In a case decided between De Canas and Sure-Tan, Puerto
Rico brought suit as parens patriae on behalf of its residents
against various east coast apple growers and related parties who
928. Section 274A(d)(2)(C) of the INA, added by 100 Stat. 3364, (8 U.S.C.S. §
1324a(d)(2)(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)).
929. Section 274A(d)(2)(D), 100 Stat. 3364.
930. Section 274A(d)(2)(E).
931. Section 274A(d)(2)(F).
932. Section 274A(l) of the INA, as added by § 101(a) of the IRCA, 100 Stat. 3370 (8
U.S.C.S. § 1324a(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)).
933. Section 274AUj) of the INA specifies "one year [after] three years after" enact-
ment of the IRCA, which occurred in 1986 (8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a(j) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1987)), as added by § 101(a) of the IRCA, 100 Stat. 3370.
934. Section 274A(l)(1)(A), as added by § 101 of the IRCA, 100 Stat. 3370.
935. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
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refused to employ Puerto Rican workers when there was a
shortage of help to pick apples and who hired Jamaican workers
instead. In Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel.
Barez,936 the Court considered the Wagner-Peyser Act,9 " which
required employers to recruit nationwide, including Puerto Rico,
before hiring aliens,"3 8 in order to comply with the INA's allow-
ance of visas for temporary workers from abroad.9 39 Under the
INA, no alien may enter the United States with a temporary-
worker visa unless the Secretary of Labor certifies that there is a
shortage of United States citizens to do the job, and that the
employment of the alien will not adversely affect domestic labor-
ers." ' In this regard, the Jamaican workers were not legally eli-
gible for the apple-picking jobs until the Puerto Rican workers
were first employed.
Under the Wagner-Peyser Act, Puerto Rico is considered a
"state"941 and had a "quasi-sovereign 9 42 interest in bringing
suit. It thereby possessed the necessary interest required in or-
936. 458 U.S. 592 (1982) (White, J.) (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.) (Powell, J., took no part). See generally, Young, States...
Parens Patriae Role, 68 A.B.A.J. 1492 (1982); Note, Civil Procedure-the Right of a
State to Sue as Parens Patriae, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 471 (1983).
937. Act of June 6, 1933, 48 Stat. 113 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § § 49-491-1
(1982)) (federal employment service).
938. The requirements of recruiting nationwide for available United States workers
(including Puerto Ricans) before recruiting foreign workers, is delineated by a combina-
tion of statutory specifications and regulations. Under § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii) of the INA, 66
Stat. 168, as amended by § 301(a) of the IRCA of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3411 (8 U.S.C.S. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)) no foreign worker is
permitted an H-2 temporary-worker visa unless "unemployed persons capable of per-
forming such services or labor cannot be found in this country." Nationwide recruitment
is provided for by rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to
authority granted by 29 U.S.C. § 49k (1982).
939. Section 101(a)(15)(H)(ii) of the INA, 66 Stat. 168 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(15)(H)(ii) (1982), as amended by Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, §
301(a), 100 Stat. 3411), provides for visas for temporary workers from abroad. The
amendments of 1986 created two subtypes to the old (H)(ii) designation, (H)(ii)(a) and
(ii)(b). The new (H)(ii)(a) visas are directly concerned with foreign agricultural workers.
The issue in Alfred devolved upon Puerto Rico's ability to bring suit as parens patriae
where foreign workers were employed without the proper (H)(ii) visas.
940. Section 212(a)(14) of the INA, 66 Stat. 183 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(14) (1982)). See note 839 supra.
941. 29 U.S.C. § 49a(5) (1982), 96 Stat. 1392. At the time of the Alfred L. Snapp
decision the Act of Sept. 8, 1950, ch. 933, 64 Stat. 822, amending Act of June 6, 1933, ch.
49, 48 Stat. 113, 114, placed this definition at 29 U.S.C. § 49b(b).
942. 458 U.S. at 602, 607.
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der to bring a parens patriae action. The "quasi-sovereign" in-
terest existed in Puerto Rico's concern over the "health and
well-being-both physical and economic-of its residents in gen-
eral,"9 83 as well as its interest "in not being discriminately de-
nied its rightful status within the federal system."94 4 Under
Snapp, it is clear the labor protection offered United States citi-
zens as well as residents of Puerto Rico will be enforced against
a private employer who tries to circumvent the federal labor
scheme by employing unauthorized foreign laborers.
A private employer may still possess considerable leeway in
making decisions concerning the composition of his workforce.
In Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co.,94 5 a lawfully admitted
resident alien married to a United States citizen was refused em-
ployment by a private manufacturer on the basis of her nonci-
tizenship.9" The company refused to employ aliens. 4 Making a
Title VII claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,948 the woman
asserted she had been discriminated against on the proscribed
basis of "national origin." According to Justice Marshall, the
ban against discrimination on the basis of national origin does
not bar distinctions based upon lack of United States citizen-
ship.949 He equated national origin with ancestry, 5 ° rather than
with citizenship. He also referred to the then established federal
practice of "discrimination against aliens by denying them the
right to enter competitive examination for federal employ-
ment." 951 This rationale, however, has conceivably evaporated
since the decision in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,95 2 where the
Court held that the Civil Service Commission could not discrim-
inate on the basis of alienage in its hiring practices. Coupled
943. Id. at 607.
944. Id.
945. 414 U.S. 86 (1972) (Marshall, J.) (Douglas, J. dissenting). See generally, Note,
Title VII, United States Citizenship, and American National Origin, 60 N.Y.U.L.Rav.
245 (1985).
946. 414 U.S. at 87.
947. Id.
948. Section 703 of Title VII, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) (1982)) (forbidding employment discrimination on the basis of "race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin").
949. 414 U.S. at 88 n.2.
950. 414 U.S. at 89.
951. Id.
952. 426 U.S. 88 (1976), discussed in text accompanying note 1105 infra.
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with the federal scheme as expressed in the Civil Rights Act
which prohibits hiring practices that discriminate on the basis of
national origin, the suggestion readily arises that permanent res-
ident aliens are protected under the law from discriminatory
practices of private employers.
The Court held, however, thai Espinoza, the alien, had been
permissibly denied employment because of her lack of citizen-
ship rather than on the basis of her national origin. The Court
observed that other employees at the plant, although citizens of
the United States, were of Mexican ancestry, as was Espinoza."'
The Court stated that "nothing in the Act makes it illegal to
discriminate on the basis of citizenship or alienage." 954 The
Court did recognize, however, that aliens, as all individuals, are
protected from illegal discrimination under the Civil Rights Act,
such as discrimination based on race, color, religion, or sex. But,
according to Justie Marshall, discrimination on the basis of citi-
zenship is not illegal and is not equivalent to prohibited discrim-
ination on the basis of national origin.
Justice Douglas's dissent relied upon Griffiths 55 and
Sugarman.95 These cases were decided upon the basis of state
involvement with forbidden discrimination. Espinoza involved
discrimination on the basis of alienage by a private employer.
The Espinoza Court did not attempt to find state involvement
in the private employer's discrimination. But Justice Douglas'
point is well-taken that if states are not permitted to discrimi-
nate on the basis of citizenship, it is difficult to read a federal
statute banning employment discrimination on the basis of na-
tional origin as not similarly extending protection to aliens. Jus-
tice Douglas also cited the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's position that "discrimination on the basis of alien-
age always has the effect of discrimination on the basis of na-
tional origin."9 ' The majority of the Court, however, was unable
to agree with this conclusion.
Espinoza has been legislatively overruled by passage of the
953. 414 U.S. at 93.
954. Id. at 95.
955. 413 U.S. 717 (1973), discussed in text accompanying note 984 infra.
956. 413 U.S. 634 (1973), discussed in text accompanying note 989 infra.
957. 414 U.S. at 97.
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IRCA of 1986. Section 274B(a)(1)(A) 951 prohibits discrimination
with respect to hiring practices based upon national origin or
citizenship status, unless the person receiving the discrimination
is an illegal alien. An employer may, however, hire a citizen
ahead of an alien if the two candidates are equally qualified. 9
Congress appropriately included such provisions to assuage fears
of many ethnic groups that their members, although citizens of
the United States or otherwise lawfully present in the United
States, would face difficulties finding employment under the new
ban against employing unauthorized aliens because their mem-
bers otherwise appeared to be foreigners. Indeed, the IRCA's
provision allowing for termination of employer sanctions by 1990
is a prudent consideration which would eliminate these potential
difficulties."'
B. State Discrimination Against Aliens
State discrimination against resident aliens has been upheld
in numerous Supreme Court opinions. For example, state bans
on ownership of real property by resident aliens ineligible to be
naturalized have been enforced except when such prohibitions
simultaneously discriminate against a citizen's ancestry."' State
958. As added to the INA by § 102 of the IRCA of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3374 (codified at 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)). The new section provides
three exceptions to the rule, contained in § 274B(a)(2)(A-C), 100 Stat. 3374 (8 U.S.C.S. §
1324b(a)(2)(A-C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)). Section 274B(a)(2)(C) permits discrimina-
tion on the basis of citizenship status when an employer is otherwise required to do so by
federal, state, or local government requirements.
The legislative history states:
Since Title VII does not provide any protection against employment discrimina-
tion based on alienage or non-citizen status, the Committee is of the view that
the instant legislation must do so. ...
To accomplish this objective, the bill makes it an "unfair immigration-re-
lated employment practice" to discriminate with respect to hiring, firing, recruit-
ment or referral for a fee based on national origin or citizenship status.
H.R. REP. No. 682(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 70, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5649, 5674.
959. Section 274B(a)(4) of the INA, 100 Stat. 3375 (codified at 8 U.S.C.S. §
1324b(a)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)).
960. Section 274A(l) of the INA, added by § 101 of the IRCA, 100 Stat. 3370 (codi-
fied at 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a(l) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)).
961. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948)(unconstitutional discrimination exists
where state statutory scheme presumes a conveyance of land to a minor citizen who is a
child of a resident alien ineligible to be naturalized is for the purpose of evading a state
law prohibiting land ownership by such aliens; the presumption impermissibly discrimi-
746 HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL [Vol. IV
laws prohibiting leasing of farmland and indirect forms of con-
trol of land by aliens who failed to declare an intention to be
naturalized or who were ineligible to be naturalized have been
left undisturbed by Supreme Court opinions even though such
aliens may have been residing permanently within the United
States.9 62 States have freely exercised a power to discriminate
between aliens who declared an intention to become citizens and
those who did not.9" Recent federal legislation has stamped its
imprimatur upon this distinction for the limited purposes of
safeguarding certain lawfully present "intending citizens" from
nates on the basis of a citizen's ancestry and deprives the citizen of equal protection of
law where there is no compelling state justification otherwise necessary to sustain the
discrimination); but cf. Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258 (1925) (when the conveyance
is paid for by an ineligible alien and the land is held by an unrelated third party, a
presumption that the transfer was for the purpose of evading a state law prohibiting
ineligible aliens from owning or having an interest in agricultural land is constitutionally
permissible and the state law requiring escheat of the property to the state will be
upheld).
962. See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 219 (1923) (land owner is not deprived
of due process nor equal protection under the fourteenth amendment where United
States citizens were forbidden by state law and state constitution from renting real prop-
erty to Japanese resident aliens who had not declared an intention to naturalize upon
penalty of such property escheating to the state; state may restrict land ownership to
"citizens, and aliens who may, and who intend to, become citizens, and who in good faith
have made the declaration required by the naturalization laws"); Porterfield v. Webb,
263 U.S. 225 (1923) (state may bar resident aliens ineligible to receive United States
citizenship from leasing land and under this restriction, ineligible aliens do not have a
claim for violation of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment even though
aliens eligible to become United States citizens may rent land); Webb v. O'Brien, 263
U.S. 313 (1923) (since the Treaty between the United States and Japan of 1911, 37 Stat.
1504-1509, did not explicitly grant ineligible Japanese resident aliens the right to use or
to have the benefit of land for sharecropping purposes, it was not a violation of the
fourteenth amendment for a state to pass legislation expressly proscribing such activity);
Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923) (state statute may prohibit aliens who are ineligible
to be naturalized from holding stock in a corporation which owns farmland).
963. For example, in Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 218, it was stated: "For-
merly in many States the right to vote and hold office was extended to declarants, and
many important offices have been held by them. But these rights have not been granted
to nondeclarants." In the same opinion, the Court justified the basis for this
discrimination:
The alien's formally declared bona fide intention to renounce forever all alle-
giance and fidelity to the sovereignty to which he has lately been a subject, and
to become a citizen of the United States and permanently to reside therein
markedly distinguishes him from an ineligible alien or an eligible alien who has
not so declared.
Terrace, 263 U.S. 197, 219 (footnote omitted). See also Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621
(1904)(state may require out-of-state individuals to declare intention to become citizens
and residents of the state in order to vote).
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discrimination in the work force based on national origin or lack
of citizenship status. 64
It was recognized early in the United States that aliens, at
common law, could purchase land or take it by act of the gran-
tor, although they could not receive land through descent nor by
such other comparable operation of law. Under the commmon
law, the alien could exercise complete dominion over such prop-
erty subject to seizure by the sovereign state." 5 The existence of
an applicable treaty between the United States and the country
of the alien's origin will supplant state legislation or common
law, and has occasionally extended greater rights to the nonresi-
dent alien who has a claim to property in the United States. 6
Such treaties usually have been directed toward establishment
of reciprocal rights in the nationals of each contracting country.
It is of relatively recent vintage that aliens have been recognized
to possess a right sounding in the Constitution to exploit the
natural resources found within the geographic boundaries of a
particular state.96 7 Blanket provisions by the state proscribing
964. Section 102 of the IRCA of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, added a new § 274B to the
INA (codified at 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324b (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)). Section 274B(a)(3)(B)(ii)
includes as part of the definition of an intending citizen, an alien who "evidences an
intention to become a citizen of the United States through completing a declaration of
an intention to become a citizen." The other requirements alluded to in the text are that
the "intending citizen" possesses the status of either a lawful permanent or temporary
resident, a refugee under § 207 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1982), or an asylee under §
208 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982). These requirements appear in § 274B(a)(3)(B)(i)
of the INA as added by § 102(a) of the IRCA of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603. In this regard,
cf. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977), discussed in text accompanying note 1011 infra
where the aliens refused to declare an intention to become United States citizens.
965. See Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 379, 388-89 (1813)
(Story, J.); Phillips v. Moore, 100 U.S. 208 (1879).
966. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879) (where a treaty so provides, an alien
heir from one of the contracting countries can be granted the right to proceeds from the
sale of real property located in the United States when it escheated to the state following
the death of an owner whose only surviving heirs were aliens); Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S.
(2 Wheat.) 124 (1817) (Marshall, C.J.) (the incapacity of aliens to receive land by descent
can be removed by treaty). See also, Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333 (1901)(absent the
existence of a treaty, a state could, through its own legislation, allow aliens to hold real
property within its borders).
967. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (state statute
prohibiting the issuance of commercial fishing license to aliens ineligible to receive
United States citizenship violates fourteenth amendment's equal protection require-
ment); but see Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914) (Holmes, J.) (state statute
prohibiting unnaturalized foreign born residents from hunting wild game within the
state, and to that end, from possessing a shotgun or rifle, does not offend the fourteenth
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employment of noncitizens by private employers have similarly
foundered on constitutional shoals, although there are a signifi-
cant number of exceptions to this rule. 68 The existence of an
applicable treaty will also extend limited rights to even nonresi-
dent enemy aliens who advance a claim to real property located
within a state.9 69 More recently, similar protection has been pro-
vided to claims concerning personalty despite the absence of an
applicable treaty provision where to allow otherwise would sim-
ply invite too great an interference by a state in the regulation
of foreign affairs. 70
A reverse of this trend toward expansion of alien rights in
relation to the state can be noted concerning alien suffrage. Ac-
cording to one commentator, any claim to such a right appears
to have been totally extinguished by 1928, '1 but the right had
been previously recognized in a surprisingly large number of
states and territories.17  The reason behind giving aliens the
amendment); see also McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) (State of Virginia can
restrict oyster cultivation in its waters to citizens of Virginia, excluding citizens of other
states, without violating the privileges and immunities clause of art. IV, § 2, nor the
commerce clause of art. I, § 8).
968. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915)(state may not require private employers to
discriminate against noncitizen employees); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
369(1886)(fourteenth amendment applies equally to both citizens and aliens in the
United States); but see Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927)(state, through a city
ordinance, could prohibit a noncitizen from operating a pool hall); Heim v. McCall, 239
U.S. 175 (1915)(state could require by statute that only citizens of the United States
could be employed on public works projects); Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195
(1915)(state may make violation of its prohibition against employing noncitizens on pub-
lic projects a misdemeanor).
969. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947)(state resident's testamentary disposition di-
recting acquisition of real property located within the state in favor of nonresident en-
emy aliens will be upheld at least to the extent that such property may be used to satisfy
the claims of United States creditors, regardless of a state statutory scheme, where a
federal treaty remains in force with the foreign country of which the aliens are nationals
and residents).
970. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1968)(state regulation of descent and
distribution of estates containing personalty to nonresident aliens may not interfere with
the effective exercise of the nation's foreign policy, even in the absence of a treaty, where
such state regulation "has more than 'some incidental or indirect effect in foreign coun-
tries,' and [a] great potential for disruption or embarrassment"); but cf. Clark v. Allen,
331 U.S. 503, 514-518 (1947)(absent a conflicting federal treaty arrangement, a state may
regulate the descent and distribution of personalty by citizens to nonresident aliens
where the state regulation has only "some incidental or indirect effect in foreign
countries").
971. See Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 114 (1931).
972. In Minor v. Happerstett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874), Chief Justice Waite
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vote, however, may have been less one of altruism than for
deeper political purposes."" With the exception of alien suffrage,
marked inroads have recently been made significantly regulating
state power to discriminate on the basis of alienage.7
1. Legal Permanent Residents and the Repercussions of the
Sugarman Exception
In Graham v. Richardson,9 5 the Court held that it is imper-
missible for a state to condition welfare benefits on possession of
United States citizenship or residence in the United States for a
specified number of years.970 The state's classification excluded
legal permanent residents from public assistance. Richardson
signalled the start of a line of cases restricting the power of
noted that at least nine states allowed aliens, under appropriate circumstances, the right
to vote:
Besides this, citizenship has not in all cases been made a condition prece-
dent to the enjoyment of the right of suffrage. Thus, in Missouri, persons of
foreign birth, who have declared their intention to become citizens of the United
States, may under certain circumstances vote. The same provision is to be found
in the constitutions of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas,
Minnesota, and Texas.
Id. at 177. See ALA. CONST. OF 1875, art. VIII, § 1; ALA. CONST. OF 1901, art. VIII, § 177;
MINN. CONST. OF 1857, art. 7 (Democratic and Republican documents); Mo. CONST. OF
1865, art. 2; TEX. CONST. OF 1869, art. 3, § 1. One commentator has pointed out that at
one time "the laws and constitutions of at least twenty-two states and territories granted
aliens the right to vote. This tendency reached its greatest extent about 1875." Ayls-
worth, supra note 971, at 114. According to the same article, "For the first time in over a
hundred years, a national election was held in 1928 in which no alien in any state had
the right to cast a vote for a candidate for any office-national, state, or local." Id. at
114.
973. For example, predictions that aliens coming from English or Northern European
backgrounds would be anti-slavery and thereby join the Republican Party rather than
the Democratic Party have been cited as one key consideration in extending the
franchise to some types of aliens in Texas. See VERNON'S ANN. TEX. CONST. art. 6, § 2
(Interpretive Commentary).
974. Similarly, the states' ability to require citizenship for those holding high elected
offices has been recognized for some time. Cf. Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 161
(1892)(state may prescribe a federal citizenship requirement for individuals seeking of-
fice of governor or lieutenant governor).
975. 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (Blackmun, J.) (Harlan, J., joining in parts III and IV, and
in the judgment of the Court). See generally, Hull, Resident Aliens and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause: the Burger Court's Retreat from Graham v. Richardson, 47 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 1 (1980); Note, The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1985 and the Right of
Legalized Aliens to State Public Assistance: Equal Protection Versus Plenary Federal
Power, 24 COLUMBIA J. TRANSNAT'L L. 397 (1986).
976. Id. at 366, 376.
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states to discriminate against legal permanent residents in the
area of state employment and public benefits. The Court formu-
lated language which reappeared through subsequent decisions
that "classifications based on alienage . . . are inherently sus-
pect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a
prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority. . . for whom
such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate. '977 The state's
desire to apply limited resources to its citizens, rather than to
legal permanent residents, as part of supporting the public inter-
est, was deemed an insufficient basis for the denial of benefits.9 78
The Court refused to frame the issue as one involving a constitu-
tional right to interstate travel. 7 Rather, the Court viewed the
classification as "inherently suspect and . . . therefore subject to
strict judicial scrutiny whether or not a fundamental right is im-
paired." 980 To buttress its result, the Court added that aliens
contributed to the welfare fund through payment of taxes and
also are subject to military induction. 81 The Graham decision
addressed the relationship of the state with legal permanent res-
idents.982 The Court did not decide whether Congress could im-
pose such restrictions under its "immigration and naturalization
power, ' ' " or whether a state could enforce similar restrictions
against aliens who are not legal permanent residents.
In In re Griffiths,98" a Connecticut law prohibiting nonci-
tizens from taking the state bar exam, and therefore from the
practice of law, was held to violate the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. The Court again applied strict scru-
tiny and required that the "State must show that its purpose or
interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial and
that its use of the classification is 'necessary. . . to the accom-
977. Id. at 372 (quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938)).
978. 403 U.S. at 372. See the discussion of the "special public-interest doctrine" at
note 997 infra.
979. Graham, 403 U.S. at 375.
980. Id. at 376.
981. Id.
982. Id.
983. Id. at 382 n.14. But cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), and
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) for a discussion of federal discrimination on the
basis of alienage, at text accompanying notes 1105 and 1115 infra.




plishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest."9 85
Although the Connecticut State Bar Examining Committee
claimed there was a "link between citizenship and the powers
and responsibilities of the lawyer,"'9 8  the Supreme Court dis-
agreed. It stated that the functions of a lawyer do not "involve
matters of state policy or acts of such unique responsibility as to
entrust them only to citizens. 9 87 In a significant bit of dictum
the Court added that "the status of holding a license to practice
law [does not] place one so close to the core of political process
as to make him a formulator of government policy." '988
The Court's hesitation to expand constitutional protection
to resident aliens concerning occupations which were closely in-
volved with the political process was more clearly announced in
dicta in Sugarman v. Dougall, "8 where a New York statute plac-
ing restrictions on the employment of aliens in the state civil
service990 was struck down. The scheme barred state employ-
ment unless the applicant was a citizen of the United States.
The Court initially framed the issue in terms which later resur-
faced in some of the more recent opinions on this subject.9 ' The
Court decided that "[tlhe New York scheme . . . is indiscrimi-
nate." '92 It did not bar "some or all aliens from closely defined
and limited classes of public employment on a uniform and con-
sistent basis."99 3 The "competitive class" positions included
985. 413 U.S. 721-22 (footnotes omitted).
986. Id. at 724.
987. Id.
988. Id. at 729 (footnote omitted).
989. 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (Blackmun, J.) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See generally,
Agege, Employment Discrimination against Aliens: The Constitutional Implications, 36
LAB. L.J. 87 (1985).
990. See Hampton, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) for discussion of the federal civil service, at
text accompanying note 1105 infra.
991. For example, the overinclusive-underinclusive evaluation mentioned in
Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 642, reappeared in such cases as Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454
U.S. 432 (1982) and Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984), discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 1039-63 infra. The Court in Sugarman observed that the state's
asserted justification proves both too much and too little. . . . [Tihe State's
broad prohibition of the employment of aliens applies to many positions with
respect to which the State's proffered justification has little, if any, relationship.
At the same time, the prohibition has no application at all to positions that
would seem naturally to fall within the State's asserted purpose.
413 U.S. at 642.
992. 413 U.S. at 639.
993. Id.
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those "all the way from the menial to the policy making."""4 In
line with Graham and Griffiths, the Court applied strict judicial
scrutiny" 5 and held that the statutory scheme violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.9 6 The statutory
scheme failed, despite the state's proper concern in defining its
political community because the legislative means the state had
chosen were not sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve the
state's otherwise substantial purpose.99 7
In dictum, the Court created an exception to the seemingly
broad protection proffered legal permanent residents which has
since become known as the Sugarman exception. The state has
power to refuse employment on the basis of noncitizenship for
positions "that go to the heart of representative government. '" 998
In later decisions, after complaint that the Sugarman exception
had started to swallow the Sugarman rule, the Court reempha-
sized Sugarman for its discussion of closely tailoring the classifi-
cation for a permissible state objective. a99
Following Sugarman, the Court affirmed a district court de-
cision concerning a citizenship requirement for jury membership
in Perkins v. Smith.1100 A Maryland statute, as well as a federal
994. Id. at 640.
995. The Court used the phrase "close scrutiny," 413 U.S. 642, and followed a strict
scrutiny analysis.
996. 413 U.S. at 646.
997. Id. at 643. The Court rejected a call to apply the "special-public-interest doc-
trine" in which state grants categorized as privileges, rather than as rights, can be made
contingent upon the recipient's citizenship. 413 U.S. at 643-45. By doing so, the Court
refused to apply the reasoning behind such cases as Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915);
and Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915), described briefly supra at note 968. In
describing the special-public-interest doctrine, the Court noted that the doctrine's pur-
pose was basically one of economics where the state restricts the allocation of limited
resources for the benefit of its own members. 413 U.S. 643-44. One recent opinion has
adverted to this doctrine in somewhat of a more favorable light. See Cabell v. Chavez-
Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982), at text accompanying note 1039 infra.
998. 413 U.S. at 647. The Court stated:
And this power and responsibility of the State applies, not only to the qualifica-
tion of voters, but also to persons holding state elective or important nonelective
executive, legislative, and judicial positions, for officers who participate directly
in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy perform functions
that go to the heart of representative government.
Id.
999. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984), at text accompanying note 1054
infra.
1000. 426 U.S. 913 (1976), aft'g without opinion, 370 F.Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974).
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provision, 1001 excluded noncitizens from jury duty. The district
court utilized the Sugarman exception in upholding the statu-
tory scheme and in supporting the government's position that
"jury service is a unique responsibility going to the heart of rep-
resentative government and as such should be entrusted only to
citizens."' 00 It stated that "the jury is one of the institutions at
the heart of our system of government." 008 By applying the
Sugarman exception, the Graham position that aliens form a
suspect class as a "discrete and insular minority" for whom
strict scrutiny is appropriate is silently overruled. 10 0 4 Strict scru-
tiny is avoided in place of mere rationality review. Although
aliens may remain a suspect class, there is no need for a deter-
mination of whether a compelling state interest may justify the
classification. The basis for strict scrutiny disappears by apply-
ing the Sugarman exception.
In Examining Board of Engineers v. Flores de Otero,'00 5
"Puerto Rico's restriction, by statute, of licenses for civil engi-
neers to United States citizens"'100 was held unconstitutional.
The suit was brought by two legal permanent residents. The
Court explained "that the protections accorded by either the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment ap-
ply to residents of Puerto Rico.' 10 0 7 The Court did not specifi-
cally decide which of the two amendments is applicable to Pu-
erto Rico which had virtually banned "the private practice of
civil engineering by aliens."'00 8 The Court relied upon Graham
and Griffiths and applied strict judicial scrutiny to Puerto Rico's
1001. Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 952, as amended by Act of Mar. 27,
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274, § 101, 82 Stat. 58, as amended by Act of Apr. 6, 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-269, § 1, 86 Stat. 117 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (1982)).
1002. 370 F.Supp. at 136.
1003. Id. at 137.
1004. In Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 648, the Court stated "our scrutiny will not be so
demanding where we deal with matters resting firmly within a State's constitutional
prerogatives."
1005. 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (Blackmun, J.) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part) (Stevens,
J. took no part).
1006. Id. at 575.
1007. Id. at 600.
1008. Id. at 601. The Court did not decide whether Puerto Rico should be treated
like a state under the fourteenth amendment or whether it should be directly governed
under the fifth amendment as a creature of the federal government.
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statutory discrimination against aliens. °0°9 The Court phrased its
strict scrutiny analysis in familiar terms by announcing that
"the governmental interest claimed to justify the discrimination
is to be carefully examined in order to determine whether that
interest is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be made
whether the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary
and precisely drawn." 010 Since the statute in Flores de Otero
was unable to withstand this scrutiny, the licensing scheme was
held to be unconstitutional.
In Nyquist v. Mauclet,01' the Court held the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment was violated under a
statutory scheme where New York State barred resident aliens
from receiving some higher education benefits. The state assis-
tance included Regents college scholarships, tuition assistance,
and guaranteed student loans which were indirectly financed by
the federal government. State law required the applicants to be
either a United States citizen, or to have applied for such citzen-
ship, or if not qualified to obtain such citizenship at the time of
applying for the education benefits, to have submitted a state-
ment to the state expressing an intention to apply for citizenship
when eligible, or to be a refugee paroled into the country by the
United States Attorney General. 0 12 Two legal permanent resi-
dents, neither of whom intended to become a United States citi-
zen, brought suit. The Court followed Graham in considering
that "classifications based on alienage 'are inherently suspect
and are therefore subject to strict scrutiny whether or not a fun-
damental right is impaired.' 0o3 In the Court's own language it
applied a "stringent examination.' '0 14
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Mauclet was later adopted, in
part, by Justice Powell in Ambach v. Norwick.01 5 Justice Rehn-
quist maintained in Mauclet that the aliens were not a discrete
and insular minority because the statute provided they could be
1009. 429 U.S. at 602.
1010. Id. at 605.
1011. 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (Blackmun, J.) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing, joined by Burger, and Stewart, JJ.).
1012. Id. at 3-4. The statute at issue was N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 661(3) (McKinney Supp.
1976).
1013. 432 U.S. 8 n.9.
1014. 432 U.S. at 7.
1015. 441 U.S. 68 (1979), discussed infra at text accompanying note 1026.
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eligible for the education benefits if each alien declared "his in-
tention to become a citizen as soon as possible."'" 16 Since each
individual's membership in the minority class could terminate,
Justice Rehnquist argued that strict judicial scrutiny was not
necessary. The majority rejected this argument by noting that
the fact that aliens were being coerced under state power to
change their status did not alter the fact that discrimination
based upon alienage had occurred. 01 7 Additionally, the classifi-
cation on the basis of noncitizenship is one founded on what
could be an immutable trait for many legal permanent residents.
Not all resident aliens eventually become eligible to apply for
citizenship. Not all such aliens can make a declaration of intent
to apply for such citizenship, possibly out of fear of losing their
first citizenship to some other country. For example, aliens may
refuse to make a declaration of intent to become United States
citizens because under section 337(a) of the INA'0° ' they can be
required to renounce any foreign citizenship. Justice Blackmun
warned that the state's effort to expand the exception in
Sugarman to allow the state a justification for discrimination on
the basis of noncitizenship in order to encourage aliens to be-
come citizens and members of the state's political community is
a reading of the Sugarman exception that "would swallow the
rule."o10 19
In Foley v. Connelie,1020 a legal permanent resident was de-
nied a position as a New York State Trooper. The Court upheld
the restriction. Foley, the alien, was barred from taking a com-
petitive exam for the position. The Court applied rationality re-
1016. 432 U.S. at 20 (footnote omitted). Under the INA of 1952, Act of Jun. 27, 1952,
§ 316, 66 Stat. 242 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1982)) there was a required
five-year period of lawful permanent residence before naturalization could be obtained.
Section 319 of the 1952 Act, 66 Stat. 244 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1430 (1982)) had
a three-year period for spouses of United States citizens.
1017. 432 U.S. at 8, n.10.
1018. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, § 377, 66 Stat. 258 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §
1448(a) (1982)).
1019. 432 U.S. at 11.
1020. 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (Burger, C.J.) (Stewart J., and Blackmun, J., separately
concurring) (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, and Stevens, JJ.) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.). See generally, O'Fallon, To Preserve the Conception
of a Political Community, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 777 (1980); Comment, Alienage and
Public Employment: The Need for an Intermediate Standard in Equal Protection, 32
HASTINGS L.J. 163 (1980).
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view and explained that "[t]he State need only justify its classi-
fication by a showing of some rational relationship between the
interest sought to be protected and the limiting classifica-
tion.' 10 21 The Court based application of this standard upon the
exception developed in Sugarman. The Court described the
analysis required to determine whether the position is one going
to the heart of representative government as an examination of
"each position in question to determine whether it involves dis-
cretionary decisionmaking or execution of policy, which substan-
tially affects members of the political community.' ' 02 2 The basis
for including police officers on the list of occupations that may
be filled in a discriminatory manner is that the "police function
is . . . one of the basic functions of government"'' 2 S possessing
"an almost infinite variety of discretionary powers.', 0 2  The
Court indicated that in applying the Sugarman exception, mere
rationality review was utilized: "In the enforcement and excep-
tion of the laws the police function is one where citizenship
bears a rational relationship to the special demands of the par-
ticular position."'02 5
In Ambach v. Norwick,10 6 the Court held New York State
"may refuse to employ as elementary and secondary school
teachers aliens who are eligible for United States citizenship but
1021. Id. at 296.
1022. Id. at 296 (footnote omitted).
1023. Id. at 297.
1024. Id. (footnote omitted).
1025. Id. at 300. Justice Marshall's dissent voiced concern that the Sugarman excep-
tion had swallowed the general rule. He stated that police officers only enforce the law;
they do not legislate. 435 U.S. 302-07. According to Justice Stevens' dissent, the majority
opinion in Foley, in which an alien could be denied employment as a State Trooper, was
difficult to harmonize with Griffith, where aliens were allowed to practice law. 435 U.S. at
308-312.
1026. 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (Powell, J.) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens, JJ.). See generally, O'Fallon, To Preserve the Conception of a
Political Community, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 777 (1980); Note, Alien Teachers: Suspect
Class or Subversive Influence?, 31 MERCER L. REV. 815 (1980); Note, A Further Retreat
From Graham, 40 LA. L. REV. 997 (1980); Comment, Alienage and Public Employment:
The Need for an Intermediate Standard in Equal Protection, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 163
(1980); Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Statute Barring Aliens from Po-
sitions as Public School Teachers is within the Exception to Strict Scrutiny Analysis,
1980 S. ILL. U.L.J. 107; Note, Constitutional Law: State Discrimination against Resident




who refuse to seek naturalization.' ' 027 The statute was similar to
the one in Mauclet'012 which was found to be unconstitutional.
In upholding the requirement, the Court reasoned consistently
with Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Mauclet. Under the statute,
the noncitizen had to show "an intention to apply for citizen-
ship."'0 29 The statute in Mauclet had provided similarly, al-
though the result in Ambach was to the opposite effect. The
Court envisioned teaching in the public school system as a "gov-
ernmental function."'030 According to the Court, public school
teachers perform a task going "to the heart of representative
government.' 03' They are invested with a high "degree of re-
sponsibility and discretion' ' 0 .32 in performing that governmental
function. The standard the Court used was one of rationality re-
view.1033 That a government function was involved was decisive
in Ambach; not that the alien could make a declaration of inten-
tion to naturalize. 0 84 However, the Court's reliance' 35 upon the
fact that the aliens in Ambach could declare an intention to nat-
uralize, but had refused to do so as a valid justification for the
state's discrimination, is contrary to the Court's rejection of this
distinction in Mauclet.0 36 An explanation lies in the fact that
Ambach utilized the Sugarman exception, however warranted,
and thus employed mere rationality review. In Mauclet, the
Court applied strict scrutiny. 0 17 In his dissent, Justice Black-
mun stated "[i]t seems constitutionally absurd, to say the least,
that in these lower levels of public education a Frenchman may
not teach French, or, indeed, an English woman may not teach
the grammar of the English language."'03 8 He contended the re-
1027. 441 U.S. at 69.
1028. Discussed at text accompanying note 1011 supra.
1029. 441 U.S. at 70 (footnote omitted).
1030. Id. at 75.
1031. Id. at 76 (quoting Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647 (1973)).
1032. 441 U.S. at 75.
1033. Id. at 80.
1034. See the discussion of Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Mauclet at text accompa-
nying note 1015 supra.
1035. 441 U.S. 80-81.
1036. See discussion of Mauclet in text accompanying notes 1015-18 supra.
1037. See text at note 1013 supra.
1038. Id. at 84. Cf. Nelson v. Miranda, 413 U.S. 902 (1973), aff'g without opinion 351
F.Supp. 735 (D. Ariz. 1972) where one legal permanent resident alien was denied em-
ployment as an office clerk within a high school and another was denied positions as a
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sult was irreconcilable with Griffiths.
As a result of this line of decisions, an important unan-
swered question remained: which facts would trigger application
of the Sugarman exception with its accompanying standard of
mere rationality review, and which factual circumstances would
avoid a suggestion that a function going to the heart of represen-
tative government is present, thereby triggering strict scrutiny?
As these earlier cases indicate, the Court proceeded on a case-
by-case basis without clearly defining the applicable decisional
parameters, perhaps because the required distinction which the
Court had desired to make was vague and elusive.
In Cabell v. Chavez-Salido,'05 9 the Court upheld a Califor-
nia statute which required state probation officers and deputy
probation officers to be United States citizens. The Court re-em-
braced the "public/private" 104 0 distinction which had been dis-
paraged in Graham and other recent cases.' 04' Justice White's
view of the older "public/private" distinction was that a state
could discriminate between citizens and aliens concerning alloca-
tion of public benefits and public resources. A state, however,
was not permitted to discriminate between the two classes when
intervening in the private sector, such as by requiring discrimi-
social worker and as an Arizona State teacher. These denials were held unconstitutional,
contrary to the result in Ambach.
1039. 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (White, J.) (Blackmun, J. dissenting, joined by Brennan,
Marshall, Stevens, JJ.). See generally, Young, Aliens . . . State Employment, 68
A.B.A.J. 342 (1982); Comment, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection and Alien Dis-
crimination-Broadening the Exclusion from Public Employment, 29 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 749 (1985); Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection Fourteenth Amend-
ment-State Requirement of Citizenship to be Peace Officer: Sugarman Exception, 8
BLACK L.J. 322 (1983); Note, Alienage Classifications-the Mandatory Citizenship Re-
quirment for California Peace Officers Primarily Serves a Political Function and Does
Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 23 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 691 (1983); Note, Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Amendment-Equal
Protection-Aliens' Rights-Governmental Function Doctrine, 21 DUQ. L. REV. 277
(1982); Leigh, Aliens-Equal Protection-State Requirement of Citizenship for Public
Employment, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 616 (1982); Comment, Constitutional Law-Equal Pro-
tection, 31 EMORY L.J. 707 (1982); Comment, State Alienage Classifications: Time for
Federal Preemption?, 28 Loy. L. REV. 632 (1982); Aliens-Equal Protection Clause, 3
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 113 (1981).
1040. 454 U.S. at 437.
1041. Graham, 403 U.S. at 374. In Graham, the Court referred to a "special public-
interest doctrine." In Cabell, Justice White equated his "public/private" doctrine with
the "special public-interest doctrine." Cabell, 454 U.S. at 437. See also Takahashi v. Fish
& Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
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nation in the realm of private employment.' 42 Although Justice
White agreed that the "public/private" distinction had fallen
into disuse," 43 his delineation of a political function and an eco-
nomic function of state government, which in turn either al-
lowed or disallowed, respectively, the state relative leeway in
discriminating on the basis of alienage closely paralleled the for-
mer "public/private" distinction. 1 44 The "public" component of
the older distinction is the analogue of the present "political"
element. The "private" component of the older decisions is re-
flected in the current "economic" component described in Jus-
tice White's dichotomy.
In Cabell, the emphasis upon Sugarman was slightly differ-
ent than in previous cases. Sugarman recognized and applied
traditional equal protection analysis in which the statutory re-
striction was examined to determine whether the classification
was either under- or overinclusive when analyzed in light of an
otherwise legitimate or substantial state interest or purpose.1 145
In Cabell, the Court employed this analysis to determine
whether the statutory restriction was designed to achieve a po-
litical or economic goal. The Court stated that "[f]irst, the speci-
ficity of the classification will be examined: a classification that
is substantially overinclusive or underinclusive tends to under-
cut the governmental claim that the classification serves legiti-
mate political ends.1 0 46
The hunt for a legitimate political end was a variation from
the language of prior equal protection cases where the Court
looked for a legitimate state purpose or interest. Perhaps in the
context of legal permanent residents and the fourteenth amend-
ment, "legitimate political ends" are the equivalent of those
"functions that go to the heart of representative government" as
the dictum in Sugarman suggested. 1 4  This would constitute a
shift away from prior equal protection analysis since the mean-
ing and the scope of the phrase quoted from the Sugarman deci-
1042. 454 U.S. at 436-38.
1043. Id. at 438.
1044. Id. at 440.
1045. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 642. See note 991 supra.
1046. 454 U.S. at 440.




sion is far from clearly established. Under this analysis, however,
a statute that was not "sufficiently tailored' 104 8 to "substan-
tial[ly] fit"'0 49 some legitimate political end would be categorized
as a statute regulating economic aspects of an alien's life. Analy-
sis then proceeds to consider whether the economic regulation
was permissible under the strict scrutiny analysis of Graham. If,
however, the statute passed the first test and was properly tai-
lored toward some legitimate political end, a second inquiry fol-
lowed which invoked the Sugarman exception under a standard
of rationality review.
The Court indicated in Cabell that it would defer to state
legislative judgments as to what positions are "important sover-
eign functions of the political community"'050 that go to the
heart of representative government. The Court cited factors
which placed a probation officer in the position of performing a
function that goes to the heart of representative government.
Probation officers in California exercised broad discretionary co-
ercive powers over a limited number of probationers, including
the responsibility to see to it that all terms of probation were
met. The officers had the power to arrest as well as to release
some detained individuals, and also had a wide range of contacts
with local communities in the course of their work.' 05' This enu-
meration left open to a large extent how the Court will rule in
future cases under modified fact patterns. In upholding the Cali-
fornia statute under the Sugarman exception, the Court utilized
the standard "lower level of scrutiny"'0 52 which has now become
part of the Sugarman analysis. Once again, a dissenting voice
complained that Sugarman's exception had swallowed
Sugarman's rule. 1058
In Bernal v. Fainter,0 54 a Texas statute forbidding aliens
from becoming notaries public was struck down. The position
did not go to the heart of representative government and the
1048. 454 U.S. at 442.
1049. Id.
1050. 454 U.S. at 445.
1051. 454 U.S. at 445-46.
1052. Id. at 444.
1053. Id. at 458 (Blackmun, J.).
1054. 467 U.S. 216 (1984) (Marshall, J.) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). See generally,
Note, Discrimination Against Resident Aliens: Diminishing Expectations of Equal Pro-
tection, 15 LAW. AM. 521 (1984).
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Sugarman exception did not apply. The Court invoked strict
scrutiny, as originally announced in Graham. Although the stat-
ute was determined not to be overinclusive since it limited only
a narrow class of individuals from becoming notaries, 1055 it failed
to pass constitutional muster because it did not further "a com-
pelling state interest by the least restrictive means practically
available.' 10 5" The state had other options at its disposal, such
as testing all individuals for their knowledge of relevant state
law, to eliminate those individuals unfit to be notaries, rather
than a blanket prohibition against an entire class of individuals.
In Bernal v. Fainter, the Supreme Court attempted to de-
fine further which positions go to the heart of representative
government and which may exclude legal permanent residents.
In referring to the two-part test in Cabell, the Court emphasized
"that the political-function exception must be narrowly con-
strued; otherwise the exception will swallow the rule and depre-
ciate the significance that should attach to the designation of a
group as a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom heightened
judicial solicitude is appropriate.'01 5 7 The Court determined the
statute forbidding aliens from being notaries was not overinclu-
sive because "it applies narrowly to only one category of persons:
those wishing to obtain appointments as notaries. '1°  The Court
did not decide whether the statute was underinclusive, although
it suggested it might be, since the person who supervised licens-
ing of notaries public was not required to be a citizen of the
United States. 0 59 The Court found the prohibition failed the
second prong of the Cabell test, which essentially meant the
Sugarman exception did not otherwise save the prohibited dis-
crimination. The position's responsibilities did not go to the
heart of representative government; rather they were "essen-
tially clerical and ministerial.' 060 The Court stated that the
"political function exception is properly applied [where the posi-
tion is] invested either with policy-making responsibility or
broad discretion in the execution of public policy that requires
1055. Id. at 222.
1056. Id. at 227.
1057. Id. at 222 n.7.
1058. Id. at 222.
1059. Id. at 222-23.
1060. Id. at 225.
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the routine exercise of authority over individuals. '" 10 61 Neither
the responsibility nor the discretion was invested in the notary
public position.
As a result of Bernal v. Fainter, the relative balance be-
tween the separate components of the Court's equal protection
analysis was restored to the condition in which it rested follow-
ing the Graham decision and its immediate progeny. This analy-
sis emphasizes that resident aliens are indeed members of a
"'discrete and insular' minority" and that as a general rule,
state legislation discriminating against them must be subjected
to strict judicial scrutiny. The Bernal decision took the empha-
sis off the Sugarman exception and thereby reduced the applica-
bility of mere rationality review. As reiterated in Bernal, the
purpose of the Sugarman exception was to allow the states to
exclude from those positions that "are so closely bound up with
the formulation and implementation of self-government [those]
persons outside the political community . . . who have not be-
come part of the process of democratic self-determination.
106 2
As viewed in the Sugarman decision itself, this was to be a lim-
ited exception infrequently utilized. Bernal returned the juris-
prudence on this subject to this original viewpoint. The problem
of defining when to apply the Sugarman exception still remains
rather difficult. In light of the one-time accepted existence of
alien suffrage in a number of states,0 68 it is by no means clear
that the Sugarman exception cannot be further limited.
2. State Discrimination Against Temporary Visitors and Illegal
Aliens
The class of aliens who are not legal permanent residents
includes nonimmigrants as defined by the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (INA).' 06' These people, who constitute a heteroge-
neous class of individuals, are typically in the United States on a
temporary visa. Additionally, the Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act (IRCA) of 1986 created a new class of aliens called tem-
1061. Id. at 226.
1062. Id. at 221.
1063. See notes 971-74 and accompanying text supra.
1064. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (1982), amended by Act of Oct. 21, 1986, Pub. L.




porary legal residents.10 15 A further category of aliens consists of
those illegally in the United States. The period of stay during
which visa-holders may remain in the United States can be quite
prolonged. Many visa holders receive their visas as nonimmi-
grants under the authority of section 101(a)(15) of the INA.Y066
That section currently defines nineteen different classes of tem-
porary visas. 08 7 There are also visas available under other provi-
sions of the INA10 68 or under other statutes or treaties, such as
visas for some participants in NATO. 06 9 The rights to which
these aliens are entitled, under federal and state law, have occa-
sionally been the subject of litigation in the Supreme Court.
Several cases decided by the Burger Court examined these is-
sues, frequently borrowing concepts from decisions concerning
the rights of aliens who are in the United State permanently or
who occupy legal statuses far different than the nonimmigrants
before the Court.
a. Representatives of Foreign Governments and Education
Benefits
In Elkins v. Moreno,107 0 suit was brought on behalf of aliens
who were financially dependent on relatives named in visas is-
1065. See, e.g., § 245A of the INA, Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 201(a),
100 Stat. 3394 (codified at 8 U.S.C.S. § 1255a (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)) (granting tem-
porary resident status to the subclass of those aliens illegally within the United States
since before Jan. 1, 1982); § 210 of the INA, Act of Nov. 6, 1986, § 302(a), 100 Stat. 3417
(codified at 8 U.S.C.S. § 1160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)) (granting temporary legal resi-
dence to agricultural workers who meet certain prerequisites based upon a government
determination of shortage of agricultural workers).
1066. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1101(a)(15) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
1067. The most recent additions have come in § 312(b) of the IRCA, 100 Stat. 3435,
which created a temporary visa for parents and children of special immigrants, and for
children of parents of special immigrants under a new § 101(a)(15)(N) (8 U.S.C.S. §
1101(a)(15)(N) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)) where the term "special immigrant" is defined
to include certain officers or employees of international organizations. Section
101(a)(27)(I) of the INA, added by § 312(a) of the IRCA, 100 Stat. 3434 (codified at 8
U.S.C.S. § 1101(a)(27)(I) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)).
1068. See e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982) (immigrant visas); 8 U.S.C. § 1204 (1982) (visas
for immediate relatives and special immigrants).
1069. See 5 U.S.T. 877, 1094-1100; 4 U.S.T. 1794, 1796 (representatives and members
of NATO); 22 U.S.C. § 2691 (1982) (nonimmigrant visas for aliens who are members of
proscribed organizations in compliance with the Helsinki Final Act).
1070. 435 U.S. 647 (1978) (Brennan, J.) (Rehnquist J., dissenting, joined by Burger,
C.J.). See generally, Wildes & Grunblatt, Domicile for Immigration and Federal Gift
and Estate Tax Purposes-is a Harmonious Rule Possible?, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 113
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sued under section 101(a)(15)(G)(iv) of the INA'"7' as immedi-
ate family members of a representative of a foreign government
that is a member of an international organization meeting in the
United States (G-4 visas). The University of Maryland had de-
nied these aliens within the State of Maryland "'in-state' status
for tuition purposes.''l072 The aliens claimed violation of various
provisions of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment and the supremacy clause. The policy of
the University of Maryland was to grant in-state status to
United States citizens and legal permanent residents who com-
plied with certain requirements relating to a minimum period of
domicile within the state. 10  The supremacy clause issue, and
arguments based upon state taxation concerns, were raised but
were not decided. The controlling issue was phrased by the ma-
jority in terms of whether G-4 visa holders "can form the intent
necessary to allow them to become domiciliaries of Mary-
land.' 107 4 According to the Court, the university did not discrim-
inate on the basis of nonimmigrant status, or noncitizen status,
but entirely upon a nondomiciliary basis.
The Court decided that under federal law a G-4 visa holder
can become a Maryland domiciliary. It then sent the case to the
Court of Appeals of Maryland to decide, on the basis of that
state's law, whether such aliens could become domiciled within
Maryland. According to the Court "Congress did not require G-4
aliens to maintain a permanent residence abroad or to pledge to
leave the United States at a certain date.' ' 0 75 Under other visa
provisions for other classes of nonimmigrants, Congress had spe-
cifically required that nonimmigrant aliens have an intention
"not to abandon a foreign residence, or by implication .. .an
(1983).
1071. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(G)(iv) (1982) provides for visas for "officers, or employ-
ees of . . .international organizations, and the members of their immediate families."
1072. 435 U.S. at 650.
1073. Domicile was defined, according to university policy, as "a person's permanent
place of abode; namely, there must be demonstrated an intention to live permanently or
indefinitely in Maryland." 435 U.S. at 651. The policy also considered 8 additional fac-
tors, one of which was whether the student or a person on whom the student was depen-
dent, paid Maryland income tax, including "taxable income earned outside the State." Id
at 651.
1074. 435 U.S. at 658.
1075. Id. at 664.
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intent not to seek domicile in the United States."""78 These
aliens could not become domiciled within the United States
without an adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the
INA. 1'0 " The Court stated Congress did not place a similar pro-
hibition against G-4 aliens from possessing the intent to take up
domicile within the United States. These aliens could develop
the "subjective intent to stay indefinitely in the United
States.'10 78 The Court then sent the question to the Maryland
Court to learn whether G-4 aliens were barred by operation of
state law from becoming domiciliaries within Maryland.' 79
In Toll v. Moreno,0 80 the Court recognized that the Mary-
land Court of Appeals answered in the negative to the certified
question sent from the Supreme Court as a result of Elkins v.
Moreno.108' Therefore, G-4 aliens were not incapable, according
to the Maryland court, from becoming domiciliaries within the
state. In the meantime, the Board of Regents in Maryland clari-
fied its policy position by indicating that nonimmigrants who
could become domiciled within Maryland were still ineligible for
favorable "in-state" tuition status. The Supreme Court re-
manded to the district court for consideration of the problem in
1076. Id. at 665. The Court examined the visa provisions which address whether spe-
cific types of visa holders must intend to return to their countries of origination. Under §
101(a)(15)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B) (1982)) (a temporary visitor for bus-
iness or pleasure), the visitor must have "a residence in a foreign country which he has
no intention of abandoning"; § 101(a)(15)(C) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(C)
(1982)), provides for aliens who are in "immediate and continuous transit through the
United States" without an intention to remain in the United States; § 101(a)(15)(D) (8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(D) (1982)), provides for crewmen who intend "to land temporarily
...and to depart from the United States with the vessal or aircraft on which [they]
arrived"; § 101(a)(15)(F) (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F) (1982)) requires nonimmigrant stu-
dents to have "a residence in a foreign country which [they have] no intention of aban-
doning . . .who seek[] to enter the United States temporarily"; § 101(a)(15)(H) of the
INA, as amended Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 301(a), 100 Stat. 3411 (codi-
fied at 8 U.S.C.S. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)) provides for temporary
workers who reside in foreign countries which they have no intention of abandoning.
1077. 8 U.S.C. 1255(a) (1982).
1078. 435 U.S. at 666.
1079. Id. at 668-69.
1080. 441 U.S. 458 (1979) (per curiam).
1081. The certified question was
Are persons residing in Maryland who hold or are named in a visa under 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(G)(iv)(1976 ed.), or who are financially dependent upon a
person holding or named in such visa, incapable as a matter of state law of be-
coming domiciliaries of Maryland?
441 U.S. at 459-60 (footnote omitted).
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light of the Board of Regents' new explanation and the prior
holdings related to the case.
When the case subsequently returned to the Supreme
Court, the Court was squarely confronted with the issue whether
the supremacy clause was violated by Maryland's refusal to
grant in-state status to nonimmigrant aliens domiciled within
the state. In Toll v. Moreno,"8 the Court decided there was
such a violation. The Court considered whether there was an en-
croachment by the state "upon Congress' prerogatives with re-
spect to the regulation of immigration.' 0 8 The Court recog-
nized a conflict between the state and congressional power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations as well as with the broad
congressional authority over foreign affairs.10 84 The Court distin-
guished De Canas v. Bica'0 85 on the basis that Congress had in-
tended to allow the states to regulate employment of illegal
aliens to the extent consistent with federal law.'0 18 Unlike the
California statutory scheme in De Canas, Maryland's refusal to
allow G-4 visa holders to become state domiciliaries was con-
trary to congressional intent:
In light of Congress' explicit decision not to bar G-4
aliens from acquiring domicile, the State's decision to
deny "in-state" status to G-4 aliens, solely on account of
the G-4 alien's federal immigration status, surely
amounts to an ancillary "burden not contemplated by
Congress" in admitting these aliens to the United
States.
10 87
Other factors which directed the Court's decision included the
fact that the federal policy to encourage international organiza-
tions to locate within the United States was frustrated by the
university's policy. Since the federal government expressly re-
1082. 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (Brennan, J.) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (O'Connor J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.).
See generally, Olivas, Plyler v. Doe, Toll v. Moreno, and Postsecondary Admissions:
Undocumented Adults and "Enduring Disability", 15 J. L. & EDUC. 19 (1986).
1083. Id. at 9, referring to the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, and Con-
gress' authority to regulate immigration under art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
1084. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (regulation of commerce with foreign nations).
1085. 424 U.S. 351 (1976), discussed in text accompanying note 852 supra.
1086. 458 U.S. at 13 n.18. See also De Canas, 424 U.S. at 361.
1087. 458 U.S. at 14.
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lieved the G-4 aliens from taxation, the State of Maryland could
not go about indirectly recouping such loss by charging higher
tuition to the children of such aliens.
b. Illegal Aliens and Education Benefits
In Plyler v. Doe,10 a8 the State of Texas' denial to "undocu-
mented school-age children . . . free public education that it
provide[d] to children who [were] citizens of the United States
or legally admitted aliens"""8 9 was struck down by the Court as a
1088. 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (Brennan, J.) (Marshall J., concurring) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring)(Powell, J. concurring)(Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by White, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor, JJ.). See generally, Olivas, Plyler v. Doe, Toll v. Moreno, and Postsecondary
Admissions: Undocumented Adults and "Enduring Disability", 15 J. L. & EDUC. 19
(1986); Garcia y Griego, The Rights of Undocumented Mexicans in the United States
after Plyler v. Doe: A Sketch of Moral and Legal Issues, 15 J. L. & EDUC. 57 (1986);
Gerety, Children in the Labyrinth: The Complexities of Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. PITT. L.
REV. 279 (1983); Harvith, Education Law, 34 SYRACUSE L. REv. 215 (1983); Perry, Equal
Protection, Judicial Activism, and the Intellectual Agenda of Constitutional Theory:
Reflections on, and beyond Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. PiTT. L. REV. 329 (1983); Hull, Undocu-
mented Alien Children and Free Public Education: an Analysis of Plyler v. Doe, 44 U.
PITT. L. REV. 409 (1983); Lichtenberg, Within the Pale: Aliens, Illegal Aliens, and Equal
Protection, 44 U. PiTT. L. REV. 351 (1983); Comment, Equal Protection: Can California
Offer More for Undocumented Alien Children?, 16 PAC. L.J. 1101 (1985); Note, Rethink-
ing Equal Protection, 49 Mo. L. REV. 166 (1984); Comment, The Quasi Fundamental
Right Emerges in Equal Protection Analysis, 19 NEW ENG. L. REV. 151 (1984); Note,
Analysis of an Analogy: Undocumented Children and Illegitimate Children, 1983 U.
ILL. L. REV. 697 (1983); Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Public Education
for Undocumented Aliens, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1487 (1983); Comment, Expanding the
Application of the Equal Protection Clause to Illegal Aliens, 10 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 563
(1983); Note, The Rights of Undocumented Aliens: Balancing Equal Protection and
Federalism, 28 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 431 (1983); Note, Constitutional
Law- Undocumented Alien Children, Equal Protection, and "Special Constitutional
Sensitivity," 3 Miss. C.L. REV. 295 (1983); Note, Equal Protection for Illegal Aliens and
Education for Undocumented Children, 24 S. TEx. L.J. 350 (1983); Note, Equal Protec-
tion, Education, and the Undocumented Alien Child, 20 Hous. L. REV. 899 (1983); Note,
Equal Protection-Intermediate Scrutiny Applied to Texas Statute Denying Educa-
tion to Undocumented Children, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307 (1983); Note, Equal Pro-
tection Clause Requires a Free Public Education for Illegal Alien Children, 14 TEx.
TECH L. REV. 531 (1983); Comment, Constitutional Law: Equal Protection Rights of Ille-
gal Alien Schoolchildren, 23 HARv. INT'L L.J. 389 (1983); Comment, Paving the Way for
Heightened Judicial Scrutiny in Constitutional Adjudication of Denials of Education,
9 J. CONTEMP. L. 235 (1983); Equal Protection: Right of Illegal Alien Children to State-
Provided Education, 96 HARV. L. REV. 130 (1982); Comment, Access to Education: a
Constitutional Right, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 819 (1982); Comment, Constitutional
Law- Undocumented Aliens-State Statute Denying Undocumented Aliens Access to
Free Public Education Unconstitutional, 6 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. J. 367 (1982).
1089. 457 U.S. at 205.
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violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The alien children were determined to be persons within
the state's jurisdiction, who, under the language of the four-
teenth amendment, were entitled to equal protection of the laws.
The Court rejected the argument that "undocumented aliens,
because of their immigration status, are not 'persons within the
jurisdiction' of the State of Texas, and that they therefore have
no right to the equal protection of Texas law."10 9 The Court
stated that to permit a state to interpret the "within its jurisdic-
tion" phrase of the fourteenth amendment to
identify subclasses of persons whom it would define as
beyond its jurisdiction, thereby relieving itself of the ob-
ligation to assure that its laws are designed and applied
equally to those persons, would undermine the principal
purpose for which the Equal Protection Clause was incor-
porated in the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Pro-
tection Clause was intended to work nothing less than
the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-based
legislation. The objective is fundamentally at odds with
the power the State asserts here to classify persons sub-
ject to its laws as nonetheless excepted from its
protection.1091
Since the Court had already indicated that a state may follow
the federal government's lead, as in De Canas v. Bica, °92 the
Court was required to consider whether federal disapproval of
the presence of illegal alien children within the country permit-
ted Texas' prohibition against their presence in the state school
system. The Court recognized that illegal aliens do not consti-
tute a suspect class'0 98 and that education is not a fundamental
right.1°1 But the Court determined that the classification did
not "operate harmoniously within the federal program '"1095 be-
1090. Id. at 210-16.
1091. Id. at 213. The equal protection clause in the fourteenth amendment reads:
"nor shall any State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."
1092. 424 U.S. 351 (1976), discussed in text accompanying note 852 supra.
1093. 457 U.S. at 219 n.19, & 223.
1094. Id. at 223. A general discussion appears at 221-23. See, e.g., San Antonio Inde-
pendent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
1095. 457 U.S. at 226.
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cause any particular illegal alien child might be eligible for a
number of different forms of relief from deportation."9" During
their residence in the United States as illegal aliens, according to
the Court, they were in fact "enjoying an inchoate federal per-
mission to remain.' 0 °97 Once the Court determined the four-
teenth amendment applied, the equal protection arguments
struck down the Texas prohibition.1 8
Plyler held that the denial of free public education to illegal
alien children was not shown to further any "substantial state
interest.' 0 19 Thus, the statute could "hardly be considered ra-
tional."'1100 The statute failed to pass a mere rationality level of
review. It operated to inflict permanent damages on children as
the Court explained that "[t]he inability to read and write will
handicap the individual deprived of a basic education each and
every day of his life." 0' Many of these illegal aliens remain per-
1096. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § § 1251 (1982), as amended Act of Nov. 10, 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-639, § 2(b), 100 Stat. 3541; 1252 (1982 & Supp. II 1984); 1253(h) (1982); 1254
(1982), as amended Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 315(b), 100 Stat. 3439, for
examples of various types of relief to deportation.
1097. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226.
1098. A Texas statute conceivably affecting much the same group of people as in
Plyler was subsequently upheld by the Court in Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983)
(Powell, J.) (Brennan, J. concurring)(Marshall, J. dissenting). Texas had a residency re-
quirement for minor children who wished "to attend public free schools while living
apart from their parents or guardians." Id. at 322. The student bringing the challenge
was born in the United States and was a United States citizen, although his parents were
Mexican citizens living in Mexico. The student fit the category of a child born in the
United States to parents who were illegal aliens and who were later deported. The Court
upheld the residency requirement. Since the alien had no parent or guardian in the state,
he was denied a free public education. The law obviously affected a similar group of
individuals as was targeted by the statute in Plyler. This time, the classification passed
constitutional muster,
This problem was foreseen in Justice Powell's concurrence in Plyler, where he
stated:
The classes certified in these cases included all undocumented school-age
children of Mexican origin residing in a school district. . . or the State. Even so,
it is clear that neither class was thought to include mature Mexican minors who
were solely responsible for violating the immigration laws. . . . A different case
would be presented in the unlikely event that a minor, old enough to be respon-
sible for illegal entry and yet still of school age, entered this country illegally on
his own volition.
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 240 n.5 (citation omitted).
1099. 457 U.S. at 230.
1100. Id. at 224.
1101. Id. at 222.
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manently in the United States and become citizens." 02 The stat-
ute unfairly punished illegal alien minors for the act of their
parents in bringing them to the United States which was an ac-
tivity over which the children had no control."103 The state pro-
vided no satisfactory reasons to support these constitutional
deficiencies.' 10
C. Federal Discrimination Against Legal Permanent
Residents: Employment, Medicare, and Illegitimacy
In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,"0 the Civil Service Com-
mission and other federal agencies denied legal permanent resi-
dents employment in many available government positions. The
Court stated that Sugarman 0 6 and Griffiths 07 did not apply
"because the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on state
power are not directly applicable to the Federal Government
and because Congress and the President have broad power over
immigration and naturalization which the States do not pos-
sess. ' 1" 8 The Court prohibited the discrimination by reasoning
that the authority of the Commission to impose the discrimina-
tion was not the same as the authority of Congress or the Presi-
dent to make the same decision. The decision to hire only citi-
zens was not made at the congressional or presidential level but
only by the Civil Service Commission."0 9 The Court assumed
"without deciding, that the Congress and the President have the
constitutional power to impose the requirement that the Com-
mittee has adopted."' 0 But the Commission, unlike the Presi-
dent or Congress, had "no responsibility for foreign affairs, for
treaty negotiations, for establishing immigration quotas or con-
1102. Id. at 222 n.20.
1103. Id. at 219-20.
1104. Id. at 228-30.
1105. 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (Stevens, J.) (Brennan J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., White, and Blackmun, JJ.). See gener-
ally, Agege, Employment Discrimination against Aliens: the Constitutional Implica-
tions, 36 LAB. L.J. 87 (1985); Comment, The Role of Structural Due Process in Equal
Protection, 29 U. KAN. L. REV. 99 (1980).
1106. 413 U.S. 634 (1973), See text accompanying note 989 supra.
1107. 413 U.S. 717 (1973). See text accompanying note 984 supra.
1108. 426 U.S. at 95 (footnotes omitted).
1109. 426 U.S. 105-14.
1110. Id. at 114.
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ditions of entry, or for naturalization policies.""" Additionally,
the administrative burden to decide which positions in the Civil
Service Commission were sensitive and therefore properly re-
served for citizens was not such an onerous task as to justify the
blanket proscriptions that were used." 2 The Court repeated a
much older finding that the right to work for a living is an "in-
terest in liberty.""' 13 Deprivation of a discrete class's interest in
that liberty, when that class is not entitled to vote, must be done
according to some due process standards within the fifth
amendment.""'
In the same year that it decided Hampton, the Court de-
cided Mathews v. Diaz,"' 5 which upheld a federal Medicare pro-
vision denying benefits to aliens over 65 years of age who had
not been legal permanent residents in the United States for five
years or more. The Court reasoned this did not amount to a dep-
rivation of liberty without due process of law. According to the
Court, congressional discrimination between the numerous cate-
gories of aliens was constitutionally permissible when the statu-
tory distinctions were not "wholly irrational.""' 6 It was "reason-
able for Congress to make an alien's eligibility depend on both
the character and the duration of his residence.'1117 The Court
announced this result despite its concession that "unnecessary
hardship is incurred by persons just short of qualifying."' M The
circumstances of the case were unlike those involving the welfare
benefits in Graham v. Richardson" 9 because federal, rather
than state benefits, were involved.
The distinction between the results achieved in Hampton
and Mathews is superficially explained by the decision-making
level in the federal government responsible for the discrimina-
tory plans. In Hampton, the prohibited decision to discriminate
had been made by the Civil Service Commission. In Mathews,
1111. Id.
1112. Id. at 114-16.
1113. Id. at 102 (footnote omitted) (referring to Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41
(1915)).
1114. 426 U.S. 102-3.
1115. 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (Stevens, J.).
1116. 426 U.S. at 83.
1117. Id.
1118. Id.
1119. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). See text accompanying note 975 supra.
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Congress itself authorized discrimination against the legal per-
manent residents who desired to receive Medicare benefits. In
an extension of the rationale behind Mathews, Congress, in the
IRCA, placed numerous restrictions on the availability of federal
benefits to aliens in a host of immigration statuses.1120 Whether
there remain any boundaries to the congressional power to limit
federal benefits to aliens cannot be considered completely set-
tled, since many of the benefits Congress has denied to different
categories of aliens affect the lives of such people in ways con-
ceivably far different than in Mathews and may one day raise
issues of fundamental fairness and questions of legislative ra-
tionality which were not presented in the Mathews decision.
The Court has also upheld a federal statutory scheme that
discriminated against some aliens on the basis of illegitimacy,
although state laws discriminating on the basis of illegitimacy
have been struck down as a violation of equal protection. 11 21 In
Fiallo v. Bell," 22 the Court upheld provisions of the INA which
1120. See, e.g., § 121(a) of the IRCA of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3384
(affecting AFDC, Medicaid, unemployment compensation, and the food stamp program).
Section 245A to the INA, as added by § 201(a) of the IRCA, 100 Stat. 3394 (codified at 8
U.S.C.S. § 1255a (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)) created a new category of legal temporary
resident aliens who had already established a continuous unlawful residence since Janu-
ary 1, 1982. Section 245A(h)(1)(A)(i) provides that the new legal temporary residents will
be barred for five years from eligibility for "any program of financial assistance furnished
under Federal law (whether through grant, loan, guarantee, or otherwise) on the basis of
financial need." Such aliens are also barred from "medical assistance under a State plan
approved under title XIX of the Social Security Act" and from "assistance under the
Food Stamp Act of 1977." Section 245(A)(h)(1)(A)(ii), (iii). These are particularly harsh
consequences for people who work and pay federal taxes. A citizen who has just joined
the workforce and has begun to pay taxes does not receive similar discrimination. The
IRCA allows some exceptions for aged, blind, or disabled aliens, as well as restricted
emergency benefits for pregnant women. Section 245A(h)(3). The general restrictions are
directed against some of the most helpless and defenseless individuals in society. It is
constitutionally absurd to assert that under the guise of general immigration powers
Congress and the majoritarian process may ride roughshod over an obviously "discrete
and insular minorit[y]." United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4
(1938).
1121. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) where a state law permitting intes-
tate succession to illegitimate children only from their mothers and not from their fa-
thers was held to deny equal protection. This decision was decided the same day as
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). According to Nowak, Rotunda, & Young, the different
results are explained by the expansive federal power over immigration and naturaliza-
tion. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 649 (3rd ed. 1986).
1122. 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (Powell, J.) (White, J. dissenting) (Marshall, J., dissenting,
joined by Brennan, J.).
discriminated against the relationship between an illegitimate
child and its natural father while according favorable immigra-
tion status to the relationship between an illegitimate child and
its natural mother. 112  At the time of the Fiallo decision, under
the INA, requests for immigrant visas by children or parents of
United States citizens, or children or parents of legal permanent
residents, were facilitated to the extent that the Act's labor cer-
tification requirements were dispensed with,"24 and when a
United States citizen was involved, the numerical quota restric-
tions were also lifted.""' A parent could invoke these provisions
in order to obtain an immigrant visa for a child or conversely,
the child could do so on behalf of the parent. When Fiallo was
decided, the INA excluded an illegitimate child and its unwed
father from obtaining the immigration benefit while simultane-
ously according the benefit when the parties involved were an
illegitimate child and its unwed mother. In deciding that the
discrimination was constitutionally permissible, the Court ad-
hered to considerations of federal sovereignty" 6 as well as the
federal immigration powers in order to defer to Congress' ex-
plicit legislation. Justice Marshall, in his dissent, further ex-
pounded upon the ideas he introduced in his dissenting opinion
in Kleindeinst v. Mandel."27 His dissent was vindicated by the
1123. The statutory provisions under scrutiny were § § 101(b)(1)(D), (b)(2) of the
INA of 1952, 66 Stat. 171, as amended, Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, § 2, 71
Stat. 639 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § § 1101(b)(1)(D), (b)(2) (amended 1986)). Section
101(b)(1) provided that "[t]he term 'child' means an unmarried person under twenty-one
years of age who is- . . (D) an illegitimate child, by, through whom, or on whose behalf
a status, privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the relationship of the child to its
natural mother." Section 101(b)(2) provided that "[tihe terms 'parent', 'father', or
'mother' mean a parent, father or mother only where the relationship exists by virtue of
any of the circumstances set forth in (1) above." Following Fiallo, Congress amended §
101(b)(1)(D) on the INA. See note 1128 infra.
1124. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 789-90, discussing § 212(a)(14) of the INA, as amended by
Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 10, 79 Stat. 917 (1965) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(14)) (labor certification requirement) (amended 1986)).
1125. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 789-90, discussing § 201 (a), (b) of the INA, as amended Act
of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 1, 79 Stat. 911 (1965); as amended Act of Oct. 20,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, § 2, 90 Stat. 2703 (1976) (quota requirements) (currently codi-
fied at 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a), (b) (1982)).
1126. But see, note 394 supra and accompanying text.
1127. 408 U.S. 753 (1972). In Fiallo, Justice Marshall looked at the discriminatory
effect which the statute produced on those already within the United States as citizens
or legal permanent residents. In Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), discussed at text accompa-
nying note 329 supra, Justice Marshall expressed a concern for infringement upon the
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passage of section 315 of the IRCA which amended the INA to
terminate the discrimination against fathers of illegitimate
children. " 2
VIII. ALIENS AND CLAIMS OF ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE UNITED
STATES
Estoppel has not proven to be a successful defense when
raised by aliens in deportation proceedings or other actions by
the INS. In Dunn v. INS,"2 9 certiorari was denied with respect
to a request to review an alien's unsuccessful claim that the INS
was barred from initiating a deportation proceeding. The dissent
explained the factual background of the case. The alien was a
legal permanent resident who temporarily left the United States
to avoid the Vietnam draft.1130 When he returned, he was im-
prisoned because legal permanent residents were obligated by
first amendment rights of United States citizens to hear and speak with Mandel, whom
the United States refused to allow to enter. In his dissent in Fiallo, Justice Marshall
argued that the distinction based upon some type of illegitimacy, but not others, denied
equal protection of the laws to United States citizens:
It is irrelevant that aliens have no constitutional rights to immigrate and that
Americans have no constitutional right to compel the admission of their families.
The essential fact here is that Congress did choose to extend such privileges to
American citizens but then denied them to a small class of citizens.
430 U.S. at 807. Additionally, Justice Marshall continued his inquiry into the asserted
justification or authorization of the discrimination on the alleged basis of national self-
defense or security. He stated that "Congress deliberately chose, for reasons unrelated to
foreign policy concerns or threats to national security, to deny those rights to a class of
citizens traditionally subject to discrimination." Id. at 808. According to Justice Marshall
The class of citizens denied the special privilege of reunification in this
country is defined on the basis of two traditionally disfavored classifica-
tions-gender and legitimacy. Fathers cannot obtain preferred status for their
illegitimate children; mothers can. Conversely, every child except the illegiti-
mate-legitimate, legitimated, step-, adopted-can obtain preferred status for
his or her alien father. The Court has little tolerance for either form of
discrimination.
Id. at 809. This approach by Justice Marshall is a logical extension of the position he
formulated in Mandel.
1128. Section 315 of the IRCA, 100 Stat. 3439, amended § 101(b)(1)(D) of the INA of
1952, to allow that within the definition of the term "child" shall be included "an illegiti-
mate child, by, through whom, or on whose behalf a status, privilege, or benefit is sought
by virtue of the relationship of the child to its natural mother or to its natural father if
the father has or had a bona fide parent-child relationship with the person."
1129. 419 U.S. 919 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting from the denial of cert., joined by
Douglas, J.).
1130. Id. at 920.
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statute to be eligible to serve in the armed forces."1" After he
completed his prison sentence, the INS brought a deportation
proceeding against him on the theory that when he fled the
United States, he lost his status as a legal permanent resident. If
the petitioner were no longer a legal permanent resident when
he left the United States, then he would no longer have been
covered by the statute requiring the imprisonment of legal-per-
manent-resident draft evaders. Since the petitioner served his
term in prison under a statute directed against legal permanent
residents, he claimed the INS was barred, in fundamental fair-
ness, from advancing the argument that he was no longer a legal
permanent resident and no longer entitled to remain in the
United States. The denial of certiorari, in effect, accepted the
INS argument. The dissenting opinion explained that the gov-
ernment had successfully "prosecuted petitioner for breaching
an induction order premised on his status as a permanent resi-
dent" '"32 and was barred from deporting him on a claim that he
had, by the same trip to Canada, lost his legal permanent resi-
dence status. Justice Stewart's dissent concluded that "the judg-
ment before us is grossly unjust. The Service has noted that pe-
titioner has a 'penchant for botching up his life.' Perhaps so, but
the Government's botching up of this case has served to com-
plete the wreckage. ' '1 33
In INS v. Hibi,13 4 an alien petitioned for naturalization
"even though the deadline fixed by Congress for the filing ...
had expired more than 20 years earlier."". 35 The alien was born
in the Philippines and fought for the United States Army during
World War II. A federal statute explicitly allowed for the filing
of a petition for naturalization by December 31, 1946 for those
aliens who had served in the United States Armed Forces. 1136
1131. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 4, 62 Stat. 605, as amended, Act of June 19,
1951, ch. 144 § 1(d), 65 Stat. 76, as amended, Act of Sept. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-129, §
101(a)(2)-(3), 85 Stat. 348 (currently codified at 50 U.S.C. App. § 454(a) (1982)).
1132. 419 U.S. at 921.
1133. Id. at 924.
1134. 414 U.S. 5 (1973) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, and
Marshall, JJ.) See generally, Note, Estopping the Government in Immigration Cases:
The Immigration Estoppel Light Remains Cautionary Yellow, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
731 (1981).
1135. 414 U.S. at 5.
1136. Section 701 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137, as amended, Second
War Powers Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 182 (formerly codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1001), repealed by
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The alien did not file until 1967, after entering the United
States. The alien claimed the government was barred from deny-
ing his petition because it had failed "to advise him, during the
time he was eligible, of his right to apply for naturalization."'"" 7
During the statutory eligibility period there had briefly been a
United States vice-consul in the Philippines to conduct natural-
izations. The Philippine Government, however, feared Filipino
men would leave the Islands and arranged for the vice-consul's
removal from the territory. According to the dissent, in comply-
ing with the request by the Philippine Government to stop natu-
ralizations, the executive branch of the United States deliber-
ately frustrated the congressional purpose behind the statute." 8
Nonetheless, the Court held the United States Government was
not estopped from denying the alien's petition for naturaliza-
tion. It stated:
We do not think that the failure to fully publicize the
rights which Congress accorded under the Act of 1940, or
the failure to have stationed in the Philippine Islands
during all of the time those rights were available an au-
thorized naturalization representative, can give rise to an
estoppel against the Government. 1 39
In INS v. Miranda,"40 a citizen of the Philippines was mar-
ried to a United States citizen in 1976. His wife petitioned for
him to receive an immigrant visa as an "immediate relative" of a
United States citizen." 4' The husband petitioned for an adjust-
ment of status to that of a legal permanent resident under sec-
tion 245(a) of the INA." 42 The INS failed to take action on the
request for eighteen months, by which time the marriage had
broken up, and the wife had withdrawn her request. The alien
claimed an estoppel had arisen from the "unreasonable delay" of
Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, § 403(a)(42), 66 Stat. 280 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §
1440 (1982)).
1137. 414 U.S. at 7-8.
1138. Id. at 10-11.
1139. Id. at 8-9.
1140. 459 U.S. 14 (1982) (per curiam) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1141. Section 201(b) of the INA, 66 Stat. 175 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)
(1982)).
1142. 66 Stat. 217 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1982)).
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the INS"" 3 and that there was "affirmative misconduct" 11" by
the INS which caused him "irrevocable harm."1 5 The Court
disagreed and held that the eighteen month delay was not "un-
warranted."'114 s The claim of estoppel raised by the alien was
therefore denied.
In United States v. Mendoza, 1 4 7 the Court reconsidered the
statutes at issue in Hibi.14 8 A Filipino national desired to be
naturalized thirty-two years after the application deadline had
passed. He claimed the government's withdrawal of a United
States naturalization officer from the Islands during the 1940s
denied him due process of law. In a prior proceeding involving
different aliens, a federal court decided this claim against the
government. 114  The alien argued that the United States was
barred by collateral estoppel from relitigating the same due pro-
cess issue. The Court held, however, that the "United States
may not be collaterally estopped on an issue . . . adjudicated
against it in an earlier lawsuit brought by a different party. '" 1 150
The Court decided that nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel
does not apply against the United States in its efforts to enforce
the immigration laws.115 1
In a case similar to Dunn, but decided several years earlier,
the Court refused to allow the United States to renege upon an
understanding it had reached with a legal permanent resident
1143. 459 U.S. at 16 (quoting from the record of the case).
1144. 459 U.S. at 16 (quoting from the record of the case).
1145. 459 U.S. at 16.
1146. Id. at 18 (footnote omitted).
1147. 464 U.S. 154 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.).
1148. See supra note 1136, and 464 U.S. 154 n.1.
1149. In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans, 406 F. Supp. 931 (N.D.Cal.
1975).
1150. 464 U.S. at 155.
1151. Id. at 158. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (involving
private litigants). The Court defined the terminology it used:
Offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when a plaintiff seeks to foreclose
a defendant from relitigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated un-
successfully in another action against the same or a different party. Defensive
use of collateral estoppel occurs when a defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff
from relitigating an issue the plaintiff has previously litigated unsuccessfully in
another action against the same or a different party.
464 U.S. at 159 n.4 (quoting Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 326 n.4). See note 1309 infra
for cases addressing res judicata in the context of immigration law.
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who was petitioning for naturalization. In Astrup v. INS,""6 the
petitioner was a legal permanent resident from Denmark who
had signed an agreement in 1950 with the United States "to give
up his right to become an American citzen"' 53 in exchange for
which the United States gave up its right to draft him into the
armed forces. In 1951, Congress repealed the 1948 statutory au-
thority for this agreement and made legal permanent residents
ineligible to receive an exemption from military service."15 This
provision was related to the provision under scrutiny in Dunn.
Following the change in law, the Selective Service drafted the
petitioner in violation of the 1950 agreement. He was rejected
from the service, however, when he was found medically unfit to
serve. The petitioner then applied for naturalization. The Court
decided that section 315 of the Act was applicable. It provides
that to be ineligible for citizenship an alien must first apply for
an exemption from military service and, secondly, must in fact
be relieved or discharged from serving. 15 5 Since the petitioner's
exemption in Astrup was only temporary, the Court reasoned
that insufficient grounds were furnished to prevent naturaliza-
tion. The Court thus held the United States to its word and re-
peated a statement by Justice Black in a different case, that
"Great nations, like great men, should keep their word.'
' 156
IX. CITIZENSHIP
Methods of acquiring and loosing citizenship raise funda-
mental issues over who is a member of the national political
community. Easily obtained expulsions from group membership
threaten the security of each individual's citizenship and dis-
courage full participation in the democratic form of government.
A. Citizenship of Those Born Abroad
There are two fundamental ways in which citizenship is
passed through the generations. Common law recognized the
1152. 402 U.S. 509 (1971) (Black, J.).
1153. Id. at 510.
1154. Act of June 19, 1951, ch. 144, § 1(d), 65 Stat. 76 (current version at 50 U.S.C.
App. § 454(a) (1982)). See supra note 1131.
1155. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, § 315, 66 Stat. 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1426 (1982).




passing of citizenship at birth to those infants born within the
geographic boundaries of the country. 1157 This is known as the
principle of jus soli."15 8 From the earliest times, however, special
provision was made for children born to citizens while in a for-
eign country. The passing of citizenship was said to be through
blood, or descent and is known as the principle of jus
sanguini.15 9 Problems often arose concerning rights of inheri-
tance. For example, in 1350, during the reign of Edward the
Third, a statute was passed allowing children born abroad to
English parents the same rights of inheritance other English
subjects enjoyed."6e0 In 1676, the English Parliament passed a
statute to aid in the naturalization of the King's subjects who
were born in foreign countries."'" Other British statutes ad-
dressed similar issues."6
1157. See e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 167-78 (1874).
1158. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 667 (1898).
1159. Id. Reportedly, the rule in ancient Rome was one of jus sanguini, "where the
citizenship of the child followed that of the parent." Id. at 666. Similarly, in France, the
"Code of Napoleon of 1807 changed the law of France, and adopted, instead of the rule
of country of birth, jus soli, the rule of descent or blood, jus sanguini, as the leading
principle." United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 667.
1160. An Act touching such as be born beyond the Seas, 25 Edw. 3 (1350) (Stat. 2)
provided:
And that all Children Inheritors, which from henceforth shall be born without
the Ligeance of the King, whose Fathers and Mothers at the Time of their Birth
be and shall be at the Faith and Ligeance of the King of England, shall have
and enjoy the same Benefits and Advantages, to have and bear the Inheritance
within the same Ligeance, as the other Inheritors aforesaid in Time to come; so
always that the Mothers of such Children do pass the Sea by the Ligeance and
Wills of their Husbands.
1161. An Act for the Naturalizing of Children of his Majesty's English subjects born
in foreign countries during the late Troubles, 29 Car. 2, ch. 6 (1676).
1162. An Act for naturalizing Foreign Protestants, 7 Anne, ch. 5, § 3 (1708) pre-
scribed that "the Children of all natural-born Subjects born out of the Ligeance of her
Majesty, her Heirs and Successors, shall be deemed, adjudged and taken to be natural-
born Subjects of this Kingdom, to all Intents, Constructions, and Purposes whatsoever."
See also, An Act to explain a Clause in an Act made in the seventh Year of the Reign of
her late Majesty Queen Anne (for naturalizing foreign Protestants) which relates to the
Children of the natural-born Subjects of the Crown of England, or of Great Britain, 4
Geo. 2, ch. 21 (1731):
That all Children born out of the Ligeance of the Crown of England, or of Great
Britain, or which shall hereafter be born out of such Ligeance, whose Fathers
were or shall be natural-born Subjects of the Crown of England, or of Great
Britain, at the Time of the Birth of such Children repectively, shall and may
• . . be adjudged and taken to be, and all such Children are hereby declared to
be natural-born Subjects of the Crown of Great Britain, to all Intents, Construc-
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Under the principle of jus soli, the children of English sub-
jects born abroad also obtained citizenship of the foreign coun-
try in which they were born. The problem of dual nationality1 63
thus arose, with its conflicting demands of allegiance to two sov-
ereigns. Nonetheless, the British statutes remained quite gener-
ous in granting citizenship to foreign-born grandchildren of nat-
ural born subjects. This did not extend so far as to grant English
citizenship to great grandchildren of natural-born English sub-
jects.""' The obligation to provide these great grandchildren
with the protection of the British Crown was too great, in light
of competing demands other countries placed on them, and the
significantly attenuated nature of their ties to England.
In the United States, statutes have provided for the grant-
ing of citizenship to children born abroad to United States citi-
zens.1165 During the period of 1802 to 1854, however, the statutes
did not allow for jus sanguini.""6 In the language of the Su-
preme Court, "'naturalization by descent' was not a common-
law concept but was dependent, instead, upon statutory enact-
ment.11 7 One state court indicated that absent any federal or
state court decisions or statutes, the question of citizenship to
those born abroad to a United States citizen must be decided on
the basis of English common law as it existed prior to the pas-
sage of any English statutes on the subject, which directed the
court's inquiry back to the year 1350.11"68
Under the common law tradition, a child born abroad to an
alien father and a citizen mother was barred from inheriting the
tions and Purposes whatsoever.
1163. See discussion in text accompanying note 1232-1303 infra.
1164. 13 Geo. 3, ch. 21 (1773).
1165. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, repealed by Act of Jan. 29,
1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414, repealed by Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566, repealed
by Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 5, 2 Stat. 153; Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 47, 2 Stat. 292;
Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, 10 Stat. 604; REv. STAT. § § 1993, 2165, 2172 (2d ed. 1878).
1166. See Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 311 (1961).
1167. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 828 (1971) (referring to United States v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)).
1168. Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N.Y. 356, 360-62 (1863), referring to 25 Edw. 3. See note
1160, supra. In addressing the question of inheritance, the court decided that a child
born in Peru was a United States citizen since his father was a United States citizen. To
avoid the problem of conflicting allegiance and conflicting requirements of sovereign pro-
tection, the court stated that once such a child comes of age, he must elect which citizen-
ship he will take permanently. Id. at 371, 377.
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mother's citizenship."6 9 The United States adopted the rule" 70
until modern times."7  In Montana v. Kennedy," 72 this prohib-
ited a woman from passing her citizenship to her child born
while she was abroad, despite the fact that within one year of
the child's birth he and his mother returned to the United
States and he resided there continuously for fifty-five years. 1 7 3
The Supreme Court upheld the rule despite noting the "appar-
ent harshness"" 7' of requiring the deportation of a fifty-five-
year-old man who had resided in the United States since
infancy."
75
Theoretically, there is no difference between citizenship ob-
tained by the native born and citizenship obtained by those who
are naturalized." 76 Naturalized citizens receive the protection of
due process under the fifth amendment." 77 Thus, for example,
Congress may not provide in a statute that a naturalized citizen
who returns to and lives in her native country for three years
will lose her United States citizenship while a native born
United States citizen may reside in such foreign country indefi-
nitely without suffering a loss of citizenship.176
In Rogers v. Bellei," 79 however, the Supreme Court indi-
cated that citizenship obtained under the doctrine of jus
1169. Collingwood and Pace, 86 Eng. Rpts. 262, 268 (K.B. 1726) ("[I]t is without
question that, if an English woman go beyond the seas, and marry an alien, and have
issue beyond the seas, the issue are aliens .... ").
1170. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961).
1171. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, 48 Stat. 797, amending REV. STAT. § 1993. The
petitioner in Montana was born in 1906 in Italy. 366 U.S. at 309. According to the Court,
this amendment was prospective only. Id. at 312.
1172. 366 U.S. 308 (1961).
1173. Id. at 309.
1174. Id.
1175. Id. at 310.
1176. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
1177. Id. at 168-69.
1178. Id. The statute under scrutiny in Schneider was § 352 (a)(1) of the INA of
1952, 66 Stat. 163, 269, repealed by Act of Oct. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-432, § 2, 92 Stat.
1046. But cf. the British Nationality Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 56, § 20(3), which
subjects a naturalized citizen to expatriation for grounds not applicable to natural-born
citizens although such grounds are not related to the actual naturalization process. The
section makes disloyal acts or speech a basis for denaturalization (Q 20(3)(a)) and also
provides that within a five-year period following naturalization imprisonment for a term
of not less than twelve months will result in loss of citizenship (Q 20(3)(c)).
1179. 401 U.S. 815 (1971) (Blackmun, J.) (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas,
and Marshall, JJ.) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.).
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sanguini is of a different status and may be treated differently
than citizenship obtained under the doctrine of jus soli. In Bel-
lei the Court interpreted the first sentence of the fourteenth
amendment as an application of the principle of jus soli since it
grants citizenship to individuals who are either born or natural-
ized in the United States who are also subject to its jurisidic-
tion. 1180 In Bellei, the individual who was denied citizenship was
born abroad to a United States citizen mother and an alien fa-
ther," and stood ready to take United States citizenship under
the principle of jus sanguini. His claim failed because he had
not complied with a statutory residency requirement. A chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the requirement of section
301(b) of the INA,"5 2 on fifth amendment due process and four-
teenth amendment grounds, was rejected by the Court. Although
subsequently modified, the statute, as applied in Bellei, required
a "post-age-14 and pre-age-28 residential requirement"'1 8" of
any national and citizen of the United States who was born
abroad by one United States parent and one alien parent. In
1180. Id. at 830.
1181. Id. at 817.
1182. 66 Stat. 163, 236, repealed by Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-584, § 1, 86
Stat. 1289. That section provided:
(b) Any person who is a national and citizen of the United States at birth
under paragraph (7) of subsection (a), shall lose his nationality and citizenship
unless he shall come to the United States prior to the age of attaining the age of
twenty-three years and shall immediately following any such coming be continu-
ously physically present in the United States for at least five years: Provided,
That such physical presence follows the attainment of the age of fourteen years
and precedes the age of twenty-eight years.
Section 301(a) of the 1952 Act, 66 Stat. 163, 235-36 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1401
(1982) as amended by Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653, § 12, 100 Stat. 3657)
provided:
SEC. 301. (a) The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at
birth:
(7) a person born outside the geographic limits of the United States and
its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a
citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physi-
cally present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or
periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were after at-
taining the age of fourteen years: Provided, That any periods of honorable
service in the Armed Forces of the United States by such citizen parent may
be included in computing the physical presence requirements of this
paragraph.
1183. 401 U.S. at 817.
Bellei, the deprivation of citizenship was upheld.
Bellei involved an alien father, a citizen of Italy, who was
never a United States citizen. He married the plaintiff's mother
in Philadelphia in 1939. She was 24, a United States citizen, and
had fulfilled a requirement of ten-year physical presence in the
United States by residing more than five of those years while
over the age of fourteen within the United States. According to
the terms of the statute then in force, she was therefore eligible
to pass her United States citizenship to a child born abroad. 1184
After the married couple moved to Italy, tha plaintiff was born
in 1939, and thereby attained Italian citizenship at birth under
Italian law. At birth, plaintiff also obtained United States citi-
zenship under existing United States law." 8" Later, the plaintiff
failed to comply with the provisions of section 301(b) of the INA
by not beginning a period of residence in the United States prior
to his twenty-third birthday that would permit him to reside
physically in' the United States for a continuous period of five
years prior to his 28th birthday.1 8
In denying citizenship, the Court circumscribed the effect of
two earlier decisions rendered by the Warren Court."81 The
Court reasoned that under the fourteenth amendment, Bellei
was neither born nor naturalized in the United States, nor had
he been subject to its jurisdiction." 88 In short, Bellei was not "a
Fourteenth-Amendment-first-sentence citizen.""189 The Court
accepted this as a distinguishing factor from the rules an-
1184. As required by § 301(a) of the 1952 Act, 66 Stat. 235-36. See supra note 1182.
1185. Act of May 24, 1934, § 1, 48 Stat. 797, amending REV. STAT. § 1993 (2d ed.
1878).
1186. Notably, when Bellei, the plaintiff, was twenty years of age he registered in
Italy, under the United States Selective Service requirements. He was "asked to report
for induction in the District of Columbia" after his twenty-third birthday when, techni-
cally, he had already lost his United States citizenship. 401 U.S. at 819. His induction
was deferred since he was a NATO employee in Europe. In early 1964, however, Selective
Service informed him he was no longer obligated to the United States military because
he had previously lost his United States citizenship.
1187. Afroyim v' Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) (involuntary expatriation of a naturalized
citizen prohibited, although the citizen participated in a foreign election); Schneider v.
Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964). According to Justice Blackmun, these cases were based upon
fourteenth amendment citizenship. Bellei, 401 U.S. at 835.
1188. The first sentence of § 1 of the fourteenth amendment reads: "All persons born
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
1189. 401 U.S. at 827.
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nounced in earlier cases involving loss of citizenship. According
to Justice Blackmun in Afroyim v. Rusk,"90 where citizenship
was maintained, the individual "was naturalized in the United
States"11 91 and, in Schneider v. Rusk," 9 the alien's "citizenship
was derivative by her presence here and by her mother's natu-
ralization here.""' 93
Since the fourteenth amendment did not apply to Bellei,
Justice Blackmun turned to the applicable statutory provision
enacted by Congress under its power to "establish an uniform
rule of Naturalization."' 1 94 The Court reasoned that since Con-
gress could withhold citizenship from someone in Bellei's posi-
tion until he resided in the United States a specified period,
Congress could also grant citizenship to one born abroad pursu-
ant to the imposition of a subsequent condition of residency for
a specified period within the United States. Bellei's claim to citi-
zenship was "wholly, and only, statutory."' 95 Therefore, the
statute could constitutionally provide for denial of the claim.
Justice Black's dissent made clear the irreconcilability of
the decision with prior cases. In Afroyim, for example, the Court
granted fourteenth amendment protection to citizenship against
any statutory deprival unless the citizen voluntarily relinquished
such citizenship. The Constitution does not provide for different
categories of citizenship. Once citizenship is obtained, it cannot
be differentiated from the citizenship others possess. In Bellei,
the plaintiff had "neither renounced his American citizenship
nor voluntarily assented to any governmental act terminating
it.""' 96 Justice Black would have held that section 301(b) of the
INA was in conflict with the result obtained in Afroyim because
the statute did not consider the citizen's intent to relinquish his
citizenship. Additionally, Schneider rejected the "concept of a
hierarchy of citizenship" that allows for the citizenship of some
individuals to be less secure than the citizenship of others." 97
The fourteenth amendment does not protect "the citizenship of
1190. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
1191. 401 U.S. at 827.
1192. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
1193. 401 U.S. at 827.
1194. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, quoted at 401 U.S. at 829.
1195. 401 U.S. at 833.
1196. Id. at 838.
1197. Id. at 839.
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some Americans and not others."" 9
According to Justice Black's dissent, Bellei was naturalized
into the United States by the statute granting him citizenship at
birth. He was thereby naturalized in the United States under
the language of the fourteenth amendment. 1199 Anyone who ob-
tained citizenship under a statute which Congress passed pursu-
ant to its power to establish a "uniform rule of Naturalization"
is a "naturalized" citizen for purposes of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The rule from Schneider v. Rusk is that there should be
no difference between the status of citizenship stemming from
the manner in which that citizenship has been obtained. The
word "in" appearing in the first sentence of the fourteenth
amendment, Justice Black pointed out, means "into": All per-
sons naturalized into the United States are citizens of the
United States. 1200 Justice Black relied upon Afroyim for the pro-
position that "every American citizen has Fourteenth Amend-
ment citizenship.' 2 0
The Court's decision in Bellei is not completely compati-
ble120 2 with Schneider v. Rusk. 20 3 In Schneider, the Court held
that the fifth amendment's guarantee of due process prohibited
unequal treatment between native born citizens and those citi-
zens who obtained their citizenship through naturalization. The
statute under scrutiny, 20' which was held unconstitutional, re-
voked the citizenship of a naturalized citizen who resided in the
1198. Id.
1199. Id. at 839-40. Justice Black explained that Bellei was "constitutionally speak-
ing, 'naturalized in the United States.'" 401 U.S. at 839 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1). Justice Black presented a practical definition of "naturalization." According
to this definition, "naturalization when used in its constitutional sense is a generic term
describing and including within its meaning all those modes of acquiring American citi-
zenship other than birth in this country. All means of obtaining American citizenship
which are dependent upon a congressional enactment are forms of naturalization." Id. at
841.
1200. Id. at 843.
1201. Id. at 843-44.
1202. Justice Brennan's dissent placed the Bellei decision into perspective vis-A-vis
the Warren Court decisions when he stated that "I suppose today's decision downgrading
citizens born outside the United States should have been expected. Once again . . . the
Court's opinion makes evident that its holding is contrary to earlier decisions." 401 U.S.
at 845.
1203. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
1204. Section 352(a)(1) of the INA of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 269, repealed by Act of Oct.
10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-432, § 2, 92 Stat. 1046.
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country "of which she was formerly a national"12 5 for a period
of three years or more, but it did not similarly provide for citi-
zenship revocation of native-born citizens from the United
States who resided in other countries for similar extended peri-
ods. The Court forbade a statutory distinction based upon the
method of acquiring citizenship.120
The majority in Bellei distinguished Schneider and Afroyim
on the basis that those two earlier decisions involved naturaliza-
tion of individuals who had spent some time within the United
States. The result in Afroyim, however, permitted denaturaliza-
tion only where the United States citizen intends to relinquish
it. The Court stated in Afroyim that "neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution ex-
pressly grants Congress the power to take away that citizenship
once it has been acquired.""1 0 Therefore, the citizen must in-
tend to relinquish such citizenship. Further, the element of in-
tent cannot be invoked in some denaturalizations, while not con-
sidered in other denaturalizations, since so doing violates the
holding in Schneider that no distinction may be made favoring
one subclass of citizens over another.
B. Expatriation of Those Born Within the United States
Birth within the United States is not necessarily a guaran-
tee of citizenship. 1208 But it is now beyond cavil that, absent cer-
tain restrictions, 1109 an individual born in the United States is a
United States citizen.1 210 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 reaffirmed
the principle of jus soli within the United States. 12 11 Ratification
1205. Bellei, 401 U.S. at 821.
1206. Indeed, the language of Schneider provides: "We start from the premise that
the rights of citizeiship of the native born and of the naturalized person are of the same
dignity and are coextensive." Schneider, 377 U.S. at 165.
1207. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 254-55.
1208. See, e.g., Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 417 (1891)(evidence that a
child was born in the United States may lack credibility and he may be denied entry into
the United States).
1209. E.g., children of ambassadors, or of enemy aliens, particularly those of an occu-
pying force. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 657-58, 674-75, 682 (1898).
1210. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898); see also Mandoli v. Ache-
son, 344 U.S. 133, 134 (1952) (Jackson, J.); Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 328 (1939);
Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 306 (1915).
1211. Act of Apr. 9, 1886, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, povided that "all persons born in
the United States and not subject to any foreign power ...are hereby declared to be
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of the fourteenth amendment on July 28, 1868, ensured that
"[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and sub-
ject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside.' 12 12 This rule was inter-
preted in United States v. Wong Kim Ark" to guarantee citi-
zenship to any child born within the geographic boundaries of
the United States unless the parents of such child were either
diplomats of a foreign country or serving in some official capac-
ity for a foreign government.' 14
In Wong Kim Ark, an individual of Chinese ancestry born
in San Francisco 111 5 was denied permission to return to the
United States following a trip to China. 121 6 His claim to United
States citizenship was upheld by the Supreme Court over the
restrictions of the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 217 which were
designed to prohibit certain individuals of the Chinese race2 1 8
as well as Chinese laborers 21 9 from entering the country. The
Supreme Court suggested limitations on the congressional power
to regulate naturalization when it stated that "Itlhe power of
naturalization, vested in Congress by the Constitution, is a
power to confer citizenship, not a power to take it away. "1220
Controversy on this point continues although it may be con-
ceded that the modern rule supports a contrary conclusion.122'
Throughout history, there have been numerous instances in
which the courts have upheld legislation designed to strip indi-
viduals of their citizenship, regardless whether such citizenship
belonged to the native born122 2 or the duly naturalized. 2 23
citizens of the United States."
1212. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, proposed June 16, 1866 by the House and Senate
"to the legislatures of the several States," 14 Stat. 358, and ratified July 28, 1868, 15
Stat. 708-11.
1213. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
1214. Id. at 653.
1215. Id. at 652.
1216. Id. at 653.
1217. The Chinese Exclusion Acts appear at note 17 supra.
1218. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 13, 1888, ch. 1015, § 3, 25 Stat. 476, and other statutes
cited in note 17 supra.
1219. See, e.g., Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, and other statutes cited in
note 17 supra.
1220. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 703.
1221. See, e.g., cases cited at notes 1224-1353 infra.
1222. See, e.g., discussion at text accompanying notes 1224 and 1229 infra.
1223. See, e.g., discussion at text accompanying notes 1304-53 infra.
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In MacKenzie v. Hare,12 24 for example, the Court upheld a
statute which suspended, during marriage, the citizenship of a
native born woman who married a foreigner yet who remained
within the United States. Under the statute at the time,2 25 upon
termination of the marriage, the woman could resume her
United States citizenship by continuing to reside within the
United States. The unconvincing rationale behind this decision
was that the expatriation occurred voluntarily as indicated by
the free undertaking of marriage. 1226 In recent times, Congress
has provided for restrictions on expatriation so that a citizen
cannot be expatriated while within the United States. 1 2 7 A nat-
uralized citizen, however, may be denaturalized while within the
United States following a court proceeding which determines
that the original grant of naturalization was improperly
conferred. 2 8
In Savorgan v. United States, 229 the Court held that a na-
tive born citizen who obtained Italian citizenship in order to
marry her Italian husband in 1940, and who lived in Italy and
Germany from 1941 to 1945, had lost her United States citizen-
ship as Congress required by statute. 23 0 The Court identified
voluntary intent as a required component for expatriation mea-
sured according to an objective basis through the ordinary
meaning of the woman's overt acts in taking Italian citizenship
and an oath of allegiance to Italy. Although the oath the woman
signed renouncing her United States citizenship was in a lan-
guage she could not understand, 23 ' the Court considered the or-
dinary meaning of her acts and did not condition expatriation
1224. 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
1225. Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228.
1226. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. at 310-12.
1227. Section 351(a) of the INA, 66 Stat. 163, 269 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §
1483(a) (1982)). The statute provides that, with certain exceptions, no national may ex-
patriate himself while within the United States, where a national includes a citizen of the
United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(21), (22) (1982). The statute also defines naturalization
as the conferring, by whatever means, "of nationality of a state upon a person after
birth." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(23),(24) (1982).
1228. See the cases discussed supra at text accompanying notes 1304-53 infra. See 8
U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982) (judicial revocation of naturalization by setting aside order ad-
mitting person to citizenship).
1229. 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
1230. The Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401(a), (b), 54 Stat. 1168-69.
1231. Savorgan, 338 U.S. at 494, 494 n.3 (1950).
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upon an analysis of her undisclosed intentions.
C. Dual Nationality
The restrictions on citizenship to those born abroad seek in
large part to avoid the problems accompanying dual nationality.
In Perkins v. Elg, the Court defined dual nationality as that con-
dition in which "two States make equal claim to the allegiance
of an individual at the same time.1' 232 It is generally regarded as
a disfavored status because of the conflicts that can arise when
two states make competing claims over the same individual, or
when the dual national turns to one state for protection from
the other. Despite statutory allowances granting citizenship to
those born abroad, 2 8 nations may seek to protect their interests
by curtailing this method of obtaining citizenship. In the United
States, children born abroad to American citizens who them-
selves obtained United States citizenship through descent and
not from presence in the United States, would not be considered
fourteenth amendment first-sentence citizens. 123 4 Such children's
claim to citizenship thereby rests more heavily upon the statu-
tory largesse of Congress' constitutionally authorized naturaliza-
tion power.
For example, based upon statutory interpretation, the Su-
preme Court held in Weedin v. Chin Bow, 2 35 that a United
States citizen father must have resided in the United States
before the birth abroad of his child in order for that child to
obtain United States citizenship. In Chin Bow, the individual
laying the claim to United States citizenship was born in China.
His grandfather was born in the United States and thereby pos-
sessed United States citizenship. Chin Bow's father was born in
China and took his United States citizenship from Chin Bow's
grandfather. Chin Bow's father did not visit the United States
1232. 307 U.S. 325, 344 (1939), (quoting DEP'T OF STATE, COMPILATION OF CERTAIN
DEPARTMENTAL CIRCULARS, 118, 121, 122 (1925) (containing instructions to diplomatic
and consular officers)). The Court has also defined dual nationality to be the "exercise
[of] rights of nationality in two countries [while] subject to the responsibilities of both."
Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 723 (1952).
1233. See text accompanying notes 1157-1207 supra.
1234. See text accompanying note 1189 supra.
1235. 274 U.S. 657 (1927).
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until after Chin Bow's birth,123 6 and according to statute, 237 the
succession of citizenship was curtailed as to Chin Bow. The la-
tent anomaly in such a scheme was that a father could be abroad
and have alien children, but later travel to the United States
and have citizen children. Nevertheless, the Court rejected Chin
Bow's argument that his father's residence at any time in the
United States entitled Chin Bow to citizenship. Part of the
Court's rationale lay in the proposition that the father's resi-
dence requirement would have to be fulfilled prior to the trans-
mission of citizenship. Since the transmission occurs at the birth
of the child, rather than upon the death of the ancestor, 238 Chin
Bow's claim failed. By curtailing Chin Bow's claim to citizen-
ship, the Court eliminated the potential problem of dual
nationality.
In appropriate circumstances, the Court will tolerate the ex-
istence of a condition which looks tellingly to be one of dual na-
tionality. 29 The Court has allowed persons to have dual nation-
ality while leaving the details for Congress and the lower courts
to resolve. The Court has been reluctant to prohibit dual nation-
ality when the individual is a native born United States citi-
zen, 240 or when there are other compelling reasons to continue
United States citizenship.124' Perkins v. Elg,2 41 for example,
concerned Marie Elg who was born in the United States in 1907
to emigrants from Sweden. From 1911 to 1929, she resided in
1236. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. at 658.
1237. REv. STAT. § 1993 (2d ed. 1878), which provided:
All children heretofore born or hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdic-
tion of the United States, whose fathers were or may be at the time of their
birth citizens thereof, are declared to be citizens of the United States; but the
rights of citizenship shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided in
the United States.
This provision embodied the Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, 10 Stat. 604, which reenacted
provisions that had been repealed by the Act of Apr. 14, 1802, § 5, 2 Stat. 153. See note
1165, supra.
1238. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. at 675.
1239. See, e.g., United States v. Gay, 264 U.S. 353 (1924) (the presumption that a
naturalized citizen relinquishes his citizenship by returning to and living in his native
country for over two years does not apply where the individual was rendering services for
the United States Navy).
1240. See, e.g., Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
1241. See, e.g., Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952), discussed infra at
text accompanying note 1250 infra.
1242. 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
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Sweden. In 1929 she was admitted to the United States on a
United States passport as a United States citizen.124 s Subse-
quently, the Department of Labor threatened her with deporta-
tion from time to time, and the Secretary of State refused to
issue her another passport.12" The Court held that a child born
in the United States who is taken, during his or her minority, to
the country of his parents' origin and whose parents resume
their allegiance to the foreign country, does not therefore lose
his or her "citizenship in the United States provided that on at-
taining majority he elects to retain that citizenship and to return
to the United States to assume its duties." '245 Absent a suitable
treaty or statute to alter this result, a person may have a dual
nationality until reaching "adult years,""1 4 at which time an
election needs to be made.
The Court extended this ruling in Mandoli v. Acheson'2 7 to
allow a native born United States citizen to maintain his citizen-
ship despite his foreign residence in Italy, his parents' native
country, many years after attaining his majority. The Court de-
cided that although the individual in Perkins v. Elg returned to
the United States promptly upon reaching her majority, the Elg
Court ruling did not apply to factual circumstances where the
individual claiming citizenship had resided outside the United
States for a longer period of time. The Court in Mandoli v. Ach-
eson expressed reluctance to remove citizenship absent a clear
statutory mandate to do so,12 48 and described the immigration
officials' view of the law as "harsh and technical.1124 9
The Court relaxed its intolerance of dual nationality most
strikingly in Kawakita v. United States,'2 50 where, notwith-
standing the preceding case law restrictions on dual nationality,
it held that a native born United States citizen of Japanese par-
ents who lived in Japan during the Second World War,125' had
not committed acts amounting to expatriation despite his se-
1243. Id. at 327.
1244. Id. at 328.
1245. Id. at 329 (footnote omitted).
1246. Id. at 345.
1247. 344 U.S. 133, 134 (1952) (Jackson, J.).
1248. Id. at 139.
1249. Id. at 138.
1250. 343 U.S. 717 (1952) (Douglas, J.).
1251. Id. at 720-21.
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verely abusive treatment12 5 of United States prisoners of war
during the Second World War. Thus, in punishment for his cru-
elties the Court was able to find him guilty of treason, which
would not have been the case had the Court determined such
acts resulted in expatriation, since a citizen owes an enforceable
allegiance to his country which a nonresident alien does not.253
A citizen's breach of such allegiance can result in a determina-
tion of treason under article III, section 3 of the Constitution.",
Nonetheless, the Court attempted to limit its toleration by stat-
ing dual nationality "could not exist if the assertion of rights or
assumption of liabilities of one [citizenship] were deemed incon-
sistent with the maintenance of the other."' 255 It is difficult to
imagine a scenario where an inconsistency could be more pro-
nounced than under the facts in Kawakita.
Six years after deciding that a citizen had not expatriated
himself by aiding the Japanese in World War II, the Court de-
termined in Perez v. Brownell 256 that a native born United
States citizen had expatriated himself by voting in a presidential
election in Mexico. Statutes specifically provided for expatria-
tion as a result of such activities. 257 The Court found Congress
has the power to regulate voting by a United States citizen in a
foreign country under its power to deal with foreign affairs. 258
In distinction with Kawakita, where the United States has an
1252. Id. at 737-40.
1253. Id. at 735-36.
1254. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 of the United States Constitution:
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against
them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person
shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the
same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.
1255. Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 725.
1256. 356 U.S. 44 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.), overruled by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S.
253, 268 (1967).
1257. See The Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401, 54 Stat. 1137, 1168-69,
amended by Act of Sept. 27, 1944, ch. 418, § 1, 58 Stat. 746. Section 401 of the 1940 act
was incorporated into § 349 of the Act of June 27, 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 267-68, (current
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982) as amended by Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-653, § § 18, 19, 100 Stat. 3658). The distinction between expatriation and denaturali-
zation is not always clear. In the context of this paper, expatriation is the denial of citi-
zenship regardless of how that citizenship was obtained, whether by birth or through
naturalization. Denaturalization, on the other hand, is generally used to denote the set-
ting aside of an order of naturalization.
1258. Perez, 356 U.S. at 59.
[Vol. IV
NOTE
interest in seeing a treasonous actor remain eligible for prosecu-
tion upon returning home, the nation also has an interest in cut-
ting ties with a citizen who votes in foreign elections in order to
avoid embarrassment in the conduct of United States foreign af-
fairs.'25 9 In Perez, the Court also announced that Congress'
power to terminate citizenship did not depend upon that citi-
zen's assent. 260 This contradicted earlier statements made by
the Court that expatriation is a voluntary renouncement of citi-
zenship.126' The Court has since modified its position on the is-
sue of assent in expatriation cases.' 2
Chief Justice Warren's dissent in Perez v. Brownell was in-
strumental in leading to the overruling of that decision, although
the Court has not completely embraced his expansive view. He
reasoned that since the government exists only by the consent of
the governed, the government cannot subsequently exclude indi-
viduals from the group from which the government received its
existence and legitimacy.'26 " Under the former Chief Justice's
concept of the relationship between the individual citizens and
the government, "the citizens themselves are sovereign, and
their citizenship is not subject to the general powers of their
government."'28 4 Individual citizenship is subject to the powers
of a single branch of government to an even lesser extent.'162
Chief Justice Warren would have flatly prohibited the govern-
ment from removing the citizenship of either the native born or
the lawfully naturalized.' 2 6
1259. Id., 356 U.S. at 60-61. For example, many naturalized United States citizens
participated in the Saar Plebiscite in January 1935 to determine sovereignty over that
territory. Id. at 54.
1260. Id. at 61.
1261. See, e.g., Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 334 (1939) ("Expatriation is the volun-
tary renunciation or abandonment of nationality and allegiance."). Conversely, a
post-Civil War statute recognized the right of all citizens freely to expatriate themselves
without consent of the sovereign. REV. STAT. § 1999 (2d ed. 1878); Act of July 27, 1868,
ch. 249, § 1, 15 Stat. 223, 223-24.
1262. See, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252
(1980).
1263. Perez, 356 U.S. at 64.
1264. Id. at 65.
1265. See, e.g., Justice Black's concurrence in Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 138
(1958) (Black, J. concurring) (citizenship is a constitutional birthright which may not be
involuntarily removed: "What the Constitution has conferred neither the Congress, nor
the Executive, nor the Judiciary, nor all three in concert, may strip away.").
1266. Perez, 356 U.S. at 66, 77. Chief Justice Warren explained:
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On the same day in which the Court decided Perez,12 67 it
rendered two other expatriation decisions which went the other
way. In a plurality opinion authored by Chief Justice Warren,
the Court in Trop v. Dulles2 68 returned to the position that re-
linquishment of citizenship must be voluntarily accomplished ei-
ther through express language or a combination of language and
conduct demonstrating a renunciation of citizenship." 69 In Trop,
a native born American was held not to have lost his citizenship
and not to have become a stateless person despite his conviction
for desertion from the United States armed forces in French
Morocco during wartime following an absence of less than one
day. 12 70 Unlike circumstances where a United States citizen
votes in a foreign election, in the case of a brief desertion, the
United States citizen does not have the opportunity to involve
himself with a foreign state or to show allegiance to another
state. The Trop Court also considered that since the military
authorities had already provided a penalty for desertion, denatu-
ralization as a further punishment violated the eighth amend-
ment's ban against cruel and unusual punishment.12 71
In a third expatriation decision rendered on the same day as
My conclusions are as follows. The Government is without power to take
citizenship away from a native-born or lawfully naturalized American. The Four-
teenth Amendment recognizes that this priceless right is immune from the exer-
cise of governmental powers. If the Government determines that certain conduct
by United States citizens should be prohibited because of anticipated injurious
consequences to the conduct of foreign affairs or to some other legitimate gov-
ernmental interest, it may within the limits of the Constitution proscribe such
activity and assess appropriate punishment. But every exercise of governmental
power must find its source in the Constitution. The power to denationalize is not
within the letter or the spirit of the powers with which our Government was
endowed. The citizen may elect to renounce his citizenship, and under some cir-
cumstances he may be found to have abandoned his status by voluntarily per-
forming acts that compromise his undivided allegiance to his country. The mere
act of voting in a foreign election, however, without regard to the circumstances
attending the participation, is not sufficient to show a voluntary abandonment of
citizenship. The record in this case does not disclose any of the circumstances
under which this petitioner voted. We know only the bare fact that he cast a
ballot. The basic right of American citizenship has been too dearly won to be so
lightly lost.
Perez, 356 U.S. at 77-78. Cf. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. at 257.
1267. 356 U.S. 44 (Mar. 31, 1958).
1268. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
1269. Id. at 92.
1270. Id. at 87-88.
1271. Id. at 101.
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the two just described, the Court determined in Nishikawa v.
Dulles,' 71 that the government must meet a clear, convincing,
and unequivocal standard '12 7 to establish that a native born
United States citizen, who was also a citizen of Japan and who
served in the Japanese Army during the Second World War, had
by his actions voluntarily renounced his United States citizen-
ship. The dispute focused on whether the United States citizen
freely joined the Japanese Army or was involuntarily drafted
into it with no alternative.127' The Court applied the rule of an
earlier case that the clear, convincing and unequivocal eviden-
tiary standard also applies in expatriation proceedings.12 7 5
Other safeguards apply in an expatriation proceeding as
well. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 1 76 the statutorily re-
quired expatriation of native born United States citizens who
left the United States to evade military service was held an un-
constitutional punishment since expatriation occurred automati-
cally without the procedural safeguards of the fifth and sixth
amendments. According to the Court in Mendoza-Martinez,
deprivation of citizenship is a punishment which "cannot be im-
posed without a prior criminal trial and all its incidents, includ-
ing indictment, notice, confrontation, jury trial, assistance of
counsel, and compulsory process for obtaining witnesses."' 2 77
In Afroyim v. Rusk,'2 7 8 the Court resolved doubt on the is-
sue of the necessary state of mind that a citizen must have while
committing an expatriating act in order for the expatriation to
become effective. The Court held that a citizen must voluntarily
renounce citizenship, and that the citizen's assent to expatria-
tion is required. 2 7" The basis of the Court's decision lay in its
analysis that "[i]n our country the people are sovereign and the
Government cannot sever its relationship to the people by tak-
1272. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958).
1273. 356 U.S. at 133. For a discussion how this standard developed and applies in
denaturalization proceedings, see the discussion infra accompanying notes 1304-53. The
burden was placed on the government. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
1274. Id. at 134-35. See also Acheson v. Okimura, 342 U.S. 899 (1952); Acheson v.
Murata, 342 U.S. 900 (1952).
1275. Id. at 133. See Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920 (1955).
1276. 372 U.S. 144, 165-66 (1963) (Goldberg, J.).
1277. Id. at 167.
1278. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
1279. Id. at 257.
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ing away their citizenship.' 1 280 Referring to the natural and in-
herent right of all people to expatriation,1281 the Court recog-
nized that the government cannot control or confer such
right. 2 82 In Afroyim, a Polish national who became a naturalized
United States citizen later voted in an election for the Knesset
in Israel. In determining that he had not lost his United States
citizenship, the Court overruled Perez v. Brownell. 128 Afroyim
held that the statute requiring expatriation for voting in a for-
eign election 2 84 was unconstitutional since the citizen had not
assented- to expatriation nor voluntarily renounced his citizen-
ship. A subsequent opinion by the United States Attorney Gen-
eral took the position that the Afroyim principles reached sev-
eral other sections of the 1952 Act. 285
In Vance v. Terrazas,2 8a the Supreme Court described in
greater detail the application of the "voluntary relinquishment"
standard. In this case, a native born United States citizen who
also bore Mexican nationality was charged with loss of United
States nationality because he allegedly swore an oath of alle-
giance to Mexico in violation of statute 287 and renounced his
United States citizenship. Based on the preceding cases where
much more egregious acts were held not to expatriate United
States citizens bearing dual nationality, 288 the taking of an oath
to a foreign country perhaps does not seem as inconsistent with
the continued possession of United States citizenship, especially
when one considers that the individual involved was also a citi-
zen of Mexico at the time he took the oath.'289 In Terrazas, how-
1280. Id.
1281. See statutes in note 1261 supra.
1282. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 265 n.20.
1283. 356 U.S. 44 (1958),' discussed at text accompanying note 1256 supra.
1284. The statutory restrictions against voting in foreign elections were repealed by
Act of Oct. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-432, § 2, 92 Stat. 1046, repealing § 349(a)(5) of the
INA, 66 Stat. 268.
1285. 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 397 (1969) (all of the provisions concerning expatriation in §
349(a) of the INA require a determination of voluntary relinquishment of United States
citizenship).
1286. 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
1287. Section 349(a)(2) of the INA, 66 Stat. 267 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §
1481(a)(2) (1982), as amended by Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653, § 18, 100
Stat. 3658).
1288. See, e.g., Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952), discussed at text ac-
companying notes 1250-55 supra.
1289. Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 255.
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ever, the Court upheld the deprivation of citizenship.
Although the denaturalization cases require compliance
with a clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidentiary stan-
dard,2 9' the standard utilized in the expatriation proceeding of
a native born citizen in Terrazas was the lower preponderance
of the evidence standard as prescribed by statute.""9' An anom-
aly thereby results in that the evidentiary standard used to ex-
patriate a native born citizen is less rigorous than the standard
used to denaturalize one who originally was an alien to the
United States.2
92
In Vance v. Terrazas, the statute in question required the
government to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an
expatriating act, such as swearing an oath of allegiance to a for-
eign government, occurred.' 93 Any person who committed such
an act is presumed to have acted voluntarily, but can rebut the
presumption with a showing, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the act was not committed voluntarily. 2 94 The Court
1290. See cases discussed at text following note 1304 infra.
1291. The Court relied upon § 349(c) of the INA, 66 Stat. 267, as amended by Act of
Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 19, 75 Stat. 656 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §
1481(c) (1982)):
(c) Whenever the loss of United States nationality is put in issue in any
action or proceeding commenced on or after the enactment of this subsection
under, or by virtue of, the provisions of this or any other Act, the burden shall
be upon the person or party claiming that such loss occurred, to establish such
claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Except as otherwise provided in sub-
section (b), any person who commits or performs, or who has committed or per-
formed, any act of expatriation under the provisions of this or any other Act
shall be presumed to have done so voluntarily, but such presumption may be
rebutted upon a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the act or
acts committed or performed were not done voluntarily.
When Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (denaturalization) was decided in 1960, and
adhered to the clear, unequivocal and continuing evidence standard, this amendment
dealing with the distinct issue of expatriations was not yet law and the lesser evidentiary
standard could not be applied to the Chaunt decision. Following the amendment how-
ever, Fedorenko v. United States, a denaturalization proceeding indicated the clear, une-
quivocal, and convincing evidentiary standard was still in force. See text accompanying
notes 1316-53 infra.
1292. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (1982) (revocation of naturalization) with 8 U.S.C. §
1481(c) (1982) (loss of nationality by native born or naturalized citizen).
1293. Section 349 (c) of the INA, 66 Stat. 267, as amended by Act of Sept. 26, 1961,
Pub.*L. No. 87-301, § 19, 75 Stat. 656 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c) (1982)). This
statute followed as a response to the imposition in Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129
(1958) of a clear, unequivocal, and convincing standard.
1294. Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 267-68.
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held, in line with earlier cases such as Afroyim v. Rusk,'2 " that
the government must prove an intent to surrender United States
citizenship. Further, the Court decided that Congress possessed
the constitutional authorization to legislate the standard of
proof to be utilized in expatriation proceedings as well as the
authorization to legislate into existence the described statutory
presumptions.'296 Terrazas requires that loss of citizenship may
occur only through a voluntary act of expatriation coupled with
an assent to be expatriated. Assent means an intention on the
part of the citizen to surrender his citizenship which can be ei-
ther expressly stated or inferred from proven conduct."97
The presumption that the expatriating act was voluntarily
committed follows once the expatriating act is proven to have
occurred. The intent, however, to relinquish citizenship cannot
be presumed. 298 Rather, the government must establish such in-
tent by a preponderance of the evidence. 1299 Unlike Terrazas, in
Nishikawa,3 00 the government had to prove the expatriating act
was performed voluntarily.130 In Terrazas, the statute provided
for a presumption of voluntariness. 302 In Nishikawa, the gov-
ernment had to prove its case on the basis of the clear, convinc-
ing, and unequivocal evidentiary standard, 30 3 but following a
statutory amendment the Court in Terrazas was able to apply a
preponderance of the evidence standard, finding no constitu-
tional bar to Congress' implementation of the lesser standard.
D. Denaturalization
Citizenship may be revoked by the federal courts when it
has been procured on the basis of false evidence. 1304 When a
1295. Discussed at text accompanying note 1278 supra.
1296. This accounts for the difference in standards utilized in Terrazas, 444 U.S. at
264-70, and in Nishikawa, 356 U.S. 129 (1957).
1297. Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 260-61.
1298. Id at 268.
1299. Id.
1300. 356 U.S. 129 (1957).
1301. Id. at 133-38.
1302. Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 269.
1303. Nishikawa, 356 U.S. at 133.
1304. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912) (admitted perjury of two
witnesses at an initial naturalization hearing who testified falsely that the individual
seeking naturalization had resided within the United States for a statutorily prescribed
five-year period prior to naturalization); Schwinn v. United States, 311 U.S. 616 (1940),
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statute passed by Congress so provides, a naturalized citizen liv-
ing permanently abroad may lose his citizenship under the the-
ory that such a naturalized individual indicates a lack of intent
to become a permanent citizen of the United States.'.. 5 A
judge's mistake during the naturalization proceeding concerning
either an interpretation of law or facts may also result in the
naturalized citizen subsequently losing his citizenship. 3 6 An
alien's failure to comply with technicalities in a naturalization
proceeding can later result in denaturalization. 3 0 7 Naturalized
citizenship may be revoked even where the alien's inability to
comply with technical statutory requirements during the natu-
ralization proceeding results from the delay of an agency of the
United States Government. 30 8
The doctrine of res judicata does not bar the United States
from raising the same objections against an individual's citizen-
ship in a denaturalization proceeding which the United States
unsuccessfully advanced at an earlier naturalization proceeding
af'g. 112 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1940). Under the statute interpreted in Johannessen, United
States citizenship could be conferred by state courts. See REV. STAT. § 2165 (2d ed. 1878)
(paragraph first). Congress passed the statute under authority of the naturalization
clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and thereby delegated its power to confer citizenship
to the states while also reserving the same power for the federal courts.
1305. Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9 (1913) (since denaturalization is an equitable
remedy, rather than one at law, the seventh amendment's requirement of a trial by jury
does not apply, and a naturalized citizen, who moved to South Africa, joined the South
African Medical Association and served in the Boer War, was properly denaturalized);
see also Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3592, § 15, 34 Stat. 601 (paragraph second).
1306. United States v. Ginsburg, 243 U.S. 472 (1917).
1307. United States v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319 (1917) (Brandeis, J.). In Ness, the alien had
failed to file in his naturalization proceeding a certificate stating the date, place and
manner of his arrival into the United States as required by the Act of June 29, 1906, ch.
3592, § 4, 34 Stat. 596, 597 (paragraph second). An alien who entered the United States
unobserved could evade a physical examination, payment of the "alien head tax," as well
as registration of entry into the country. Ness, 245 U.S. at 321. See also, Polites v.
United States, 364 U.S. 426 (1960) (acts committed before naturalization can be the ba-
sis for later revocation of citizenship).
1308. Maney v. United States, 278 U.S. 17 (1928) (Holmes, J.). In this case, the alien
filed a petition for naturalization on November 13, 1923, but the Department of Labor
did not issue a certificate indicating the date, place, and manner of the alien's arrival
into the United States, as was required under the Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3592, § 4, 34
Stat. 596, 597 (paragraph second), until November 24, 1923, and did not mail the certifi-
cate to the naturalization court until December 3. The Supreme Court construed the
statute to require a filing of the document simultaneously with the original petition of
naturalization.
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of that individual."0 9 To offset this advantage, the burden which
the government bears to obtain an order of denaturalization is
made heavy enough to afford the naturalized citizen some pro-
tections.1310 The burden of proof rests on the government to
demonstrate by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that
citizenship was not conferred according to exacting legal
standards."l "'
1309. United States v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319 (1917) (Brandeis, J.); Johannessen v.
United States, 225 U.S. 227, 238 (res judicata does not appply when the government did
not appear in the original naturalization proceeding); Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S.
654, 671 (1946) (the decision to accept an alien's oath foreswearing allegiance to his or
her home country is not res judicata because no evidence is heard at the naturalization
proceeding to establish the truthfulness or falsity of such an oath; fraud in the oath is
not an issue adjudicated in the naturalization proceeding); see also Pearson v. Williams,
202 U.S. 281 (1906) (Holmes, J.) (board inquiries concerning an alien's right to land in
the United States are not res judicata in a later deportation proceeding); Lewis v. Frick,
233 U.S. 291, 301-02 (1914)(a verdict and judgment from a federal district court acquit-
ting an indicted alien of charges of importing a woman into the United States for im-
moral purposes is not res judicata and is not binding upon the executive branch's admin-
istrative proceeding when there is a subsequent deportation hearing against the same
alien on the same charges).
1310. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
1311. Id. at 125. In Schneiderman, the government failed to show by clear, unequivo-
cal, and convincing evidence that the naturalized citizen had not been attached to the
principles of the Constitution at the time of the naturalization. Id. at 142.
The clear, unequivocal, and convincing standard of proof remains applicable in de-
naturalization proceedings. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505-07 (1981);
Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350
(1960); Maisenberg v. United States, 356 U.S. 670 (1958); Nowak v. United States, 356
U.S. 660 (1958); Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946); Baumgartner v. United
States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944).
The clear, unequivocal, and convincing standard of proof is not utilized in naturali-
zation proceedings where the burden is on the alien to show his eligibility for citizenship.
Berenyi v. INS, 385 U.S. 630, 637 (1967).
The clear, unequivocal, and convincing standard of proof is also observed in depor-
tation proceedings, Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966), despite the language in §
242(b)(4) of the INA of 1952, 66 Stat. 210 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (1982)),
which specifies a reasonable, substantial, and probative evidentiary standard.
The Schneiderman decision is also notable for the position Justice Murphy took
regarding those who are ideologically opposed to the majority view of people in the
United States, as well as for the concern which the opinion expressed to avoid trammel-
liing fundamental American values with broadly construed immigration statutes.
Schneiderman involved a member of the Communist Party who refused to relinquish his
United States citizenship. Justice Murphy started the Court's opinion with the caveat
that "[wle brought this case here ... because of its importance and its possible relation
to freedom of thought." 320 U.S. at 119. The Justice also stated that "[t]he constitu-
tional fathers, fresh from a revolution, did not forge a political strait-jacket for the gen-
erations to come." Id. at 137 (footnote omitted). He announced a standard that immigra-
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In the denaturalization context, the Court is reluctant to re-
examine issues going to the beliefs held by an individual in an
earlier naturalization proceeding,81 2 because of difficulties in
proof.'" Sufficient proof to clear the high hurdle to warrant de-
naturalization may be had where objective indicia establish that
the naturalized citizen falsely foreswore allegiance to his or her
prior sovereign during the naturalization proceeding.'' 4 Histori-
tion law generally fails to attain:
Whatever attitude we may individually hold toward persons and organizations
that believe in or advocate extensive changes in our existing order, it should be
our desire and concern at all times to uphold the right of free discussion and free
thinking to which we as a people claim primary attachment.
Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 139. In the context of entry into the United States this rule
has not been observed. See the discussion in this paper concerning Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) and recent developments on this issue at text accompanying
note 329 supra.
1312. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944).
1313. Id. 675 (noting that "proof is treacherous and objective judgment, even by the
most disciplined minds, precarious"). The naturalized citizen in Baumgartner was
charged with failing to renounce his allegiance to the German Reich in his naturalization
proceeding in 1932. The Court expressed its concern that "we must be . . . watchful that
citizenship once bestowed should not be in jeopardy nor in fear of exercising its Ameri-
can freedom through a too easy finding that citizenship was disloyally acquired." Id. at
676.
1314. Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 660 (1946). In this case, the alien had
obtained citizenship in 1937 (id. at 656), but maintained and further developed intimate
ties with the German Reich and was actively involved in a leadership role in promoting
Adolf Hitler's cause in the United States. Id. 668-69. Denaturalization was awarded in
Knauer whereas no order of denaturalization followed in Baumgartner, 322 U.S. 665,
because of the degree of involvement with and support of the Third Reich which the
naturalized citizen displayed in Knauer. Since the issue went to the intent at the time of
the oath at the naturalization proceeding, it is also significant that Baumgartner ob-
tained an order of naturalization in 1932 (Baumgartner, 322 U.S. at 665-66) whereas
Knauer took his oath of allegiance in 1937 (Knauer, 328 U.S. at 656), at a point much
closer in time to the start of full-scale hostilities between Germany and the United
States.
It is notable that Justice Rutledge's dissent in Knauer admonished that "[in my
opinion the power to naturalize is not the power to denaturalize." 328 U.S. at 678. This is
to prevent the creation of two separate classes of citizens whereby the citizenship of one
class could more readily be revoked than could the citizenship of the other class. His
comment also pierces the controversy to suggest another fundamental issue: whether
Congress, under the naturalization clause, may in fact revoke citizenship, at all, espe-
cially when the citizen refuses to relinquish it. The early view, as embodied in the stat-
utes, did not extend Congress' power so far. See Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249, § 1, 15
Stat. 223, 224, recognizing, according to Chief Justice Warren's dissent in Perez v.
Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 66, the right of voluntary expatriation alone. A substantial bit of
dicta by one of the earliest Chief Justices supports this view. In Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827-28 (1824), Chief Justice Marshall stated:
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cally, the standard of proof required under a denaturalization
proceeding has generally applied to expatriation procedures as
well, but Congress has, in modern times, established differing
evidentiary standards." 1"
In a naturalization proceeding, it is possible an alien will not
disclose all of the facts which are requested concerning his back-
ground and beliefs. The issue may then arise whether the failure
to disclose should later result in denaturalization. In Chaunt v.
United States, 1" the Court attempted to answer this question,
but the results were not altogether satisfying. Currently, an alien
affiliated with, or a member of, the Communist Party of the
United States is ineligible to be naturalized. 31 7 In Chaunt, how-
ever, the alien had been naturalized in 1940,'3'8 prior to the pas-
sage of the explicit statutory prohibition against communists in
1952. Nonetheless, an oath was required at the time of Chaunt's
naturalization in which he had to swear to support the Constitu-
tion 3 9 and he was also required to have "behaved as a man of
good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitu-
tion of the United States"' 320 for some time prior to naturaliza-
tion. Membership in the Communist Party was a bar to meeting
these requirements.132
At his naturalization proceeding, Chaunt admitted member-
ship in the International Workers' Order (IWO), a group "said
to be controlled by the Communist Party.'31 2 2 Chaunt failed to
A naturalized citizen is, indeed, made a citizen under an act of congress, but
the act does not proceed to give, to regulate, or to prescribe his capacities. He
becomes a member of society, possessing all rights of a native citizen, and stand-
ing, in the view of the constitution, on the footing of a native. The constitution
does not authorize congress to enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power
of the national legislature is, to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and
the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far as respects the individual. . . . He is
distinguishable in nothing from a native citizen, except so far as the constitution
makes the distinction. The law makes none.
1315. Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920 (1955), rev'g 215 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1954).
1316. 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
1317. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, § 313(a)(2), 66 Stat. 240 (currently codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1424(a)(2) (1982)).
1318. Chaunt, 364 U.S. at 350.
1319. Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3592, § 4 (paragraph third), 34 Stat. 596, 597.
1320. Id. at 598 (paragraph fourth).
1321. See, e.g., Chaunt v. United States, 270 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1959), rev'd on other
grounds, 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
1322. Chaunt, 364 U.S. at 355.
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disclose, however, that he had been arrested three times for mi-
nor offenses which could have connected him with the Commu-
nist Party.1323
Following his naturalization, the government sought to re-
voke Chaunt's citizenship, contending that knowledge of
Chaunt's arrests would have sparked an investigation of his
background which might have tied him to the Communist
Party. 132 4 The Supreme Court refused to revoke Chaunt's citi-
zenship because the government's knowledge of his IWO mem-
bership alone could have spurred the government to conduct the
same investigation into Chaunt's background. 1325
The precise holding in Chaunt is that an alien's failure to
disclose some information requested of him in his naturalization
proceeding will not later be sufficient grounds for denaturaliza-
tion when the government was alerted to other facts that could
have led it down a similar path of investigation into the alien's
background. Chaunt, however, is less remembered for its holding
than for its broad dicta which clouded an area of law that had
previously been quite clear.13 26
In dicta, the Court indicated that had Chaunt not admitted
his membership in the IWO, the result of the case might have
been different. 1327 There would then conceivably have been a
wall of silence completely blocking the government from investi-
gating Chaunt's background. In the proper instance, the Court
stated, a naturalized citizen may be subject to denaturalization
where facts are not disclosed in the original naturalization pro-
ceeding which "might have been useful in an investigation possi-
bly leading to the discovery of facts warranting denial of citizen-
ship,' ' 3 28 provided that no other disclosures were made by the
1323. Id. at 354. The arrests were for activities involving distribution of handbills,
public demonstrations, and breach of the peace. Id. at 352.
1324. Id. at 354.
1325. Id. at 355.
1326. See cases cited at note 1311 supra.
1327. Chaunt, 364 U.S. at 355.
1328. Id. The quoted passage appears in the context of the Court's conclusion:
We only conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, the Government has
failed to show by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence either (1) that
facts were suppressed which, if known, would have warranted denial of citizen-
ship or (2) that their disclosure might have been useful in an investigation possi-
bly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship.
Chaunt, 364 U.S. at 355. Under the facts presented in Chaunt the first prong did not
1987]
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alien that could have led the government down a similar line of
inquiry.3 " Chaunt was saved because he had admitted his
membership in the IWO.
Application of the Chaunt dicta is by no means straightfor-
ward. In a denaturalization proceeding the burden remains on
the government to prove its case in a clear, unequivocal, and
convincing fashion. 330 In practical terms, what the government
must prove to satisfy this high evidentiary standard is unclear.
Two possibilities suggest themselves: (1) either the government
must prove that if a fact had been disclosed in a naturalization
proceeding the government would have conducted an investiga-
tion without proving what the results of such an investigation
would have been; or, (2) the government, under a more stringent
interpretation of Chaunt, would have to prove in a clear, une-
quivocal, and convincing fashion not only that it would have
conducted an investigation into the alien's background, but also
what the results of such an investigation would have been. When
a number of years has passed between the naturalization and
denaturalization proceeding, the rule adopted from the Chaunt
dicta could be decisive on the issue of whether the naturalized
citizen will be denaturalized. The first interpretation of Chaunt
places naturalized citizens at greater peril of losing their citizen-
ship than the second interpretation, because merely requiring
the government to prove it would have conducted an investiga-
tion indirectly results in shifting the burden onto the citizen to
establish that his omission was harmless and not worthy of war-
ranting denaturalization. After the passage of years, any eviden-
tiary support the citizen might possessed could have long van-
ished. Conversely, if the second interpretation of Chaunt is
adopted, the government is confronted with the difficulty of
proving what the result of a hypothetical investigation would
have been. In the interests of security of citizenship and of plac-
ing naturalized citizenship on the same par as citizenship ob-
tained by the native born, the second interpretation of Chaunt
is more appropriate. It remains the law however, that the willful
apply. The confusion which Chaunt created lies when the second prong is utilized. The
difficulty is whether the government must establish what the results of such an investiga-
tion would have been or merely that it would have undertaken the investigation.
1329. Id. at 355.
1330. See note 1311 supra.
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concealment of a material fact in a naturalization proceeding
will subsequently be a basis for denaturalization.' 33'
In Fedorenko v. United States'3 2 the Supreme Court by-
passed an opportunity to clarify Chaunt by refusing to apply its
analysis in the context of fraud on an initial visa application. In
Fedorenko, the petitioner, a naturalized citizen of the United
States, failed to disclose in his' initial visa to enter the country
"that he had served during the Second World War as an armed
guard at the Nazi concentration camp at Treblinka, Poland.' 3 33
When he applied for naturalization some twenty years after set-
tling in the United States, he again did not disclose his "wartime
service as a concentration camp armed guard.' 1 3 4 He lived in
the United States approximately ten years as a citizen.
Fedorenko's original entry into the United States was cov-
ered by a special provision of the Displaced Persons Act
(DPA) 133 5 which Congress passed "to enable European refugees
driven from their homelands by the war to emigrate to the
United States without regard to traditional immigration quo-
tas." " As a former concentration camp guard, however,
Fedorenko was specifically excluded from the benefits of the
Act.' 3  He was able to enter the United States by misrepresent-
1331. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961) (alien, who applied for naturali-
zation during Prohibition, failed to disclose his principal occupation was bootlegging;
since such occupation was in flagrant violation of the eighteenth amendment, the alien
could not have been held to be attached to the principles of the United States Constitu-
tion). Unlike Chaunt, in Costello, there was concrete evidence of facts (bootlegging)
which if known at the naturalization proceeding, would have warranted denial of natu-
ralization. Costello is an example of hardship that can result from loss of citizenship
where the individual involved had lived 65 years in the United States and had arrived in
the country when he was three years of age.
1332. 449 U.S. 490 (1981) (Marshall, J.) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (White, J., dissenting) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1333. Id. at 493.
1334. Id. at 497.
1335. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009.
1336. 449 U.S. at 495.
1337. The Displaced Persons Act excluded from the scope of its benefits
1. War Criminals, quislings and traitors.
2. Any other person who can be shown:
(a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of coun-
tries, Members of the United Nations; or
(b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak of
the second world war in their operations against the United Nations.
From Part II of Annex I of the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization,
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ing his wartime activities. Under section 340(a) of the INA of
1952,138 revocation of Fedorenko's citizenship was required if
such citizenship was "illegally procured or . . . procured by con-
cealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation. 1 3 9
The Court noted that Fedorenko was not questioned nor re-
quired to disclose information about his service as a concentra-
tion camp guard in his naturalization proceeding. 134 0 Such infor-
mation, however, would have been required under the DPA
when Fedorenko first applied to enter the United States. Consis-
tent with the results in Rogers v. Bellei,13" Congress could spec-
ify the terms under which to grant citizenship. The Court also
supported application of the "clear, unequivocal and convinc-
ing 1342 evidentiary standard in denaturalization proceedings.
This is unlike the standard used in Vance v. Terrazas,3 4 1 but
the difference can be explained by the existence of an applicable
statute in Terrazas.1 344
Persons who will not be the concern of the Organization, 62 Stat. 3051-52 (footnote
omitted). The DPA excluded the types of individuals enumerated above from eligibility
for benefits bestowed upon "refugees or displaced persons." See § 2(b) of the DPA, 62
Stat. 1009.
1338. 66 Stat. 260 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982)).
1339. Id., quoted in 449 U.S. at 493.
1340. 449 U.S. at 497 n.9.
1341. 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
1342. 449 U.S. at 505. See the discussion of Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S.
at 125, and related cases, starting at text accompanying note 1304 supra.
1343. 444 U.S. 252 (1980). See text accompanying note 1286 supra.
1344. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. 490 (1981) did not apply the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard although Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980), did. Instead, Fedorenko recog-
nized the continued vitality of the traditional clear, unequivocal, and convincing stan-
dard. The different standard in Terrazas applied since § 349(c) of the INA (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1481(c) (1982)) was utilized concerning loss of nationality of those who take an
oath or swear allegiance to a foreign state under § 349(a)(2) of the INA (current version
at 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(2) (1982), as amended by Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653,
§ 18, 100 Stat. 3658). In Fedorenko, loss of nationality was based upon violation of the
DPA and subsequent failure to comply with the statutory requirements to be naturalized
under § 340(a) of the INA, 66 Stat. 260 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982)3
(naturalization illegally procured); § 316(a) of the INA, 66 Stat. 242 (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1982)) (petitioner for naturalization must have been lawfully admitted
for permanent residence); and § 318 of the INA, 66 Stat. 244 (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1429 (1982)) (similar requirement of lawful permanent residence). Since Fedorenko
entered without a valid visa, the applicable statute barred his entry into the United
States. Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, § 13(a), 43 Stat. 153, 161, repealed by Act of June
27, 1952, ch. 477, § 403(a)(23), 66 Stat. 163, 279, but with the same requirement reen-
acted in § 211(a), 66 Stat. 163, 181 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1181(a) (1982)). The
language of 349(c) of the INA (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c) (1982)) indicates that the
NOTE
In terms of Chaunt v. United States,13415 the issue in
Fedorenko would naturally have presented itself as whether the
government would be required under the clear, unequivocal, and
convincing standard to show that it would have conducted an
investigation into Fedorenko's background had it known of his
wartime activities, or whether the government, under the same
standard, would be required to prove what the results of such a
hypothetical investigation would have been. Explanations were
offered in an attempt to extenuate Fedorenko's wartime activi-
ties-such as his contention that he did not act voluntarily. 134
The Court sidestepped the potential problem of determining the
factual basis for events that had occurred almost forty years ear-
lier by confining Chaunt to instances where false statements are
made in an application for citizenship.1 4 7 Fedorenko had made
false statements in his initial visa application. 34 8 Without deter-
mining whether Chaunt applied to material misrepresentations
made in a visa application, the Court in Fedorenko decided that,
under the DPA, false statements at the time of the initial visa
application rendered the applicant ineligible for a visa.13 49 From
this determination, resolution of Fedorenko's status was
straightforward. At the time of his subsequent application for
citizenship, the naturalization statute3 50 required an applicant
to have been lawfully admitted to the United States for perma-
nent residence. 3  Fedorenko was not legally in the United
States since his initial visa was invalid and his failure to comply
with the literal provisions for naturalization rendered his natu-
preponderance of the evidence standard will apply where loss of nationality is put in
issue under the provisions of the INA or under the provisions of any other act.
Fedorenko's reference to the clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidentiary standard
suggests otherwise. This issue awaits clarification. This distinction appears to be based
upon whether the individual confronting loss of citizenship is a native born citizen, or
one who was naturalized. See text at note 1292 supra.
1345. 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
1346. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 913-14 (S.D. Fla. 1978). The
Supreme Court rejected this possibility finding no "'involuntary assistance' exception"
in the Displaced Persons Act. 449 U.S. at 512-13.
1347. 449 U.S. at 508.
1348. Id. at 509.
1349. Id.
1350. Section 318 of the INA, 66 Stat. 244 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (1982));
§ 316(a) of the INA, 66 Stat. 242 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1982)).
1351. 449 U.S. at 514-15.
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ralization ineffective. By thus confining the application of
Chaunt, the Court circumscribed the effects of a decision which
might otherwise spread significant evidentiary problems in all
denaturalization proceedings.
An unresolved issue in Fedorenko is the scope of the hold-
ing, and whether every alien who obtains citizenship following
an illegal entry is in jeopardy of losing his citizenship.
Fedorenko, however, was deported to the Soviet Union, sen-
tenced to death, and reportedly executed for his war crimes.1352
There is a likelihood that the Supreme Court will soon shed
light on these issues and, in particular, clarify the controversy
over the appropriate interpretation of Chaunt since the Court
has recently granted certiorari in Kungys v. United States""5 3 to
a third circuit opinion which squarely addresses the problems
posed by Chaunt.
Bruno Joseph Bembi
1352. Schmemann, Soviet Dooms War Criminal Who Was Deported by U.S., N.Y.
Times, June 20, 1986, at A2, col. 5; Berringer, Soviet Reports It Executed Nazi Guard
U.S. Extradited, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1987, at A3, col. 5.
1353. 107 S. Ct. 431 (1986), granting cert. to 793 F.2d 516 (3rd Cir. 1986), rev'g. 575
F. Supp. 1208 (D.N.J. 1983). See also United States v. Kungys, 571 F. Supp. 1104
(D.N.J. 1983).
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